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Abstract 
This thesis examines the relationship between processes of state consolidation and the illicit 
opium/heroin economy in Shan State since 1988. Over the past twenty-five years, the 
government of Myanmar (Burma) has established greater authority over large parts of Shan 
State, neutralizing much of the threat posed by armed groups and strengthening its hold over 
revenue extraction. During this period Myanmar has retained its position as the world‘s second 
largest producer of illicit opium/heroin, the majority of which is produced in Shan State.   
  
This thesis seeks to answer the overarching research question: What role has the 
opium/heroin economy played in fortifying and/or fragmenting processes of state 
consolidation in Shan State, Myanmar, in the period since 1988? In addressing this 
question, my study tests the hypothesis that rather than necessarily being a cause of disorder 
and state breakdown, illegal drug economies can play an important role in processes of state 
consolidation. In order to test this hypothesis I break down my overarching research question 
into four sub-questions: First, why have the Shan borderlands with China and Thailand 
become central to the government‘s statebuilding aspirations? Second, what strategies has the 
government deployed in order to extend its power and authority in borderland regions? Third, 
how have these strategies been imposed, resisted and brokered within the Shan borderlands? 
Fourth, what is the relationship between contested processes of state consolidation and the 
drug economy in Shan State in the period since 1988? 
 
In addressing these questions I argue that it is increasingly anachronistic to view the drug 
economy narrowly as part of the insurgent war economy. Alongside the continued role it plays 
in financing armed opposition to the government, the drug trade has also become deeply 
embedded within processes of illiberal state consolidation and capitalist development. Through 
an analysis of the specific spatial dynamics of power relations, material interests and 
institutional arrangements, this study renders visible the messy and fragmented multiplicity of 
motivations and actors (including insurgents, ceasefire groups, the military, government-
sanctioned militias, national and transnational investors, and local populations) which have 
shaped changing configurations of power across Shan State. In doing so, it provides new ways 
to account for the uneven political topography of the Myanmar state, the repertoires of 
violence enacted across Shan State and the different kinds of ‗institutions of extraction‘ that 
have emerged around borderland resources. 
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PROLOGUE 
 
 
 
It was a hot, humid day. The cramped office was filled with the midday sounds of the 
nearby market and the hum of the room‘s one desk-fan, which was directed at the 
furrowed brow of the immigration officer who was in the process of filing away my 
passport. This was May 2013. I was in Tachilek on the Myanmar side of the Thai 
border about to embark on a journey through eastern Shan State to Kengtung and then 
on to Mongla, a notorious ‗vice town‘ on the China border some two hundred and fifty 
kilometres away. Once out of bounds for westerners, this remote corner of eastern 
Myanmar at the heart of the ‗Golden Triangle‘ was now accessible with the travel 
permit I had been required to surrender my passport for and a chaperone, whose name 
was Sai Lern, assigned by the Myanmar Tourist Ministry. 
 
The following day the two of us boarded the dust-ridden bus for Kengtung, which I 
later learned was operated by a military-owned company. In 1925 it had taken eight 
days for the last Prince of Kengtung to reach Tachilek on the back of a mule, and even 
during the 1990s the journey by car had taken more than ten hours. Now, thanks to 
improvements made to the road, the bus was scheduled to take just four hours to cover 
the 150km route. The contract to rebuild the road was granted by the government to 
the Hong Pang Group in the late 1990s, a company owned by Wei Xuegang, a leading 
figure of the United Wa State Army (UWSA). The UWSA is the most powerful non-
17 
 
state armed group in Shan State and signed a ceasefire agreement with the government 
in 1988 that enabled it to retain control over a large swathe of territory along the China 
border. The UWSA has been heavily involved in the drug trade and Wei is wanted in 
both the United States and Thailand on heroin-trafficking charges. The road itself was 
funded through drugs money and Hong Pang has been able to collect tolls on it ever 
since.  
 
The Thai-Myanmar border crossing. The Immigration and Tourism office is the yellow building to 
the left. 
 
 
 
Indeed, we had barely left Tachilek behind before our bus shuddered to a halt at the 
Hong-Pong controlled toll-gate that marked the start of the rather grandly-named ‗Asia 
Highway 2‘, an Asian Development Bank-funded road network linking Indonesia to 
Iran. This was the first of four checkpoints we would be stopped at along the two-lane 
pockmarked road that snaked the hills and valleys to Kengtung. The tolls for these 
checkpoints had formed a part of the initial ticket price and were paid as a single 
transaction by the bus company.  
 
Shan State is the largest of Myanmar‘s fourteen administrative divisions and covers a 
region of 60,000 square miles, representing almost one quarter of the country. It shares 
long borders with China to the east, Thailand to the south and a short border with Laos 
in-between. Much of Shan State forms a vast hilly region, comprising steep, forest-
covered hill ranges, deep valleys and a few elevated plains known as the Shan Plateau. 
The region contains 55 townships and almost 16,000 villages. There are a number of 
small cities – Taunggyi in the south, Lashio in the north and Kengtung in the east – 
although the vast majority of people live in rural areas and agriculture is the main 
18 
 
livelihood. Following decades of conflict and chronic underinvestment, the region 
remains extremely poor, suffering from chronic food insecurity, and limited health and 
education services.  According to UNICEF one in five children under the age of five 
are underweight.  In towns and cities service provision is better although costs, 
especially for healthcare, are often prohibitive. Many people, especially young adults 
migrate to Thailand and China in search of work and in the villages I visited it was 
common to see only the elderly and the very young. Some migrants return home to 
assist at harvest-time; others are gone for years at a time, sending money home via 
remittance agencies.1  
 
Shan State is bisected by the steep-gorged, fast-flowing Salween River, known as Nù 
Jiāng or ‗Angry River‘ in Chinese, which flows from the Tibetan mountains in the 
north to the Andaman Sea in Mon State. The Salween is one of the world‘s longest 
free-flowing rivers, although this is set to change with the Myanmar government 
confirming in 2013 plans to construct six dams along its course in joint enterprises 
with various Chinese and Thai companies.  
 
We were east of the Salween River. Following the path of least resistance, the road 
snaked east to Tarlay before returning westwards to Mongphyak, where we stopped for 
a rice and curry lunch. Mongphyak was a sleepy, one-street town with a noticeable 
military presence. Since Myanmar‘s independence from British rule in 1948 much of 
the remote areas between Tachilek and Kengtung (and throughout Shan State) have 
been heavily contested by various insurgent armies, and the government‘s writ rarely 
extended beyond the main towns and cities. Today, however, the insurgency is a 
shadow of its former strength and much of rural Shan State is controlled by the 
Myanmar Army (known as the Tatmadaw) or local militia groups allied with it. Many 
militia leaders are involved in the drug trade alongside owning legal businesses and 
some were elected MPs in the 2010 General Election to represent the government-
backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). As we travelled on to 
Kengtung, Sai Lern pointed out the triangular red flags that dotted the roadside. They 
marked the presence of nearby Tatmadaw camps on land now claimed by the military. 
Today, more than a quarter of the Tatmadaw‘s estimated 400,000 troops are stationed 
across Shan State.     
 
                                                          
1 These remittance agencies form networks on both sides of the border; a migrant can pay money to an 
agent in Thailand who will then phone a partner agent in Myanmar (often a family member or friend) 
who will then deliver the money, even to remote villages, to the migrant‘s family, taking a 10% 
commission. 
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‗Shan‘ State is named after the dominant ethnic group (itself containing many sub-
groups)2 that live across this region. Often referring to themselves as ‗Tai‘, reflecting 
their close linguistic and cultural ties with other Tai groups across northern Thailand 
and Laos, the Shan have historically been a Theravada Buddhist, valley-dwelling, 
wetland rice-based civilisation. Living alongside the Shan are a plethora of 
predominantly hill-dwelling ethnic groups, speaking an array of languages and with a 
rich, although largely undocumented, culture of their own. On the 80km stretch from 
Mongphyak to Kengtung we passed Palaung and Shan villages, ‗red‘, ‗black‘ and 
‗yellow‘ Lahu villages (the former two are predominantly Christian, the latter practices 
a combination of animism and Buddhism), Akha and Wa villages, and a Chinese 
village whose residents are the descendants of a division of Chiang Kai Shek‘s 
beleaguered Kuomintang army that fled across the border from Yunnan following their 
defeat to Mao in the Chinese Civil War in 1949. A large number of other ethnic groups 
– including Pao, Kachin, Karen, Kokang, Danu and Lisu – also reside across Shan 
State.3     
 
We arrived in Kengtung mid-afternoon and after the obligatory registration process in 
the city‘s immigration office, Sai Lern showed me the city, which was his birthplace 
and where he still lived with his young family. Kengtung is a beautiful place, centred 
round a lake and encircled by a crest of tree-lined hills. On one of these hills an 
imposing sixty-five foot Buddha points solemnly across the city. 
 
Until the system was abolished by the central government in the 1950s, the Shan 
region was governed through a multitude of separate principalities, each with their own 
hereditary leader, known as a Chaofa (Sawbwa in Burmese). Prior to British colonial 
rule, the majority paid tribute to the Burmese Kingdom although their level of 
autonomy differed and at times some also paid tribute to the Chinese Qing Empire to 
the east. The Chaofa kingdoms varied hugely in size and power, and were regularly in 
conflict with each other.  Kengtung was the seat of the largest and most powerful 
Kingdom, partly due to its position straddling the trade routes linking China to 
northern Siam along which opium convoys regularly used travelled in the late 
nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century.  
 
                                                          
2 The ‗Tai Yai‘ is the largest group. Other groups include the Tai Lü, who live across parts of Yunnan, 
Shan State Laos and Thailand, the Tai Khün, who are the majority Shan group around Kengtung, and 
the Tai Nüa, who live mostly in northern Shan State.  
3 For detailed information into Myanmar‘s ethnic diversity see: Smith 1999; Smith & Allsebrook 1994.  
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Following victory in the Third Anglo-Burmese War in 1885, the British abolished the 
Burmese monarchy and assumed sovereignty over its Kingdom, including its erstwhile 
Shan tributaries. In 1887, British Indian Army Lieutenant, G. J. Younghusband 
described the Kengtung Kingdom as: 
 
a long, straggling, ill-defined, tongue of country, which runs between two foreign nations, 
and ends on the borders of a third. A province open to invasion to all three of them — to 
China from the north, to Siam from the south, and to the French from the east, and 
separated from the actual possessors of the country [Burma] by lofty and impassable 
ranges of mountains...The Keng Tung province in the hands of the British can never be 
anything but a source of weakness to the integrity of the Burmese kingdom. It will, like the 
Irishman's coat tails, be dragging along the ground — a constant challenge to outsiders to 
tread upon it. 
 
Indeed, the combination of the region‘s strategic importance, isolation and 
topographical hostility has long troubled central governments whose authority has 
predominantly been based on the lowland plains of the Irrawaddy some 500 kilometres 
over the mountains to the west.     
 
Although the British curbed the autonomy of these kingdoms, they governed the region 
through a classic imperial strategy of indirect rule in which maintaining the Chaofa 
structure was viewed as the most expedient and cheapest way to ensure stability. 
However, although the Chaofa retained their authority initially after the country‘s 
independence, by the early 1950s the post-colonial Burmese government took a 
different approach. The continued presence of almost forty separate kingdoms was 
viewed as a destabilising colonial anachronism in a region that was in danger of 
becoming a front-line in the Cold War between red China and the rest of Asia. 
However, the dismantling of the Chaofa system in the 1950s left a political vacuum 
across Shan State. Instead of being able to extend centralised authority, the country‘s 
military government was instead confronted by an array of armed opposition groups 
that sought a greater degree of local autonomy. In the decades that followed, large parts 
of rural Shan State were engulfed in violent conflict. In the 1970s and 1980s most of 
the territory east of the Salween and north of Kengtung was controlled by the 
Communist Party of Burma (CPB), the largest opposition group to the central 
government, heavily supported by China and headquartered close to the China border 
in northern Shan State.  
 
Since the late 1980s, much has changed. The CPB collapsed in 1988 and the 
government agreed ceasefires with its splinter groups as well as the majority of other 
armed groups across Shan State. Although pockets of insurgency remain, growing 
stability and the liberalisation of cross-border trade has enabled both the military 
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government and private companies to exploit Shan State‘s abundant natural resources, 
which include one of Asia‘s largest remaining virgin hardwood forests as well as 
deposits of silver, gold, tungsten, rubies, sapphires, magnesium and silica. Farmland 
itself has become a coveted resource, as have the region‘s rivers and the potential 
hydropower they represent. These resources have attracted investors, especially 
Chinese, ranging from powerful state-owned mining and dam companies to small-scale 
mining, logging and agribusiness ventures.      
 
Sai Lern and I sipped tea at a lakeside bar and watched the sun set, leaving a floating 
trail across the water. The tranquillity of the scene was disturbed by the steady 
monotonous whir of the generators that greeted the gloom; Kengtung still has no 
reliable source of electricity and power is often limited to a few hours each day. As we 
wandered through town we passed the site of the Kengtung Choafa‘s Palace, or Haw. 
Built in 1905, it was a grand place according to the photos I had seen, but there is 
nothing left now. It was demolished in 1991 by the government to make way for the 
dimly-lit four-storey Kyaing Tong Hotel that now stands on the site. The Palace rubble 
was used to construct the road leading to the city‘s airport. Both the road and the hotel 
were meant to prepare Kengtung for the hordes of tourists that were to arrive during the 
1996 ‗Visit Myanmar‘ year. However, the tourists never materialised and the eroding, 
hastily-built hotel stands testament to the region‘s continued isolation and deep-seated 
grievances against the central government.  
 
Sunset over Kengtung 
 
 
 
For dinner we ate rice noodle soup, followed by sugary roti at one of the throng of 
Indian food stalls lining the dark streets. Sai Lern asked me about my family and why 
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I was not married and in turn told me about 
his upbringing. A wiry elderly man with a 
toothy grin joined our conversation, 
reminiscing about the fighting close to 
Kengtung when he was younger. 
―Sometimes they still say hello to each other 
with their guns‖, he reflects, ―but now in 
other parts of Shan State, away from here‖. I 
asked him what Kengtung was like back then. 
He laughs, points at the darkness and the 
pot-holed road, and says that whilst some 
things have changed the people are still poor. 
Sai Lern nods in silent, tacit agreement.  
 
It is a sentiment echoed the following day by 
the local pastor I meet in the brightly 
coloured Catholic Church compound on a 
steep hill just outside the centre of Kengtung. 
Although the Buddhist Shan strongly 
rejected Christianity, missionaries did 
succeed in converting some from other 
ethnic groups, primarily the Akha and Lahu. 
The Kengtung missionary post declined after 
the General Ne Win‘s military government 
nationalised all church schools and hospitals 
in the early 1960s and expelled all foreign 
missionaries. Softly spoken, almost drowned 
out by the boisterous football game going on 
nearby, Father Peter told me about the 
outreach work the church still tries to do 
amongst Akha hill communities. He 
comments that growing peace and stability 
has brought new problems: ―Today, many 
communities are struggling to protect their 
land.  
Yat Thaw Mu, the large standing Buddha Statue in 
Kengtung 
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Whilst the lowland rice-paddy remains untouched, big companies are taking the land 
above this‖. Much of the land has been seized by Chinese agribusinesses for large-scale 
rubber plantations.  
 
The threat facing Akha farmers is made worse by the fact, like the majority of farmers 
across Shan State, few have their land formally registered and most practice shifting 
cultivation, leaving parts of their land unattended for years between periods of 
cultivation. Many have returned to their fields to find them fenced off, now owned by 
faceless companies. ―Sometimes even village headmen get involved and become rich at 
other‘s expense‖, Father Peter reflects. ―No-one wants to be village headman because 
they have to negotiate with the Army, the police, the rebels, the militia…sometimes it 
means less honourable people take on the job because no-one else will‖.  
 
Many farmers still grow opium, Father Peter confides. I ask if it is lucrative for them. 
―Poppy generates a good income but no-one gets rich,‖ he replies. Most farmers, he 
says, are caught in a cycle of poverty and debt in which the opium they do grow is used 
to pay off loans or used as security against which to borrow money. What money they 
do make often goes to paying ‗taxes‘ and ‗protection fees‘ to various officials and 
armed groups. Communities, he says ―do not even tell us where they are growing it‖. 
This is not so much because it is illegal, he says, but because ―the more opium they can 
grow in secret the less tax they have to pay‖. I try to ask him who collects the tax but 
he avoids my gaze and is non-committal.  
 
We say our goodbyes and Sai Lern takes me to Kengtung‘s largest market where we 
swap Myanmar currency for Chinese yuan, ready for our onward journey to Mongla. 
There is no bus that goes to Mongla, or at least none that will take foreigners. Instead, 
Sai Lern arranges for a car and a driver through Shwe Lin Star, a travel company 
owned by Lin Ming Xian, the man who controls Mongla. Twenty-five years ago 
Mongla was a sleepy backwater; now it is a small city, dubbed Myanmar‘s ‗casino 
capital‘, catering mostly to Chinese tourists who cross the border to escape their 
country‘s gambling prohibition. In 1989 Lin established a breakaway faction of the 
CPB called the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) and promptly reached 
agreement with the central government that enabled him control an autonomous region 
along the China border, known as Special Region 4. The stability and autonomy 
provided by the ceasefires were a boon for the region‘s drug trade, especially in light of 
growing drug addiction rates in neighbouring China, and much of Mongla‘s wealth was 
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founded upon heroin trafficked into China. Today, a garish, pink-walled ‗Drug 
Eradication Museum‘ in the centre of Mongla proclaims the region‘s association with 
drugs is a thing of the past, although many remain sceptical.  
 
Lin Ming Xian, centre, examines plans of the layout of the drug eradication museum in Mong La in 
1997. The museum celebrated the launch of the region‟s opium ban the same year. 
 
 
Asia Highway 2 (Between Tachilek and Kengtung) 
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Our journey to Mongla is punctuated by a further four checkpoints and as we pass 
through the final one Sai Lern whispers earnestly to me that ―we are now leaving 
Burma.‖ Strictly, this isn‘t true. Special Region 4 is still Myanmar territory, but I soon 
understand his sentiment. The currency is yuan, the dominant language is Chinese and 
the town is even set to Beijing time.  
 
Mongla turns out to be a typical frontier town; boom, bust and vice. We pay the 66 
yuan entrance fee at the Shwe Lin Star immigration office and then check into a grotty 
downtown hotel. Barely five minutes into our stay a collection of escort girl call-cards 
are thrust under our door. We walked through the town out along the main road to the 
China-Myanmar border. It is policed by a ramshackle NDAA office and then a large-
modern looking Chinese-run checkpoint. Many people, however, circumvent 
officialdom and enter via one of the many clandestine crossing points dotted along this 
porous border. The centre of the town has a large, sprawling market. Close by is the 
red-light district, a short stretch of massage parlours each with their own gaudy 
provocative signs and price-whispering touts. After dark a little further away on 
Mongla‘s ornate river bridge, lone prostitutes go freelance charging a quarter of the 
price.  
 
Sunset over Mongla 
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Within the market, a large open-air area offers electronic Mahjong tables. The serious 
casinos are now outside of Mongla, tucked away further from China‘s gaze. Chinese 
authorities have periodically raided Mongla‘s casinos in an attempt to recover public 
money frittered away on the roulette wheels by government officials and to herd 
Chinese workers back across the border. We pass a restaurant selling all manner of live 
exotic animals in tiny cages – turtles, sand lizards, baby owls, snakes and pangolins – 
any of which could become our dinner, for the right price. We avoid the proprietor‘s 
questioning stare and Sai Lern takes me to his favourite barbeque market stall – the 
only redeeming feature of this town in his eyes – where he implores me try the skewers 
of rubber-like snails in front of me.      
 
       
The Drug Eradication Museum, Mongla    Checkpoint stamps on my Entry Permit 
 
Mongla‘s future is uncertain. Rumours abounded of Lin‘s declining health, whilst 
tensions are growing with the central government regarding the region‘s continued 
autonomy. The 2010 election was cancelled in Mongla and whilst all was calm when I 
visited, it was clear that the most delicate questions regarding the region‘s political 
status, the thorny issue of disarmament, and how to manage relations with China 
remained unanswered. Two nights in Mongla was enough and on the third morning we 
took a car all the way back to Tachilek, winding our way back through the rubber 
plantations, terraced rice paddy, corn fields and steep forested hills.  
 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The brief travelogue recounted in the prologue reveals many of the themes that inspired 
my PhD and which I engage with in the pages that follow. This thesis is a study of the 
relationship between processes of state consolidation and the illegal opium/heroin 
economy in Shan State, Burma/Myanmar4 since 1988. It analyses the changes that have 
taken place across Shan State over the past twenty-five years, and how the 
opium/heroin trade has become embedded within these changes. The Shan region has a 
long history of autonomy and weak central government control and ever since 
Myanmar‘s independence from British rule in 1948 it has experienced one of the 
world‘s longest running insurgencies. Shan State remains home to a plethora of armed 
groups that have long contested the efforts by successive post-colonial governments to 
establish a unitary nation-state and to secure greater control over the region. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s Shan State became the largest source of illegal opium 
in the world, only surpassed by Afghanistan in the 1990s. For much of the post-
colonial period opium was a mainstay of the insurgent war economy, financing armed 
groups fighting against the central government and each other.   
 
Since the late 1980s, the political terrain of the Shan borderland has gradually 
transformed. Following a spate of ceasefire agreements in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the level of conflict began to recede as the majority of armed groups became 
involved in a protracted and on-going negotiation process with the government. Over 
this period the Shan borderlands have been viewed by both the Myanmar government 
and neighbouring countries less as a marginal frontier but as an important economic 
                                                          
4 In 1989 the military government changed the official name of the country from Burma to Myanmar. 
The change was justified by the government as means of distancing the country from its colonial past 
and offering a more inclusive name for both the country‘s Bamar majority and the multitude of ethnic 
nationalities within the country‘s borders. Many have questioned this logic, however, on both historical 
and linguistic grounds. The changing of the name of the country was also accompanied by name 
changes to other towns, cities, and landmarks across the country. Rangoon, for example, was renamed 
Yangon, and the Irrawaddy River was renamed the Ayeyarwaddy. The names of many places 
throughout the country‘s ethnic states were also changed, replacing names that had meaning in ethnic 
languages with new Burman names or Burmanized versions of the old names. In Shan State, for 
example, Kengtung was renamed Kyaingtong and Hsipaw became Thibaw. These sudden, forced 
changes were viewed by many as another sign and the military‘s government‘s determination to create a 
single national Burman identity and its continued rejection of the ―unity in diversity‖ politics advocated 
by Aung San, the leader of the country‘s independence movement. Lintner (2012) offers an excellent 
synopsis of the issues relating to these name changes. Today, names are used with little uniformity. 
Burma and Myanmar are used interchangeably while some of the new names have gained common 
parlance (for example, most people use Yangon, with Rangoon sounding increasingly anachronistic) 
whilst in other cases the older names are still used predominantly. I have chosen to use Myanmar when 
analysing events post-1988 and in general commentary, and have used Burma when analysing pre-1988 
events. When citing other places that have undergone name changes I have chosen whichever name is 
most commonly used and will be most familiar to readers. These choices are not intended to be a 
political statement. 
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corridor capable of facilitating increased regional integration and development. China, 
especially, has coveted Myanmar‘s largely untapped natural resources, many of which 
are located in the country‘s borderlands, to fuel its industrial economy and to 
ameliorate the country‘s coast-interior divide by stimulating economic development in 
its land-locked western provinces.  
 
The country‘s border regions have become important sites of accumulation and 
resource concessions granted to foreign companies, often as part of joint enterprises 
with military companies, have become key to improving the central government‘s 
finances. These have included logging, mining, hydropower dams, and the 
construction of oil and gas pipelines linking the country‘s offshore gas fields and deep-
sea ports in the Bay of Bengal to Yunnan. Over the past twenty-five years the 
government has prioritised stabilising and securing these once insurgent-controlled 
regions through a prolonged process of militarisation, negotiation with regional 
strongmen and the gradual extension of civilian bureaucracy. However, the presence of 
powerful ceasefire groups, militias, sporadic continued insurgency and continued 
reliance upon the Tatmadaw to control large parts of rural Shan State reveals how 
processes of state consolidation remain partial and contested, and underpinned by 
negotiation, deal-making and brokerage rather than a clear extension of centralised 
control.  
 
Amidst these changes, the opium/heroin economy has remained an integral part of the 
region‘s political economy. Drug production rose throughout much of the 1990s and 
although overall levels of production fell in the late 1990s and early 2000s, production 
has risen steadily over the past decade with commercial opium production spreading to 
areas with no history of widespread poppy cultivation. My overarching interest in this 
subject and the purpose of this study is to interrogate why opium production has 
remained widespread even as levels of conflict have receded and large parts of Shan 
State are experiencing greater levels of stability and control by government authorities 
or their proxies. The correlation between continued drug production and increased 
stability and government control unsettles prevailing theoretical frameworks 
surrounding the relationship between states and illegal economies, which view drug 
economies as a sign and a cause of conflict and state fragility or failure. 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that the relationship between drugs, conflict and state 
failure is more complex, both in Myanmar (Lintner 1999; Meehan 2011, 2015; McCoy 
1999; Snyder 2006) and in other drug-producing countries (for Afghanistan see: 
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Goodhand 2008, 2009; for Colombia see: Ballvé 2012; Thomson 2011). In all these 
these countries drug production has at times coincided with prolonged periods of, often 
deeply illiberal, statebuilding and peacebuilding (or pacification). The dominant 
theoretical paradigm for analysing the linkages between illicit drug economies, conflict 
and statebuilding offers no adequate means to engage with, or explain, these empirical 
realities.  
 
In order to address this limitation, this study develops three lines of enquiry. Firstly, I 
contend that idealised models of statebuilding are inadequate for understanding the 
relationship between state practices and illegal economies since they offer only 
normative characterisations of this relationship as pathological. In doing so, they 
ignore how illegal economies may shape the power relations, material interests and 
institutional arrangements that determine how state power is contested, negotiated and 
reproduced. Secondly, I argue that viewing state practices at the ‗margins‘ – both 
literally in terms of viewing state practices from the physical borders of state territory, 
and figuratively in terms of analysing the boundaries between legal and illegal 
activities – offers a privileged vantage point from which to interrogate the messy and 
contested processes and multiple social actors that shape how states function. Taking 
this vantage point helps to ‗unmask‘ the rhetoric of the state and to move beyond top-
down, centrist perspectives. It reveals the tangled world of coalitions and brokerage 
agreements between governments and other powerful social groups that are 
fundamental to shaping how state power becomes institutionalised and how space is 
made governable. Thirdly, I argue that engaging with how governments function in 
these liminal zones offers new ways of understanding the political economy of illegal 
drugs in such regions. Importantly, it can show why wartime economies mutate and 
persist in regions such as Shan State even as conflict recedes and governments 
consolidate greater control over these areas.  
 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
In developing these arguments this study makes two important contributions. Firstly, it 
develops a political economy framework for studying the interaction between 
processes of state consolidation and illegal drug economies. Secondly, it then uses this 
framework to develop a detailed empirical analysis of the opium/heroin economy 
across Shan State since 1988 in order to address a number of significant gaps in the 
existing literature on this subject. 
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Theoretical significance 
The theoretical innovativeness of this study lies in the political economy approach I 
develop for analysing drugs and the emphasis I place upon engaging with how the 
spatial dynamics of borderland regions impact upon the relationship between drug 
economies and processes of state consolidation. The political economy framework I 
develop challenges perceptions of the ‗exceptionality‘ of drugs, which encourages a 
tendency to view these commodities automatically as harbingers of disorder and state 
breakdown. It draws upon the insights of previous studies that have challenged reified 
linkages between illegal activities, conflict and state collapse (Chouvy 2010; Heyman 
1999; Gallant 1999; Goodhand 2008; 2009; Lintner 1999; McCoy 1999; Nordstrom 
2000; Thoumi 2003; van Schendel & Abraham 2005). This study emphasizes the 
importance of engaging empirically with the ‗politics of production‘ and focuses on 
the social relations and institutions that coalesce around drug economies. Its focus, 
both conceptually and empirically, is to situate drugs within the wider political 
economy of the regions in which they are produced, prioritising analysis of the 
relationship between illegal economies and how states function. I prioritise this focus 
because in Myanmar, as in many other parts of the world, although drugs have 
historically been produced in conflict regions where government control has been 
weak, this reality is changing. Although it is well understood that drug economies are 
central to the dynamics of many civil wars, their role in transitions from war to peace 
and in shaping how governments seeks to establish authority over territory is poorly 
understood.  
 
In order to address this weakness, I argue that studies must move beyond idealised 
Weberian conceptions of statehood, which equate the strength of the state with its 
ability to monopolise power over territory through a hierarchical and centralised 
formal institutional structure (Lemay-Hébert 2013). Throughout much of the 
postcolonial world states have rarely been able to claim a monopoly over the legitimate 
use of violence or to impose authority autonomously over society. The normative 
tendency to view these shaky institutional foundations as indicative of state 
dysfunction and fragility has obstructed understanding of the diversity of (often deeply 
illiberal) processes through which governments have sought to consolidate territorial 
control. Indeed, between the Kantian/Rawlian ‗virtuous‘ state and the Hobbesian 
anarchic dystopia exists a vast array of functioning state institutions.  
 
This study, therefore, takes as its starting point an interest in how states function 
without the institutions of Weber‘s ideal state. It conceptualizes the state as an arena, 
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or ―field of power,‖ inhabited by diverse sets of actors and interests with competing 
power, legitimacy, violence, and ideology (Midgal 2001, 15). It interrogates 
government efforts to institutionalise coercive power, extractive power and legitimate 
its authority in areas where the central government has no a priori monopoly over the 
means of violence and in which the legitimacy and exercise of public authority are 
dispersed. In doing so, I focus less on the specific design of state-building initiatives 
and more on the ―shifting constellations of power that underpin formal and informal 
institutional arrangements‖ between groups in society and how resources (political, 
economic, and social) are distributed as a consequence of conflicts, coalitions and 
brokerage arrangements (Di John 2008, 35). This approach explains why I use the term 
‗state consolidation‘ instead of ‗statebuilding‘ in this study. ‗Statebuilding‘, I argue, 
privileges analysis of intentional, top-down processes of government activities and 
often underplays the significance of how these processes are contested and negotiated. 
State ‗consolidation‘, in contrast, better captures the interplay between intentional 
government strategies to establish control across space and the ways these strategies 
are challenged, manipulated, re-worked and brokered both by government officials on 
the ground and other social groups whose actions ultimately shape governance 
structures and state practices.  
 
In contexts such as Myanmar, I argue that rather than seeing illegal economies as 
somehow detached from these processes, we must instead develop frameworks for 
understanding better how drug economies intersect with them. This study, thus, 
critically engages with the political economy literature on political settlements (Khan 
2000; Di John 2008; Di John and Putzel 2009), ‗hybrid political orders‘ (Boege et al. 
2008), ‗twilight institutions‘ (Lund 2006) and ‗limited access orders‘ (North et al. 2007; 
2009) in order to develop more insightful ways for considering why drug economies 
persist even as governments extend authority over drug-producing regions. 
 
Much of this political economy literature, however, is insensitive to how the specific 
spatial dynamics of borderland regions shape the social relations and power dynamics 
of processes of state consolidation. The focus is predominantly upon national elite-
level negotiations and political settlements and the assumption that power diffuses 
from the centre into peripheries.  
 
There has also sometimes been a tendency within borderland studies to embrace a 
rather romanticized ‗view from the border‘, in which valuable critiques against the 
totalising power of the state and the emphasis upon the agency of borderland 
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populations have gone so far as to reject the state as a useful lens for analysis of 
borderland dynamics. In contrast, this study emphasizes the importance of engaging 
with the dynamic, reflexive and dialectical relationships between borderland spaces 
and processes of state consolidation, revealing how ―the margins may play a pivotal 
role in shaping developments at the centre‖, and vice versa (Goodhand 2013, 250; Korf 
& Raeymaekers 2013, 5). By taking this lens I prioritise analysis of ‘meso-level’ 
actors and dynamics, which I define as those shaping the intermediary spaces or 
interfaces between macro-level statebuilding strategies and the micro-dynamics of 
borderland regions.    
 
I define borderlands as spatial zones in which the ‗border effect‘ of international 
boundaries impacts upon the mentalities and political and economic activities of their 
populations. I argue that these regions represent specific ―ecologies of constraint and 
opportunity‖ which definitively shape the ways in which governments seek to make 
spaces governable and how these processes are contested and negotiated (Barkey 2008, 
36; see also: Agnew 2008; Baud and van Schendel 1997; Brenner 1999; Goodhand 
2008; Nugent 2002; van Schendel 2004; Korf & Raeymaekers 2013). Institutional 
arrangements and everyday practices on the border influence the power and autonomy 
of peripheral elites, as well as the livelihood strategies of borderland populations. In 
turn, renegotiating the relationship between central government and peripheral elites is 
likely to play an instrumental role in shaping the trajectory of state consolidation. 
Economic development in borderland regions may generate significant revenue for the 
government but also risks exacerbating existing conflict fault-lines. In contexts, like 
Myanmar, where drug production is centred in borderland regions, developing a 
conceptual framework that is spatially sensitive to these borderland dynamics is 
essential to understanding the relationship between drugs and processes of state 
consolidation.  
 
The theoretical innovation of this study thus lies in the spatially-sensitive political 
economy framework it develops for interrogating how drug economies impact upon 
state consolidation, and vice-versa. This theoretical approach determines the entire 
structure of my PhD. It explains why my theorisation of the political economy of drugs 
(Chapter 4), comes after my analysis of the political economy of state consolidation 
(Chapter 2) and my engagement with the specific dynamics of processes of state 
consolidation in borderland regions (Chapter 3). In turn it explains why my analysis of 
the drug economy in Shan State in Chapter 9 is situated after a detailed explanation of 
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both the history and contemporary dynamics of state consolidation in Myanmar 
(Chapters 5-8).  
 
The fundamental purpose of this study is to provide better ways of conceptualising 
how wartime drug economies can mutate into enduring ceasefire and peacetime 
economies and can become embedded in the processes of state consolidation and 
economic development, which it is typically presumed will reduce production. 
Dedicating three chapters (2-4) to developing this theoretical approach creates a 
conceptually-heavy start to this PhD thesis. The decision to do so is based upon a 
belief that the arguments I develop in these chapters are an important contribution in 
their own right and may be beneficial to those working on related issues in parts of the 
world beyond Myanmar.   
 
Empirical significance   
The second contribution this study makes is to operationalize the political economy 
framework outlined above in order to provide a detailed empirical analysis of the 
relationship between the opium/heroin economy and processes of state consolidation in 
Shan State since 1988. My thesis addresses three significant gaps in the existing 
literature on this subject. 
 
First, it addresses a spatial gap by analysing the political economy of the drug trade in 
areas of Shan State that remain understudied. The political geography of Shan State 
has significant variation. Some areas are under complete government control, 
including most major towns and cities and sites of major development projects. There 
are also areas in which government presence remains almost entirely absent, notably 
the Kokang, Mongla and Wa ‗Special Regions‘ close to the China border where the 
government effectively ceded territorial control to a number of autonomous ceasefire 
groups in the late 1980s, all of which retain large armies and enjoy varying levels of 
Chinese support. 5  Between these two extremes, large parts of rural Shan State 
comprise ‗grey areas‘, in which the Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw) is the dominant 
authority (alongside other subservient government institutions including the police, 
and civilian bureaucracy) but in which political authority continues to be contested to 
varying degrees by an array of armed groups including ceasefire groups, insurgents 
and local militias, all of which wield state-like powers such as tax collection, coercive 
power, and the ability to manipulate local economies. 
     
                                                          
5 It should be noted that the Wa and Mongla regions remain highly autonomous, although the Kokang 
Special Region has come under increasing levels of government control since 2009.  
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Numerous recent studies on Myanmar‘s drug trade have focused on the Special 
Regions that straddle the China border (Kramer 2007; Chin 2009; Milsom 2005; 
Lintner & Black 2009). This is hardly surprising since throughout the 1990s these 
territories were at the epicentre of Myanmar‘s booming opium/heroin economy. Much 
less attention, however, has been given to the steady rise in opium production in other 
parts of Shan State from the late 1990s/early 2000s. Following a series of opium bans 
launched by the Mongla (1997 onwards), Kokang (2003 onwards) and Wa ceasefire 
groups (2005 onwards), rising opium production across Shan State has been driven by 
increased poppy cultivation in ‗grey‘ areas of Shan State. Rising production have been 
particularly pronounced in areas of Pinlaung, Hopong and Hsihseng Townships in 
southern Shan State and areas of Tangyan, Kutkhai, Namhsan, Namkham and 
Mantong Townships in northern Shan State. 
 
Many such drug-producing regions in Shan State have experienced greater levels of 
government control, reflected by heavy Tatmadaw militarisation, the receding presence 
of insurgent groups, government-orchestrated ‗development‘ projects and the granting 
of business concessions (in terms of land and resources) to private companies. The 
political geography of these ‗grey‘ areas contrasts significantly with the highly 
autonomous Special Regions along the China border and warns that the insights 
provided by existing studies on these regions should not be generalised as 
representative of the dynamics of the drug trade across all parts of Shan State. This 
reveals a significant gap in our understanding of the political economy of the drug 
trade in Shan State, a lacuna that this study seeks to address. Its purpose, therefore, is 
to draw attention specifically to the political economy of the opium/heroin trade in 
‗grey‘ areas, which represent substantial parts of northern, southern and eastern Shan 
State, have experienced significant expansion of poppy production over the past 
decade, and yet have received limited scholarly attention. 
 
Second, this study addresses a temporal gap in the literature on Myanmar‘s drug trade. 
The most fascinating insights into the politics of the drug trade in Shan State focus 
predominantly on the period from the late 1940s until the late 1980s and analyse the 
relationship between opium and the region‘s complicated insurgencies (Lintner 1990, 
1999, 2000; Tucker 2000; Smith 1999; McCoy 1999). In contrast, this study takes as 
its starting point the ceasefire agreements made between the government and various 
insurgent groups in the late 1980s. Although the insurgent war economy continues to 
shape, and be shaped by, the opium/heroin trade, I argue that drugs have also become 
embedded in a number of significant developments that have occurred since the late 
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1980s. These include: the pervasive Tatmadaw militarisation of the Shan region; the 
impact of ceasefire agreements; the proliferation of militia groups throughout Shan 
State; renewed efforts by central government to extract revenue from this area through 
both resource extraction and liberalising cross-border trade with China and Thailand; 
and profound changes to the region‘s rural economy caused by increasing levels of 
transnational investment and commercial enterprises. These profound changes warn 
against lazy assumptions that continued drug production across Shan State simply 
reflects ‗business as usual‘ within the insurgent war economy. Instead, I explain how 
the drug economy has become embedded in processes of state consolidation and 
economic development amidst efforts to make ‗grey‘ areas governable. 
 
Third, this study addresses an analytical gap in the literature on the drug economy in 
Shan State. The majority of studies focusing on the post-1988 period – most 
importantly the UNODC‘s annual opium surveys (but also Chin 2007) – ‗fetishize‘ the 
drug issue. This phenomenon is defined by two reflexes: first, the tendency to analyse 
drug-producing regions only through the ‗lens‘ of drugs, which encourages a narrow 
fixation on the metrics and mechanisms within the drug trade and overlooks the 
broader socio-economic and political milieu of which the drug trade is but a part; 
second, the tendency to analyse the drug trade through a narrow economic logic which 
focuses on the dynamics of supply and demand and the assumption that those involved 
are rational utility maximisers driven by profit motives. This leads to a narrow focus 
on the mechanisms behind, and motivations of, those directly involved in the 
production and selling of drugs (poppy farmers, opium traders and heroin traffickers).  
 
This approach, I argue, ignores a crucial set of ‗meso‘-level dynamics that shape the 
interface between sites of production and markets and which definitively shape the 
political economy of the drug trade. It overlooks the dense political and economic 
networks surrounding the drug trade that have ensured vested interests in the 
perpetuation of the drug economy extend beyond those directly involved in the 
production, trafficking and consumption of drugs. It has also perpetuated the binaries 
constructed between legal and illegal practices and in doing so offers little scope for 
understanding how legal and criminal goods may both flow through the same trade 
networks and have the same investors, how the same actors may navigate both 
networks simultaneously, and even more importantly, how extra-state networks can be 
an important foundation for the exercise of formal power.  
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In contrast, this study seeks to situate the drug economy within the broader processes 
that have transformed Shan State since the late 1980s in order to reveal the social 
relations, power dynamics and motivations surrounding the drug trade. It analyses the 
intersection between drugs and the dynamics of continued insurgency, ceasefire 
politics, militarisation, the proliferation of militias and rising volumes of cross-border 
trade and resource extraction. In doing so, it does not claim to offer a detailed 
livelihoods perspective of the drug economy. However, this study does contribute a 
rich body of knowledge surrounding developments in Shan State since the late 1980s, 
in particular by providing a detailed analysis of militias, many of whom are now major 
players in the drug trade. This rise of militias is one of the most significant but 
underreported developments in Myanmar‘s political economy over the past two 
decades. Militia politics forms the focus of Chapter 8 and Appendix 1 provides, to my 
knowledge, the first detailed set of biographies of the most prominent militias 
operating across Shan State. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to address these gaps in the existing literature, this study seeks to answer the 
overarching research question: What role has the opium/heroin economy played in 
fortifying and/or fragmenting processes of state consolidation in Shan State, 
Myanmar, in the period since 1988? In addressing this question, my study tests the 
hypothesis that: rather than necessarily being a cause of disorder and state breakdown, 
illegal drug economies can play an important role in processes of state consolidation. 
In order to test this hypothesis I break down my overarching research question into 
four sub-questions:   
 
First, why have the Shan borderlands with China and Thailand become central 
to the government‘s state-building aspirations?  
 
Second, what strategies has the government deployed in order to extend its 
power and authority in borderland regions? 
 
Third, how have these strategies been imposed, resisted and brokered within 
the Shan borderlands? 
 
Fourth, what is the relationship between contested processes of state 
consolidation and the drug economy in Shan State in the period since 1988?      
 
SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The research presented in this study is the culmination of more than one hundred 
interviews conducted personally by the author during multiple field trips to Myanmar 
and northern Thailand over the past five years, including a nine-month period of 
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fieldwork between October 2012 and June 2013.6 Interviews were conducted with an 
array of individuals and groups including: leaders and soldiers of ceasefire and non-
ceasefire groups; MPs; members of militias; former government officials; farmers 
(both poppy and non-poppy cultivators); traders; local, national and transnational 
businessmen including representatives of major Chinese companies and private 
Myanmar banks; national and international NGOs and civil society organisations 
(including religious organisations and farmers‘ groups); and fellow researchers (both 
local and international). The practical and ethical challenges surrounding my research 
are explained in greater detail in Chapter 2.  
 
There are five significant limitations to this study, which I wish to flag from the very 
outset. First, the lens I take for this study is panoramic rather than microscopic. It 
focuses on political and economic developments across Shan State over the past 
twenty-five years in order to provide the necessary backdrop for understanding the 
region‘s drug trade. In doing so, however, this study is unable to offer a more fine-
grained ethnographic account of the trends I present. Operationalizing an ethnographic 
approach would have required focusing only on a small research site within Shan State. 
Since one of the early findings of my research was the profound diversity in 
governance structures across Shan State I was concerned that this kind of methodology 
would have offered little scope for ‗analytical generalisation‘ of the political economy 
of the drug trade across Shan State, which was my over-arching interest.  
 
Second, the challenges of conducting research across a region that remains affected by 
conflict create an inherent spatial bias in my study. The fieldwork insights that 
underpin this study focus predominantly upon areas that have come under greater 
government control, rather than autonomous ceasefire zones along the China border of 
territorial enclaves controlled by insurgent groups. Although these insights address an 
important gap in the literature they are unable to provide a detailed account of the role 
of insurgent groups in the drug trade. From the outset, I want to emphasize that my 
intention is not to deny the continued involvement of these groups but to emphasize 
that in many areas of Shan State, analysing the drug trade through the prism of the 
insurgent war economy is increasingly anachronistic.  
 
                                                          
6 Interviews were conducted in Shan State (predominantly in Lashio and Taunggyi, but also in Kalaw, 
Tachilek, Mongla, Kengtung and Hsipaw), Yangon, Mandalay and in Chiang Mai, Mae Hong Son, Mae 
Sai, Chiang Rai and Fang in northern Thailand. 
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Third, despite the fact large volumes of methamphetamines, often referred to as yaba, 
are now being produced in Shan State, this study focuses only on the political 
economy of the opium/heroin trade. This is partly reflective of the greater difficulties 
of conducting fieldwork on yaba. Unlike opium, yaba production is synthetic rather 
than plant-based, which creates a more opaque commodity structure based solely on 
the smuggling of precursor chemicals and the use of makeshift, clandestine pill-
producing laboratories. I found my early attempts to research yaba were heavily reliant 
upon rumour and third or fourth-party accounts that were impossible to triangulate. In 
contrast the relative visibility of the opium economy, with large areas of cultivation, 
the involvement of hundreds of thousands of households and well established trading 
networks offered much greater scope to conduct fieldwork.  The decision to focus on 
the opium/heroin trade is also due to the fact that, due to its expansive production, 
there is a much stronger ‗territorial‘ dimension to the trade. Whereas a single, remote 
yaba ‗factory‘ can churn out millions of pills, the production of hundreds of tons of 
opium requires significant areas of land to be dedicated to poppy and offered greater 
scope for revenue to be generated not only through the sale of opium/heroin but also 
through levying taxation and ‗protection fees‘ on production. As a result, I found the 
opium/heroin trade to offer a much richer vantage point from which to interrogate 
changes to territorial governance structures across Shan State, which subsequently 
offered greater insights into processes of state consolidation.  
 
Fourth, although much of my focus is on the role of the Tatmadaw, I was unable to 
interview active or retired military personnel. Whilst those with experience of 
conducting research in Myanmar will be sympathetic to this limitation it does 
nonetheless create a significant weakness.  
 
Fifth, although my theoretical framework emphasizes the importance of interrogating 
the spatial dynamics of borderland regions in order to understand processes of state 
consolidation, my own empirical research is confined to the Myanmar side of the 
border. In some ways my research falls victim to the same ‗territorial trap‘ I set out to 
critique. Much of the literature on borderlands rightly emphasizes the importance of 
taking both sides of the borderland as a single spatial framework of analysis. In 
contrast, the starting point of my study is processes of state consolidation. I focus on 
how successive central governments in Myanmar have attempted to territorialise 
control over the Shan region, and the ways these processes have been resisted, 
contested and negotiated. My focus, therefore, is on the relationship between ‗centre‘ 
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and ‗periphery‘, albeit in ways that remain sensitive to the specific impact which the 
presence of the border and developments beyond the border have on this relationship.   
 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This study is presented in three sections. In Section 1: Theory and Methodology 
(Chapters 1-4), I explain my research methodology and present the political economy 
framework I use to conceptualise the relationship between processes of state 
consolidation and illegal drugs. In Section 2: History (Chapters 5-6) I provide a 
historical overview of governance structures (both formal state institutions and non-
formal governance) and the opium/heroin trade in the Shan region since the mid-
nineteenth century until the late 1980s. Section 3: Empirical Research (Chapters 7-9) 
draws heavily upon my own fieldwork research to present a detailed analysis of how 
post-1988 military governments have sought to establish greater authority across Shan 
State, how these processes have been imposed, resisted and negotiated, and how the 
drug trade has become embedded in these dynamics.  
 
Section 1: Theory and Methodology 
 
Chapter 1 explains the methodology I used for this study. It outlines some of the most 
significant challenges – both conceptual and fieldwork-related – with which I was 
confronted, how I tried to address them, and the limitations that remain a part of this 
study. 
 
Chapter 2 develops a political economy framework for interrogating processes of state 
consolidation in late-developing post-colonial countries. It provides a critique of the 
dominant liberal statebuilding paradigm, which I argue offers an idealised vision of 
how states function, and provides a deeply problematic framework for engaging with 
the complex and often deeply illiberal processes through which state power is 
consolidated. Instead, this chapter develops an alternative conceptual framework. It 
places power relations at the heart of processes of state consolidation. In doing so, it 
emphasizes the importance of engaging with the historical and spatial dynamics of 
power relations in societies in order to understand forms of conflict and negotiation 
that shape state practices. 
    
Chapter 3 uses the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2 to analyse how the 
specific spatial dynamics of borderland regions profoundly shape power relations in 
these regions and why these spatial dynamics therefore deserve a more central place in 
political economy frameworks for understanding state consolidation. In this chapter I 
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introduce the concept of ‗brokerage‘ and explain why this is a particularly prevalent 
modality through power is transmitted and mediated in borderland regions. I develop a 
typology of brokerage, differentiating between forms of ‗frontier‘ and ‗territorialising‘ 
brokerage, which I argue helps to explain variations in how power is negotiated across 
borderland regions and provides new insights for accounting for diverse forms of 
borderland violence. This typology becomes a key tool through which I analyse the 
dynamics of state consolidation in Shan State in later chapters.  
 
Chapter 4 uses the insights developed in the previous two chapters to theorise the 
relationship between processes of state consolidation and illegal drug economies in 
borderland regions. I challenge deeply embedded assumptions about the 
‗exceptionality‘ of drugs, and the inherent tendency to view them as drivers of conflict 
and state fragility.  Rather than separating out analysis of drug economies, I argue that 
they must be placed within the broader context of contested processes of state 
consolidation and capitalist development shaping drug-producing regions. This 
approach reveals the ‗politics of production‘ and the material and social interests 
surrounding drugs. Most importantly, it reveals how drug economies may become 
embedded in processes of state consolidation as well as breakdown, in stability as well 
as conflict, and in processes of economic development. 
 
Section 2: History  
 
Chapter 5 provides a broad historical overview of contested processes of state 
consolidation across the Shan region since the mid-nineteenth century until 1962. This 
chapter explains why understanding how the region has been governed historically and 
how drugs became an important part of the region‘s economy is important for 
understanding the contemporary relationship between the opium/heroin trade and 
processes of state consolidation. 
 
Chapter 6 analyses processes of state consolidation and the dynamics of insurgency 
across Shan State during the Ne Win era (1962-88). This chapter explains why 
understanding the legacies of the Ne Win period provides an essential starting point for 
analysing processes of state consolidation in the post-1988 period, and the role of the 
drug trade within them. I argue that in order to understand post-1988 contested 
processes of state consolidation across Shan State it is imperative to engage with both 
the legacy of centralised military-state institutions that developed under Ne Win and 
the configurations of power that developed across Shan State during this period. 
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Section 3: Empirical Research  
 
Chapter 7 provides a detailed analysis of processes of state consolidation across Shan 
State in the period since 1988. I explain why the Shan borderlands became key to the 
central government‘s statebuilding aspirations and analyse both the statebuilding 
strategies deployed by the government to extend its power and authority, and the ways 
in which these strategies have been contested, resisted, negotiated and manipulated.    
 
Chapter 8 interrogates the temporal and spatial hybridity surrounding processes of 
state consolidation in Shan State. It focuses specifically on the proliferation of 
government-sanctioned militias, which I argue represents one of the most important, 
yet overlooked dimensions of Shan State‘s post-1988 political economy. I draw upon 
the typology of brokerage developed in Chapter 3 to account for the diverse roles 
which militias have played in shaping how power has been imposed, resisted and 
reconfigured and the role they have played in shaping processes of state consolidation. 
I argue that engaging with the diverse brokerage roles played by militias provides new 
ways to account for the uneven political topography of the Myanmar state, the 
repertoires of violence enacted across Shan State and the different kinds of institutions 
of extraction that have emerged over the past twenty-five years.  
 
Chapter 9 analyses the political economy of the opium/heroin economy in Shan State 
since 1988 and the role it has played in shaping processes of state consolidation. It 
explains the factors that drive drug production and outlines how the drug economy is 
structured in Shan State. I demonstrate how the drug trade has become embedded in 
ceasefire and ‗post‘-war governance structures, albeit in diverse ways which are 
spatially uneven, and show how a political economy analysis offers news ways of 
understanding both the dynamics of the drug trade and processes of state consolidation 
across Shan State.              
 
Conclusion 
The conclusion assesses how this study has addressed the research questions outlined 
in this introduction and analyses the pioneering empirical and theoretical insights 
presented in this study. 
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SECTION 1  
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Asia World Company-operated toll on the main Lashio-Mandalay road. Photograph by the author, June 
2013. 
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CHAPTER 1  
METHODOLOGY 
 
The Golden Triangle is closing a dramatic period of opium production…A 
decade-long process of drug control is clearly paying off.  
– Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the UNODC, 2007. 
 
The Burmese military, the Tatmadaw, have a long and deep involvement 
with major narcotics producing and trafficking syndicates, which they 
utilize for national security, corporate rent seeking, and personal profit… 
combating the drug trade would best be achieved through a more open 
political system that benefits the Burmese people and grants the ethnic 
groups which live in main drug producing areas more recognition and a 
greater role in the running of their affairs. 
– ALSTEAN-Burma 2004, iii, 2. 
 
Burmese politics is laced with the quest for political legitimacy. For 
decades opposition groups have managed to play a more dominant role 
than the government in shaping western understanding of the country‟s 
political situation…the narrative developed by these organisations is one of 
good versus evil…Many groups have sought to radicalise the narratives 
that have so long sustained them because the real road to peace will destroy 
them.  
– UNODC official, Yangon, January 2013.  
 
The way the UNODC works [in Myanmar] is flawed. They are not only 
failing to address the growth of the drug trade and rising addiction rates; 
they are doing significant harm by ignoring what is driving drug 
production…they spend large sums of money on projects with minimal 
impact and repeat government data that is totally inaccurate.  
– Thai-Myanmar border-based research organisation, Mae Sot, April 
2013. 
 
A young and impressionable undergraduate History student, my interest in Myanmar 
began with a chance decision to sign up to join the University‘s Burma Society. The 
subsequent events I attended, documentaries I watched and books I read during my 
undergraduate years left me with an enduring fascination for a country I had never, 
until that point, known much about. It was at one such event that I first watched Adrian 
Cowell‘s pioneering documentary, The Opium Warlords, shot in Shan State in 1972. 
Cowell‘s profound insights into the drug trade stayed with me and a few years later, as 
a Development Studies Master‘s student unsure of what topic to focus my dissertation 
on, I returned to the subject of Myanmar‘s still-flourishing drug trade. As I delved 
deeper into the literature on the subject, I was taken aback by the polarisation of 
interpretations, sketched in the quotations above, surrounding the magnitude of the 
drug trade, the factors driving opium production, the relationship between drugs, 
conflict and the state, and the policies advocated for promoting peace and drug 
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reduction. The desire to engage more deeply with these debates led me to embark upon 
this study. I was fascinated by the profound disjuncture between ‗official‘ accounts of 
the drug trade presented by the UNODC, which has long dominated western lenses on 
the issue, and accounts by border-based research organisations (SHAN 2005; 2006; 
PWO 2006; 2010; ALTSEAN-Burma 2004). These contested narratives formed part of 
wider controversies surrounding the country and the decades-long conflict within its 
borderlands – ideological debates surrounding whether to engage with the country‘s 
military government or pursue regime change through sanctions; contested narratives 
over whether the country was a ‗failed‘ state close to caving in on itself or an 
archetypal Orwellian totalitarian state; controversial claims regarding whether 
Myanmar had become a ‗narco-state‘ propped up by drug revenues, or whether drugs 
were the domain of ‗greedy‘ insurgents more interested in profiting from perpetual war 
than peace; at the start of my research even whether to name the country Burma or 
Myanmar remained controversial and was often seen as an indication of one‘s political 
loyalties.  
 
These debates posed enduring challenges when conducting this study. They acted as a 
constant reminder that qualitative social science research is never simply a case of 
asking the right questions to the right people; it also requires engaging with the 
―dialectic between language as social mirror and language as social agent‖ and how 
information cannot automatically assumed to be ―transparently representational‖ but 
may also be ―moral and political‖ (Hunt 1989, 17; Halttunen 1999: 166). Indeed, 
within the first few months of my fieldwork I was advised by border-based research 
organisations to steer clear of developing ties with UNODC and larger Yangon-based 
INGOs, who warned that whilst such links could allow me to navigate access to 
remote parts of Shan State they would undermine my ability to ―get to the truth‖. 
Barely a month later, a UNODC official warned me against being ―hoodwinked‖ by 
such border-based organisations, whom he viewed as manipulating the drug issue to 
de-legitimate the government.  
 
Alongside trying to navigate this ―information economy‖ and the risk of ―battlefield 
bias‖, I was confronted with practical and ethical challenges regarding how to access 
borderland populations and how to address sensitive issues of power, conflict and 
drugs (Goodhand 2000). The purpose of this chapter is to explain the choices I made 
when designing my study and carrying out my fieldwork. Throughout the course of my 
research I was confronted regularly with difficult methodological trade-offs. Although 
rarely discussed in the literature, my aim in this chapter is to draw explicit attention to 
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these trade-offs. I therefore want to use this chapter to explain some of the most 
significant challenges – both conceptual and fieldwork-related – with which I was 
confronted, how I tried to address them, and the limitations that remain a part of this 
study.  
 
1.1 POSITIONING MY RESEARCH 
 
1.1.1 Navigating UNODC hegemony 
Any study on the drug economy in Myanmar is immediately confronted with the 
question of how to navigate an extremely sensitive and politicised subject over which 
there is very little consensus regarding the validity of existing data on the subject. The 
UNODC holds a hegemonic position over quantitative data and policy narratives on 
the drug economy in Myanmar (and globally). It is the only organisation to publically 
present extensive quantitative figures on Myanmar‘s drug trade.7 It has the funds and 
government support required to conduct extensive fieldwork surveys and satellite 
imagery analysis, the results of which it has published since 2002 as part of its annual 
Southeast Asia Opium Survey. These glossy, accessible reports present clear, quotable 
statistics on levels of drug production that have proved irresistible for policymakers, 
journalists and researchers looking for ―plain facts‖ to give a snapshot of the 
magnitude and lucrativeness of the drug trade (Thoumi 2005, 185). There are, however, 
major limitations in using this body of research either as an empirical baseline for 
studying the political economy of Myanmar‘s drug trade or as a methodological toolkit 
to follow.  
 
Firstly, the accuracy of data presented in UNODC reports is questionable in light of 
the fact that it draws heavily upon government data, especially regarding crop 
eradication, without independently verifying these claims. This is despite the fact that 
the government has limited financial and technical resources to collect accurate data 
and the fact that data collection in Myanmar is highly politicised. Statistics are 
"negotiated more than they are observed in Myanmar" and officials at the township 
level often have a vested interest in reporting data in such a way as to win favour with 
higher officials (Dapice et al 2009). The sensitivity surrounding illegal drugs magnifies 
the desire of officials at all levels of government to manipulate data on the subject. 
Furthermore, as Ware and Clarke (2011) rightly argue, there has also long been ―a 
manipulation of data culture‖ within Myanmar in which the desire amongst 
development agencies to maintain a working relationship with the government has 
                                                          
7 China also conducts opium surveys across the China-Myanmar borderlands, mostly via satellite 
imagery, although this information is not publically available. See Tian et al. 2011.  
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increased willingness to publish government data despite misgivings about its 
reliability. The UNODC itself, is not an impartial actor, but is also shaped by the 
ideological pre-conceptions of those funding and/or conducting research. All of these 
factors ensure that both the snapshot figures produced by the UNODC on the drug 
trade, and the political narratives used to explain what drives production, are the 
culmination of layers of methodological weaknesses and biases that are rarely made 
explicit.   
 
Secondly, the means through which UNODC surveyors gain access to drug-producing 
areas is not neutral and creates potential for bias. The organisation is required to work 
closely with the government‘s Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC) 
when carrying out field surveys and ‗ground-truthing‘. I spoke with a plethora of 
international NGOs working in-country before starting my fieldwork in Shan State and 
all expressed the difficulties inherent in this level of government oversight, especially 
for foreign staff. Trips to rural sites were short, subject to careful scrutiny, and staff 
members were not allowed to remain overnight, all of which limited research to 
discussions with local officials and headmen or carefully choreographed focus-group 
discussions. Such approaches exacerbate the risk, acknowledged privately by many 
NGO staff, that community responses are often shaped by a desire to provide the 
answers which researchers want to hear, a mentality ―culturally and psychologically 
bound up with a fear of retaliation‖ following decades of military rule (Myanmar Local 
Resource Centre 2009, 2).   
 
1.1.2 Navigating ‘gatekeepers’ 
These inherent weaknesses discouraged me from using UNODC data as a baseline for 
my study or attempting to replicate the way in which UNODC gains official ‗access‘ to 
fieldwork sites. Instead, I decided to pursue less official channels to reach borderland 
populations. In doing so, I drew upon the wealth of fieldwork experience and extensive 
borderland networks of a number of Myanmar NGOs, civil society organisations and 
research groups. Numerous studies warn of the dangers of becoming reliant upon such 
―gatekeepers‖ to access informants and the danger that this poses of ―impression 
management‖, where gatekeepers seek to control researchers‘ exposure in order to 
amplify certain narratives and events and silence others (Matelski 2014, 77). Such 
concerns are especially pertinent when conducting research in Myanmar‘s borderlands. 
The enduring conflict between the central government and ethnic armed groups (and 
between these groups themselves) has created heavy contestation over borderland 
narratives, which have been central to attempts by all sides to forge legitimacy locally, 
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nationally and internationally. Engaging with these narratives is fundamental to 
understanding the grievances that underpin this conflict, but such engagement also 
requires constant reflection upon whose voices are amplified, whose are silenced, and 
―whose knowledge counts‖ (Goodhand 2000, 12).  
 
These concerns resonated throughout my fieldwork and shaped my methodological 
approach in a number of ways. First, I made the conscious decision to avoid becoming 
embedded within any single research organisation, despite the potential such an 
approach offered for gaining more prolonged access to research sites and informants. 
The sheer ethnic diversity of the region also meant that my ability to access Shan, 
Palaung, Pao, Wa and Lahu networks were dependent upon different contacts, and 
ensured that my research was never reliant upon a single gatekeeper-controlled point 
of access.     
 
Second, although many of my first interviews were with political elites (leaders of 
armed groups, politicians, NGO staff and civil society leaders), through these contacts 
I was also able to interview large numbers of people who I would not otherwise have 
been able to speak with, including farmers (both poppy and non-poppy farmers), local 
businessmen and traders, local government officials, soldiers of ceasefire and non-
ceasefire groups, village headmen, and former militia leaders and recruits. I was able 
to develop my own form of ‗snowball sampling‘ where people I met introduced me to 
other people to interview, which meant my own research networks outgrew initial 
‗gate-keepered‘ networks. This also allowed me to interview multiple people from the 
same area separately, giving me spatially clustered insights through which to 
triangulate data rather than remain reliant upon the insights from a single interview.   
 
Third, the prolonged time I spent conducting fieldwork over the past four years 
alleviated the pressure for informants to impress upon me a particular narrative. In 
Mae Hong Son (northern Thailand) I witnessed a ‗research‘ visit by a UN official to 
the headquarters of a ceasefire group. Having arrived mid-morning from Bangkok, her 
return flight was the same day, before which she declared her wish to be taken to the 
Thai-Myanmar border to meet with ‗local communities‘ along the border. It is hardly 
surprising that in such contexts organisations seek to present a particular voice or 
stage-manage interactions, knowing they have such limited time to present their 
viewpoint and for fear of losing face if such interactions cannot be arranged. My own 
diligence, my willingness to meet people multiple times, my flexibility regarding 
arrangements helped to reduce the kind of stage-management I had witnessed.  
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Fourth, having a precise geographical and historical knowledge, a sound grasp of the 
dizzying array of acronyms and personalities in local and national politics, and an 
understanding of important political and cultural events also helped me to gain respect 
and encouraged those I interviewed to move beyond the repetition of broad narratives, 
 
I don‘t believe that I was co-opted by these gatekeepers or that they sought to exercise 
undue control over who I met and the narratives I was exposed to. Over time, it also 
became clear to me that the association often made between voices critical of the 
government and armed groups is too simplistic and perpetuates the misleading notion 
that there is a single government/anti-government conflict dynamic. Many of those I 
interviewed expressed an overwhelming desire for peace and expressed concerns about 
the actions of armed groups as well as the government. Their emphasis that one cannot 
engage with ethnic and humanitarian issues in the borderlands without making it clear 
that the government (and proxies) are the primary agent of threat is, I believe, accurate 
and should not prejudice against engaging with the work of these groups.     
 
1.2 DESIGNING MY RESEARCH FRAMEWORK: AVOIDING THE DRUG ‘FETISH’ 
 
1.2.1 Avoiding the drug ‘fetish’: towards a political economy approach 
In his study of research ethics in war-zones, Jonathan Goodhand (2000, 15) warns 
against a ‗conflict fetish‘ in which violence becomes ―the only lens through which to 
look at people‘s lives‖, despite the fact that ―those affected by conflict frequently 
remind researchers and aid workers that there are other aspects to their lives, that war is 
not the only point of reference‖ (see also: Korf et al. 2010, 385-6; Nordstrom & 
Robben 1995, 4). In many drug-producing regions, a comparable ‗drug fetish‘ exists in 
which the drug issue becomes the only lens through which their societies are analysed. 
In the case of Shan State, this approach is typified by the UNODC‘s annual opium 
surveys which isolate analysis of the drug economy from the region‘s broader political 
and economic dynamics. The lack of understanding regarding the relationship between 
drugs and the region‘s broader political economy has been exacerbated by the fact that 
other NGOs working on related issues in borderland regions, such as conflict resolution, 
land rights, livelihoods and rural development have steered clear of the drug issue for 
fear that engaging with such a sensitive subject could threaten their ability to maintain 
the government support required to work in-country.  
 
The ‗drug fetish‘ creates a fixation on metrics surrounding the drug economy, 
epitomised by the UNODC‘s prioritisation on calculating the amount of land used to 
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cultivate poppy, opium yields and farm-gate prices (Mansfield, 2007; Mansfield 
forthcoming). Such metrics are undoubtedly useful and important in developing 
understanding and policy responses. However, the provision of such metrics without 
engaging with the political economy surrounding the drug trade creates three distinct 
problems. First, it assumes that the volume of drugs produced is directly correlated 
with their social, political and economic impact. The weakness of this approach is a 
point well made in Francisco Thoumi‘s (2005, 195) study of the drug trade in 
Colombia: 
during the 1970s and 1980s the illegal drug industry generated real estate and contraband 
booms in Colombia that most citizens perceived as positive. By the late 1990s, the industry 
was clearly funding the Colombian "ambiguous war" and its economic effects were clearly 
negative…Evidence shows that accurate estimates are less important than what many 
might think. What has been important is not merely the size of the trade, but its ability to 
alter social behaviors, increase corruption and crime, and finance insurgent and 
counterinsurgent guerrillas. The size of the illegal drug industry is not particularly relevant 
as a cause of these social developments. 
 
In this vein, I argue that rather than fixating solely upon the magnitude of the drug 
trade it is more important to focus on the power relations, material interests and 
institutional arrangements surrounding it. I contend that it is not the volume of illicit 
drug production itself, but instead the social relations surrounding production and 
trafficking that determines the relationship between drugs, conflict, and state 
consolidation/breakdown (Goodhand 2008b; Meehan 2011). 
 
Second, the drug fetish has perpetuated a narrow economic interpretation of the 
dynamics surrounding drug economies, which assumes that the trade is shaped solely 
by the market logic governing supply and demand, and that those involved are driven 
solely by rational profit maximisation (Mansfield 2007b). Thirdly, it does a poor job of 
capturing the complexity and hybridity across drug-producing regions, instead 
suggesting a misleading homogeneity regarding who is involved in the drug trade and 
why, as well as the relationship between drugs and the broader politics of the areas in 
which they are produced (Mansfield 2006, 54-6).8 This weakness is exacerbated by the 
fact that UNODC opium surveys provide a single figure for the various metrics they 
provide, rather than disaggregating them.  
 
 
 
1.2.2 Honing my research and continued limitations 
                                                          
8 David Mansfield‘s vast body of work on the opium economy in Afghanistan offers a detailed analysis 
of the critiques briefly mentioned here. See: http://www.davidmansfield.org/all.php. 
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Before beginning my PhD I had initially considered focusing on one specific township 
in Shan State in order to develop my own set of quantitative data to present an 
‗objective‘ counterpoint to both UNODC data and that produced by border-based 
research groups. However, having undertaken a three month scoping study (March-
June 2011) to Myanmar prior to starting my PhD, I realised that much of the country 
remained off-limits to foreigners. Even if I was able to gain access to remote parts of 
Shan State, such access would be short and dependent upon a level of official 
monitoring that would compromise my ability to speak freely to a wide sample of 
people. Beyond these practical difficulties, I also realised that such an approach 
threatened to replicate the same fetishized approach to the drug trade present in 
UNODC studies. 
 
I thus realised that the greatest ‗value-added‘ of conducting a PhD study on the drug 
trade in Shan State did not lie in replicating existing methodologies by developing a 
survey-based quantitative study that was likely to be riddled with unintended 
methodological short-comings and biases. Instead, I pursue a political economy 
analysis that prioritises a ‗spatial‘ approach rather than a ‗thematic‘ approach, in the 
sense that I situate the drug trade within the wider social, political and economic 
dynamics of the China-Shan-Thai borderland region, rather than approaching this 
region through the narrow prism of drugs. In doing so I address the interplay between 
the drug economy and broader trends in Shan State‘s rural political economy, 
including: Tatmadaw militarisation and continued insurgency; the impact of ceasefire 
agreements; attempts by state officials to govern borderland spaces; the proliferation of 
militias; growing volumes of cross-border trade and investment; and how all of these 
phenomena have impacted upon local power structures and livelihoods. Drugs are 
inevitably a part of these dynamics, but rather than fixate narrowly upon the drug issue, 
a spatially informed political economy approach provided a more penetrating analysis 
of these linkages.  
 
In this way, my research methodology focuses upon achieving two specific aims. 
Firstly, I develop a robust conceptual framework that justifies why studies of illegal 
drug economies should undertake a broader political economy analysis of processes of 
state consolidation and economic development in the regions in which drugs are 
produced. This explains why I dedicate three chapters of my PhD to developing this 
framework. Although this creates a conceptually-heavy start to my study I hope it can 
promote new ways of thinking about drug economies that are insightful to researchers 
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studying other parts of the world. Secondly, I have endeavoured to operationalize this 
approach in my own empirical study.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The qualitative research framework I developed for this study draws upon Barakat et 
al.‘s (2002) ‗composite approach‘ and Burawoy‘s (1998) ‗extended case method‘.  The 
composite approach addresses the challenges of conducting research in conflict-
affected environments through a flexible mixed methods approach, combining 
extensive research prior to entering the field, building trust with informants, semi-
structured interviews and direct observation. The extended case method is built around 
five processes: (i) engaging with prior theory in order to conceptualise social processes 
and to set clear research questions; (ii) compiling situational knowledge based on these 
questions; (iii) aggregating situational knowledge to comprehend social processes; (iv) 
locating these social processes within a wider temporal and spatial field of social 
forces; and (v) using these insights to address and ―reconstruct‖ existing theory.  These 
processes are not linear but are fluid and reflexive; as attempts are made to aggregate 
situational knowledge into a comprehension of social forces, new questions and 
theoretical concepts emerge, which then provide a feedback loop, shaping subsequent 
interviews and driving the focus of investigation in new directions.  
   
The qualitative case study approach I adopt is designed to address the weaknesses of 
large N-study quantitative studies, especially the ‗greed-grievance‘ model, which has 
been so influential in shaping claims that lootable resources such as drugs drive violent 
conflict and increase state fragility (Collier & Hoeffler 1998; Collier 2003).9 My case 
study approach offers qualitative analytical depth into the mechanisms linking 
resources, conflict and processes of state consolidation by offering insights into a 
wider set of variables than can easily be captured in quantitative studies or that are 
extremely difficult to code, such as processes of agrarian change, the ‗messy‘ politics 
of brokerage and bargaining processes, and the impact of cross-border and regional 
developments. Unlike quantitative studies, which ―assume that civil war is a clearly 
defined and coded category of violence‖ (Sambanis 2005, 323) and which seek to 
arbitrarily define ‗war-time‘ and ‗peace-time‘, a qualitative case study approach  
                                                          
9 This model claims that resource dependence, proxied as the ratio of primary commodity exports to 
GDP, increases the risk of conflict, especially in countries with low average incomes, slow growth and 
high unemployment or underemployment. An increase in resource dependence from 0% to 32%, Collier 
et al (2003) claim, increases the probability of war from 1% to 22%. Lootable resources, such as drugs 
and alluvial diamonds and timber, are singled out as especially conflict-inducing and these arguments 
have been used to strengthen the notion of a ‗resource curse‘ in which resource abundance actually 
stunts economic development.  
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offers scope to engage with the realities of a ‗continuum of violence‘ (Cramer 2006, 
11-13). This is especially relevant in the context of Myanmar‘s borderlands where a 
decline in outright civil war appears to have been accompanied by the embedding of 
violence, exploitation and dispossession within social and economic structures. 
 
Both the ‗composite‘ and ‗extended case method‘ approaches emphasize the 
importance of structuring fieldwork research around ‗prior‘ theory and existing 
knowledge. This is particularly important when conducting research in conflict-
affected environments and on sensitive subjects as it ensures the researcher has as great 
a possible understanding of important events, actors and existing power structures 
before entering the field, offering greater scope to navigate ‗battlefield bias‘ by 
drawing attention to potential discrepancies in fieldwork interviews as they arise. In 
preparing for my fieldwork I thus adopted an ―outside-in, inside-out‖ approach in 
which I drew upon the wider structural context, history and existing contextual 
knowledge of Shan State‘s political economy (Goodhand et al. 2014). This ‗outside-in‘ 
perspective provided scope to then situate the actions and agency of those   ‗inside‘ the 
research context, including those I interviewed directly. This was particularly 
important for my research since my study analyses the period since 1988, much of 
which pre-dated my own fieldwork, which began only in 2011. In building this prior 
knowledge base I focused specifically on addressing my first two research questions:  
 
(1) Why have the Shan borderlands with China and Thailand become central to 
the government‟s state-building aspirations?  
 
(2) What strategies has the government deployed in order to extend its power 
and authority in borderland regions? 
 
I conducted an extensive literature review of previous studies on Myanmar‘s border 
regions, existing fieldwork reports from organisations working in these areas and 
detailed analysis of various media outlets (both contemporary reports and their 
archives) including state media (The New Light of Myanmar), regional media 
organisations (such as The Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN) and Kachinland 
News) and those from neighbouring countries (including The Bangkok Post, Asia 
Times, Far Eastern Economic Review, Xinhua). I also undertook a pre-fieldwork 
scoping study to establish contact and build trust with key local organisations and to 
solicit advice on how to conduct fieldwork from those with existing experience. Over 
the two years prior to entering the field I developed a detailed ‗database‘ of 
information which focused on: processes of economic development (trade, sites and 
types of resource extraction and their magnitude, and key economic actors involved); 
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government strategies of militarisation (e.g. locations and sizes of military battalions); 
structures of authority and their territorial reach (including the Tatmadaw, civilian 
government, armed groups and village headmen, evidence of tax collection); evidence 
of the drug economy (especially apparent changes in scale of production and actors 
claimed to be involved), and disaggregating populations across Shan State (including 
by ethnicity and assets). Importantly, in developing this ‗prior knowledge‘ my focus 
went beyond the confines of events in Shan State itself, enabling me to situate 
development ―within a wider…spatial field of social forces‖ (Burawoy 1998). 
      
This body of ‗situational knowledge‘ provided the foundation for my own fieldwork, 
which was built upon a wide-range of semi-structured interviews. (Issues around 
negotiating access to interviewees and the challenges of engaging with sensitive 
subjects are addressed in the following two sections). Alongside building upon this 
body of knowledge my fieldwork interviews focused specifically on addressing my 
third and fourth research questions:   
 
(3) How have these strategies been imposed, resisted and brokered within the 
Shan borderlands?  
 
(4) What is the relationship between contested processes of state consolidation 
and the drug economy in Shan State in the period since 1988?      
 
In seeking to address these questions, I deployed three techniques when conducting my 
semi-structured interviews. Firstly, I focused on key turning points or ‗moments of 
rupture‘ in the political economy of Shan State since 1988, which included: the 
collapse of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in 1988; the signing of ceasefires (in 
the late 1980s / early 1990s); the surrender of Khun Sa‘s Mong Tai Army in 1996; the 
start of large-scale ‗development‘ projects; renewed tensions between ceasefire groups 
and the government following the country‘s 2008 constitution; and the 2010 General 
Election.  This approach was founded on the belief that insights into the power 
relations surrounding the imposition, contestation and negotiation of state authority 
(and the role of illegal resources in these processes) are likely to be clearest at times 
when they are put under greatest pressure following shocks to the wider socio-political 
world in which they are located.  
 
Secondly, my research prioritised a number of key themes (including the formation 
and activities of militias; the impact of Tatmadaw militarisation; the impact of changes 
to the rural economy) through a set of ‗bridging questions‘ in an attempt to ―to locate 
everyday life in its extralocal and historical context‖ (Burawoy 1998, 4). From my 
scoping study in 2011 I learnt that the use of ambiguous or convoluted terms such as 
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‗state consolidation‘, ‗statebuilding‘, ‗political settlement‘ or ‗commodification‘ were 
not helpful. Instead, I found that asking questions about specific issues such as who 
collected tax, who manned road checkpoints and how local disputes were addressed 
were all issues that interviewees could easily relate to whilst also offering me insights 
into local power structures. 
 
Thirdly, I used these key ruptures and themes to structure the interviews I conducted to 
collect a series of ‗life histories‘ with key individuals. These ‗life history‘ interviews 
came later in my fieldwork after I had built trust with key informants (either those I 
wished to interview or those who could introduce me to these figures 10 ). These 
individual life histories were built upon lengthy, often multiple, interviews with figures 
including: insurgent and ceasefire group leaders; former MTA soldiers; former militia 
leaders and soldiers; and farmers (both those who had grown poppy and those who had 
not). These interviews, in turn, provided new information on events and names of 
people or groups (often militias) who I then researched by trawling through media 
sources and asked about in future interviews.  
 
                                                          
10 This is not to say that those figures whose life histories I collected were part of gate-keepered 
networks, since my interest in interviewing them stemmed from my own prior research, rather than the 
request/advice of ‗gatekeepers‘ in the field. I required assistance in some cases to access these figures 
but the selection was normally my own. 
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Figure 1: Applying Burawoy’s ‘extended case method’ as a research framework 
 
The stage of 
my extended 
case method 
Research questions Research approach Research timeline 
Prior theory 
 
 
Overarching research question: 
 
What role has the opium/heroin 
economy played in fortifying 
and/or fragmenting processes of 
state consolidation in Shan 
State, Myanmar, in the period 
since 1988? 
Engagement with political economy literatures on:  
processes of state consolidation:  political 
settlements (Khan 2000; Di John 2008; Di John 
and Putzel 2009), „hybrid political orders‟ (Boege 
et al.), „twilight institutions‟ (Lund) and „limited 
access orders‟ (North et al. 2007; 2009) 
Illegal economies: Nordstrom 2000; McCoy 
1999; Heyman 1999; Gallant 1999; Goodhand 
2008b; 2009; Chouvy 2010; Lintner 1999; 
Thoumi 2003; van Schendel & Abraham 2005. 
Borderlands: Agnew 2008; Baud and van 
Schendel 1997; Brenner 1999; Goodhand 2008; 
Nugent 2002; van Schendel 2004; Korf and 
Raeymaekers 2013) 
Draft conceptual framework written in first year of 
PhD (September 2011-June 2012) prior to leaving 
for fieldwork. 
 
Draft methodology paper written prior to leaving 
for fieldwork regarding how to operationalise and 
test my conceptual framework (June 2012-
September 2013). 
  
Compiling 
situational 
knowledge 
1. Why has the Shan borderland 
with China and Thailand 
become central to the 
government‘s state-building 
aspirations?  
 
2. Second, what strategies has 
the government deployed in 
order to extend its power and 
authority in borderland regions? 
Prior to fieldwork: 
Analysis of existing literature (academic studies, 
research reports, media) on both historical and 
contemporary processes of economic development 
across Shan State, militarisation, structures of 
authority, indicators of state consolidation, 
evidence of the drug economy. 
During fieldwork: Updating and triangulating 
situational knowledge; addressing key gaps in 
existing ‗situational knowledge‘, especially 
surrounding militias and the local dynamics of the 
drug economy (e.g. credit systems) onwhich very 
little as been written. 
Scoping study to establish network of contacts and 
hone research methodology (March -June 2011). 
 
Creation of ‗detailed database‘ of ‗situational 
knowledge‘ prior to fieldwork (September 2010-
June 2012). 
 
Situational knowledge provided foundation for 
interviews conducted in: 
Northern Thailand/ Thai-Myanmar border: 
Oct-Nov 2012; Feb 2013; May 2013 
Yangon: Jan 2013; March 2013 
Shan State (Taunggyi/Lashio/ 
Kengtung/Mongla/Tachilek/Kengtung): Jan-
March 2013; May-June 2013    
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Aggregating 
situational 
knowledge to 
comprehend 
social 
processes 
3. How have these strategies 
been imposed, resisted and 
brokered within the Shan 
borderlands?  
 
4. What is the relationship 
between contested processes of 
state consolidation and the drug 
economy in Shan State in the 
period since 1988?      
Semi-structured interviews: 
Structured around: 
 
 (i) key „moments of rupture‟: 
the collapse of the  CPB (1988); 
ceasefire agreements (1980s/1990s);  
Surrender of Khun Sa‘s MTA (1996);  
large-scale ‗development‘ projects; renegotiation 
of ceasefire agreements following the country‘s 
2008 constitution; 2010 General Election. 
 (ii) „key themes‟: 
Militias, militarisation, rural livelihoods, taxation 
 
(iii) „Life history‟ interviews with carefully 
selected individuals 
More than 100 interviews conducted between 
Oct 2012 and June 2013 and during a further 
field visit to Fang District, Chiang Mai 
Province April-May 2014 with: farmers (both 
poppy and non-poppy farmers), local businessmen 
and traders, local government officials, soldiers 
and leaders of ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups, 
former and incumbent village headmen, and 
former members of local militias. 
 
Life history interviews with: insurgent and 
ceasefire group leaders; former MTA soldiers; 
former militia leaders and soldiers; farmers (both 
those who had grown poppy and those who had 
not). 
  
Locating 
social 
processes 
within an 
wider 
temporal and 
spatial field of 
social forces 
Relevant to all research 
questions 
Breaking out of ‗methodological nationalism‘ to 
capture the footloose, complex, regional dynamics 
shaping processes of state consolidation and drug 
production and trading. 
 
Interviews conducted in northern Thailand 
throughout fieldwork. 
 
Systematic analysis of existing literature covering 
Myanmar, China and Thailand (academic studies, 
research reports, media). 
Theoretical 
reconstruction 
Return to my overarching 
research question: 
 
What role has the opium/heroin 
economy played in fortifying 
and/or fragmenting processes of 
state consolidation in Shan 
State, Myanmar, in the period 
since 1988? 
Constant ‘dialogue’ between theory and 
fieldwork findings throughout the research. 
e.g. engagement with literatures made relevant by 
research findings e.g. Militias (e.g. Ahram 2011; 
Roberts 1983) and brokerage (Blok 1969; Duara 
1988; Geertz 1960; Mosse & Lewis 2005; Wolf 
1956) and relevant contexts beyond Myanmar 
(e.g. Ballvé 2012; Thomson 2011)   
Continued engagement with theory throughout 
fieldwork. 
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1.4 NEGOTIATING ACCESS IN THE FIELD 
 
1.4.1 The challenges of accessing borderland populations in Shan State 
Accessing research sites and potential informants in conflict-affected environments 
and/or in which illegal activities are taking place remains an enduring practical and 
ethical challenge for researchers (Barakat et al 2002; Bourgois 1990; Chin 2007; 
Goodhand 2000; Lertchavalitsakul 2014; Nordstrom & Robben 1995; Scheper-Hughes 
1995; Vlassenroot 2006; Wood 2006). Tensions exist between the researcher‘s desire 
to conduct pioneering research and the need to ensure the safety of oneself and 
especially informants who will remain there after the researcher has left. There are also 
problematic trade-offs between using connections with powerful and influential people 
versus the biases and limitations that such access points may then create (Brooten & 
Metro 2014, 10). All of these tensions and trade-offs often take place in environments 
susceptible to sudden change, where the ‗rules of the game‘ are opaque and where 
what has been deemed possible or acceptable in provincial cities is different to the 
reality one confronts when moving into more remote areas.  
 
At the time of my fieldwork (2011-2013), I found it easy to access major towns and 
cities across Shan State but, as a foreigner, it was still difficult to reach rural areas 
beyond these towns. This was partly due to the on-going and unpredictable risk of 
political violence and the government‘s subsequent desire to prevent foreigners from 
entering areas where such risks exist. It is also a result of the fact that government 
suspicion surrounding the activities of outsiders remains. Despite the changing 
political climate, checkpoints along roads remain ubiquitous and most people, whether 
local government officials or bus drivers and motorcycle taxis, understandably prefer 
to err on the side of caution rather than risk repercussions for having granted foreigners 
access. Whether this ‗politics of fear‘ reflects the actual authoritarian reach of the state 
or is itself part of the way state power has been constructed is often unclear and varies 
from place to place (Matelski 2014, 72). Whilst most local government checks are 
simply filed away in rusting filing cabinets and the number of passport copies I had to 
give to checkpoints along various roads seemed to serve no particular purpose, 
hierarchies of control do exist and can work effectively.11  
 
                                                          
11 For example, on one trip I took into the suburbs north of Yangon to see (unsuccessfully) whether I 
could stay with the family of a Burmese friend, I learnt that each street in the urban ward had its own 
representative responsible for monitoring all comings and goings and recording the number of people in 
each household every night. Any irregularities were reported to the Township office. Such levels of 
monitoring are by no means limited to major cities. Lertchavalitsakul‘s (2014) account of her own 
unsuccessful attempt at ―sneaking‖ into Mong Yak (a fictitious name), a town southeast of Taunggyi 
where foreigners were prohibited, reveals similar levels of scrutiny. 
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Such restrictions were frustrating. However, learning why I could not access certain 
places became, in itself, a useful way of understanding better which authorities 
controlled certain territories. I was also very aware that the risks of accessing these 
areas posed a disproportionate risk to those who took me and with whom I would 
speak with and my ethical desire to ensure I did ‗no harm‘ meant I too erred on the 
side of caution. Near the beginning of my fieldwork one research organisation 
recounted an incident a few years earlier in which a French journalist had visited a 
number of villages along the Irrawaddy River between Yangon and Mandalay. Local 
authorities, unsure how to manage this unexpected visitor, had allowed him to stay in 
the area subject to a police chaperone. Unhappy with this arrangement the journalist 
had given the policeman the slip and spent the day exploring the area alone. Back at 
his guesthouse that evening he was hauled to the local police station and forced to 
watch his chaperone get beaten. It was an unsubtle means of showing that whilst 
foreigners remained largely untouchable, the flouting of government authority had 
consequences. Whilst this account is perhaps an extreme example, it nonetheless 
encouraged me to find ways of generating data without taking risks that could 
endanger others and without subjecting myself to the kind of official scrutiny that 
would limit my ability to generate reliable data.               
 
1.4.2 Negotiating access 
In response to these challenges, I sought ways to speak to people from remote rural 
areas as they passed through provincial towns and cities as well as across the border in 
northern Thailand where I could speak to them safely and without attracting the 
attention of officials. Although this methodology approach precluded any kind of 
direct participant observation or ethnographic immersion in rural areas, it did at least 
enable me to interview a large number of diverse people from townships across Shan 
State including: local pastors and monks whose dioceses/monasteries were in rural 
areas; MPs from rural constituencies; university students and members of youth groups 
who were travelling back and forth between their home villages and 
schools/universities in Taunggyi, Lashio and across the border in Thailand; people 
who had moved to live, temporarily or permanently, in towns and across the border; 
farmers and traders who came into urban areas on market days or for other reasons (for 
example, I was in Taunggyi for Pa-Oh National Day and was able to interview people 
who had travelled from neighbouring townships to attend the festivities); members of 
staff from local NGOs as well as the attendees of the various medical, agricultural and 
educational training programmes and youth groups which these NGOs organise. I also 
benefitted from the changing political climate in the country and was able to visit 
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liaison offices of various political parties and ceasefire groups that had opened in 
provincial cities in order to meet people who were passing through these offices.  
1.4.3 Continued challenges: ‘Representational’ and ‘spatial’ bias 
However, concerns about the representativeness of my research remained, especially 
the fact that my fieldwork design meant I drew predominantly upon accounts from 
those who were most politically conscious and with the greatest means to travel and 
access services within cities or across the border. These concerns led me to apply for a 
fieldwork grant in order to undertake a further stint of fieldwork in April-May 2013 
with the intention of developing a stronger voice in my research from more 
marginalised rural communities. I was still unable to access remote conflict-affected 
regions of Shan State so instead I travelled to a number of remote settlements along the 
Thai-Shan border where many Shan communities were living having fled across the 
border. I enlisted the services of a young Shan interpreter and made contact with a 
locally-respected Shan man from the area who agreed to act as a guide and to introduce 
me to families in the area. His role as a ‗facilitator‘ was important as the majority of 
Shan communities living in the area were without official documentation and, without 
this prior introduction, it would have proved difficult for me to talk with them. I 
conducted interviews with a large number of people, the vast majority of whom were 
farmers who had fled from their homes in central and southern Shan State at various 
points over the past twenty-years. These testimonies offered a more quotidian insight 
into rural economies and power structures, as well changes to their localities over the 
course of their lifetime. 
  
Despite my efforts to negotiate access to populations from across Shan State, there are 
a number of enduring limitations in my methodology. I remained unable to access the 
most vulnerable populations within Shan State, notably IDPs and those living in areas 
most heavily affected by conflict. This has created a distinct ‗spatial bias‘ in my 
research and this is something I try to be explicit about in this study. My research 
focuses predominantly on areas that have come under increasing government control, 
and where the dominant authorities are the Tatmadaw, government bureaucracy and 
proxy government forces, as it is these areas that I myself was most easily able to 
access or from where many of my informants were able to travel. As I emphasize time 
and again, the purpose of my study is to examine the political economy of the drug 
trade in areas where insurgency has receded in order to explain how and why drugs 
have become embedded in the complex and messy processes of state consolidation. 
This is not to deny that drugs are also grown in insurgent-controlled areas or to deny 
that insurgent groups derive revenue from the drug trade. Despite the polarised 
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narratives surrounding the drug trade, these two phenomena are not exclusive and 
drugs have played a role in both government efforts to wrestle territorial control and 
efforts to resist these processes.           
 
1.5 CONDUCTING SENSITIVE RESEARCH: ‘TALKING’ POWER, CONFLICT AND 
DRUGS 
  
1.5.1 Discussing sensitive issues and avoiding the drug ‘fetish’ in practice 
For both ethical and conceptual reasons, I mostly avoided asking direct questions on 
drugs, instead reacting to when interviewees raised the issue rather than prompting it 
myself. Drugs remain a highly sensitive issue and from an ethical perspective it was 
important to avoid putting people in an uncomfortable position. This was especially 
because at times, despite my efforts to put those I interviewed at ease, the context was 
not power-neutral and I sensed that the pressure people felt to answer my questions 
threatened to impinge upon their own assessment of whether they were comfortable 
talking about certain subjects. Moreover, from a conceptual perspective, asking direct 
questions about drugs threatened to fetishize the subject rather than enable me to 
situate the drug economy within the broader political economy of the region and how 
people‘s interactions with drugs were simply one part of their lives. I thus developed a 
more indirect and flexible approach in which I encouraged interviewees to speak about 
their own lives. Where this threatened to take the interview down unwanted tangents, I 
utilised a number of ―cue questions‖ to re-focus the interview, asking about their own 
livelihoods, the taxes they had to pay and who made decisions in their communities 
(Barakat et al. 2002).  
 
Time was an important aspect of this approach. I found many people were willing to 
speak for hours about their lives. Drugs were very commonly a part of these narratives 
but by listening to these broader testimonies rather than trying to extract only 
information about drugs, I gained invaluable insights into how the drug economy 
intersects with broader social, political and economic processes. Encouraging people to 
focus specifically on their own experiences was also an important aspect of my 
interview approach. Asking people broad questions about conflict, the government or 
the drug trade often elicited stock responses, whereas letting them talk about their own 
personal experiences generated more nuanced insights. 
 
1.5.2 Methodological trade-offs when conducting sensitive research 
This kind of indirect approach entailed methodological trade-offs between the ethical 
imperative of letting interviewees speak for themselves within the parameters they 
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themselves set, versus my desire to generate greater discussion on issues that I found 
particularly enlightening and to triangulate findings from previous interviews. This 
proved a constant balancing act regarding how best to manage interviews. I discovered 
that responding to comments made by an interviewer about a particular event, 
individual or location by providing corroborating information I had gained from 
previous interviews or prior reading could sometimes generate greater trust as it 
demonstrated my own knowledge, which interviewers often appreciated and respected. 
Other times, however, the transition from general discussion to focusing on precise 
insights aroused surprise and suspicion. For example, I remember entering a discussion 
with one individual who demonstrated a clear knowledge about a particular militia 
leader, offering me scope to triangulate earlier research findings. Halfway through the 
discussion my interviewee loosened his shirt sleeve to reveal a gold watch which he 
laughingly said had been a gift from this militia leader after they had both visited a spa 
together in Thailand and was valued at more than 10,000 baht (US$300). Such 
surprising linkages revealed how inter-connected the drug trade is with wider social, 
political and economic borderland networks. It also demonstrated clearly how those 
best-placed to corroborate information about the most sensitive aspects of my research 
on the drug trade were also those most likely to know people involved in the trade and 
around whom I needed to be sure that my research was neither interpreted as a threat 
nor susceptible to manipulation.  
 
1.5.3 Enduring challenges 
Over the course of my fieldwork it proved much more feasible to triangulate data on 
some aspects of my research project than others. Regarding the drug commodity chain, 
I generated a substantial body of evidence regarding poppy cultivation, opium trading, 
taxation and credit systems, and the role of militias in the drug trade. It was, however, 
much more difficult to generate substantive information about heroin refining and 
trafficking. Regarding rural power structures, it was easier to learn how local 
communities interacted with various authorities (such as the Tatmadaw, ceasefire and 
non-ceasefire armed groups, militias and government bureaucracies) than it was to 
understand the relationship between these various authorities themselves. There were 
also certain issues, notably the extent to which government officials owned drug 
shipments (rather than just taxing them) and how drug money entered the legal 
economy, which were regular topics of discussion but for which I felt the information I 
generated was hard to substantiate. Similarly, I found it extremely difficult to generate 
triangulated insights about the yaba trade than I did about opium production and 
trading. Rather than ignore the limitations of my empirical research by trying to paper 
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over these significant gaps, I have instead centred my study on those aspects of the 
Shan State‘s rural political economy that I feel my research is able to depict accurately.          
 
1.6 CONCLUSION  
In this chapter I have outlined the challenges I faced in conducting my research, the 
ways I sought to address these challenges and the ongoing limitations and biases that 
remain a part of this study. I have drawn attention to the methodological trade-offs that 
I faced, the subsequent choices I made and how these have impacted upon the final 
focus of my study. This research does not constitute a comprehensive, exhaustive 
account of the drug trade in Shan State and nor does it claim to be. It makes no 
pretence to offer a fine-grained ethnographic account of the drug economy across rural 
Shan State. It does, however, offer two important contributions. 
 
Firstly, it develops a political economy methodology that moves beyond rational actor 
explanatory models for explaining involvement in the drug trade and provides a 
corrective to ‗fetishized‘ approaches to drug economies by focusing on how they 
interact with the broader social, political and economic milieu of which they are 
inevitably a part. Secondly, it provides one of the first detailed empirical studies of the 
complex mosaics of governance that have emerged across Shan State over the past 
quarter-century, the proliferation of militias in the region, the forms of brokerage and 
negotiation surrounding processes of state consolidation, and the ways in which the 
opium/heroin economy has become embedded within these dynamics. Thus, despite its 
limitations, this study offers scope to improve understanding amongst academics, 
policymakers and practitioners working on these issues both in Myanmar and beyond 
and provide new insights for those looking to navigate the contentious and polarised 
debates cited at the start of this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
UN-MASKING THE STATE 
Towards an alternative conceptual framework for 
understanding state consolidation 
 
The state is not the reality which stands behind the mask 
of political practice.  It is itself the mask which prevents 
our seeing political practice as it is…The state is, then, 
in every sense of the term a triumph of concealment. It 
conceals the real history and relations of subjection 
behind an a-historical mask of legitimating illusion: 
contrives to deny the existence of connections and 
conflicts which would if recognised be incompatible 
with the claimed autonomy and integration of the state. 
    Abrams (1988) 
 
In the two decades following the Myanmar government‘s repression of pro-democracy 
protests in 1988 and its subsequent refusal to acknowledge the results of the 1990 
General Election, Myanmar was commonly portrayed as a fragile and failing state. The 
country suffers from poor public services, rampant corruption, economic 
mismanagement and high inflation, a catalogue of human rights abuses, the world‘s 
longest running insurgency, a growing HIV/AIDS crisis, high numbers of internally 
displaced people and is also the world‘s second largest producer of illegal 
opium/heroin and a major source of methamphetamines. Throughout the 1990s and 
2000s, especially following the 2007 Saffron Revolution and Cyclone Nargis in 2008, 
countless studies drew attention to the failings of the Myanmar state, and the human 
suffering these created (ALTSEAN-Burma 2003; Lintner 1990; Mawdsley 2001; 
Larkin 2008; Rogers 2004). Since its inception in 2005, the Fund for Peace has 
constantly ranked Myanmar as ―alert‖ (its most severe warning) in its Failed State 
Index, and the country has consistently ranked in the top 20 failing states in the 
Brookings Institution‘s Index of State Weakness in the Developing World since the 
Index was launched in 2001. 
 
Yet, from the government‘s own perspective the past twenty-five years witnessed a 
period of prolonged state consolidation. The threat posed by insurgent groups12 is at its 
lowest since the country gained independence in 1948 and the government has 
established greater control over parts of the country‘s borderlands in which state 
                                                          
12 The term ‗insurgent group‘ is a contested one, with many armed opposition groups preferring the term 
‗resistance group‘. They argue that the term ‗insurgent‘ portrays their actions as illegal and subversive, 
when it is in fact the state that has acted unlawfully and abusively. My use of the term is not intended to 
be a normative judgement. 
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authority has historically been extremely weak. The military government‘s financial 
position has improved since the late 1980s as it gained greater control over border-
trade and the extraction of the country‘s abundant natural resources. The government‘s 
decision to promulgate a new constitution in 2008, to hold a general election in 2010 
(the first since 1990) and to embark upon a period of sustained political and economic 
reforms since then, is a reflection of the consolidation of state power over the 
preceding two decades. The reforms launched under President Thein Sein‘s 
government since 2010 have been motivated by the government‘s growing 
assertiveness and confidence that it is now in a position to embark upon political and 
economic reforms needed to shake-off its international pariah status without 
threatening the stability of the state and its control over the country. 
     
The emergence of a nominally civilian government following the 2010 election and the 
rhetoric of reform espoused by Thein Sein‘s government has encouraged foreign 
governments, donors and NGOs to re-engage with Myanmar. This has been reflected 
most clearly by the World Bank‘s commitment to support Myanmar‘s ―triple transition 
– from an authoritarian military system to democratic governance, from a centrally 
directed economy to a market-oriented economy, and from 60 years of conflict to 
peace in its border areas‖ (World Bank 2014). Linking these three policy initiatives is a 
desire to fashion a progressive liberal market state. However, by embracing a 
particular vision of how states ought to function, and then measuring state performance 
against this idealised model, the liberal statebuilding paradigm provides a deeply 
problematic framework for engaging with the complex and often deeply illiberal 
processes through which state power is consolidated.   
  
Developing a conceptual framework for understanding how state power is consolidated 
in late-developing post-colonial countries (or what Kevin Woods (2011, 745) terms 
―state[s]-in-formation‖) forms the theoretical foundation for this study.  I argue that the 
past twenty-five years have represented a sustained period of state consolidation in 
Myanmar; yet the dominant liberal statebuilding paradigm offers little explanatory 
power for understanding this process. This chapter seeks to address this weakness by 
developing an alternative conceptual framework through which to interrogate 
processes of state consolidation, founded upon three analytical pillars. The first of 
these emphasizes the importance of analysing power relations to understand how states 
function. I argue that statebuilding is an inherently political and conflictual processes 
defined by contestation over three sources of power: the means of coercion, the means 
of extraction and the legitimation of public authority. The second pillar advocates a 
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historical analysis for understanding the relationship between state institutions and the 
societies they purport to govern. Thirdly, I accentuate the spatial dynamics of state 
consolidation. I challenge state-centric narratives and the reification of the territorially-
bounded nation state, instead emphasizing how dynamics beyond and below the 
nation-state influence how space is governed. This conceptual framework forms the 
foundation of the entire study. It provides a lens through which to analyse the specific 
dynamics of state consolidation in borderland regions (Chapter 3) and to develop new 
insights into the political economy of illegal drugs (Chapter 4), in order to interrogate 
the relationship between the opium/heroin economy and processes of state 
consolidation in Myanmar‘s eastern borderlands.   
 
2.1 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE LIBERAL STATEBUILDING PARADIGM 
Over the past two decades statebuilding has become an essential component of western 
development strategy towards so-called ‗fragile‘ states (Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand 
2004). ―Learning to do state-building better‖ is viewed as ―central to the future of 
world order‖ (Fukuyama 2004, 120), and ―one of the most important foreign policy 
challenges of the contemporary era‖ (Krasner & Pascual 2005, 153). The liberal 
statebuilding agenda has sought to increase state ‗effectiveness‘ by supplanting ―core 
state competencies‖ (OECD 2008) modelled on the institutions of western countries 
and founded upon: (i) democratisation; (ii) the creation of a market economy, (iii) 
welfare provision underpinned by a social contract between the state and its citizens, 
(iv) a legal institutional framework – the rule of law – to protect business and citizens‘ 
rights; and (v) and the development of institutions able to ensure internal security (See 
Azulai et al. 2014; Ghani & Lockhart 2008; USAID 2005; Whaites 2008 and the 
Institute for State Effective (e.g. 2006, 2014) for paradigmatic examples). This highly 
prescriptive and functionalist ―virtuous state-building‖ approach (Giustozzi 2011, 5) 
reflects Fukuyama‘s (2014, 25) aspiration that global prosperity lies in all states 
―getting to Denmark‖, by establishing societies that are ―prosperous, democratic, 
secure, and well governed, and experience[…] low levels of corruption‖. 
 
The conceptualisation of the ideal state, however, is problematic, for at least five 
reasons. First, it reifies the coherence of ‗the state‘. The state becomes viewed as a 
distinct entity, imbued with ―authoritative intentions‖, able to impose rules and 
decisions over society (Mitchell 1991, 85). It is conceptualised as ―essentially a 
subjective realm of plans, programs, or ideas‖, in which the determinant of success 
becomes the quality of the design and implementation of statebuilding initiatives (ibid, 
82). There is an ―almost Hegelian assumption that that the state has an independent 
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identity, a will, and a capacity to choose of its own‖ (Byres 1998, 46).  It is 
conceptualised as able to represent the ‗universal interest‘ of society, and where 
conflicts do emerge, to play the role of neutral arbiter.  
 
Second, this highly prescriptive approach to statebuilding demonstrates fixation with 
outcome, and disregard for process. The policies advocated regarding how to ‗fix‘ 
‗failing‘ states are invariably focused on reaching a specific vision of the state and 
underemphasize how statebuilding is an inherently political process, shaped by the 
structure of power relations within a society. By focusing on the autonomous agency 
of the state, it renders invisible a multitude of actors and institutions, many of which 
reside beyond the formal parameters of state institutions, which determine how state 
power is constructed, subverted and negotiated. As Timothy Mitchell (1991) rightly 
argues, ―the scholarly analysis of the state is liable to reproduce in its own analytical 
tidiness the imaginary coherence and misrepresent the incoherence of state practice‖.   
 
Third, by imbuing the state with a set of pre-existing characteristics – namely a 
legitimate monopoly over the means of violence over a clearly defined territory – and 
defining those states without these characteristics as fragile or failing, liberal 
statebuilding approaches explain away two of the most fundamental processes shaping 
contemporary state consolidation. It is precisely the processes through which 
governments seeks to assert and legitimate control over the means of violence and 
extraction within the territory they lay claim to, that accounts for the diversity in how 
states function. Such normative approaches to statebuilding are unable to account 
adequately for contexts in which the lack of Weberian foundations has not created state 
fragility or led to state breakdown. As Joel Migdal (2001, 15) rightly states, ―the 
fixation with Weberian definitions of the state offers ―no way to theorize about arenas 
of competing sets of rulers, other than to cast these in the negative, as failures or weak 
states or even non-states‖. 
 
Fourth, the projection of how the state should function has commonly invoked a form 
of ―historical amnesia‖ (Cramer 2006, 9). The focus on building ‗better‘ states 
precludes detailed analysis of the historical relationships between governments and the 
tangled array of social groups, institutions and interests that form the societies they 
purport to govern.  
 
Fifth, states have often been conceptualised as top-down, centrally imposed structures 
in which power diffuses outwards to the limits of a state‘s territory. In doing so, it 
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ignores the spatial dynamics of statebuilding, in particular how state ‗territory‘ is 
actually produced and the specific ―ecologies of constraint and opportunity‖ which 
borderlands pose to how states function (Barkey 2008, 36).   
 
2.2 DEVELOPING AN ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STATE 
CONSOLIDATION 
In order to address these weaknesses, this study offers an alternative political economy 
framework for engaging with processes of state consolidation, built upon three 
analytical pillars:  
 
i. Power  
The starting point for understanding how states actually function is to acknowledge 
that statebuilding is an inherently political process riven with intense competition over 
the means to implement and enforce decisions. The state cannot be defined as an 
autonomous agent wielding control ‗over‘ society, but is the institutional structure 
forged out of conflicts and coalitions that develop between various social actors 
competing to exercise ‗state‘ power. This power may be defined as the ability of a state 
institution to ―define and enforce collectively binding decisions on members of society‖ 
(Lund 2011, 887), and is shaped by competition over three resources of power: the 
means of coercion, the means of extraction, and the legitimation of authority. 
Understanding how states function requires analysis of the reflexive relationship 
between existing power structures in society and processes of state consolidation: we 
must understand how society constrains the autonomy of state institutions, but also 
how those commanding state institutions may use their authority to transform existing 
constellations of power within society. It requires us to understand why state 
consolidation is an intensely contested political process, who the key social actors are 
which shape processes of state consolidation, and how the state consolidates power 
over the means of coercion and extraction, and legitimates its authority, in order to 
understand the political settlements and coalitions which determine how states function. 
 
ii. History 
Historical analysis provides insights into the terrain of pre-existing social structures, 
material interests, power relations and competing structures of authority that shape 
processes of state consolidation. It reveals the competing and overlapping forms of 
institutional control alongside which states function, and reveals how processes of state 
consolidation may be defined less by the hegemonic extension of state power and more 
by processes of institutional bricolage and ―sedimentation‖ in which state institutions 
‗pile up‘ alongside pre-existing political institutions (Bierschenk et al. 2002, 6). A 
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historical lens allows us to understand why social groups may react to state authority in 
different ways including direct confrontation, indirect subversion or active 
engagement. This approach enables us to begin to dissect the diversity of state 
performance and move beyond simplistic normative explanations which view states‘ 
inability to impose idealized models of statehood as rooted in corruption, misguided 
planning or technocratic failures of implementation. As a methodology it advocates a 
different frame of analysis that focuses less on the state in vacuo – its professed aims 
and policies and their implementation – but instead conceptualizes the state as a ‗field 
of power‘ in which processes of consolidation are defined by the history of interaction 
between state institutions and social structures.   
 
iii. Space/territory  
Viewing the state as the sole sovereign authority over space has become a cornerstone 
of modern conceptions of the state. Territory is conceptualised as an institutionally 
bounded space governed by the state that is politically, socially and economically 
homogenous. The linkages between territory, political authority and the state, however, 
must be challenged for they reify and essentialise state-territory-authority relations, 
and in doing so overlook the very processes through which territory is actually 
produced. In many states power is widely dispersed, creating a profound disjuncture 
between a state‘s ‗juridical‘ sovereignty – the enshrinement in international law of 
national borders and the state‘s right to control society within these borders – and its 
‗empirical‘ sovereignty, namely its ability to actually to impose control over territory. 
In order to understand how state institutions exert territorial authority we must 
interrogate the historically and geographically specific processes of ‗territorialisation‘, 
through with political authority is over space is established and naturalised. This 
approach engages with how government elites seek to use state institutions to assert 
authority over space, but also requires moving beyond ―seeing like a state‖ in order to 
analyse how these strategies are shaped by dynamics below and beyond the state over 
which central state institutions may have little control. Processes of territorialisation 
offer a crucial, but oft-overlooked variable, which can help to explain the divergence 
of state performance across the world.  
  
2.3 PILLAR ONE: POWER 
 
2.3.1 The ‘dual character’ of state consolidation 
The seductiveness of the ‗idea‘ of the state as a coherent, reified and autonomous 
entity obstructs how this very ‗idea‘ forms a legitimizing discourse for the exercise of 
power, and a mask behind which the machinations of power operate.  This is not to 
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deny that the state is unimportant or unworthy of analysis; stateless societies have 
invariably been short-lived and the construction of a state structure has been 
instrumental to the development of the modern world. The state has become the 
primary means through which to secure order, to facilitate economic development and 
to promote the kinds of services – education, health, judicial – which people demand.  
However, any engagement with how states function must acknowledge the ‘dual 
character’ of the exercise of state power.  Drawing upon the work of Mushtaq Khan 
(2010), this approach requires understanding how the imposition of state power is 
experienced through both its „social‟ impact – how state institutions impact on how 
society functions – and its „distributive‟ impact – how these institutions ―define[...] the 
distribution of the net benefits‖ between different groups in society.   
 
Khan‘s work is primarily focused on understanding how state institutions have 
implications for economic growth and the distribution of material benefits in society. 
Yet, understanding the dual character of the exercise of state power is an insightful 
way of understanding processes of state consolidation.  For example, a central tenet of 
almost all definitions of the state is that it controls the means of coercion.  The state‘s 
ability to wield a monopoly over the means of violence is often viewed as the state‘s 
primary raison d‘être, allowing society to move beyond the Hobbesian condition of a 
constant war of all against all. Control over the proliferation of weapons and the state‘s 
ability to prevent the use of violence becoming a means of arbitration may represent an 
inherently positive social impact of state consolidation. Yet, we cannot ignore the 
distributional impact of such processes.  In societies where the state has no a priori 
monopoly over the means of violence but is instead confronted by powerful social 
groups who contest its authority, attempts to create a state monopoly on coercion may 
enable the state to use violence to assert control over populations and resources, whilst 
denying other groups this right to protect their own interests. Whilst the liberal 
statebuilding paradigm emphasises the dangers posed by fragile states, it is equally 
true that the ‗distributional impact‘ of statebuilding processes many pose profound 
risks and challenges to many social groups who may view state encroachment as a 
greater threat than the absence of formal state institutions.   
 
2.3.2 The state as a ‘field of power’ 
In order to embrace the dual character of processes of state consolidation we must 
view the state as a site of societal contest, a ―field of power‖, defined by Bourdieu as 
―the space of play within which holders of capital….struggle in particular for power 
over the state‖ (Bourdieu 1994, 5). The ‗state‘ is not a single actor, but represents the 
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administrative structures, conventions and distribution of resources within society that 
develop as a result of conflict and coalitions between various actors. The ‗government‘ 
is often the single most powerful entity within society and may seek to drive certain 
‗statebuilding‘ initiatives.  However, the statebuilding processes, including efforts to 
impose taxation, manage property rights, govern access to resources, and to control the 
means of violence, are likely to be heavily contested by other social actors in societies 
where there are competing centres of power, legitimacy, violence and ideologies. This 
emphasizes the need to distinguish between processes of statebuilding and state 
consolidation. Statebuilding is defined as conscious, pro-active efforts to ―establish an 
apparatus of control‖ (Goodhand, 2009, 7; Berman and Lonsdale 1992, 5; Bliesemann 
de Guevara, 2012: 5). State consolidation on the other hand, reflects a more immanent 
process of ―conflicts, negotiations and compromises between diverse groups‖ which 
shape how state institutions become embedded in society (Berman & Lonsdale 1992, 
5).  
 
Analysing state consolidation engages with processes as much as outcomes and 
addresses how ―purposeful attempts at establishing state institutions are ‗bent‘ by the 
complex social processes they provoke and by the compromises they require‖ 
(Bliesemann de Guevara 2012: 5; de Certeau 1984). It focuses less upon the specific 
design of statebuilding initiatives and more upon understanding the specific processes 
of interaction – including both conflict and coalition – between various social actors 
and the ―political settlements‖ that emerge (Di John 2008; Di John & Putzel 2008; 
Khan 2000; Parks & Cole 2010). These political settlements reflect the ―shifting 
constellations of power that underpin formal and informal institutional arrangements‖, 
which emerge between various social actors and the way in which resources (political, 
economic and social) are distributed as a consequence (Di John 2008, 35). It is these 
forms of coalitions and deal-making that may ‗corrupt‘ the initial aspirations of 
statebuilding initiatives; the resulting state institutions should not, however, 
automatically be viewed as deviant or failing, but may instead represent the most 
viable means through which the interests of various powerful social actors are 
accommodated in societies still affected by ―the brutal politics of sovereignty‖ 
(Goodhand 2009, 9). From this starting point it then becomes possible to address more 
fundamental questions surrounding processes of state consolidation, including: how 
state institutions manage competing sources of authority; whether political coalitions 
and settlements ultimately serve to fortify or fragment state authority; the extent to 
which these political settlements promote or undermine stability and economic 
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development, and the role that resources, including illegal goods (the subject of the 
Chapter 3), play in these processes.  
 
State consolidation can therefore be understood as being shaped by the following two 
processes:  
 
1. Contestation over three resources of power.  The first is competition for 
control over the means of coercion, which embodies the ability to enforce 
obedience; Second, is the competition for control over the means of extraction, 
both in terms of taxation and resource exploitation, and the ability to control 
the means of ―appropriation-displacement-exploitation-accumulation‖ inherent 
within capitalism (Li 2007, 19); third, is the contest over the very legitimacy of 
the exercise of public authority.       
 
2. Monopolizing versus managing resources of power. State consolidation may 
be defined by both: (i) attempts by governments to monopolize and centralize 
control over the means of coercion and extraction and the legitimation of 
authority; (ii) a more pragmatic and pared-down attempt to manage power 
relations through processes of coalition-building, negotiation and brokerage 
with other powerful social actors. These practices seek to establish order and 
limit the opposition against formal state authority but may result in the 
proliferation rather than centralization of power in society. These two strategies 
often occur in parallel, reflecting the tensions that exist between statebuilding 
aspirations and the more prosaic difficulties of actually exercising authority in 
spaces where the state‘s writ has historically been weak.     
 
2.3.3 Resources of power 
 
i. The means of coercion 
Establishing control over the means of coercion is viewed as the cornerstone of the 
modern state. It enables governments to implement and enforce decisions and is 
instrumental in ensuring that those social groups adversely affected by the 
‗distributive‘ impact of government decisions do not mount armed opposition 
against the state. Much of the literature on statebuilding has equated the 
consolidation of state power with the state‘s monopolization over the means of 
coercion. This draws upon the history of European state formation where the 
monopolization of the means of coercion was central to the state‘s ability to 
overcome external and internal threats (Tilly 1990; Leander 2004). Liberal 
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statebuilding interventions have sought to strengthen the state‘s monopolisation 
over the means of violence through ‗security sector reform‘ (SSR) and 
‗demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration‘ (DDR) programmes, as well as 
judicial and bureaucratic reforms designed to strengthen and legitimate the state as 
the ―primary security organ‖ (MacGinty 2010, 581; see also Call & Stanley 2008).  
 
However, defining state consolidation narrowly in terms of the state‘s capacity to 
establish a monopoly over the means of violence is problematic.  As Diane Davis‘ 
and Anthony Pereira‘s (2003) work attests, the model of European state formation 
has been oversimplified.  Looking retrospectively from the vantage point of today‘s 
highly centralised states, there has been a tendency to view the military as ―a 
relatively centralized and homogenous national institution established in the service 
of the national state‖ (Davis 2003, 11). In doing so the important role played by 
―irregular armed forces‖, including retainers, militias, guerrillas, paramilitaries, 
mercenaries and vigilantes has been expunged. This approach also overlooks the 
fact that many states have been unable (or have not necessarily sought) to 
monopolise the means of coercion and, despite ‗failing‘ to do so, are not racked by 
disorder.  
 
There are many reasons why governments may seek ways to maintain order and 
obedience without establishing a state monopoly over the means of violence, not 
least the cost of maintaining a large army and conducting prolonged military 
offensives, especially in states where remote terrain, especially mountains and 
forests, make it difficult to overcome pockets of armed resistance.  There is also the 
risk that the strategies required to establish a monopoly on coercion, which may 
include conscription, prolonged military occupation, the use of martial law, counter-
insurgency strategies that target civilians as well as armed opposition and heavy 
military spending may actually de-legitimise the state and incite opposition.  
 
The specific international context in which post-colonial states consolidated is also 
important. Since the end of World War Two, even in countries where central 
government authority is weak, Cold War superpower patronage and the continued 
near-inviolability of state borders in international law reduced the risk that states 
faced from external invasion. This diminished the need to establish large standing 
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armies, weakening the Tillyian linkage between war-making and state-making 
(Tilly 1975; 1990; Leander 2004; Ahram 2011). In this context, some incumbent 
governments have been reluctant to build strong centralised military institutions, 
aware that military leaders may use such a power base to launch military coups 
against them, and have instead retained the use of ‗irregular armed forces‘.  
 
The use of ‗irregular‘ or proxy armed forces may also confer upon the state elites a 
number of advantages.  They may be cheaper to maintain than regular armies, 
especially in protracted low-intensity conflicts; they may have ―superior knowledge 
of the physical and cultural terrain in their respective territories‖; and they may be 
used to carry out ‗dirty work‘ (such as extrajudicial killings of opposition and brutal 
counterinsurgency campaign) in such a way that provides governments with a 
degree of plausible deniability (Ahram 2011, 14). Such actions rely upon the 
strategic ‗illegibility‘ of coercive power, rather than its formalization.  
 
Analysing how the means of violence is managed requires understanding how state 
institutions may engage with, rather than necessarily seek to overcome, other social 
groups who wield coercive power. These processes may not necessarily increase 
‗state fragility‘ but they do emphasize the importance of understanding how state 
consolidation may be founded upon efforts to manage, rather than necessarily 
monopolize, coercive power. One of the most effective ways for governments 
manage coercive power may be to create what Douglass North et al. (2007 & 2009) 
have described as ‗limited access orders‘, whereby the government uses its control 
over the political and economic system to create ‗rents‘ by manipulating access to 
certain political privileges and economic opportunities. Powerful groups and 
individuals who wield the ability to challenge state authority are given access to 
these rents in an attempt to gain their loyalty and encourage them to co-operate with 
the state and with each other rather than to fight. In contexts where state institutions 
have no monopoly over the means of violence, political and economic structures 
may thus be designed to create the rents which ―provide[...] the glue that holds the 
coalition together, enabling elite groups to make credible commitments to one 
another to support the regime and perform their functions‖ (North et al, 2007: 8).  
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The ‗failure‘ of states to enact democratisation, promote market liberalisation, 
uphold the rule of law and prioritise greater government accountability and 
transparency in line with the ‗good governance agenda‘ cannot simply be blamed 
upon corruption or a lack of political will but may be rooted in the fact that such 
processes threaten to destabilise the system of rents upon which stability is built. 
Raeymaekers et al‘s (2008) conceptualisation of the ―mediated‖ state draws 
attention to many ―no-war-no-peace‖ contexts across the world where the state is 
neither collapsed nor moving in teleological fashion towards establishing a 
monopoly over the means of violence, and reveals how governance structures may 
be founded upon bargaining processes and coalition-building between state and 
non-state actors and the ―co-existence of multiple public authorities‖. Moving 
beyond the language of state ‗fragility‘ offers a valuable starting point from which 
to analyse why the stability, durability, extent of violence and developmental 
outcomes of ‗mediated states‘ varies and thus to develop more nuanced insights into 
why states perform so differently.     
 
ii. The means of extraction 
Processes of state consolidation are also determined by contestation for control over 
the means of extraction or, in Bourdieu‘s (1994, 4) terms, the concentration of 
―economic capital‖.  This includes control over taxation, resource extraction and 
trade.  Importantly, it also relates to the ―unification of economic space‖ under state 
control, by which I mean the ability of state institutions to impose and enforce the 
‗rules of the game‘ surrounding economic practices, for example through the 
imposition of a single system of state-defined land laws and the dismantling of 
other forms of customary land tenure (ibid, 5). Controlling resource extraction plays 
an important role in processes of state consolidation for a number of reasons:   
 
First, extraction generates the revenue needed to finance the expansion of the state‘s 
legibility and iconography.  This includes the construction of state infrastructure – 
armies, police forces, central offices, palaces, roads and railways, border 
checkpoints – and also the financing of a bureaucracy with the capability to reach 
down into society and to unify the practices of social life within the confines set by 
the state.  This entails: (i) the financing of local government departments to regulate 
tax collection, manage the local economy, carry out judicial functions, and to 
provide services; (ii) the collection and codification of data – Bourdieu‘s 
―informational capital‖ – such as census data, cartography and land records; and (iii) 
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the policing of everyday practices to prevent the transgression of state-defined 
practices. 
 
Second, extraction finances the provision of services, which may be essential to 
legitimating state authority and preserving order. The relationship between 
extraction and legitimation is complex.  On the one hand extraction reveals the ‗raw‘ 
power of the state, in terms of its ability to reach down into the pockets of its 
citizens and to forcibly open up new spaces for resource extraction through land 
dispossession and forced displacement, often inciting challenges to the state‘s 
legitimacy.  However, the state‘s regulation of the economy (through the use of one 
single state-sanctioned currency, the printing of money, the role of central banks, 
and the function of the judicial system to uphold property rights), and the use of 
revenue to build the iconography of the state and to provide services can help to 
imprint the ‗idea‘ of the state. As Bourdieu (1994, 7) argues, ―the state 
progressively inscribes itself in a space that is not yet the national space it will later 
become but that already presents itself as a fount of sovereignty.‖  
 
Third, controlling the means of extraction also relates to the ability to govern the 
volatile dynamics of capitalism and ensure that these dynamics strengthen rather 
than undermine the construction of state power. There is a powerful spatial aspect to 
these dynamics, which is analysed in greater detail in section 4.2.1, below.  
 
Fourth, the ability of state institutions to control the means of extraction is also 
essential to the forms of negotiation and coalition-building surrounding state 
consolidation (Di John & Putzel 2009; Khan 2000). Controlling the means of 
extraction may revolve around the management rather than monopolisation of 
revenue flows. Governments may seek to direct revenue flows in order to create the 
rents that underpin limited access orders.  In such cases, state actors may not 
directly channel revenue to the centre, but may grant ‗taxation‘ rights and 
‗extraction‘ rights to other powerful social groups in order to gain their co-operation, 
whilst simultaneously seeking to deny revenue-generating opportunities to those 
opposing state authority. Attempts to direct trade flows away from border points 
controlled by opposition groups through trade gates controlled by the state or 
groups allied to it provide a good example. These kinds of activities may also create 
„hierarchies of extraction‟ in which state actors allow powerful local elites to 
extract revenue in areas under their control (though taxation, control over trade, or 
the sale of natural resources) in return for ensuring these territories are stable and 
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orderly, allowing the government to extract resources from the same area through 
large-scale projects, such as dam-building or mining. Understanding how resources 
may be used for political rather than economic purposes offers greater scope for 
interrogating what determines whether political coalitions built around resource 
rents prove durable, stable, peaceful and developmental, or continue to provoke 
conflict and prove antithetical to economic growth.    
 
iii. Legitimation 
Thirdly, state consolidation is defined by the contest over the very legitimacy of the 
exercise of state power. Henri Lefebvre‘s (1991, 280, 308) assertion that the 
modern state is a form of ―violence directed towards a space‖, designed to create a 
unified and homogenous society within a space that ―has nothing homogenous 
about it‖, provides a powerful corrective to state-centric analysis. It captures the 
essence of how the struggle for legitimacy is a heavily contested process in which 
the consolidation of state authority is often predicated upon wrestling support away 
from other social actors. It challenges the assumption underlying the liberal 
statebuilding paradigm that social contracts forged between the state and civil 
society confer upon the state the legitimacy to exercise authority. Indeed, the history 
of state consolidation reveals that social contracts often emerged after the 
aggrandizement of state authority, rather than as an a priori mechanism through 
which to legitimate this process. An inherent contradiction has often existed in 
which attempts to legitimize state authority took place at the same time as state 
actors sought to dismantle pre-existing ‗non-state‘ social structures and to control 
and extract resources from populations (in the form of taxation and systems of land 
control). Amidst these processes many communities‘ initial interaction with state 
authority has been one of exploitation and extraction in the form of taxation, 
conscription, and dispossession, rather than any kind of welfare or service provision.  
The value of these insights lies not in advocating a simplistic conceptualisation of 
state-society relations as antagonistic and confrontational, but does reveal how 
attempts to impose state authority rarely enjoy universal legitimacy and are heavily 
contested by social groups seeking to re-work the state‘s growing presence and 
power to their own advantage.  
 
The quest for legitimacy is founded upon attempts by state actors to make societies 
and cultures more easily ‗legible‘ and ‗governable‘, in order to control populations 
and impose regularised systems of taxation and land ownership (Scott 1998).  
Attempts to make the state‘s right to govern autonomously over a given territory 
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appear ―incontestable and exclusive‖ should be understood as part of a wider 
process of ―territorial socialization‖ (Newman & Paasi 1998, 196; Duchacek 1970). 
The very aim of such narratives is to shroud the violence, contestation and 
subversion which often underpin these processes and to project state power over 
areas where state authority often remains anything but hegemonic. Establishing 
legitimacy provides the means to normalize the exercise of state power and to 
encourage groups in society to act within the confines of the political system rather 
than to oppose it. The process of legitimation forms the cornerstone of the creation 
of ―infrastructural power‖, which enables state actors to govern ‗through society‘, 
rather than rely perpetually upon the use of ―despotic power‖ to impose control 
‗over society‘ (Mann 1984). It creates ‗disciplinary power‘ by forging the 
boundaries of (state-defined) acceptable social behaviour and ensures that these 
boundaries are internalised by populations (Foucault 1975).  
 
2.4 PILLAR TWO: HISTORY 
History provides a devastating dismantling of the ‗amnesia‘ that underpins the liberal 
statebuilding paradigm and reveals the disjuncture between contemporary models of 
statebuilding and the processes through which states have historically consolidated 
control.  The ―virtuous‖ liberal statebuilding model overlooks (or actively erases) the 
distinctly non-virtuous and illiberal processes of violence, coercion and dispossession 
that have been an instrumental part of state consolidation through history (Giustozzi 
2011; Tilly 1990; Boege et al 2008; Cramer 2006). It ignores the fact that the history 
of state empowerment is also the story of the disempowerment of other structures of 
non-state authority and power. Historical analysis of state consolidation therefore 
warns against the tendency to conflate statebuilding with peacebuilding and the 
assumption that state empowerment is necessarily an antidote to conflict. The 
dominant statebuilding model also overlooks the fact that the institutions which now 
define modern European statehood (i.e. liberal market democracies) developed 
incrementally after the state‘s consolidation of coercive and extractive power and 
territorial control (Tilly 1990). However, the value of taking a historical approach lies 
not only in its destructive dismantling of the liberal statebuilding paradigm. It also 
offers a constructive methodological framework for how to analyse the state and an 
alternative starting point for engaging with the empirical realities surrounding how 
state power is constructed and reproduced. I argue that this approach offers three 
important ways of engaging with processes of state consolidation. 
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2.4.1 Historicizing state-society relations 
A historical analysis offers insights into the terrain of pre-existing social structures, 
material interests and power relations upon which processes of state consolidation are 
contested. It reveals the competing and overlapping forms of institutional control 
alongside which states institutions function, and reveals how processes of state 
consolidation may be defined less by the hegemonic extension of state power and more 
by processes of institutional bricolage and ‗sedimentation‘ in which state institutions 
‗pile up‘ alongside pre-existing political institutions (Bierschenk et al. 2002, 6). 
Throughout much of the postcolonial world, ―states are ‗younger‘ than the societies 
they purport to administer and the demarcation of borders preceded nation-building‖ 
(Goodhand 2008, 228). Trade, migration, capital flows and familial networks have 
historically extended ‗beyond‘ the national borders constructed by states, creating 
loyalties and resources flows beyond the purview of state institutions (Sadan 2013). As 
James Scott (2009, 5) argues in relation to Southeast Asia, ―to an eye not yet 
hypnotized by…state-centric histories, the landscape would have seemed virtually all 
periphery and no centers‖ in which people‘s lives were governed by social structures 
beyond the state and with worldviews unencumbered by the idea of the nation-state. 
Processes of state consolidation are not an institutional tabula rasa, nor do they simply 
extend outwards across previously anarchic spaces. As Sudipta Kaviraj (1991, 73) 
asserts, ―all societies have structures and states have to obey to their logic and adapt to 
its compulsions.‖ As a methodological approach, taking historical seriously advocates 
a different frame of analysis and a different analytical starting point, one that focuses 
less on the state in vacuo – its professed aims and policies and their implementation – 
but instead conceptualizes the state as a field of power in which processes of 
consolidation are defined by the interaction between the state and other social actors 
and institutions. Such understanding enables us to begin to dissect the diversity of state 
performance. 
 
2.4.2 Rendering visible the multitude of social actors and ‘twilight’ 
institutions which impact upon how state power is consolidated 
Analysing state consolidation through a historical lens also reveals the conceptual 
sterility of the simplistic binaries that are often drawn between ‗state‘ and ‗non-state‘ 
actors and reveals how the actions and interests of social actors commonly straddle 
these supposed boundaries. A historical analysis demonstrates the importance of 
―twilight institutions‖, defined as institutions which may not enjoy legal recognition as 
a formal part of the state but which nevertheless exercise public authority, and 
influence how formal power structures operate (Lund 2006). Engaging with the history 
of these kinds of ‗twilight institutions‘ provides insights into: (i) the foundations of 
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their authority: i.e. whether authority lies in their recourse to physical/coercive power; 
control over sources of capital and credit and access to markets; symbolic authority in 
the form of religious or cultural leaders; access to the state resources; and/or their 
ability to hold the state at bay; (ii) the material interests of these institutions: i.e. the 
extent to which processes of state consolidation and capitalist expansion embody 
threats or opportunities to the authority of twilight institutions; (iii) how these 
institutions have historically interacted with state structures, which may offer insights 
into how they are likely to interact with the state in the future and the kinds of conflict 
or negotiation which may emerge. 
 
This historical approach also offers a way of navigating some of the pitfalls inherent in 
―renaissance of interest in ‗the local‘‖ in peacebuilding and statebuilding policy, which 
has increased willingness amongst policymakers to consider engagement with ‗non-
state‘ forms of authority (Mac Ginty & Richmond 2013, 771; cf: UNDP 2014; 
Brinkerhoff 2011). Engaging with the history of ‗non-state‘ social actors – whether 
they be armed groups, village headmen, religious leaders, respected elders, traders, 
moneylenders or private companies – offers scope to understand better their material 
interests and foundations of authority without falling into the trap of viewing these 
actors as necessarily having greater social legitimacy or local ―embeddedness‖ 
(Meagher 2012). 
 
2.4.3 Accounting for the ‘punctuated equilibrium’ of state formation 
The trajectory of state-society relations is defined by interspersed periods of conflict 
and stability, phases of rapid change and the empowerment of state institutions, and 
periods of seeming hiatus or backsliding. It is marked by periods of state encroachment 
into new social spaces (whether in the form of territorial spaces or spheres of social 
activity previously beyond its control,) and periods of retreat where non-formal or 
‗twilight‘ institutions may once again gain the upper hand in shaping public authority 
in these spheres.  
 
Studies which view state consolidation as a gradualist, teleological process of 
convergence towards an ideal state form, and ignore the uneven, non-linear, conflict-
ridden nature of this process, are likely to exaggerate the durability of periods of 
statebuilding, and despair at times when the authority of state institutions wanes. A 
historical approach allows us to move beyond the hyperbolic language of 
‗success‘/‗transformation‘ and state ‗failure‘ and ‗collapse‘ that these studies stimulate 
and instead emphasizes the importance of interrogating why the process of state 
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consolidation is one of ‗punctuated equilibrium‘ (Cramer & Goodhand 2002, 898). It 
forces us to generate explanations beyond merely the internal analysis of specific 
statebuilding policies (whether external interventions or domestic government-led 
strategies). Instead, it engenders (i) a broader historical scope: for many states in the 
Global South this necessitates consideration of the enduring colonial legacy upon 
contemporary state consolidation, including how colonial rule impacted upon the 
structure of state-society relations, how it (dis)empowered certain social groups, and 
the specific conditions through which countries entered the global capitalist economy; 
(ii) a broader geographical scope: examining how developments beyond a country‘s 
borders define the trajectory of state consolidation, something that requires analysis of 
processes of state consolidation to move beyond the prism of ‗national histories‘. For 
example, it requires engaging with how changes in neighbouring polities (such as 
levels of repression, economic malaise or changes in regulation such as criminalisation 
of certain commodities) have historically pushed flows of people and commodities 
across borders in ways that have re-shaped power structures and impacted upon the 
coalitions or ‗limited access orders‘ which underpin political settlements.  
 
2.5 PILLAR THREE: SPACE AND TERRITORY 
 
2.5.1 Escaping the ‘territorial trap’ 
The nation-state has become the territorial prism through which the contemporary 
world is defined and made legible. Territory is conceptualised as an institutionally 
bounded space governed by the state that is politically, socially and economically 
homogenous. The state is implicitly defined by its ―verticality‖ – its position above 
society – and its ―encompassment‖ – its ability to radiate power outwards to the limits 
of its territorial boundaries. As James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta (2002, 982) argue, 
―these two metaphors work together to produce a taken-for-granted spatial and scalar 
image of a state that both sits above and contains its localities, regions and 
communities‖.  
 
The idea of the territorially defined nation-state has been an extremely seductive one. 
The social sciences emerged as modern European territorial states came to dominate 
the world and social scientists have largely ―stood in awe of the state‖ (van Schendel 
2005, 38). This idea has also been embraced by many post-colonial state elites seeking 
to consolidate state authority in regions in which state institutions have historically 
been weak, heavily contested and expensive to impose. The territorial claims made by 
state elites have been closely linked to forms of ―official nationalism‖, defined as 
attempts by state leaders to forge legitimacy through conflating state, territory, nation 
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and society in order to proclaim ―exclusive national cultures‖ (Paasi 2003, 111). 
Control over land/space and the attempts to reify borders as a clear boundary between 
‗us‘ and ‗them‘ have been instrumental to nationalist discourses.  Cartographic 
imagery of clearly bounded states, the imposition of a single lexicon of state-
sanctioned place-names, and the creation of a bureaucratic structure claiming to 
control social practice all serve to construct the appearance of the state as a timeless, 
dispassionate neutral arbiter above and encompassing society. The spatial imagery of 
the state is also important in creating ‗mental maps‘ and instilling ‗disciplinary power‘, 
encouraging those seeking to exercise power to do so through state institutions rather 
than outside of them, and so constraining the modes of possible opposition to the state 
(Migdal 2004; Foucault 1975). 
 
However, the reified linkages between territory, political authority and the state are 
deeply problematic. The historical processes through which territorial sovereignty is 
forged have been ignored and the idealized European model of ―territorial statehood‖ 
(Agnew 2008, 180) has been projected onto the rest of the world. Space is viewed as 
―a realm of stasis, as a pre-given, unchanging territorial platform upon which social 
action occurs‖ (Brenner 1999, 41). This creates a ―methodological nationalism‖, which 
sits uneasily with the reality that in many states power is widely dispersed (Agnew 
1991). Consequently, much analysis has fallen into what John Agnew (1994) has 
termed a ―territorial trap‖, succumbing to three ―uninterrogated geographical 
assumptions‖. First, the assumption that the state wields sovereignty over the entirety 
of its territorial jurisdiction, including all political and economic processes that take 
place within this territory; Second, the assumption that social, political and economic 
life can be clearly delineated into ‗domestic‘ and ‗international‘ spheres; Third, the 
assumption that the state is the ‗container‘ of society and that economies, societies and 
polities are bounded by the cartographic lines which mark a state‘s territory.  
 
This ‗territorial trap‘ ignores the processes through which states seek to territorialise 
power and the impact which these processes have on defining the nature of political 
settlements. The state‘s control over its national territory has been presented ―as a 
natural precondition of social and political existence rather than being seen as a 
product of historically determinate strategies of parcelization, centralization, enclosure, 
and encaging‖ (Brenner 1999, 49. See also: Agnew 2008; Agnew and Corbridge 1995; 
Baud & van Schendel 1997; Goodhand 2008; Newman and Paasi 1998). As Ferguson 
and Gupta (2002, 983) elucidate,  
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the point is not that this picture of the ―up there‖ state is false (still less that there is no such 
thing as hierarchy, generality of interest, etc.) but that it is constructed; the task is not to 
denounce a false ideology but to draw attention to the social and imaginative processes 
through which verticality is made effective and authoritative. 
 
The ‗territorial trap‘ also renders invisible the multiplicity of actors and social forces 
beyond and below formal state institutions which shape how territory is produced. The 
construction of authority over space emerges out of both ―intentional territorial 
strategies‖ directed by the state, and an array of forces which may seeks to ―contest, 
challenge and transgress‖ these strategies (Novak 2011, 747).  We must understand 
that territory is both ―the expression of state-centred spatial orders‖, yet also 
―simultaneously, the product of, and resources for, individuals, organisations and 
social groups whose discourses and practices are organised across non-state centred 
scales‖ (ibid, 742-3).  
 
2.5.2 The ‘production of territory’ 
Escaping the ―territorial trap‖ when analysing state consolidation requires a 
historically and geographically specific analysis of how state authority over space is 
produced and becomes naturalised (Lefebvre 1991). I argue that this process may be 
best understood as governed by three intersecting processes:  
 
i. State strategies of territorial control   
First, the ‗production‘ of territory is shaped by the attempts of state institutions to 
‗homogenize‘ territory and populations – defined as the attempt to establish a single 
form of political authority and administrative control over space. This process is driven 
by attempts to make societies and cultures more easily ‗legible‘ and ‗governable‘, in 
order to control populations and to impose regularised systems of taxation and land 
ownership (Scott 1998). These processes embody an intentional strategy by state elites 
to control the means of coercion and the means of extraction through the spatial 
institutionalization of power (Paasi, 1996). Territorial control also facilitates the 
construction of boundaries – both physical and symbolic – through which state 
institutions are able to set ―the limits of acceptable political, economic and social 
behavior‖ (Taylor 2009, 11). This allows state actors to define social boundaries of 
inclusion/exclusion and to build national identities, in which citizens are defined by 
their relation to the territorial state and its institutions.  
 
ii. Spatial dynamics of capitalism 
The spatial configurations of class structures, modes of production and capital 
accumulation have long fascinated Marxist political geographers (Harvey 2001). 
Capitalism‘s perpetual expansion and drive to overcome spatial barriers to profit 
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through transport and communications innovation (the ―annihilation of space through 
time‖ (Marx, cited in Harvey 2003) has been instrumental in the uneven processes of 
territorialisation which shape global development (Harvey 2001; 2003; 2005; Lefebvre 
1991; De Angelis 2004). For the purposes of this analysis, I engage with this literature 
more narrowly to focus on the relationship between the spatial dynamics of capitalism 
and the consolidation of state power over space. The extent to which capitalist forces 
serve to strengthen or destabilise state territorialisation is heavily contested, reflecting 
in many ways a major dialectic within capitalism itself.   
 
Many studies on contemporary globalisation argue that capitalist forces have proved 
contradictory to processes of state consolidation, calling into question the viability of 
the nation-state to serve as the primary territorial unit through which to preserve order, 
stimulate development and deliver services (Leander 2004; Duffield 1998; Evans 1997; 
Strange 1995). Capitalism, it is argued, is defined by a constant quest for 
deterritorialization – the creation of a single global market, the free flow of capital and 
labour, and the deconstruction of borders. In the age of neoliberalism, policies of 
deregulation, privatisation, structural adjustment and the supremacy of transnational 
finance have weakened the motivation and ability within state institutions to assert 
territorial control.  Taxation, once the driving force for establishing state bureaucracies 
to control space (or more accurately populations within space), has been replaced by 
access to international capital flows as the primary means of financing states (Leander 
2004). Controlling capital no longer requires the expansion of territorial control; rather 
it is founded upon maintaining access to flows of international capital, a process which 
often is conditioned by neoliberal demands for deregulation, privatisation and ‗smaller‘ 
states.  
 
These policies have undermined the state‘s capacity to monopolise control over space 
for a number of reasons. Declining budgets have limited state patronage networks, 
weakening the capacity of governments to co-opt powerful elites through access to 
state positions or state-controlled rents such as licenses and import/export quotas. 
Capitalist modes of production may therefore undermine the ways which states have 
previously sought to use economic resources to forge stable political settlements. 
Furthermore, declining state budgets and the ―diminished interest of external powers in 
propping up armed forces for larger geo-political reasons‖ has reduced the scope for 
states to establish armed forces capable of monopolising the means of coercion within 
its territory (Leander 2004, 7). Alongside the declining capacity of central state 
institutions to order space, capitalism‘s perpetual geographical expansion has 
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empowered sub-national elites who have the de facto power to control access to space 
and the resources (both natural and human) contained therein. This has intensified the 
interaction between transnational capitalist forces and local elites at the expense of an 
increasingly marginalised central state (Reno 1998).  
 
More broadly, the mobility of capital and labour under neoliberal globalisation creates 
new forms of identity politics that unsettle the nationalist ideology upon which the 
legitimation of the modern nation-state has been forged. Nationalist ideology is 
founded upon the construction of boundaries, which capitalist forces transgress and 
erode. This contradiction may manifest itself at borders where the free flows of 
migrant labour and the dominance of foreign currency and trade networks can make a 
mockery of the rigid ‗us/them‘ divide which borders are meant to symbolise. These 
contradictions may also occur in urban spaces where the concentration of migrant 
labour and/or foreign investment (for example in elite gated neighbourhoods) may 
create conjunctural spaces – segregated sites of lived-in space dissimilated from the 
nation-state and the imagined community it is meant to represent (De Genova 2014). 
In sum, ―research has represented the spaces of globalisation (based upon circulation, 
flows, and geographical mobility) and the spaces of territorialisation (based upon 
enclosure, borders and geographical fixity) as mutually opposed systems of interaction‖ 
(Brenner 1999, 60). 
 
This apparent contradiction, however, has been challenged by a growing literature that 
demonstrates the synergy between the production of state territory and the spatial 
foundations of neoliberalism. (Barney 2008; Brenner 1999; Brenner & Elden 2009; 
Peluso & Lund 2011; Woods 2011). These studies draw attention to the fact that the 
spread of capitalism demands an institutional and political structure through which 
resources can be commoditized, new property right regimes can become entrenched 
and new capitalist social relations can be reproduced. David Harvey‘s (2003) analysis 
of the inherent dialectic within capitalism between ―fixity and motion‖ draws attention 
to the fact that the mobility of capital, labour and goods is reliant upon relatively fixed 
forms of territorial organisation – infrastructure, urban spaces, communication 
networks and regulation. The territorialisation of space also enables the state to impose 
order, stability and coherence upon the inherently volatile, contested and destabilising 
forces unleashed by capitalism. As Brenner (1999, 43-4) argues, ―against conceptions 
of globalization as a process of state demise or erosion‖, territorial states should be 
understood as ―essential geographical components of the globalization 
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process…[and]…have operated as provisionally stabilized forms of territorialization 
for successive rounds of capital accumulation.‖  
 
Kevin Woods (2011, 753) develops a similar line of reasoning in relation specifically 
to Kachin State in northern Myanmar, where he argues that the military government is 
―appropriating the market to do battle‖ in order to territorialise areas previously 
controlled by insurgent groups. By directing transnational finance into resource-rich 
upland areas where state control has historically been extremely weak, the government 
has been able to establish military-private partnerships which have spearheaded both 
processes of primitive accumulation and increased state legibility, thus converting the 
state‘s de jure sovereignty into de facto control. In these contested borderland spaces, 
national and transnational corporations have sought to promote functioning state 
institutions, viewing these as the most viable way to ―fix, regulate and expand 
capitalist spaces‖, most importantly to uphold and enforce their property ‗rights‘ (ibid, 
751). Through these new ―geographies of power‖ the state is thus able to 
institutionalize territorial control over borderland areas where its sovereignty has 
historically been extremely weak (ibid, 767).   
 
The relevance of this debate to my conceptual framework for engaging with state 
consolidation lies in the diversity of potential outcomes that it reveals. It emphasizes 
the centrality of engaging empirically with the relationship between capitalist spatial 
forces and state strategies of territorialisation within specific localities and the non-
linear ways in which this relationship changes over time. It reveals the importance of 
analysing how capitalism defines and redefines the ‗field of power‘ surrounding the 
state and the extent to which capitalism strengthens or undermines the limited access 
orders and political settlements which underpin processes of ‗negotiated statehood‘. 
  
iii. The “multiple territorial strategies” of everyday life 
The specific spatial dynamics of state consolidation also requires engaging with how 
state strategies to institutionalise territorial control and capitalist forces are contested, 
re-woven, appropriated and subverted through a multitude of quotidian struggles and 
practices. It requires us to engage with the dynamic relationship between government 
rationalities, capitalist forces and the active, productive role of populations (Novak 
2011). The ‗production of territory‘ is thus both a cause of contestation and conflict, 
and is itself shaped by these conflicts (Lefebvre 1991; Brenner & Elden 2009, 367). 
This reveals the constant volatility and perpetual contestation which surrounds 
attempts to create and reproduce ‗abstract‘ state space.  
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Understanding ―how territory unfolds in its actuality‖ thus requires us to consider who 
benefits and who loses from processes of territorialisation, why, and how (Novak 2011, 
742).  It requires us to engage with the relative power of groups which are affected by 
processes of territorialisation, the kinds of alliances which may be forged in support 
and opposition to these processes (including their transnational nature), and how these 
alliances change over time. It necessitates understanding the resources of power which 
social groups have and the types of strategies which they may deploy. In doing so we 
can begin to understand the ways in which populations seek to uphold or transgress 
certain spatial configurations of power and the impact this is likely to have on 
processes of state consolidation.  
 
2.5.3 Borderlands as ‘extreme’ sites of territorialisation 
Borderlands embody ‗extreme‘ sites of territorialisation since the spatial dynamics of 
these regions have a profound impact upon all three processes outlined above, i.e. state 
strategies of territorial control, the dynamics of capitalist forces and the productive 
capacity of populations to re-work government rationalities and capitalist forces. 
Rather than develop this argument superficially here, explaining the ‗centrality‘ of 
borderland spaces to processes of state consolidation forms the subject of the next 
chapter in which I argue that understanding how state institutions are constructed and 
contested in borderland spaces deserves a more central place in frameworks for 
understanding state consolidation. 
 
2.5.4 The heterogeneity of territorial practises 
The emphasis in this chapter on the territorialisation of power is not to suggest that 
states or capitalist forces have an intrinsic, teleological drive to territorialise all space.  
Indeed, there are many cases where governments have little interest in imposing costly, 
destabilising and often violent strategies of territorialisation across all parts of a 
country and the ―political topography‖ of spatial strategies clearly varies (Boone 2003). 
They may inspire the kind of ‗gatekeeper states‘ elucidated by Frederick Cooper 
(2006), in which governments have little means or desire to extend control over space 
other than the interface between the domestic and international economy.  
Alternatively, they may create enclaves of territorial control, predominantly around 
valuable natural resources, within a wider space over which the state‘s governance is 
limited (Ferguson 2006). Furthermore, even in regions where states have embarked 
upon more expansive spatial strategies of control, as I will argue has been the case in 
Myanmar‘s eastern borderlands since 1988, ‗territorial practices‘ may retain a high 
degree of informality, pluralism and spatial hybridity. Engaging with the diversity of 
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territorial practices offers scope to understand better how the spatial institutionalization 
of power affects the more conspicuous processes – the capacity of state institutions, the 
nature of conflict and economic development – which policymakers seeks to influence.  
 
2.6 POWER, HISTORY AND SPACE: A MATRIX OF STATE CONSOLIDATION 
The matrix below (Figure 2) offers a way to visualise how the three ‗pillars‘ of ‗power‘, 
‗history‘ and ‗space/territory‘ intersect to shape processes of state consolidation. It 
provides a structured approach to thinking about how states function and offers out a 
set of questions that may be useful when considering why processes of state 
consolidation demonstrate such divergence. 
 
Figure 2: Matrix of state consolidation 
 
State 
consolidation  
defined as the 
consolidation  
of power 
 
COERCIVE 
POWER 
The ability to enforce 
obedience 
 
EXTRACTIVE POWER 
The ability to extract revenue 
from society in the form of 
taxation, resource exploitation, 
trade, and control over the 
„rules of the game‟ governing 
extraction 
 
LEGITIMATION 
„Disciplinary power‟: the 
legitimation of state authority 
and the normalization of state 
power 
Multiple 
dynamics shape 
state 
consolidation 
‘State strategies’ 
Strategies intended to 
strengthen state 
institutions and 
transform state-society 
relations 
Capitalist forces 
Flows of capital and labour 
and processes of 
displacement, exploitation, 
accumulation and 
dispossession  
‘Everyday practices’ 
How „state strategies‟ are „bent‟ 
by populations: how populations 
appropriate, subvert and/or re-
work state strategies  
 
Dynamics 
shaping 
power relations 
 
 
 
 
 
HISTORY 
 
Historicizing state-society relations 
What is the terrain of pre-existing social 
structures, material interests and resources of 
power over which the state seeks to consolidate 
power? 
Rendering visible the multitude of actors 
and institutions which shape state 
consolidation 
Which social actors exercise public authority?  
What are the foundations of their power?  
How have they historically interacted with the 
state? 
Accounting for the ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’ of state consolidation 
How are contemporary processes of state 
consolidation shaped by the legacy of previous 
statebuilding strategies? 
 
SPACE / TERRITORY 
 
Spatial dynamics of power? 
How are the state‟s attempts to assert 
territorial control shaped by events, 
institutions and actors both beyond and 
below the state? 
Understanding the spatial  
dynamics of capitalism 
What is the relationship between state 
institutions and capitalist forces in the 
creation of governable space?  
Borderlands as integral to state 
consolidation 
What are the opportunities and threats 
which borderlands pose to state 
authority? 
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Processes of 
state 
Consolidation 
 
 
MONOPOLIZATION OF POWER 
Attempts to monopolize power within state 
institutions and centralize state control 
over the means of coercion, extraction and 
legitimate its position as the sole 
sovereign institution of political authority.  
MANAGING POWER RELATIONS  
Processes of negotiation, brokerage and 
coalition-building with other powerful social 
actors. The role of „limited access orders‟ and 
the emergence of „mediated statehood‟ in 
which there are multiple forms of political 
authority. 
 
Accounting for  
divergent 
Political  
Settlements  
 
 
 
 
 
(DIS)ORDER 
 
Understanding the state 
as a ‘field of power’ 
State consolidation is 
defined by contestation 
between social groups over 
the distribution of power 
 
Understanding the 
causes of (dis)order 
requires understanding: 
Who is contesting state 
consolidation? 
What are their sources of 
power and strength vis-à-vis 
the state? 
How do they seek to engage 
with the state? 
What are the processes for 
contesting state power – are 
there institutionalised 
bargaining processes or is 
the use of violence 
prevalent?   
 
LEVEL OF 
ECONOMIC  
DEVELOPMENT  
 
Who controls economic 
resources? 
 
How are economic 
resources used by the 
state? 
Are resources used to 
establish coalitions and 
limited access orders to 
forge stability? If so, how 
does this affect the 
productive use of resource? 
 
What is the distributive 
impact of how the state 
extracts resources from 
society? 
Does this distribution 
stimulate economic 
development? 
How does this distribution 
ameliorate or incite conflict?  
 
 
CENTRALIZATION 
OR 
DECENTRALIZATION 
OF POWER 
 
Is state consolidation 
marked by the 
centralization of power 
within state institutions 
or the management of 
networks of  
power?  
Are there multiple sources 
of public authority? What is 
the interaction between 
them? 
 
If power remains 
decentralized  
to what extent does this  
fortify or fragment state 
authority? 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter has been to develop an alternative political economy 
framework for conceptualising state consolidation in late-developing post-colonial 
states.  Its aim has been to move beyond the ―mythicized‖ ‗idea‘ of the state and how it 
should operate, to a more rigorous analysis of how states actually function in practice. 
This offers scope to move beyond defining states by their deviance from idealised 
models of liberal market democracies and instead to interrogate the complex set of 
forces which determine why states function in particular ways and why there is such 
divergence in state practices. This approach rejects the functionalist fixation with 
outcome – interpreting state practice in terms of the implementation of a specific set of 
plans and programmes – and instead shifts focus to the processes of coercion, 
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contestation, negotiation and subversion which determine how these programmes, or 
‗state strategies‘, manifest themselves in actuality.  
 
This chapter introduces a number of core themes integral to the rest of this study. First, 
it emphasizes the centrality of power relations to shaping how states function. Second, 
it argues that the state is best understood as a ‗field of power‘ in which processes of 
state consolidation may be less about the monopolisation of power by state institutions 
and more about the ways in which power is negotiated and the forms of coalition that 
emerge between governments and other powerful societal actors. Third, it argues that 
how states function is shaped by the interaction between intentional ‗state strategies‘ 
and the ways that these strategies are contested, embraced, subverted and appropriated 
by populations. Fourth, it emphasizes that processes of state consolidation can only be 
understood by analysing their context-specific histories and spatial dynamics.  
 
From this admittedly broad conceptual framework, the following two chapters provide 
a more sharply-defined focus on two aspects of state consolidation that are central to 
this thesis.  Chapter 3 analyses how borderland regions have a profound impact upon 
processes of state consolidation. Chapter 4 then considers how illegal economies, 
specifically drugs, both shape and are shaped by processes of state consolidation. 
Chapters 5 and 6 then seek to provide an overview of the historical trajectory of 
processes of state consolidation in Shan State, drawing attention to the power relations, 
borderland spatial dynamics and multiple social groups that have influenced this 
trajectory. This historical backdrop then sets up the three empirical chapters (7-9). 
Throughout these empirical chapters, there is constant emphasis given to the 
relationship between intentional ‗state strategies‘ deployed by Myanmar‘s military 
governments since 1988 to assert control across Shan State and the ways in which 
these strategies have been contested, negotiated and brokered. It is this relationship, I 
argue, that offers a valuable foundation for understanding the changing political 
economy of the opium/heroin trade in the period since 1988.               
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CHAPTER 3 
 
BORDERLANDS, BROKERAGE AND THE 
CONTESTED REPERTOIRE OF STATE 
CONSOLIDATION 
 
 
In Chapter 1 I sought to challenge mythicized ideals of statecraft to develop an 
alternative conceptual framework for interrogating processes of state consolidation. I 
sought to ‗un-mask‘ the state‘s pretence as an omnipotent, neutral arbiter of social 
relations, and instead reveal the state for what it is, namely a site of societal contest 
shaped by the complex contestation for power. In doing so I demonstrated that 
processes of state consolidation are commonly governed by political coalitions 
between various social groups resulting in forms of ‗negotiated statehood‘. The aim of 
this chapter is to develop further the insights in Chapter 1 by interrogating processes of 
state consolidation in borderland regions, in order to provide a framework for 
understanding the contemporary dynamics of Myanmar‘s eastern borderlands.   
 
Borderlands are hereby defined as spatial zones in which the ‗border effect‘ of 
international boundaries impacts upon the mentalities and political and economic 
activities of their populations. As Willem van Schendel (2006, 43-44) eloquently 
surmises, the sanctity of the territorially-bounded nation-state in the imagery of world 
politics has meant that ―borderlands were treated not as entities in their own right, but 
as the margins of states, societies, nations, economies, and cultures.‖ Such an approach 
has, I argue, overlooked both the importance of borderlands to the construction of the 
modern state and the historical processes through which territorial sovereignty in these 
areas has emerged. It has given inadequate attention to the importance of bordering 
processes in shaping state formation and the role that the margins can play in shaping 
political developments at the centre (Goodhand 2008b; Korf & Raeymaekers 2013).  
 
In contrast, I argue that the reflexive relationship between states and borderlands – i.e. 
how state institutions manage borderland spaces and populations, and how 
borderlanders engage with state authority – plays an integral role in shaping processes 
of state consolidation within and also beyond the confines of borderland spaces. 
Therefore, whilst borderland spaces are worthy of study in their own right, I emphasize 
that the significance of understanding how state power is imposed, contested and 
negotiated in borderlands should not be compartmentalised as a concern only of 
91 
 
‗borderland studies‘, but deserves a more central place in frameworks for 
understanding state consolidation more broadly (Korf & Raeymaekers 2013).  
 
In developing these arguments I draw upon a growing body of work on borders, 
borderlands and frontiers. This literature has mushroomed over the past two decades, 
inspired by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the European 
Union, and concurrent efforts to dismantle certain borders in the name of economic 
development – embodied most clearly by the emergence of the EU and NAFTA free 
trade zones – and to ‗harden‘ others in the name of national security, notably the outer 
perimeters of the EU, the US-Mexican border and the Israel-Palestine border. It is also 
reflective of broader ideological shifts in which borders have been viewed as fetters to 
economic development within a ―neo-liberal fantasy‖ of a borderless world (Anderson 
2002, 237). Furthermore, whilst global trends in poverty alleviation and conflict 
reduction have generally been positive over the past two decades, these trends have 
been geographically uneven (Goodhand 2015, 1). Borderlands continue to be viewed 
as hotbeds for violence, terrorism, criminality and illicit economies, encouraging a 
growing academic and policy focus on borders and borderland regions. This 
renaissance of borderland studies is long overdue; yet as Hastings Donnan and Thomas 
Wilson (1999, xiv) warn, by becoming such a ―buzzword‖, borders became a concept 
that was ―in danger of being both everywhere and nowhere.‖ 
 
In the first half of the chapter I address concerns regarding the conceptual fuzziness 
surrounding borderlands by developing a systematic analysis to demonstrate why 
borderland studies deserve a more central place in frameworks for understanding state 
consolidation. I argue that borderlands embody ‗extreme sites of territorialisation‘, for 
two reasons. First, they represent distinct ―ecologies of constraint and opportunity‖ 
surrounding government strategies to consolidate state power. Drawing upon the 
conceptual framework developed in chapter 1, I argue that this is because borderland 
regions create a specific set of spatial dynamics surrounding contestation over the 
means of coercion and extraction and the legitimation of state authority. Second, I 
argue that borderlands commonly reveal most starkly many of the paradoxes that 
underpin processes of state consolidation, most importantly the contrast between the 
claims of the state‘s monopolisation of power (often heavily vaunted through shows of 
state power such as checkpoints, security, strong military presence, and claims of 
distinct borders between us/them) and the ways in which borderlands are made 
governable through more pragmatic forms of negotiation and coalition-building.  
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In the second half of the chapter I introduce the concept of ‗brokerage‘, arguing that 
this represents a particularly prevalent modality through power is transmitted and 
mediated in borderland regions. The concept of brokerage is becoming more popular, 
emerging out of growing literature on political hybridity and social network theories 
for understanding how states and societies function.  However, the use of this concept 
lacks clarity, a lacuna I seek to address, by analysing how and why state power is 
mediated through forms of brokerage in borderlands, and by interrogating the different 
forms which this brokerage takes. Importantly, I argue that analysing brokerage offers 
valuable ways of considering how political coalitions and processes of ‗negotiated 
statehood‘ may serve simultaneously to fortify and fragment state authority and 
provides new insights for accounting for borderland violence. 
 
3.1 BORDERLANDS AS EXTREME SITES OF TERRITORIALISATION 
A fundamental aim of this chapter is to explain why the territorialisation of borderland 
spaces deserves a prominent position in studies of state consolidation. Following Janet 
Sturgeon (2004, 481), I define attempts by governments to territorialise borderlands as 
―the implementation of citizenship, state control over access to and use of national land 
and resources, and efforts to control national space up to international borders‖. The 
focus of my analysis is centred explicitly on post-colonial states where the 
―demarcation of borders preceded nation-building‖ (Goodhand 2008, 228). ―The 
centrality of territory in state self-definition‖ inevitably meant that control over 
international borders became a priority for these states, albeit a deeply problematic one 
in light of the fact that in many cases the state‘s control over the borderland regions it 
now laid claim over was historically weak and contested (van Schendel 2013, 267). 
The ―cartographic anxiety‖ induced by the centrality of bounded-territory to the 
definition of the modern nation-state has, I argue, created a paradox at the very heart of 
how post-colonial state institutions manage borderland regions (Krishna 1994). It has 
encouraged a ―territorialist epistemology‖, which has sought to make these regions 
(and their populations) appear as natural, uncontested parts of the nation-state by 
reifying the linkages between state, national identity, territory and sovereignty 
(Brenner 1999, 48); yet at the same time it is often in borderland regions that fears of 
disunity, fragmentation and treachery are strongest, creating a ―state of exception‖ in 
which government strategies to consolidate control diverge most clearly from idealised 
models of statecraft  and in which the civilising mask of the state is torn away to reveal 
its coercive foundations (Agamben 2005; Hagmann & Korf 2012).   
In order to analyse processes of state territorialisation in the borderland spaces of 
postcolonial states it is imperative to move beyond a territorialist epistemology in 
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which these processes are defined against idealised contemporary western states and to 
view instances where these states do not exhibit the same characteristics as somehow 
deviant. We must also move beyond the ―civilizing frontier rhetoric‖ and ―high 
modernist discourses‖ (Scott 1998; Cramer and Richards 2011; Peluso and Lund 2011), 
which have tended to view borderlands as inextricably linked to the nation-state – as 
having a ―fixed material essence‖ embedded within national territories – and to 
characterise borderland violence and underdevelopment as necessarily a consequence 
of localised disorder and state absence (van Schendel 2005, 7; Hagmann & Korf 2012, 
206).  
Furthermore, we must acknowledge that these narratives are part of the ‗mask‘ of the 
state, a ―fictive exercise‖ to disguise the violence and contestation that commonly 
surrounds the imposition of state sovereignty in borderland regions (Agnew 2008, 181). 
We must embrace the fact that these borderland narratives, these ―state-induced 
misrecognitions‖, are a triumph of concealment (Brenner 1999, 49), which form part of 
a wider process of ―territorial socialization‖ intended to make the state‘s control over 
territory appear inviolable and incontestable (Duchacek 1970, cited in Newman & 
Paasi 1998, 196). Their power and ubiquity exists precisely because borderlands are so 
often sites of subversion, which challenge and make a mockery of state narratives. In 
particular, they are designed to conceal the fact that borderlands embody ―geographies 
of power‖, which contest, re-shape and often subvert the geography of the nation-state 
(van Schendel 2005, 269). In contesting these narratives we need to engage with how 
the dynamics of borderlands definitively impact upon contests over the means of 
coercion, extraction and legitimation which shape how state power is consolidated.     
3.1.1 Borderlands, coercive power and the (de)construction of ‘limited access 
orders’ 
Coercive power forms the cornerstone of state power for it enables those at the helm of 
the state to implement and enforce decisions, to control populations and resources, and 
to overcome opposition to the ‗distributive impact‘ of its actions. In defining what 
makes states strong, Robert Taylor (2009, 11) argues that,  
 
dominant states are able to structure social relations so as to ensure no threats to their 
stability and perpetuation can develop, as the state is the ultimate arbiter of societal 
conflicts. The establishment of state hegemony and the state‘s consequent ability to set the 
limits of acceptable political, economic and social behaviour are only possible when the 
state is accepted as legitimate and no other institution can effectively deny its dictates. 
 
The open-endedness of border regions, however, perpetually undermines the ability of 
state institutions to enclose social practices and it is often in borderlands where it is 
easiest to transgress these state-defined limits of acceptable political, economic and 
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social behavior. An important reason for this lies in the fact that borderlands pose an 
array of profound challenges to the ability of state institutions either to monopolize 
coercive power or even to manage it effectively. 
 
Against attempts by central governments to monopolize coercive power, the border is 
often a subversive force in terms of both the mentalities it nurtures and the practical 
benefits it confers upon those seeking to evade state authority. The ideological 
subversion of the borderland is rooted in the challenge it poses to the exercise of 
‗infrastructural power‘, defined as the ability to make populations internalize the power 
of the state and act within state-set parameters of behaviour. Infrastructural power 
allows those in charge of state institutions to govern ‗through‘ society based upon co-
operation and engagement rather than constantly having to impose control ‗over‘ 
society through repression (Mann 1984).  As Willem van Schendel argues (2006, 256),  
 
the better state violence is hidden behind a framework of widely accepted rules and norms, 
the more powerful the state is likely to be….this ideal is particularly hard to attain in 
borderlands because the vicinity of another state, with different rules and norms, always 
provides borderlanders with an alternative…it is more difficult for borderlanders to 
internalize a state unconditionally, and this makes states habitually mistrust borderlanders.  
 
For those seeking to challenge state authority, borderlands also confer a number of 
practical advantages. Access to cross-border spaces provides opposition with a means 
to evade the state. Cross-border spaces can offer sanctuaries and training sites enabling 
even relatively weak rebel groups to wage protracted guerrilla warfare.  Access to 
cross-border services, especially medical services but also to education and banking, 
are also important for it reduces the opportunity costs associated with fighting (and the 
likely exclusion from access to state services that such opposition entails). Trade 
networks across the border also offers opposition groups access to weapons, finance 
and information, whilst the sanctity of international borders invariably prevents state 
authorities from being able to curb activities beyond their boundaries. As Willem van 
Schendel and Erik de Maaker (2014, 6) acknowledge, ―whereas states create borders 
and exploit them to their own advantage, borders can also act against states‖, often 
making borderlands ―a privileged site of rebellion against the power of the state‖ (van 
Schendel 2005, 256). 
 
The subversive power of the borderland is exacerbated by the fact that borderland-
based opposition groups are often able to garner support from neighbouring 
governments. Whilst many insurgent groups draw attention to the arbitrariness of 
cartographic boundaries as part of their challenge against state power, borderland 
rebels invariably oppose only one state.  This point is demonstrated clearly in Willem 
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van Schendel‘s (2005) study of the Bengal borderland. This meeting place of India, 
East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) and Burma has been a hotbed for insurgency for 
decades. In many ways the foundations of these multitude insurgencies lie in the 
arbitrariness of Radcliffe‘s Line, which disrupted regional patterns of trade and 
migration and turned this region into a peripheral zone of the emerging Indian, 
Pakistani and Burmese centralised states. Yet, Bengal borderland rebels have ―pitted 
themselves against only one of these states‖ with their strategies ―securely nested in 
post-Partition geography‖ (van Schendel 2005, 282).  Paradoxically, in the longer term 
the tendency of insurgent geographies to adhere to the territorialist epistemology of the 
states they seek to challenge has helped to imprint these borders in the mentalities of 
borderland populations.  In the shorter term, however, rebel groups‘ adherence to state 
geographies has meant that they have often enjoyed support from neighbouring states, 
whose governments have viewed them as capable of providing an array of useful 
functions, such as intelligence-gathering, the creation of border buffer zones on the 
other side of the border and/or access to cross-border resources.  Such alliances have 
often exacerbated the challenge that borderland rebels pose since it has allowed them to 
access to financial and medical services, weapons, and business opportunities to 
finance their activities.  
 
Borderlands also represent specific opportunities and challenges for attempts by state 
actors to manage coercive power through negotiation and coalition-building. One of 
the most common ways to build these coalitions, as described in Chapter 1, is through 
the creation of ‗limited access orders‘, namely attempts by the government to 
manipulate access to political and economic opportunities under its control to generate 
‗rents‘ through which to generate loyalty from other power social groups in society 
(North et al 2007; 2009).  North et al‘s work however, like much analysis on state 
formation, is spatially blind. Their conceptual framework is centred upon intra-elite 
bargaining at a national scale and is underwritten by the implicit assumption that the 
state forms a clearly defined territorial unit. In doing so, it fails to interrogate the 
impact of borders – especially the ability of state institutions to control the 
opening/closing of borders – on how limited access orders function. North et al‘s work 
shows no consideration for how the ability of borderland elites to bargain with 
neighbouring cross-border actors may affect the internal dynamics of political 
coalitions.  Indeed, without the power to enclose powerful non-state actors, the logic 
which underpins limited access orders cannot be operationalised since the 
government‘s claim to offer preferential access to valuable political and economic rents 
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may be subverted by non-state actors‘ recourse to cross-border sources of patronage 
and international flows of weapons and finance. 
 
It is only through the creation of a territorially enclosed state that the incentives for 
non-state actors to co-operate with the centre are likely to become strong enough to 
enable the creation of durable political coalitions. Managing borders, therefore, plays a 
crucial factor in determining the durability of limited access orders. It influences the 
extent to which state authorities are able to break down cross-border political and 
economic networks that threaten to subvert state sovereignty and force borderland 
actors to engage with central governments. Furthermore, there is little consideration in 
North et al‘s work regarding how political coalitions may transcend a specific nation 
space. This is deeply problematic as understanding the transnational nature of political 
coalitions may be instrumental in determining their stability and why they perform so 
differently across time and space.  
 
Understanding the specificity of borderland dynamics also offers insights into 
understanding why these regions are prone to violence and instability. Borderland 
violence is often viewed as indicative of a lack of state penetration and the supposedly 
wild, untamed nature of these frontier areas. However, in many cases borderland 
violence arises not from a lack of state presence but as ―emanations of state sovereignty‖ 
and the contradictions that commonly emerge between the logic of nation-state 
geographies and borderland geographies (Hagmann & Korf 2012, 206). Indeed, the 
combination of the benefits that borderland spaces confer upon those opposing state 
authority and the ―postcolonial anxiety‖ surrounding the centrality of bordered territory 
to the nation-state ideal has commonly created cycles of conflict in which governments 
have resorted to violence in an attempt to impose order, in turn exacerbating the state‘s 
weak legitimacy, strengthening links between local populations and opposition 
movements and motivating further cycles of violent insurgency and counter-insurgency 
(Krishna 1994, 508; Krishna 1999, 73; van Schendel 2005, 13). Addressing violence in 
borderlands thus requires a deeper engagement with how states function in these 
regions, rather than simply advocating firmer state authority.  
 
3.1.2 Borderlands: sites of opportunity and threat to the state’s extractive 
power 
The economic geography of borderlands also shapes contestation over the means of 
extraction and creates specific opportunities and threats for state elites seeking to 
consolidate extractive power. Most obviously, borders represent valuable economic 
resources since the ability to control and tax cross-border trade can generate significant 
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revenue.  Borders separate different systems of regulation and commodity valuation 
and the difference in the exchange value of goods on different sides of the border can 
create a ―spatial discount‖ making cross-border trade especially profitable (Goodhand 
2015). The ‗border gradient‘ that emerges as a result of the meeting point of different 
regulatory zones may be a function of differences in the legal systems on either side of 
the border, such as restrictions on natural resource extraction on one side of the border 
but not the other, which may result in a sharp rise in value as commodities cross the 
border. It may also be a result of varying levels of enforcement surrounding the 
production and trading of illegal goods, creating a situation in which the risk premium 
attached to a particular commodity becomes much higher once it crosses the border. It 
may also result from the revenue that can be generated from the very act of border 
transgression. For example, the revenue generated from people trafficking across 
borders and/or the sale or forgery of citizenship documents is a direct function of the 
role that borders are meant to play in creating separate territories of identity and 
citizenship. As Goodhand (2015) emphasizes, ―borders are in this sense less 
constraints than fields of opportunity‖, and often create especially productive zones of 
accumulation. Controlling the border may thus allow governments to generate 
significant revenue and/or to ensure that transnational flows adhere to the logic of 
limited access orders. Indeed, these flows may be transformed into economic rents 
with which to construct political coalitions. Controlling the border can therefore 
become an essential means through which to finance state patronage systems and 
prevent revenue from diffusing into networks beyond state control where they may 
strengthen opposing systems of patronage and loyalties. 
 
Furthermore, the emphasis given to regional economic integration as a tool for 
development since the end of the Cold War and the ideological dominance of 
neoliberalism has transformed the perception of many borderlands from frontier 
regions or buffer zones to economic corridors, providing greater impetus for states to 
invest resources in consolidating control over these areas (World Bank 2011, 35). 
Notable examples include India‘s Look East policy in which Northeast India has come 
to be viewed as an important gateway to economic integration with Southeast Asia, 
and the Asian Development Bank-funded Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) 
Initiative, which is designed to stimulate trade between Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, 
Vietnam, Yunnan Province (China) and Myanmar by establishing ‗economic corridors‘ 
through borderland regions, over which central governments have historically 
commanded little authority (Swe and Chambers 2011, 6). The economic dynamism of 
borderland regions may thus inspire a ‗border effect‘, creating the motivation for states 
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to territorialise borderlands and ensuring that the costs of formalizing state control will 
likely be recovered over time. In cases where borderlands contain valuable natural 
resources in their own right (alongside the revenue generated from border trade) this 
border effect will be even stronger. This ‗border effect‘ may also work at another, 
seemingly paradoxical, level.  As Paul Nugent‘s (2002) study of the Ghana-Togo 
border aptly demonstrates the presence of the border can create economic opportunities 
through the smuggling of contraband across these borders, an act which becomes 
valuable precisely because of the presence of the border and the potential this offers 
for transgression. For Nugent, such acts of seeming transgression against the nation-
state should not be interpreted as a subversion of state power but actually became an 
important means through which the border became entrenched and legitimated in the 
mentalities of the population. As Nugent argues, the economic opportunities created by 
borders may mean that it is hardly in border communities‘ interests to deconstruct, 
challenge or subvert borders and even seemingly anti-state processes such as 
smuggling should not automatically be seen as modes of resistance but serve as means 
through which borders are strengthened, legitimated and made real.       
 
However, there is nothing teleological about such border effects and the economic 
geography of borderlands commonly represent profound challenges to governments. 
There is often a palpable contradiction between the spatial rationality of the nation-
state and borderland economic geographies.  To adapt Arjun Appadurai‘s terminology, 
it is in the borderlands that the state‘s efforts to operationalise ―trait geographies‖, best 
defined as the attempt to affix specific attributes to a given space (national identities, 
language, relations to the state), come up most sharply against the ―process 
geographies‖ of many societies in which human organization is the result of ―various 
kinds of action, interaction, and motion - trade, travel, pilgrimage, warfare, 
proselytization, colonization, exile, and the like‖ (Appadurai 2001, 7-8), none of which 
fit easily within the spatial container of the state. The quest to create territorially-
bounded states has often gone against the process geographies of regional economies 
which have invariably stretched beyond the spatial container of the state, linking 
various metropoles, linking zones of supply and demand for commodities, and sites of 
agricultural production with sites of industrial production.  Efforts to construct the 
modern nation-state by prioritizing strong border control have often effectively 
inspired ―economic surgery in the service of state territoriality‖ (van Schendel 2005, 
159). As Willem van Schendel‘s study of the Bengal borderland shows, the 1947 
Partition had a devastating impact upon the pre-existing networks of trade which 
stretched across Bengal, Assam and Arakan. The prioritization given to border security 
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damaged numerous local economies, notably jute production which had historically 
been cultivated in what became East Pakistan and sent to factories in Calcutta, now 
across the border (van Schendel 2005, 158-60). The ―cartographic anxiety‖ 
surrounding the border resulted in much heavier regulation of what were now cross-
border international commodity chains and there were periods when the border was 
shut down entirely for political reasons, resulting in the ―the political assassination of 
this regional economy‖ (van Schendel 205, 147).  
 
As van Schendel‘s work shows, ―the tensions between the territorial exclusivity of the 
new state-sponsored nationalisms and the reality of cross-border identities and flows 
turned the borderland into a crucial arena of symbolic interaction, an enduring 
battleground of identity politics‖ (van Schendel 2005, 333).  Within this battleground it 
is a truism that for borderland populations the region they live in is not marginal but is 
the centre of their world and they are unlikely to calibrate their lives in order to fit a 
territorial framework in which they are made peripheral. Borderlanders have 
commonly shown greater ‗loyalty‘ to regional economies and trade networks upon 
which their livelihoods are dependent upon than to the nation-state they have found 
themselves to be a part of. As a result, borderland populations may flaunt the limits of 
economic behavior set by state institutions (seeking to control and tax these activities). 
In many cases the state‘s response has been to outlaw and criminalise these kinds of 
economic activities, an approach that is rarely effective in diminishing their prevalence 
and importance but serves to push these flows underground.  This making of illicitness 
has, however, served state narratives by removing economic activity beyond 
government control from official statistics.  Again, such a move has often been a 
triumph of concealment, allowing the state to appear far closer to acting as the 
‗container‘ of society than in reality it is and has led to the systematic downplaying of 
the importance of unregulated cross-border flows to national economies (Nordstrom 
2000; van Schendel and Abraham 2005). This masquerade ignores the role which 
borderland economies may play in generating revenue and aggrandizing patronage 
networks and alternative power centres beyond government control. The dynamism of 
borderland economies may also undermine state institutions from within by 
encouraging state officials to transgress their own rules in the pursuit of economic gain 
and undermining the extension of centralized administrative, policing and judicial 
institutions.      
 
3.1.3 Borderlands:  Consolidating or contesting the legitimacy of the nation-
state and its ‘disciplinary’ power? 
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‗Disciplinary power‘ reflects the extent to which populations internalize and accept the 
legitimacy structures of authority that govern their lives (Foucault 1975). Border 
governance has an important impact on the extent to which state institutions develop 
disciplinary power. International borders are central to the iconography of the state and 
alongside the national flag a country‘s cartographic silhouette is often one of the most 
important visual imageries of the nation-state. Discourses of border security are an 
important aspect of justifying the state‘s raison d‘être, especially its coercive power in 
contexts where borders remain disputed. Controlling the border enables governments 
to construct and deconstruct certain social, political and economic boundaries by 
managing cross-border flows of people and goods and defining the rules for inclusion 
and exclusion in the political community. Establishing control over borders thus 
strengthens the image of the state as the natural spatial container of society. It 
promotes the development of national identities and ―imagined communities‖ 
(Anderson, 1991) in which citizens are defined by their relation to the territorial state 
and its institutions. The ability to institutionalise state authority in border regions also 
plays an important role in increasing governments‘ international standing since it is 
perceived to offer a more secure environment for investment and trade, to provide a 
means of tackling illegal borderland flows (such as people, drugs, arms), and to 
prevent the adverse impact of unruly borderlands from spilling over into neighbouring 
polities. 
 
However, borderlands commonly represent zones of hybridity in which governments 
face great difficulty in imposing and legitimating their sovereignty.  Borderlands are 
often sites of ―legal pluralism and jurisdictional complexity‖, embodying a ―space of 
encounter between different forms and logics of rule‖ (Goodhand 2015, 9). The 
challenges they pose emanate not from their isolation or marginalisation but because 
they are invariably regions intimately affected by ―national and transnational networks 
of travel, trade, migration, knowledge exchanges, political alliances and conflicts‖, 
none of which fit easily into the container of the nation-state (Aggarwal, 2004, 14). 
James C Scott‘s conceptualization of borderlands in Southeast Asia as zones of 
hybridity and resistance provides one of the clearest (and more controversial) theses 
into the challenges that states face in borderland spaces.  Scott argues that upland 
borderlands across Southeast Asia – a region he calls ‗Zomia‘13 – embody zones of 
                                                          
13 Zomia was a term first coined by Willem van Schendel (2002). Deriving from zomi, the word for 
highlander common to a number Tibeto-Burman languages, the term was used by van Schendel to 
describe a large swathe of upland mainland Southeast Asia extending across Southwest China, eastern 
Myanmar (Kachin and Shan State), northern Thailand, Laos and north Vietnam.  Some have also 
included Tibet, northeast India and parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan in a broader use of the term. Van 
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refuge or ―shatter zones‖ which are best understood historically as anti-state spaces 
defined by activities and ideologies designed explicitly to repel the centripetal forces 
of the state‘s ‗civilising mission‘ (Scott 2000; 2008; 2009).  Rather than viewing 
borderlands as passive zones, Scott‘s work emphasizes the agency of borderland 
populations and how their activities make it extremely difficult for state institutions to 
establish territorial sovereignty. Indeed, he argues that the very profile of the societies 
that reside in these zones – low population density, extensive agriculture, linguistic and 
ethnic diversity – have developed in response to efforts by states to control them. 
Many have challenged Scott‘s arguments, rejecting his overtly antagonistic portrayal 
of the relationship between the state and borderland populations and questioning the 
utility of conceptualising these regions as anti-state spaces (Nugent 2002; Sadan 2010). 
Scott himself has added a temporal caveat to the applicability of his thesis, arguing that, 
in light of the growing military and technological capabilities of governments 
throughout the twentieth century, his conceptualisation of the ‗anti-state‘ upland 
borderland is applicable only to the pre-World War Two period.  
 
Whilst many of the challenges to Scott‘s work are justified, the overarching value of 
Scott‘s thesis is his ability to demonstrate that the reason why borderlands often prove 
inimical to the extension of the disciplinary power of state institutions is less a result of 
these regions‘ uncivilized, anarchic nature, but is invariably a consequence of the fact 
that central state institutions comes up against pre-existing structures of power and 
other forms of existing public authority which feel threatened by, and are likely to try 
to repel, state encroachment. As the work of Nancy Lee Peluso and Christian Lund 
shows, ―[f]rontiers are not sites where ‗development‘ and ‗progress‘ meet ‗wilderness‘ 
or traditional lands and peoples.  They are sites where authorities, sovereignties and 
hegemonies of the recent past have been or are currently being challenged by new 
enclosures, territorializations, and property regimes‖ (Peluso and Lund 2011, 668).  
 
Legitimating state sovereignty across borderland spaces cannot, therefore, be 
conceptualised as the mere diffusion of state power from the centre, instigated through 
the gradual extension of state institutions, but is likely to be a conflictual process, 
challenged and subverted by existing sovereignty regimes in the borderlands, which, as 
I have shown above may utilise the border to develop and strengthen their own 
coercive and extractive power in order to challenge the centripetal forces of the state. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Schendel‘s use of the term was to challenge the arbitrariness of area studies in academia, which had 
served to marginalise this vast region. James C Scott‘s work draws heavily upon the concept, arguing 
that Zomia embodies ―the last enclosure‖ (Scott 2009, 4-9).  
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In attempting to address these challenges and to generate legitimacy amongst 
borderland populations governments have number of options.  As van Schendel (2005, 
257) argues, they ―can educate them to internalize the state, cajole them into state-
approved behaviour, turn them into a crucial symbol of the nation, buy their loyalty, 
threaten them with violence, or actually unleash violence on them‖. Extending control 
over borderland regions is important to national elites because border transgressions 
reveal the failures of their strategies of territoriality and their claims to sovereignty on 
both the domestic and international stage.  Consequently, there commonly emerges a 
disjuncture between government claims of the centrality of borderland populations to 
the nation-state and the willingness of elites to unleash violence upon them in the 
pursuit of cowing populations into submission. Such contradictory practices often 
serve merely to further de-legitimate the state in the eyes of those living in these areas.          
 
The history of colonial rule and anti-colonial nationalist movements also offers 
important insights into why state institutions may be weakly embedded in borderland 
regions. In many colonies the ease of conquest was followed by the difficulties of 
routinizing and internalizing colonial authority (Cooper 2005, 2).  Colonial power was 
invariably concentrated in urban centres and spaces of capital accumulation, primarily 
port cities linking the national economy with international trade, and riverine and 
railway networks linking sites of production (such as mines) and labour supply to these 
cities.  Many colonies comprised sites of direct colonial control (mostly urban spaces 
but also mine towns and plantations) surrounded by vast swathes of territory nominally 
under colonial authority but over which colonial governments had neither the power 
nor the inclination to assert systematic control. Whilst not necessarily situated close to 
international borders, these swathes of territory embodied ―internal borderlands‖ 
defined by weak state penetration (Goodhand 2008, 228). Within these internal 
borderlands, colonial authorities commonly sought to secure stability and access to 
cheap labour at minimal cost by deploying the age-old strategy of indirect rule by 
trying to ―co-opt indigenous elites into playing essential but subordinate roles in 
running the empire‖ (Cooper 2005, 3). Mahmood Mamdani‘s (1996, 287) work 
encapsulates the changing trajectory of European colonization as it quickly moved 
―from the zeal of a civilizing mission to a calculated preoccupation with holding power, 
from rejuvenating to conserving society, from being the torch bearers of individual 
freedom to being custodians protecting the customary integrity of dominated tribes‖. 
As Mamdani‘s conceptualisation of the ―bifurcated state‖ shows, colonial rule in 
Africa (and beyond) resulted in the creation of two distinct systems of power under a 
single authority. The impact of colonial rule was felt more acutely in urban centres 
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where former power structures were dismantled, colonial systems of government were 
imposed and colonial subjects were denied access to the state on the basis of 
discourses of racial inferiority. In contrast, colonial powers sought to assert control 
throughout rural ‗internal borderlands‘ by incorporating and strengthening ―traditional‖ 
authorities, reifying customary rule and seeking to govern through forms of Native 
Authority. This ―decentralized despotism‖ empowered and reified local structures of 
authority and patronage networks beyond the control of the state, entrenching divisions 
between urban centres and rural peripheries.   
 
Furthermore, this system ensured that in many cases nascent anti-colonial nationalist 
movements were strongest in urban centres. As Mamdani (1996) shows with regards to 
Africa (although it is an insight pertinent to other parts of the world also), ―the 
mainstream nationalists who inherited the central state at independence understood 
colonial oppression as first and foremost an exclusion from civil society, and more 
generally as alien rule. They aimed to redress these wrongs through deracialization 
internally and anti-imperialism externally‖. Such ―urban-centered reform‖ often did 
little to engender support and loyalty within borderland regions. However, the 
centrality of territorial sovereignty to the new post-colonial nation-state meant the 
colonial legacy of bifurcation and weak penetration of internal borderlands had to be 
dealt with, usually in one of two ways. The post-colonial state could attempt to impose 
its territoriality in order to create a centralized, unitary state, or it could look to govern 
through the systems of customary authority it inherited, albeit now masked under the 
rubric of nationalism.  Both these strategies, however, more often than not had limited 
success in consolidating state power.  Attempts to impose state authority through 
violent territoriality have often been met with resistance, with opposition capitalising 
upon the advantages borderlands offer as ‗privileged sites of rebellion‘.  Governing 
through customary authority has commonly been less violent but often equally 
unsuccessful in enabling central governments to consolidate power and has 
perpetuated networks of patronage and clientelism beyond the direct control of the 
state and over which central governments have commonly found it difficult to enforce 
their authority. 
 
I have sought to explain why borderlands represent ‗extreme sites of territorialisation‘ 
and how maximising the opportunities and minimizing the risks which borderlands 
pose (summarized in Figure 3) must be understood as an important dynamic shaping 
processes of state consolidation. 
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Figure 3: Borderlands as zones of opportunity and risk for governments seeking 
to consolidate state power 
 
 OPPORTUNITY RISK 
COERCION 
The ability to open/close the 
border is an important 
foundation for establishing 
limited access orders by 
forcing non-state actors to 
‗look inwards‘ and to engage 
with the central state.   
Cross-border networks of 
patronage and access to 
alternative power centres 
break down the logic of 
limited access orders. This 
strengthens the bargaining 
position of borderland actors 
vis-à-vis the government. 
CAPITAL 
Strengthening of the state‘s 
economic position through:  
- Taxation of cross-border 
trade. 
- Extraction (or taxation of 
extraction) of resources 
within the borderlands. 
- Taxation of borderland 
populations. 
- Management of 
transnational capital to adhere 
to the logic of ‗limited access 
orders‘. 
Revenue from cross-border 
trade, from resources in the 
borderlands and from 
inflows of transnational 
capital may afford 
borderland elites economic 
autonomy from the central 
government.  This may lead 
to the breakdown of limited 
access orders and may fund 
opposition to the state. 
 
LEGITIMATION 
Control of the borderlands 
allows the state to provide 
services and welfare and to 
define the parameters of 
acceptable political, economic 
and social behaviour; It 
allows the state to define 
social boundaries of 
inclusion/ exclusion and to 
build national identities, in 
which citizens are defined by 
their relation to the territorial 
state and its institutions. 
Social identities that 
transcend the territorial state 
undermine the notion of the 
state as the container of 
society; The porosity of 
borderlands may encourage 
multiple frameworks of self-
identity, leading to the 
rejection of nation-building 
strategies and undermining 
the state‘s efforts to establish 
homogeneity.  
 
 
Throughout this chapter I have sought to draw attention to the reflexive relationship 
between borderland societies and state institutions. Whilst this relationship may not 
necessarily be one of perpetual antagonism we must take seriously the capability of 
borderland populations to challenge, re-work and subvert state power in pursuit of their 
own interests. The impact of the interplay between state strategies and these alternative 
tactics of power plays a fundamental role in determining the nature of sub-national 
political settlements that emerge in borderlands, which in turn shape the trajectory of 
state consolidation at the centre.  In order to account for divergence in state 
performance we must therefore interrogate both how states negotiate their borderlands, 
and how borderlands negotiate the state.  
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3.2 BROKERAGE: NEGOTIATING THE BORDERLAND; NEGOTIATING THE 
STATE 
In the second half of this chapter I introduce the concept of brokerage, and argue that 
this concept provides a valuable means of generating better understanding of how 
governments seek to maximise the opportunities and minimise the threats which 
borderlands represent. I define brokerage as a social relation which facilitates the 
transmission of power through society. Brokerage is important in complex social 
systems where the transmission of power is not hierarchical or easily imposed from 
above and where the flow of power is not unidirectional. Instead, it emerges in social 
systems where power structures are comprised of multiple different networks. These 
networks represent localised systems of power which may be founded upon patronage, 
personal or kinship loyalties or localised economic structures. This system of networks 
creates points of disjuncture – synapses – between different networks. These may be 
spatial synapses (between rural and urban networks or across international borders), 
boundary synapses (the disjuncture created by the boundary between different cultures, 
ethnic affiliations, languages) and sovereignty synapses (the meeting point of different 
systems of rule or sovereignty regimes, such as between state law and customary law). 
These synapses are not mutually exclusive; indeed a synapse may have a spatial, 
boundary and sovereignty dimension.  
 
Processes of state consolidation are reliant upon the transmission of state authority 
across these synapses. In turn this confers power upon those who prove able to 
facilitate this transmission, revealing the multi-dimensional and multi-sited nature of 
power. These two factors reveal the dual foundations of the relationship between 
brokerage and state consolidation. Firstly, it shows that government attempts to assert 
control over society may not be hierarchical or monopolistic, but instead may be 
shaped by engagement with social actors who can navigate the synapses that are likely 
to impede the transmission of state power through society.  Brokers are valued as 
‗network specialists‘, for their ability to understand the knowledge systems and life-
worlds on either side of the synapse and to transmit power across these potential choke 
points. Secondly, it reveals that these brokers cannot simply be defined as ‗state 
agents‘, for their ability to straddle these synapses gives them autonomy, agency and 
power. Drawing upon Bruno Latour‘s concept of ‗translation‘, David Mosse and David 
Lewis (2006) emphasize this point, arguing that brokers do not simply respond to the 
social structures they find themselves in, but may play a constructive role in creating 
these structures (Latour 2005; see also James 2011, 335-6). Brokers cannot simply be 
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defined as ‗intermediaries‘ facilitating the transmission of power through society but 
may also act as ‗mediators‘ working to ―transform, translate, distort, and modify the 
meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry for their own purposes (Latour 
2005, 39). These dual foundations reveal the dynamism, complexity, multi-sited 
agency and multiple nodes of power surrounding the relationship between brokerage 
and processes of state consolidation.  
 
Drawing upon a rich and diverse body of anthropological (Bailey 1963; Blok 1969, 
1974; Geertz, 1960; James 2011; Lindquist 2015; Mosse and Lewis 2006; Vincent 
1978; Wolf 1956) and historical (Barkey 2008; Duara 1988; Kettering, 1986; Tilly 
1967) literature, I argue that analysing brokerage practices offers valuable insights for 
studies of state consolidation. In particular I argue that this literature offers: nuanced 
understandings of how power is transmitted through society and the extent to which 
forms of negotiation and mediated statehood serve to fortify or fragment state power; a 
sophisticated way of engaging with eternal debates surrounding the interplay of 
structure and agency surrounding state-society relations; new ways of interrogating the 
political economy of resources; and, importantly, new insights into accounting for 
violence. However, whilst much of the literature on brokerage is concerned with the 
relationship between centre and periphery, and between urban and rural spaces, I argue 
that this literature has, hitherto, lacked sufficient sensitivity to the specific spatial 
dynamics shaping the transmission of power through borderland regions.  Following a 
brief analysis of the existing anthropological and historical literature on brokerage, the 
remainder of this chapter seeks to address this lacuna by examining how brokerage is a 
particularly useful concept for analysing contested processes of state consolidation in 
borderland regions.   
 
The anthropological and historical studies cited above are all loosely connected by an 
explicit interest in analysing how power is transmitted through society, albeit from 
different starting points. Within the political anthropology of the 1950s and 1960s 
interest with brokerage emerged initially from studies analysing machinations of 
indirect colonial rule, especially the relationship between native authority and colonial 
power. Against the prevailing influence of structural functionalism, these studies 
instead emphasized the agency of those tasked with mediating between centre and 
periphery (Gluckman, Mitchell & Barnes, 1949; Swartz 1968; Bailey 1963; Redfield 
1956). Drawing upon the Manchester School‘s emphasis upon ―situated analysis‖ they 
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highlighted the importance of manipulation, manoeuvre and mediation for 
understanding how institutions functioned and processes of social change.14 
 
By the 1960s, focus on the transmission of colonial power had been superseded by a 
growing pre-occupation with the role of brokerage in post-colonial nation-states, 
especially the importance of brokers, or middlemen, in promoting socio-cultural 
integration by navigating the synapses between the ―plurality of regional cultures‖ 
(Geertz, 1960, 228) and addressing ―the difficulty of communication between people 
still largely absorbed in those cultures and the metropolitan-based nationalist 
leadership‖ (Geertz 1960, 228). Eric Wolf‘s (1956) work on Mexico and F.G. Bailey‘s 
(1963) analysis of the relationship between India‘s fledgling parliamentary democracy 
and pre-existing forms of social and political organisation in Orissa were both 
concerned with the relationship between nation and community and focused their 
analytical lens explicitly upon the role of brokers. Variously described as ―cultural 
brokers‖, ―cultural middlemen‖, ―politician entrepreneurs‖ or ―intermediate power 
holders‖, brokers stood at the interface between nation and community, forming "the 
bones, nerves and sinews running through the total society, binding it together, and 
affecting it at every point‖ (Wolf 1956, 1065). These studies emphasized the 
importance to the integration of communities into nation-state polities of figures able 
to ―communicate‖ and ―translate‖ across the interstitial spaces between different social 
scales. 
 
These studies provided two particularly valuable starting points for studies on 
brokerage. First, they sought to broker disciplinary boundaries by bridging the divide 
between Anthropology‘s focus on (often rural) communities as encapsulated sites of 
study, and Political Science‘s pre-occupation with elites and national-level politics, 
and in doing so emphasized the enduring importance of multi-scalar analysis of power 
relation. Second, these studies revealed the complexity, volatility and paradoxes which 
underpin the relationship between the state and the brokers whose services they 
employ.  Wolf‘s work, in particular, emphasized the ―double-edged sword‖ which 
brokers embody for the state.  On the one hand, they play a crucial role in navigating 
the synapses between nation and community enabling state institutions to ―reach down‖ 
into localities. On the other hand, however, their Janus-faced position can be 
                                                          
14 The Manchester School was a school of Anthropological thought closely associated with the 
Department of Social Anthropology at Manchester University that was founded by Max Gluckman in 
1947. Notable anthropologists associated with the School were F.G. Bailey, John Barnes, Frederick 
Barth and Elisabeth Bott.     
 
108 
 
problematic.  Their raison d'être lies in the perpetuation of interstitial spaces and 
conflicts, since it is through mediating such tensions that they derive their power. 
Furthermore, brokers‘ privileged position enables them to accumulate material 
resources and power, giving them scope to increase their own autonomy (Wolf 1956, 
1072).  
 
Geertz‘s work similarly emphasized the role of ―cultural middlemen‖ in facilitating the 
penetration of Indonesian nation-building strategies into rural Javanese society, a 
process he viewed as ―in many ways the most essential pre-requisite for the success, in 
democratic form, of the nationalist experiment both in Indonesia and elsewhere‖ 
(Geertz 1960, 229). Geertz‘s work, in contrast to Wolf, focused on the ―internal 
contradiction‖ which brokers themselves faced. Focusing on the Kijaji (rural Muslim 
teachers), Geertz emphasized how the Kijaji‘s new social role as broker between the 
emerging nation-state and rural communities, over which the Kijaji had historically 
wielded great authority and respect, offered great opportunities for the them to protect 
their social position and power by embedding themselves within the emerging nation-
state structure; yet by forging links with nationalist, secular, metropolitan-based power 
structures the Kijaji risked alienating his rural support base with whom his authority 
was founded upon his ―status as a truly religious other-worldly man‖ (Geertz 1960, 
242).  
 
Whilst Geertz, Wolf and Bailey‘s studies were primarily interested in the role of 
brokerage in emerging post-colonial nation-states, Anton Blok‘s magisterial account of 
the role of the mafia in Sicilian society between 1860 and 1960 offers a more 
multifaceted account of the causes and functions of brokerage. Blok showed how the 
rise of the mafia in nineteenth century Sicily arose out of the changing nature of 
political and economic relations between state and rural power structures, and between 
rural landowning elites and the peasantry. The Bourbon state, and the Italian state 
which proceeded it in 1860, sought to overcome the power of the rural aristocracy by 
attempting to facilitate the rise of a new smallholder class through bringing an end to 
feudalism and emancipating the peasantry.  Instead, however, these land reforms 
facilitated a wave of dispossession which concentrated land ownership in the hands of 
a small elite (especially after expropriation of large tracts of church lands in 1860) and 
the emergence of an ―alliance‖ between feudal aristocracy and a rising landed gentry 
which ―broke into the system‖ (Blok 1969, 158). Attracted to the trappings of urban 
civility in Palermo, Naples and beyond, many of the aristocracy became absentee 
landlords and leased their lands to a rising class of large leaseholders, known as 
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gabelloti. In a context of land alienation and the proletarianization of the rural masses 
caused by widespread dispossession, the gabelotti relied upon a class of soprastante 
(estate administrators), and campiere (armed ‗guardians‘) whose main quality was, 
rather euphemistically, to ―make themselves respected‖ among the local population 
and constituted ―a private police-force at the service of the large estate owner‖ (Blok 
1969, 159).  
 
The mafia emerged out of these networks of privatised protection. Their role was one 
of mediation, brokering the changing relationship between the central state and Sicilian 
elites and between these elites and the peasantry. Whereas older forms of armed 
retainers, had essentially functioned to preserve law and order and to protect feudal 
privileges, the mafia capitalised upon the dynamic changes wrought by the advent of 
the state and the market. By controlling the interfaces between the local community 
and the outside world, they served both to moderate and make possible the extension 
of the state and market relations into the Sicilian periphery. Blok‘s study also reveals 
the complex relationship between brokers and the rural peasantry. On the one hand 
they blunted the impact of state policies designed at emancipation and protected the 
vested interests of the landowning class by securing their control over land, labour and 
votes, in ways which enforced submission and kept any form of open class struggle or 
agrarian revolution in check. On the other hand, however, mafia – namely the network 
of privatised protection which coalesced around the landed elites – also offered the 
―main mechanism for social mobility‖ for those members of the peasantry intent upon 
improving their lot. Mafia often incorporated forms of banditry, transforming 
―potential leaders of a peasant movement into allies, economically as well as 
politically‖ (Blok 1969, 159).15  
 
Blok‘s pioneering study reveals how political and economic processes of social 
transformation facilitate the rise of brokers and in turn are shaped by their actions. 
Critics of the explanatory power of studying brokerage have often folded their 
criticism into a broader rejection of ‗action theory‘, rejecting its focus on the individual 
as the starting point for social analysis, the prioritisation given to the study of face-to-
face encounters in situated analysis methodologies, and what they see as the misguided 
attempt to understand state power through its quotidian practices (See Vincent 1978; 
Lindquist 2015). Blok‘s work, however, reveals how brokerage can be analysed 
                                                          
15 This echoes Hobsbawm‘s (2000, 61) insight that most bandits will ―sooner or later be tempted to take 
the easy road…[becoming] a retainer of the lords, a member of some strong-arm squad which comes to 
terms with the structures of official power. 
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through fine-grained ethnographic study which does not succumb to the excesses of 
these approaches but can offer a valuable vantage point for interrogating the perpetual 
dialectic between structure and agency.  
 
Blok‘s work is also exceptional in placing violence and coercion at the centre of 
understanding brokerage and also revealing its ambiguities. For Blok, violent coercion 
served both as a means of repression and social mobility, as both a force facilitating 
the extension of market relations and state power and a means with which to assuage 
and distort their penetration into Sicilian society, ultimately a force both for continuity 
and change. Blok‘s work is also illuminating in its ability to chart the non-linear 
relationship between brokerage and process of state consolidation.  Whilst many 
ethnographic studies of the 1950s and 1960s, permeated with the prevailing power of 
modernisation theory, tended to view brokerage as having a necessary but temporary 
function in the transition of traditional societies to modernity, Blok‘s work revealed a 
more complex and ambiguous relationship. With the advent of Fascism, the growing 
strength of the repressive power of the central state marked the decline of mafia 
brokers. The state refused to tolerate challenges to its monopolization of coercive 
power and through the creation of an autonomous provincial police force was able to 
provide an alternative, and for the landed elites a cheaper and less burdensome, means 
of security (Blok 1974, 182-189). However, as Blok‘s study shows, Fascism merely 
acted as a substitute for the mafia by replacing one form of protection with another.  
By leaving the pre-existing agrarian structure and social milieu in place and by treating 
mafia as a form of ―rural delinquency‖ rather than a function of the broader power 
structure, the underlying raison d'être for mafia remained in place.  Following the 
Allied landing on Sicily in 1943 and the subsequent retreat of Fascist forces the state 
monopoly on violence crumbled and the landed elites once again found themselves 
resorting to the services of the mafia who were able to act as much-needed power 
brokers safeguarding their property ―from the attacks of a starving peasantry‖ and the 
outbreak of banditry that proliferated in the years of scarcity after the war (Blok 1974, 
190). The mafia regained their position as power brokers in a structure in which the 
central state again came to operate through them in order to maintain stability and 
penetrate Sicilian society. In turn, the mafia again became reliant upon state patronage 
since negotiating access to state resources and personnel buttressed their authority and 
ensured immunity from the law.    
 
Blok‘s insights offer valuable starting points for interrogating the relationship between 
brokerage and state consolidation. The existence of brokerage as a form of transmitting 
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power in society has often been conceptualised as indicative of ―the collapse of state 
power‖ (Jackson 2003, 137).16 This tendency, however, is in many ways a reflection 
once again of the seductive power of the ‗idea‘ of the state, and a willingness to 
construct analysis upon assumptions of how states ought to function rather than an 
empirical assessment of how they actually function. To the contrary, I argue that the 
scope for brokerage is enhanced rather than undermined by government efforts to 
assert state authority. State actors face a perpetual struggle between attempts to assert 
and legitimate state power and more pragmatic strategies that are ―forced to work with 
the grain of society‖, and it is out of this tension that the demand for brokerage 
emerges. State consolidation strategies create new resources of power because 
governments are likely to confer resources upon those able to perform brokerage 
functions. It is important to emphasize the potential for opportunism and volatility 
within this situation since state authorities may not necessarily ‗know‘ who is best 
placed to perform brokerage functions. Furthermore, the conferral of state resources 
may not necessarily reflect existing structures of authority but may also inspire other 
social actors to ‗claim‘ their brokering credentials in order to access these resources. 
The opportunities and threats which encroaching state authority embody may also 
increase the demand from local populations for those who prove able, or least initially 
‗claim‘ to be able, to access state resources (such as influence on decision-making 
around property rights, and business opportunities) and/or to hold the state at bay. 
Furthermore, the non-linear ebb and flow of state consolidation, and the difficulties 
states face in permanently monopolising power may create a multiplicity of local 
political institutions – a form of institutional ―sedimentation‖ (Bierschenk et al 2002, 6) 
– in which state bureaucracies exist alongside other forms of ‗twilight institutions‘ 
(Lund 2006). This messy reality may further facilitate the rise of brokers able to 
navigate these multiple realms.  
 
The ways in which state consolidation strategies may facilitate the rise of brokerage 
inspires a rich set of questions worthy of both conceptual analysis and empirical study. 
First, it is important to consider the diverse motivations which governments may have 
for pursuing brokerage strategies, and how these different purposes may in turn shape 
the way in which resources are deployed. Drawing upon the typology of power 
developed in chapter 1, I argue that they may seek to use brokerage strategies to 
                                                          
16 Jackson here is focused specifically on the rise of warlords, often typified as a specific type of 
coercive power broker. Whilst such a description may certainly be accurate in some cases – there is not 
space here to address the empirical and conceptual literature on warlords – the claim that warlordism, by 
very definition, is a reflection of state collapse is illustrative here of the tendency to view the presence of 
power brokers (such as warlords, mafia, gangs) as the antithesis of state consolidation. 
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strengthen the state‘s coercive power, its extractive capability and its legitimacy. 
Government actors may embrace brokerage to extend the state‘s coercive reach, often 
as part of counter-insurgency strategies in circumstances where it is unable to 
monopolise control, using brokers as a means to secure territory and populations, albeit 
indirectly, in order to deny opposition groups safe havens and access to recruits and 
resources. The state may also use brokerage as a means to extract resources from 
society, finding it easier to achieve this through the use of brokers rather than by 
expanding state bureaucracies.  
 
As Karen Barkey‘s (2008) analysis of the Ottoman Empire reveals, the Tillyan model 
of European centralised statebuilding was by no mean ubiquitous. The longevity of the 
Ottoman Empire lay in its ―crucially negotiated character‖ and was a function of the 
Empire‘s ability to use ―intermediate bodies‖ to broker between state and periphery 
and so ―maintain compliance, resources, tribute, and military cooperation, and to 
ensure political coherence and durability‖ (Barkey 2008, 10). Brokerage relations 
offered the Ottomans a means by which to expand territorial control, extract resources, 
minimise direct conflict (in contrast to European state formation) and achieve huge 
longevity without the formal bureaucratisation and centralisation associated with 
European statehood.   
 
Brokerage may also play a role in strengthening the legitimacy of the state.  Integration 
into the state offers a means for brokers to secure their authority, whilst in turn the 
willingness of brokers to embrace the imagery and iconography of the state may blur 
gradually the distinction between localised sovereignty regimes and centrally imposed 
forms of authority that have historically have been viewed as arbitrary and exploitative 
(Geertz 1960; Meehan 2015).  
 
Analysing brokerage also provides an important entry point for considering the 
political economy of resources in society. I argue that the relationship between 
brokerage and resources is twofold. Gaining access to resources may be the very raison 
d'être for brokerage, with brokers being defined by their ability to mediate state access 
to resources (such as taxation of local populations, sites of resource extraction). 
However, resources may also be used instrumentally as a means to bind brokerage 
agreements, allowing brokers to gain control over certain resources in return for their 
services in helping state authorities to achieve other aims. These two functions may 
operate concurrently, creating hierarchies of extraction, in which certain resources (or 
a certain amount of a resource) are used instrumentally to secure brokerage agreements, 
113 
 
creating environments conducive to further extraction by the state (Meehan 2015). One 
of the clearest examples of this is tax farming.  Barkey‘s (2008) study of the Ottoman 
Empire and Prasenjit Duara‘s (1988) analysis of state consolidation in early twentieth 
century rural north China both reveal how the central governments sought to use 
brokers as a means of expanding tax revenues, accepting a certain degree of abuse by 
brokers as a de facto ‗fee‘ for their services. It may also be the case within these 
hierarchies of extraction that certain resources are used instrumentally in order to gain 
access to other types of resources.  Tax collection can be a laborious and costly 
business for states in areas where their presence is weak.  The issuance of ‗taxation 
rights‘ may therefore be used as a means to co-opt brokers, whose ability to secure 
territory and labour may then be utilised by governments to accumulate revenue from 
other resources such as mines.  
 
Studies of brokerage must also engage with the complex reality that multiple 
brokerage relations are likely to exist concurrently.  Indeed, whilst brokerage may 
form an aspect of state strategies to assert authority, it may concurrently embody ways 
for populations to navigate the opportunities and threats which processes of state 
consolidation embody. This messy reality is developed well in Duara‘s study, which 
demonstrates how the Chinese state‘s efforts to deepen its bureaucratic reach into rural 
society elicited different forms of brokerage in response. On the one hand it created 
forms of ―entrepreneurial brokerage‖, comprising members of the bureaucracy willing 
to take on ―onerous and low-status jobs‖ of tax collection, well aware that the state‘s 
weakness meant these positions offered ample scope for self-enrichment (Duara 1988, 
46-47). On the other hand, it also inspired forms of ‗protective brokerage‘, with local 
figures emerging to manage relations between state authorities and rural communities 
and avoid the excessive predation created by the state‘s use of entrepreneurial brokers 
(Duara 1998, 43; 55-57). As Duara‘s study shows, it is important to move beyond 
simplistic and normative characterisations of brokers either as positive ―emanations of 
civil society‖ or as ―parasites‖ exploiting their privileged position for personal gain 
and instead confront the messy diversity of brokerage practices (Bierschenk et al 2002, 
4).  
 
3.2.1 Borderlands, brokerage and violence  
Although the anthropological, historical and political science literature I draw upon 
inspires a rich and nuanced questioning of the relationship between brokerage and 
processes of state consolidation it remains insufficiently sensitive to the spatial 
dynamics of this relationship, especially how in borderland regions. This is 
114 
 
problematic because brokerage is a particularly prevalent modality through which state 
authority is contested and consolidated in borderland regions. Government efforts to 
assert authority in borderlands, coupled with the difficulties state bureaucracies 
commonly face in these regions (bureaucrats may not speak the same language as 
borderland populations, they may face competing sovereignty regimes and growing 
state presence may be viewed with distrust) and the huge costs and potential for 
counter-movements associated with attempts to monopolise power, creates privileged 
spaces for brokerage to emerge. States look to those able, or claiming to be able, to 
preserve stability, facilitate extraction and embrace the iconography of the state, whilst 
borderland populations in turn may seek the services of those able to manage relations 
with the state, either in terms of holding its power at bay or navigating access to the 
resources it controls. Furthermore, whilst many borderland regions may hardly 
embody anti-state spaces, their complex transnational flows, process geographies, 
ethnic and linguistic diversity and histories of weak penetration create complex 
networks of loyalty and sovereignty, which create durable synapses blunting the 
transmission of state power.  The challenges state representatives faces in 
understanding, navigating and ultimately controlling these various networks creates 
willingness to mediate power through those who can. The ebb and flow of state power, 
so common in many borderlands, also means that demand for alternative service 
providers (especially of protection and credit) may continue even as state 
bureaucracies expand their territorial reach, since populations remain reluctant to rely 
on the services of a still weakly-consolidated state. Once again this may create demand 
for those able to navigate between state bureaucracies and alternative sovereignty 
regimes. 
 
Just as demand for brokerage may be greatest in borderlands, it is also here that the 
paradoxes surrounding brokerage may become most apparent. From the perspective of 
central governments, the ideal broker is one who has the ability to discipline and 
control local networks yet is also heavily reliant upon the state, so making the broker 
more likely to transmit state policy rather than seek to attenuate it for his own ends.  
However, these two ‗ideal‘ qualities verge on the oxymoronic. The ability to discipline 
and control populations is likely to be dependent upon the broker having significant 
power and local sovereignty, either through recourse to coercion, economic power or 
personal loyalty. This kind of localised sovereignty is likely to give brokers a degree of 
autonomy from formal state institutions since the broker‘s power is not derived solely 
from their relation to the state.  In turn, this may increase their ability to re-fashion 
state policy to adhere to their own interests. From the perspective of the broker, a 
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different paradox arises.  State penetration increases demand for his services, both 
from the state and from the population. Yet, as state power increases the broker is 
faced with the challenge, outlined by Eric Wolf and Clifford Geertz, of how to remain 
relevant and how to ensure his services continue to be needed, rather than be subsumed 
by a consolidating state that may rather assert control directly over populations and 
resources.  
 
The importance of brokerage to processes of state consolidation in borderlands also 
offers valuable ways of thinking about borderland violence. The prevalence of 
borderland violence is commonly portrayed as a consequence of their unruliness and 
absence of state sovereignty. Contrary to this prevailing wisdom, however, the 
significance of brokerage as a modality of state consolidation in borderlands offers 
ways of conceptualising borderland violence not as the antithesis of order, but as 
embedded within the very mechanisms through which state authority is created and 
upheld. Apart from Anton Blok‘s study of the Sicilian mafia, the role of violence in the 
literature on brokerage has been strangely absent. In many ways, as Kalyvas et al 
(2008, 1-2) argue, this reflects ―the lack of integration between the study of order and 
the study of conflict and violence‖. Brokerage has been analysed in terms of its ability 
to facilitate integration and establish order and efficiency and has thus rarely garnered 
interest from students of violence and conflict whose lens is focused on ―places and 
periods in which order has collapsed‖ (ibid).  
 
There are many reasons why recourse to brokerage as means of consolidating state 
power in borderland regions may be fraught with violence.  In areas where the 
government is confronted with its own inability to monopolise the means of coercion, 
it is likely to prioritise garnering support of those who can.  From the government‘s 
perspective, those wielding coercive power may represent the most visible form of 
authority in regions where linguistic and ethnic diversity and transnational flows create 
―geographies of ignorance‖ for government actors (van Schendel 2002). Attempting to 
broker deals with wielders of violence may also be perceived as likely to create the 
least form of resistance to governments since it provides a means of co-opting those 
who pose the greatest threat. The potential for violence within such strategies is 
threefold. First, violence may have a performative aspect, becoming a means for 
borderland actors to demonstrate their authority and suitability for brokering roles, 
both in terms of showing their ability to deliver results and to act as a warning of what 
may happen if they are overlooked by the government. In contexts where government 
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actors are not clear about who the enemy is, this approach may provoke forms of 
exemplary or ―indiscriminate violence‖ (Kalyvas 2006; Giustozzi 2011, 12-14).  
 
Second, the government may prove willing to allow brokers to use violence as a means 
to deliver results, granting them protection, impunity or even arms. Third, government 
willingness to sanction brokers to use violence may lie in the fact that operating 
through such mediators gives governments a degree of plausible deniability by creating 
a layer of distance between the formal state bureaucracy (police, army) and abuses 
which may serve to consolidate state power. Violence may thus become an accepted 
means through which borderland brokers are able to achieve the results required to 
maintain state support, such as maintaining security, disciplining populations, 
extracting resources and/or fighting insurgents. ‗Violence rights‘ granted to brokers by 
the government may in turn become a means through which brokers aggrandise their 
own power.17  
 
These insights warn that the tendency within the broader literature on hybrid political 
orders to assume that forms of ‗local‘ governance are likely to be more ―organic‖ and 
―enjoy[…] a high degree of legitimacy and local ownership‖ is not necessarily 
accurate (Menkhaus 2006/7, 82). Much of this literature assumes, as Kate Meagher 
(2012, 1080) points out that, ―violent non-state actors [will] gravitate toward legitimate 
behaviour owing to a long-run preference at the individual and the social level for 
stability, security and non-violent livelihoods‖. Within systems of brokerage, however, 
the perpetuation of a broker‘s power may be more dependent upon upwards 
accountability to government rather than downwards accountability to local 
populations. Similarities can be drawn here with John Sidel‘s (2004) work on ‗bossism‘ 
in Indonesia and his argument, contra Midgal, that local strongmen (he does not use 
the term ‗broker‘) derive power from their position ‗within‘ the state rather than 
society. Local elites, he argues, may be less ‗traditional‘ – and oligarchies less 
enduring – than is often assumed: ―For all the supposed ‗weakness‘ of the state, it is in 
fact the very – in Migdal‘s terms, ‗weblike‘ – structure of the state which creates the 
conditions for the emergence, survival, and success of local strongmen‖ (Sidel 2004). 
Securing ‗accountability‘ to the government within such a structure may be directly 
reliant upon the broker‘s ability to deliver results, which may be predicated upon the 
use of violence.  As Meagher warns (2012, 1097), this may represent a Faustian 
bargain, ―which leads not to more efficient and socially legitimate security 
                                                          
17 The term ‗violence rights‘ was one used by Professor Christopher Cramer in conversations with the 
author. 
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arrangements, but to the embedding of violent or illegitimate forms of order in the 
machinery of the state‖. 
 
Controlling the synapse between state institutions and borderland populations confers 
significant power upon brokers; yet state actors may not know who is best placed to 
play this role, or indeed there may be no clear dominant power broker. This may 
increase competition between potential brokers for control of the interface between 
state and locality, with violence becoming a means, paradoxically, of securing 
government backing to deliver order. The paradoxes inherent within brokerage may 
also create a heightened susceptibility for violence.  For brokers, the need to ensure 
their continued usefulness may create a Janus-faced approach to violence, whereby 
they seek to justify their position by delivering order, whilst allowing or even initiating 
a degree of disorder to demonstrate the continued importance of their services.  Such a 
stance may ensure that violence, especially forms of ‗symbolic‘ violence, remain an 
important dynamic surrounding brokerage (Kalyvas 2006). For state actors, relying 
upon brokers whose local autonomy is high and whose loyalty remains questionable, 
may mean that violence becomes a powerful means through which to try to keep 
brokers in check. Although the state may be weak in those borderland localities where 
it is reliant upon brokers, its overall coercive power is likely to be much greater. This 
allows local state actors (e.g. police, local army units) to call upon this power as a 
warning to brokers should they transgress the often ill-defined parameters of 
acceptable behaviour. Furthermore, the potential for borderland brokers to access 
cross-border sources of revenue and patronage may reduce the state‘s ability to control 
brokers through the promise of state resources alone, increasing the likelihood of 
recourse to violence.   
 
Finally, whilst brokerage may be effective at reducing the threat of outright rebellion 
in borderlands with an insurrectionary history, it may not be as effective at addressing 
the underlying grievances within such borderlands. Brokerage is necessarily an elite 
strategy whereby state actors seek to transmit their power through society by calling 
upon the services of regional elites. In many borderlands these elites may have at one 
time or another also sought to challenge the state.  Their re-positioning as brokers may 
be founded upon a realisation that in the face of growing state power outright 
opposition is no longer a viable option and may represent an attempt to negotiate the 
best deal possible from the government. Where this is the case, trust is likely to be low 
and brokerage strategies may leave many of the grievances of borderland populations 
unaddressed. Drawing upon Baud and van Schendel‘s (1997, 227-8) terminology, this 
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may create a transition from a rebellious borderland, defined by the presence of an 
outright insurrection against the state, to an ―unruly borderland‖ where there is no 
longer organised opposition to the state but where ―local society proves to be unruly, 
resisting the new social and territorial boundaries and the rules that come with them‖. 
Within such ‗unruly borderlands‘, violence or the threat of violence is likely to remain 
a key mechanism through which to forge order. Within such environments the 
presence of violence cannot simply be explained away as an indicator of disorder and 
state absence but may be embedded in the very strategies intended to establish order, 
giving weight to the concern than in many cases order may simply represent ―violence 
in disguise‖ (Kalyvas et al 2008, 1). 
 
3.2.2 The spectrum of borderland brokerage  
Whilst brokerage may be a key modality through which state institutions consolidate, 
this process is often governed by ‗rules of the game‘ that remain unclear and ever-
changing.  Brokerage is rarely a static social relation, but one defined by the constant 
jostling and re-negotiation as both state actors and borderland brokers seek to 
strengthen their position in a terrain of partial knowledge and uncertainty, the 
dynamics of which are often shaped by events far beyond the borderland itself. 
In order to conceptualise the complex diversity of brokerage relations I argue it is 
useful to think of a spectrum of brokerage practices, ranging from what I define as 
frontier brokerage to territorialising brokerage. These two ‗ideal‘ types are not 
binaries but instead mark the outer parameters of a continuum.  Frontier brokerage 
represents a strategy through which governments seek to transmit power over a space 
where state institutions have hitherto exerted very little control and within which 
competing sovereignty regimes remain powerful, such as former rebel-held areas. The 
function of frontier brokerage is to facilitate the ‗lateral‘ expansion of state institutions. 
Within such regions the priority of state actors is likely to be focused on establishing a 
greater degree of control and stability, securing territory and strengthening counter-
insurgency activities, and developing secure trade corridors across international borders.  
The state needs frontier brokers to strengthen the coercive power at the state‘s disposal, 
to nullify potential opponents by co-opting them and may also seek to utilise their 
cross-border political and economic networks. Agreements surrounding local resources 
are likely to be used as a means to strengthen brokerage ties and taxation rights and 
resource concessions may be granted by state actors to brokers as a means of securing 
their loyalty.  Demand for the services of frontier brokers from populations in these 
regions is more likely to be inspired by wariness of encroaching state power and a 
desire to attempt to hold the state at bay. Within the dynamics of frontier brokerage the 
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major paradox lies in the fact that the most useful brokers in the government‘s eyes – 
those able to secure control over localities and deliver results – are also likely to be 
those with greatest autonomy and over which the government may struggle to assert its 
authority. Consequently, the greatest potential for violence in frontier brokerage 
emanates from government attempts to provide a show of strength to demonstrate the 
latent threat it poses in order to keep frontier brokers in check. Violence may also be a 
result of the fact that the ‗rules of the game‘ remain unclear and in flux as state power 
waxes and wanes, and because growing opportunities to serve as brokers creates 
competition between potential brokers to prove who is best placed to play this role. 
Violence is likely to be more sporadic but may be more extreme when used as a 
strategy by state actors and/or by brokers to demonstrate their coercive power in order 
to re-negotiate brokerage agreements.   
 
At the other end of this spectrum territorialising brokerage emerges in areas over 
which the government is unthreatened by any major insurrectionary force, but where 
state authority remains weakly embedded.  State institutions lacks infrastructural power, 
and ethnic, linguistic, cultural and/or religious differences between state bureaucrats 
and local populations perpetuate a degree of distrust. In this context the function of 
brokerage is to facilitate the ‗vertical‘ penetration of state authority into society and 
deepen processes of territorialisation. The state seeks to exert control over local 
resources, to extract taxation and to entrench state regulation, especially surrounding 
land control and property rights. Control over resources is thus the raison d‘être of 
brokerage strategies, rather than being deployed as a means to secure other aims, 
although hierarchies of extraction may still exist. Governments require the services of 
brokers in these regions because underlying grievances and continued distrust of state 
institutions within local society ensure that asserting direct control may be time-
consuming, costly and threaten to inspire counter-movements (albeit more likely as 
forms of surreptitious resistance such as evasion, sabotage and flight rather than 
outright rebellion). Using territorialising brokers offers a more expedient and cost-
effective means of strengthening control and may be viewed as a way to blur the 
distinction between local systems of government and centrally imposed forms of 
authority, which populations may still view as arbitrary and exploitative. Demand from 
local populations for the services of territorialising brokers is likely to be rooted more 
in attempts to navigate access to state services and resources rather than offering scope 
to evade state power. The autonomy of territorialising brokers is lower as greater state 
presence limits their capacity to mediate power to serve their own interests.  The major 
paradox within territorialising brokerage lies within broker themselves who may find 
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that becoming embedded within a strengthening state bureaucracy offers opportunities 
to secure their position but in turn may normalise state power to such an extent that 
their services are no longer required. Where territorialising brokerage is dominant the 
greatest potential for violence is that it may be used by brokers as a means to ―generate 
compliance‖ in instances where they know that their use of violence will be condoned 
by the state (Kalyvas 2006, 28). Violence may be more commonplace but less 
conspicuous, becoming embedded in everyday forms of control rather than being used 
as a means to re-negotiate state-broker agreements.    
 
Figure 4: The Spectrum of borderland brokerage 
 
 FRONTIER 
BROKERAGE 
 TERRITORIALISING 
BROKERAGE 
 
SPATIAL 
FUNCTION 
 
Lateral expansion of state 
control outwards over 
spaces where government 
authority is weak and 
alternative forms of 
authority remain powerful 
 Vertical penetration of state 
control, deepening state 
control over society 
 
STATE 
PRIORITIES 
 
 Security and stability 
Counter-insurgency 
Secure access to cross-
border trade routes 
 Resource extraction; 
Enforcement of state 
regulations (especially 
property rights) 
 
 
WHY THE 
STATES NEEDS 
BROKERS 
 
Strengthen the state’s 
access to coercive power; 
Capitalise on brokers’ 
ability to secure territory 
and maintain order; 
Co-opt opposition; 
Utilise brokers’ cross-
border political and 
economic networks 
 Cheaper and more 
expedient than 
institutionalising direct 
control; Blur the distinction 
between local systems of 
government and centrally 
imposed forms of authority; 
Reduce the risk of 
opposition to growing state 
control 
 
ROLE OF 
LOCAL 
RESOURCES 
Used to secure brokerage 
agreements 
 Gaining access to resources 
is the raison d’être of 
brokerage strategies   
WHY 
POPULATIONS 
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BROKERAGE 
SERVICES 
 
Brokers seen as a means 
of holding the state at bay 
  
Brokers seen as a means of 
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resources 
LEVEL OF 
BROKER 
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High 
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PARADOX 
 
Those best able to deliver 
brokerage services are 
also likely to be those with 
greatest autonomy and 
 Brokers may strengthen 
their position by becoming 
embedded within state 
bureaucracy, but in doing so 
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over which the 
government may struggle 
to assert its authority. 
they may serve to normalise 
state power to such an 
extent that their services 
are no longer required 
 
POTENTIAL 
FOR 
VIOLENCE 
 
Violence used to re-
negotiate brokerage 
agreements; 
State use of violence as a 
show of strength to keep 
brokers in check; 
Unclear rules of the game; 
Competition between 
potential brokers to 
secure state support 
  
Brokers enjoy state 
impunity and use violence 
as a means of generating 
compliance 
 
It is important to emphasize again that these forms of brokerage are not binary, and 
Figure 4 is designed to capture a spectrum of brokerage relations rather than advocate a 
distinct typology. Brokerage arrangements may fluctuate as the relative strength of the 
state and brokers waxes and wanes, often for reasons that extend far beyond the 
borderland itself. Whilst governments may seek to consolidate power in borderland 
regions where state authority has historically been weak by transitioning from forms of 
frontier brokerage to forms of territorialising brokerage and ultimately to forms of 
direct state control, there is nothing teleological about this process.  
 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter has been to demonstrate why borderlands are important in 
shaping processes of state consolidation and to analyse how state power becomes 
consolidated in these regions. Analysing these processes offers a lens ―for reading the 
state at its limits‖, and provides important, yet often overlooked, insights into the 
trajectory of state formation and the diversity of state practices and performance 
(Harris 2009, 5). I have argued that borderlands form ‗extreme sites‘ of 
territorialisation, which are central to processes of state consolidation, based on three 
propositions: First, how state authority is consolidated in border regions provides an 
important explanatory tool for understanding dynamics of power relations, conflict and 
development; Second, borderlands pose specific opportunities and challenges to 
governments seeking to consolidate and legitimate state control over the means of 
coercion and revenue extraction. These spatial dynamics impact upon the forms of 
negotiation, coalition-building and limited access orders which underpin political 
settlements. Third, the centrality of borderlands to processes of state consolidation and 
in shaping the diversity of state performance has largely been overlooked as a result of 
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the ―state centrism‖ and methodological nationalism which pervades the Social 
Sciences (Brenner 1999).  
 
In developing these arguments I have sought to apply the conceptual framework of 
state consolidation developed in Chapter 2 in a way that is sensitive to the specific 
spatial dynamics of borderland regions. Through this approach I have demonstrated 
how and why brokerage is an important modality through which state power is 
transmitted, mediated and challenged in borderlands and have emphasized the 
dynamism, volatility, potential for violence and diverse use of resources surrounding 
brokerage practices. Alongside Chapter 2, the analysis in this chapter forms an 
important foundation for developing an alternative conceptualisation of the political 
economy of illicit drugs, which is the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
 
THE STATE-DRUG NEXUS  
Illegal drug economies and the making of 
governable space    
 
The purpose of this chapter is to draw upon the insights developed in Chapters 2 and 3 
in order to explore the dynamics of state consolidation in drug-producing 
environments and the role that illegal drug economies play in shaping these processes. 
The argument that drug economies can become embedded in processes of state 
consolidation is controversial. Indeed, most of the literature on drugs and the 
prevailing rationale for counter-narcotic strategies have consistently interpreted illicit 
drugs as important drivers of conflict and state fragility. Drug revenues have typically 
been viewed as providing both the motivation and the means for armed groups to 
challenge state authority and drug production and trafficking are assumed to thrive in 
states of lawlessness where the absence of state authority enables criminal 
organisations to engage in illegal activities unchallenged and to enjoy unrestricted 
cross-border access to lucrative foreign markets. 
 
However, empirical evidence suggests that the relationship between drugs, conflict and 
state fragility is more complex than this, both in Myanmar (Lintner 1999; Meehan 
2011, 2015; McCoy 1999; Snyder 2006) and in other drug-producing countries (for 
Afghanistan see: Goodhand 2008, 2009; for Colombia see: Ballvé 2012; Thomson 
2011). In all these cases drug production has, at times, coincided with prolonged 
periods of stability as well as disorder and statebuilding as well as state breakdown. I 
argue that by fetishizing drugs as intrinsically conflict-prone and fragility-inducing 
commodities the dominant theoretical paradigm surrounding drug economies offers no 
adequate means with which to engage with these empirical realities. This chapter seeks 
to address this weakness by challenging deeply embedded assumptions about the 
‗exceptionality‘ of drugs. Rather than separating out analysis of drug economies, I 
argue that they must be placed within the broader context of contested processes of 
state consolidation and capitalist development shaping drug-producing regions and 
must, therefore, be incorporated into the wider study of the power relations, bargaining 
processes and institutional arrangements which coalesce around these processes.  
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In doing so, my intention is not to replace one reified model by another and nor is it to 
deny that strong linkages do exist between drugs, war economies and state breakdown 
in some contexts. Instead, my purpose is to show the perception that drug economies 
only flourish in the frontier beyond state authority reflects underlying normative 
assumptions surrounding the ‗correct‘ role of the state, rather than an accurate 
empirical analysis of the political economy of illegal commodities in many source 
countries. Focusing analysis upon the interplay between drug economies, state 
consolidation and capitalist development reveals the ―politics of production‖ and the 
material and social interests surrounding drugs (Nevins & Lee Peluso 2008, 2). This 
approach offers important new insights into how drug economies impact upon, and are 
in turn impacted by, the broader social, political and economic milieu in which they 
are produced, trafficked and consumed. 
I make two overarching arguments in this chapter.  First, I argue that where 
governments set out to assert greater authority over drug-producing regions, drug 
economies are likely to become deeply implicated in diverse strategies of 
territorialisation designed to create ‗governable space‘, serving both the interests of the 
state and capitalism. Second, I argue that whilst drug-producing regions may continue 
to experience violence, instability and poverty, we cannot explain away these 
phenomena by recourse to static narratives of state absence, lawlessness, corruption 
and underdevelopment. Instead we must engage with how drug economies and the 
violence and instability surrounding them may actually become an integral part of 
processes of state consolidation and capitalist expansion.   
This chapter is divided into three parts. Section 1 analyses the dominant interpretation 
of the relationship between states and drug economies, something which I term the 
‗drugs-conflict-state fragility nexus‘. Section 2 offers a rigorous critique of this nexus, 
emphasizing how conventional interpretations of drug economies suffer from from a 
number of profound weaknesses, namely historical amnesia, methodological and 
empirical limitations, normative assumptions and commodity fetishism. In Section 3, I 
develop my alternative historical political economy framework for analyzing drug 
economies.  I show how and why drugs may become embedded in contestation 
surrounding control over coercive power, extractive power and the legitimation of 
authority which define processes of state consolidation.  In order to develop this 
argument I make three related points. First, I demonstrate how drugs play an important 
role in stimulating and shaping processes of capitalist development.  Second, I argue 
that capitalist development is likely to stimulate a ‗border effect‘ in which the 
governments seek to establish greater control over drug-producing regions.  Third, I 
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show how drugs become (often concurrently) central to the dynamics of coercion, 
brokerage and resistance which surround state strategies designed to create governable 
space.   
4.1 THE DRUGS-CONFLICT-STATE FRAGILITY NEXUS 
 
4.1.1The rise of the global prohibition regime 
Over the course of the twentieth century the prevailing international attitude towards 
drugs underwent profound transformation. Throughout the nineteenth century ―global, 
free and mass markets‖ had developed for opiates, cannabis and cocaine (Buxton 2008, 
2). Drugs, especially opium, had become deeply embedded in imperial, globalised 
trade networks. At the time of the Shanghai conference in 1909 – the first international 
conference to assess the impact of opium and which laid the groundwork for the first 
international drug control treaty signed three years later – opium cultivation and 
consumption was at an all-time high (Buxton 2008, 7). Over the course of the next one 
hundred years this unfettered production, trade and legal consumption has been 
replaced by a powerful drug control regime founded upon strict prohibition. 
 
The quest for prohibition was driven at the start of the century by the increasingly 
powerful missionary lobby in the UK and the US. Emerging out of wider concerns 
regarding the deleterious social effects of alcohol and gambling, the focus on drug 
control developed quickly following America‘s acquisition of the Philippines 
following the 1898 Spanish War. Christian missionaries successfully lobbied the new 
US administration to end opium use in the Philippines, whilst also drawing attention to 
the fact that such measures would be futile without the ability to curb the supply of 
opium from within the region (Bewley-Taylor 1999; Musto 1987). It was this concern 
which led to the Shanghai Opium Conference and marked the rise of US ―narco-
diplomacy‖ and the international push for strict prohibition (Buxton 2008, 10; 
McAllister 2000, 66). The international drug control regime became intimately linked 
to the rise of American power, whilst the creation of the League of Nations and the 
United Nations provided a forum for international cooperation to target drugs, 
culminating in the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.  
 
Prohibition also reflected the gradual ideological shift in the first half of the twentieth 
century away from classical liberalism and emphasis upon minimal state intervention 
in society, to greater emphasis upon welfare or social liberalism. Drugs became 
blamed for an array of social ills including crime, violence and the destruction of 
families and communities, and the state was viewed as having a paternalistic 
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responsibility for protecting society against narcotics (Berlin 1969; Braithwaite 2008; 
Seddon 2010, 11-2; 133-4).  
 
Since 1945, the rhetoric of drug-induced social and moral collapse reached new highs, 
especially in the US. Following President Nixon‘s 1971 declaration that ―America's 
public enemy number one in the United States is drug abuse‖ and his intention to 
―wage a new all-out offensive‖ to overcome the scourge of narcotics afflicting ―both 
the body and the soul of America‖, the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) was 
established in 1973 and, under US pressure, the 1961 UN Convention was 
strengthened (Nixon 1971; Musto 1987, 172-3). Nixon‘s ‗war on drugs‘, re-launched 
under President Reagan, was underpinned at home by a vast increase in the size and 
powers of federal drug control agencies, strict law enforcement, skyrocketing 
incarceration of drug offenders and mass anti-drug campaigns epitomised most clearly 
by Nancy Reagan‘s ‗Just Say No‘ campaign (Bagley 1988; Hawdon 2001). Through 
diplomatic pressure and tying American foreign (including military aid) to drug 
control measures, the US-led War on Drugs developed into a global prohibition regime 
(Bagley 1989; Gerber & Jensen 2001; Bewley-Taylor 1999, 202). The clearest 
example of this is the U.S. ‗certification process‘, launched in 1986 (and still in place), 
which targeted countries deemed to be failing to implement counter-narcotic policies 
by imposing sanctions, withdrawing most foreign aid and blocking loans from 
multilateral development banks (Bewley-Taylor 1999, 202-3; Jelsma 2011, 6-7). The 
‗War on Drugs‘ has become defined by highly militarised efforts to stem the supply of 
drugs through crop eradication, and the strengthening of police, military and border 
control agencies in source countries, as well as tough anti-corruption and anti-money 
laundering initiatives.  
 
However, despite the vast sums of money spent, the international drug control regime 
is failing. Cultivation, production and consumption of illegal drugs have risen over the 
four decades since Nixon first launched the war on drugs (Baum 1996; Jelsma 2011). 
Furthermore, whilst tackling the flow of drugs has been justified as a social imperative, 
the drug control regime has had serious deleterious social consequences of its own 
(Tullis 1995; Baum 1996; Jensen, Gerber & Mosher 2004) Eradication drives have 
increased the vulnerability of communities whose livelihoods depend on cultivation 
without tackling the root causes of poverty, whilst criminalization and tough law 
enforcement have been associated with human rights abuses, reluctance to support 
harm reduction and treatment services, mass incarceration in the US and, by increasing 
the risk premium attached to production and trafficking, have created perverse 
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incentives for involvement, creating a flourishing black market in drugs that is 
increasingly difficult to tackle (UNODC 2008, 216; Levine 2002). 
 
In spite of the clear failures of the international drug control regime its fundamental 
tenets – prohibition, strict law enforcement and supply reduction – not only remain in 
place but have been justified by an increasingly sophisticated rationale. Alongside the 
continued emphasis upon the morality and social imperative of drug control, the 
prioritisation given to reducing production in source countries has become 
underpinned by two inter-related arguments which have emerged since the end of the 
Cold War: firstly, that drugs are a major cause of sustained violent conflict, and 
secondly, that they play a fundamental role in increasing state fragility.  In doing so, 
proponents of the drug control regime have sought to insulate the war on drugs from 
its critics by embedding counter-narcotics strategies within broader foreign policy and 
development concerns focused on peacebuilding and statebuilding. 
  
4.1.2 Drugs, conflict and state fragility 
Concerns regarding the conflict-inducing and state fragility-inducing characteristics of 
drugs emerged out of a wider body of literature in the 1990s that was interested in why 
the end of the Cold War had failed to deliver a prolonged peace dividend and what 
factors continued to drive war in the Global South. Within this literature, the 
importance of war in creating the foundations of strong modern nation-states, argued 
most convincingly by Charles Tilly (1990) in relation to early modern European state 
formation, has been questioned.  Many argue that contemporary wars in the developing 
world embody a ‗new‘ form of war that does ―not make states, but rather unravel[s] 
them‖ and have been interpreted as increasingly driven by the quest for profit rather 
than deep-seated political grievances (Leander 2004, 69; Collier & Hoeffler 1998).18 
Thriving drug economies have been viewed as indicative of both the dynamics of ‗new‘ 
wars and the greed-based motivations of conflict actors.  
These ‗new‘ wars are internal, rather than inter-state conflicts; they involve an array of 
irregular armed forces – paramilitaries, organized crime and warlords – rather than 
                                                          
18 Charles Tilly‘s (1975, 42) famous aphorism that ―War made the state and the state made war‖ was 
based on an analysis that it was through the violent challenges which the state faced from armed rivals 
that the state was inadvertently forced to gradually monopolise its control over the means of violence, 
by disarming rival groups or incorporating them into the regular army, and the means of extraction, by 
increasing the territory it controlled and the size of the population from which it could extract taxation 
from.  As well as increasing the bureaucratic reach of the state, the need to increase taxation in order to 
fund warfare, protect its borders and police its territory created new forms of bargaining between the 
state and social groups.  There emerged a ‗political community‘ in which civilian groups responded to 
state demands for revenue by placing their own demands upon the state.  For Tilly, ―the pursuit of war 
and military capacity[...] as a sort of by-product, led to a civilianisation of government and domestic 
politics‖ (Tilly 1990, 206). 
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hierarchical centrally-organized armies; they inflict violence predominantly upon 
citizen rather than combatants; they fuel a globalized war economy; and they create 
‗bad neighbourhoods‘ and ungoverned spaces, from which flows of refugees and illicit 
goods spill over and destabilise other parts of the world (Leander 2004; Jung 2003; 
Kaldor 2007; Newman 2004; Snow 1996; Strange 1996; Kaplan 1997). The 
―globalised context‖ of contemporary conflicts is cited as the primary reason why the 
Tillyian linkage between war and early modern European statebuilding are no longer 
applicable to contemporary conflicts (Leander 2004, 69).  Neoliberal demands for 
decentralisation, privatisation and the free flow of goods have weakened state capacity 
and allowed non-state actors to ―establish relations of their own with wielders of 
international capital‖ (Leander 2004, 72).  This has strengthened local power holders at 
the expense of the central state, complicating the distinctions between public and 
private authority and undermining the state‘s efforts to centralise the means of violence.  
At the same time globalisation has increased the profitability of cross-border trade by 
linking marginalised areas of the world economy with lucrative foreign markets.  This 
has intensified conflict over access and control of resources, creating new war 
economies underpinned by ―robbery and plunder‖ and new sets of war actors (Munkler 
2005, 14).   
Many studies have focused specifically on the economic dimensions of war, especially 
their self-financing nature following the end of Cold War patronage (Hirshleifer 1995; 
Hirshleifer 2001; Ballentine & Sherman 2003; Collier 2000; Berdal & Malone 2000; 
Keen 1998; Grossman 1991; 199).  Following the influential work of Paul Collier and 
Anke Hoeffler (1998; Collier et al 2003) attention has focused on the relationship 
between resources, especially lootable resources, and violent conflict.  The multi-
country econometric regressions developed by Collier and Hoeffler claim to reveal that 
resource dependence, proxied as the ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP, 
increases the risk of conflict, especially in countries with low average incomes, slow 
growth and high unemployment.19   
The mechanisms underpinning this so-called ‗resource curse‘ are understood to be 
fourfold.  First, in countries dependent upon natural resources, the outbreak and 
sustenance of violent conflict is conceptualised as driven by the economic motivations 
(‗greed‘) of conflict actors rather than by social, political or ideological grievances 
(Collier 2006, 3). Resources, such as alluvial diamonds and drugs, which are easily 
‗lootable‘ are considered especially conflict prone (Ross 2004; Lujala et al 2005).  This 
                                                          
19 An increase in resource dependence from 0% to 32%, Collier et al (2003) claim, increases the 
probability of war from 1% to 22%. 
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is because the fact that they can be extracted without the use of expensive equipment 
and can be easily smuggled. This prevents states from monopolising production or 
preventing extraction, allowing conflict actors to gain easy access (Lujala et al 2005, 
539; Snyder 2006). Second, in the cost–benefit analyses conducted by conflict actors, 
modelled as rational utility maximisers, the income generated from looting resources is 
considered to outweigh the opportunity costs of war.  Violence is understood as rent-
seeking predation, with the plunder of natural resources seen as the driving force in 
most contemporary wars.  Third, as well as providing the motivation to fight, resources 
provide rebels with the means by which to procure weapons and provide credible 
material incentives for fighting, increasing soldier recruitment (Ballentine & Nitzschke 
2005, 1).  Fourth, it is argued that the profitability of resource extraction in war 
environments corrupts motivation structures, transforming even ideologically-driven 
insurgents into profit-seeking rebels (Cornell 2005; Brown 1999).  Over time, war 
becomes a rational choice for combatants since it offers a more profitable environment 
than peace.  Indicative of this claim is David Keen‘s (1998) assertion that the ―point of 
war may be precisely the legitimacy which it confers on actions that in peacetime 
would be punishable as crimes.‖   
Whilst the literature that focuses on drugs is quite limited (Collier‘s datasets for 
example do not include drugs), they are considered an especially conflict-prone 
resource for a number of reasons.  First, drugs are an inherently lootable resource.  
Second, the fact that they are illegal is presumed to make them especially predisposed 
to conflict since a thriving drug economy is deemed to require the creation of 
ungoverned spaces (Cornell 2005).  This is based on the presumption that state control 
would entail a clamp down on illegal activities, epitomised by the UNODC‘s (2010, 
232) claim that:   
Large-scale opium poppy cultivation requires large land areas, and is a highly labour-
intensive activity. To generate the heroin needed to satisfy global demand, thousands 
of hectares and hundreds of thousands of workers must be employed without state 
interference, and the best deterrent for state interference with this process is a rebel 
army. Without an active conflict, heroin production can be eliminated.   
The illegality of drugs is also presumed to make peace harder to achieve because the 
need to maintain legitimacy within the international system is believed to discourage 
states from offering any form of negotiated settlement with rebel groups that could 
allow them to retain some form of control over the drug trade, thus making the 
opportunity cost of peace extremely high for rebel groups involved in drug production. 
Finally, the ‗risk premium‘ attached to drugs makes them especially profitable, 
increasing the likelihood that initial grievances of insurgents located in drug-producing 
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regions may be corrupted (Cornell 2005, 758).  The long-running insurgencies in 
Myanmar and Colombia are often viewed as paradigmatic examples of the corruptive 
capabilities of drug revenues and the challenges this poses to establishing peace 
(Cornell 2005; Brown 1999).  
In response, the rationale for drug control has become embedded in liberal 
statebuilding ideology and efforts to address the threat posed by ‗fragile states‘. Whilst 
the US had proved willing to prioritise anti-communist national security imperatives 
over counter-narcotics and had turned a blind-eye to the role of certain pro-western 
governments in the drug trade, the end of the Cold War meant such trade-offs no 
longer seemed necessary (Walker 2009; McCoy 1991; Sedra 2012, 47). Statebuilding 
was viewed as an important and necessary antidote to the growing instability and 
insecurity created by ‗new wars‘ in the post-Cold War era. Amidst the concern to 
create ‗effective states‘ illicit drug economies have been typified as both a sign and a 
cause of state fragility. As David Nugent argues, ―illegal networks are usually taken to 
point to the limits of the state…[and]…are generally seen to reflect and/or fill a void in 
state activities, to point to an absence or at least a ‗thin-ness‘ in ‗stateness‘‖ (Nugent 
1999, 68-9; Goodhand 2008, 413). Drug economies are perceived to flourish in 
ungoverned non-state spaces, creating a lucrative source of revenue that finances rebel 
groups, insurgents and terrorists intent upon destabilising the state system. Where state 
participation in the drug trade has been proved irrefutably, such involvement has been 
blamed on the corruptive capacity that the allure of drug revenues can have on state 
officials and rectifiable through stricter law enforcement and civil service reform. 
Tackling drugs has therefore been advocated not only as having inherent moral worth 
but also as having important peace dividends and providing a means of strengthening 
fragile states with a clear complementarity perceived to exist between counter-
narcotics strategies and liberal statebuilding initiatives.  
 
4.2 THE DRUGS-CONFLICT-STATE FRAGILITY NEXUS: A CRITIQUE 
The ―materialist explanation of conflict‖, which underpins greed-driven 
understandings of the dynamics of ‗new wars‘, has been extremely seductive to 
policymakers due to its apparent ability to explain complex social phenomena (Cramer 
2002, 1849). As Christopher Cramer (2002, 1848) argues, ―the rational choice theory 
of conflict offers an analytical godsend to those made viscerally anxious by the 
―senseless anarchy‖ story‖, offered by Robert Kaplan  (1994, 2001) amongst others as 
an explanation for the foundations of contemporary conflict. The supposed 
complementarity between counter-narcotics strategies and broader peacebuilding and 
statebuilding initiatives has also been welcomed by advocates of the existing drug 
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control regime as a means of legitimating further expansion of counter-narcotics 
interventions and maintaining the focus on cutting supply from source countries. 
However, as a framework for understanding the political economy of illicit drugs and 
the relationship between drugs and state consolidation, the drugs-conflict-state fragility 
nexus suffers from a number of profound weaknesses. 
Firstly, the drugs-conflict-state fragility nexus is founded upon staggering historical 
amnesia, which ignores the diverse social, political and economic role drugs have 
played through history. Drugs have financed empires and states as well as those 
opposing their authority (Blue 2000; Trocki; Brook & Wakabayashi 2000; Wright 
2013). They have provided revenue to an array of warlords, insurgents and criminal 
networks which have challenged state authority (McCoy 1999; Gibson & Chen 2011; 
Thomson 2011, 340); yet they have also provided a means to finance counter-
insurgency strategies and a steady source of informal income for numerous police 
forces and militaries across the world (Walker 2009; Meehan 2015; van Schendel 2005, 
170). By financing warlords and insurgents, drug economies have served to blunt the 
territorial reach of many states; yet the ability of state actors (such as police, armies, 
bureaucracies) and proxy state actors (such as militias and paramilitaries) to generate 
revenue from these same drug economies has also provided the motivation and the 
means to finance the expansion of state authority (Ballvé 2012; Goodhand 2005, 202; 
Goodhand 2009; Thomson 2011, 340; Meehan 2015). Drugs have been central to war 
economies; yet informal deals surrounding drugs have also been instrumental to 
stabilising peace agreements and forging durable coalitions between governments and 
powerful opposition groups (Goodhand 2005; Goodhand 2008, 406; Meehan 2011; 
Meehan 2015). Drugs have had a profound impact on expanding capitalist social 
relations by extending the reach of cash economies, intensifying processes of 
commodification, accumulation and dispossession (Ballvé 2012; Trocki 2000; 
Thomson 2001, 341; Cubides 2001; Richani 2002); and have also facilitated a dynamic 
of resistance, allowing some groups to resist or reverse processes of dispossession and 
proletarianisation. Transnational revenue flows derived from drugs have posed major 
challenges to states by financing global organised crime networks and creating 
deleterious macroeconomic effects such as ‗Dutch Disease‘20 (Thoumi 1995, 249); yet 
drug revenues have also provided start-up capital for banking systems in many 
countries and laundered drug money has been an important source of investment in 
many domestic economies (Trocki 1999; Meehan 2011). The violence associated with 
                                                          
20 Dutch Disease refers to when large inflows of capital (in this case from drug exports) lead to 
exchange rate appreciation decreasing the competitiveness of other export commodities. 
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drugs has taken countless lives and destabilised many communities; yet the cultivation 
of drug crops remains a vital survival strategy for many poor rural communities 
(Goodhand 2005, 206-209; see Chapter 9).  
The historical political economy of drugs is thus one of profound complexity and 
diversity. The selective appropriation of evidence from this complex history to justify 
a rigid interpretation of drugs as drivers of conflict and state fragility suggests the 
prioritisation of normative assumptions regarding how states should function rather 
than empirical analysis of how states actually interact with drug economies. The 
relationship between the state and illicit drugs has been founded upon a number of 
implicit ―normative binaries‖ between state and non-state actors, licit and illicit 
activities, and conflict and development (Ballvé 2012, 611). These binaries equate the 
state with law and order and relegate illicit activities to the status of a ―deviant 
subculture‖ (Heyman and Smart 1999, 19; See also: Milliken and Krause 2002, 753-4). 
However, as Carolyn Nordstrom‘s (2003, 36) work powerfully demonstrates, the 
artificial analytical binaries constructed between official, state-sanctioned networks 
versus shadow ―extra-state‖ networks stunt our understanding of how states function 
and underestimates the significance of these networks to national and global 
economies. 21  It has caused academics and policymakers to ignore how legal and 
criminal goods both course through the same trade networks and have the same 
investors, how the same actors may navigate both networks simultaneously and, even 
more importantly, how ―extra-state‖ networks can be an important foundation for the 
exercise of formal power (Nordstrom 2000, 42).  
Secondly, the very empirical foundations for the presumed linkages between lootable 
resources and conflict remain shaky and have significant methodological limitations, 
including poor quality data and the use of questionable coding and proxies (Cramer 
2002; Cramer, 2006).  For example, using primary commodity exports as a share of 
GDP to proxy for greed is extremely problematic. As Cramer (2006, 1852) points out, 
this could equally be a proxy for ―failed policy, missing economic dynamism, a 
probable shortage of consumer goods and imports and widespread grievance and 
dissatisfaction with this predicament‖. By linking conflict to resource dependence the 
greed-driven account of war circumvents the need to analyze why a country remains 
reliant upon primary commodities, the factors that undermine economic diversification 
and development, and the extent to which the causes of conflict are actually embedded 
                                                          
21 Nordstrom chooses the term ―extra-state‖ rather than ‗non-state‘ or ‗informal‘ to encapsulate the way 
in which ―while these networks are not comprised by states themselves, neither are they entirely distinct 
from, or opposite to, states – they work both through and around formal state representatives and 
institutions.‖  
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within these foundations. The relationship between states and drug economies 
becomes tautological; drugs create fragile states and perpetuate conflict, whilst wars 
and state failure create environments for drug production.  
Thirdly, this tautological narrative reflects an extreme form of ‗commodity fetishism‘. 
Drugs are interpreted as exceptional commodities inhered with conflict and fragility-
inducing ‗qualities‘.  These qualities have come to be viewed somehow as physical 
properties of drugs, rather than arising from the specific social relations surrounding 
their production, trafficking and consumption. As Paul Cohen (2013, 179-80) argues, 
―contemporary drug laws thereby ignore serious problems and fixate on the drugs as 
objects as if they were the cause of the problems‖. Such ‗commodity fetishism‘ has 
created a failure within much of the dominant literature on drugs to engage with the 
context-specific social, economic and political environments of drug-producing 
countries.     
An alternative conceptual framework is needed—one that analyses illicit drug 
economies as they actually exist, rather than as exemplars of war economies and failed 
states, one that is sensitive to the diversity of experiences across time and space, one 
that engages explicitly with the ‗politics of production‘, and one that provides new 
ways of understanding the association between drugs and states without resorting  to 
simplistic and normative depictions of the corruption and ‗criminalization‘ of the 
modern state. Such an approach must begin by acknowledging that it is not the 
presence of drugs themselves, but the social relations surrounding them that determine 
the impact of drugs on the broader social, political and economic milieu in which they 
are produced, trafficked and consumed. 
4.3 TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DRUGS 
Drawing upon the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2, I argue that drug 
production and trafficking are likely to become embedded in contestation surrounding 
control over coercive power, extractive power and the legitimation of authority which 
define processes of state consolidation.  In order to develop this argument I make three 
related points. Firstly, I demonstrate how drugs can play an important role in 
stimulating and shaping processes of capitalist development.  Secondly, I argue that 
the expansion of capitalist development is likely to stimulate a ‗border effect‘ in which 
governments seek to establish greater authority over drug-producing regions.  This is 
because a central dynamic of state consolidation is the ability of state institutions to 
―fix, regulate and expand capitalist spaces‖ (Woods 2011, 751) and to ensure that the 
dynamics of capitalist development strengthen rather than undermine the construction 
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of state power. Thirdly, I argue that this ‗border effect‘ is likely to create an intimate 
relationship between illicit drug economies and processes of state consolidation in 
which drugs can become (often concurrently): (i) a means to finance the government 
strategies to strengthen state institutions; (ii) central to processes of negotiation and 
brokerage arrangements surrounding how power is managed and transmitted; and (iii) 
embedded within dynamics of resistance against the expansion of capitalist social 
relations and state power.   
 
4.3.1 Drugs and capitalist development 
Drugs and development have most commonly been characterized as opposites. In part 
this is because drug cultivation is blamed for diverting land from other productive uses 
whilst consumption is blamed for reducing productivity and creating heavy burdens on 
households by forcing them to spend money (and time) purchasing drugs and caring 
for addicts (Cohen 2013). It is also a consequence of the conflict-inducing 
characteristics, explained above, which drugs are presumed to have. Drug economies 
are presented as existing in the poorly integrated global margins, fuelling and in turn 
fuelled by poverty, conflict and perpetual underdevelopment (UNDP 2001; UNODC 
2010). Within this conceptualization, ‗development‘, defined implicitly in capitalist 
terms as the expansion of markets, private property rights, global economic integration 
and production for profit, is the antidote (Thomson 2011, 329).  
 
Drug production and poverty are indeed intimately linked; cultivators tend to be 
extremely poor, and their decision to grow drug crops are invariably part of livelihood 
survival strategies in which drug production is valued because of the fact that it offers 
a means to access credit and to generate cash to purchase food for periods of the year 
when households cannot cover their own subsistence, as well as to provide income to 
cover the cost of other necessities such as health costs and important events such as 
weddings and religious festivals (Mansfield 2001, 2004; TNI 2014). However, the 
binary constructed between drugs, conflict and poverty on the one hand, and capitalist 
development on the other ignores – or actively erases – a crucial set of agrarian 
dynamics which offer contrasting insights into the relationship between drugs and 
capitalist development and complicates assumptions that development necessarily 
reduces production and violence (Cramer 2006; Cramer & Richards 2011).  
 
The historical and political economy literature on the relationship between illegal 
practices, capitalist development and state formation elicits important challenges to 
these narratives (Gallant 1999; Goodhand 2009; Heyman & Smart 1999; McCoy 1999; 
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Tagliacozzo 2005; Trocki 1999; Trocki 2000; van Schendel & Abraham 2005). This 
literature reveals that although drugs, poverty and conflict do commonly coexist, their 
relationship is not necessarily a function of the lack of ‗development‘ but may actually 
be embedded in the very processes of capitalist development. This raises two important, 
but largely overlooked, questions: firstly, what is the relationship between drug 
economies and processes of capitalist development? And secondly, how do drug 
economies impact upon the relationship between capitalist development and processes 
of state consolidation?  
 
Carl Trocki‘s (1999; 2000) analysis of the opium trade in nineteenth century Southeast 
Asia powerfully reveals its importance to the spread of capitalism. As Trocki shows, 
opium facilitated the economic integration and commercialization of rural production 
sites, fuelled processes of accumulation and dispossession, played an important role in 
expanding international trade networks in an array of commodities, and gave birth to 
an emerging Chinese capitalist class. The transformational impact of opium emerged 
out of the growing demand for opium and the desire of colonial governments to 
generate revenue from this growing demand, without the hassle and expense of 
running the day-to-day administration of opium sales. This led to the creation of 
‗opium farms‘ whereby colonial governments put out to tender territorially-bounded 
contracts within which the successful buyer gained the sole right to purchase and sell 
opium for a fixed time period as well as the responsibility for securing his monopoly.  
 
In the latter half of the nineteenth century there was large-scale Chinese migration 
(both voluntary and indentured labour) to European colonies throughout Southeast 
Asia as a result of population pressures in southern China, the upheaval caused by the 
Taiping Rebellion and employment opportunities within the colonies both on 
plantations and in cities (Trocki 2000, 85). High demand for opium amongst these 
labourers ensured that opium farms became increasingly lucrative.  In many cases the 
owners of plantations and other commodity-producing enterprises (such as mines) also 
controlled opium supply to labourers.  As Trocki‘s analysis shows, the prices that 
commodities such as tin, pepper and gambier could fetch barely covered labour costs 
and would have encouraged little investment. Controlling opium sales (and also 
gambling and liquor), however, enabled the capitalist to recoup his labour costs as 
most wages were spent on these goods. Commodity producers ―could easily afford to 
―pay‖ their coolies three or four dollars per month, partly because this was usually only 
a bookkeeping transaction‖ (Trocki 2000, 90). As Smyth (1898) points out, ―The 
Chinese ‗tauke‘ [boss or merchant] is in a position to work mines which no-one else 
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could possibly make pay. Very often he does not look to the actual mining for a profit 
but to the gambling, opium, and spirit shops attached to the kongsi [company] and to 
the food and stores with which he supplies his coolies‖. There was thus a clear link 
between opium farming and the bringing to market of other commodities at ―rock-
bottom prices‖ (Trocki 2000, 100).  
 
Both within the plantations and mines and amongst rural agriculturalist communities, 
mass consumption of opium created Southeast Asia‘s ―first class of wage earners‖ and 
―consumers‖, monetizing local economies, bringing peasants into the cash economy 
and entrapping labour in relations of debt. With commercialization came credit 
systems, invariably controlled by the same investors as those holding opium farms. 
Within these systems farmers pledged future harvests, land and other assets in return 
for credit.  Poor harvests, opium addiction or other shocks saw growing levels of 
dispossession and capital accumulation in the hands of a growing Chinese capitalist 
class.22  
 
Furthermore, the opium farms became important generators of wealth beyond their 
locality. The wealth-generating potential of these monopolies, especially in growing 
urban centres such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai made them increasingly 
expensive and meant that their purchase usually required a corporate body of investors, 
known as ‗kongsi‟. These syndicates connected wealthy local merchants with 
transnational investors, which served to integrate capitalist networks across the region.  
Many of these kongsi had diverse portfolios with income generated from opium being 
invested into other commodities and into the founding of a number of the first Asian 
banks (Trocki 1999, 173; Trocki 2000; Conne 2010). 
 
Trocki‘s analysis is of a period before global drug prohibition. However, the status of 
drugs as illegal should not be presumed automatically to have broken down the 
relationship between drug economies and processes of capitalist development in drug-
producing regions. Continued demand for (now criminalized) drugs and high ‗risk 
premiums‘ have inspired trade networks linking rural production sites with markets 
and with other commodity trading networks. These growing trade networks have 
served to monetize rural economies, which in turn has created markets for other goods 
(including agricultural inputs such as pesticides and fertilizers and commodities 
                                                          
22 Trocki argues that the dismantling of the opium farming system and its replacement with government-
controlled opium monopolies was in part inspired by fears that the dispossession which accompanied the 
commercialization of the Southeast Asian peasantry threatened rural instability. 
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ranging from whiskey to milk powder to motorcycles) and has stimulated the creation 
of systems of credit and taxation. The income derived from drug production has also 
stimulated agricultural expansion by opening up frontier zones, making previously 
uncultivated land commercially viable, and generating income to invest in clearing 
land, hiring labour and extending transport networks and irrigation (Mansfield 2001; 
Mansfield forthcoming; Goodhand, Meehan and Pérez-Niño 2014).  
 
As a high value commodity, the cultivation of drug crops is also able to stimulate 
demand for wage labour (especially for harvesting opium), inspiring new forms of 
labour mobilization and seasonal migration. Furthermore, far from being a function of 
the marginalized nature of rural economies, drug production may in fact become a 
response to the unequal integration of these regions into the global economy and the 
impact of economic liberalization. The rapid expansion of coca and opium production 
in Colombia in the 1980s was in part attributable to the collapse of the country‘s cotton 
sector as a result of the volatility of international commodity markets and competition 
from other global producers (Thomson 2011, 332; Richani 2002, 94). Similarly, opium 
production has risen in parts of Myanmar over the past two decades as a result of the 
fact that cheaper imports of tea and cigarettes have reduced the market for the tea and 
cheroots historically produced in these regions. In these cases drug production has 
become the alternative development strategy for rural communities, warning against 
the assumption that economic integration and capitalist development necessarily 
reduce drug production. 
 
Furthemore, drug production continues to stimulate forms of capital accumulation and 
dispossession in ways not dissimilar to those documented by Trocki. Although often 
overlooked, there is significant diversity in the socio-economic groups involved in 
drug economies and whilst the majority of farmers grow drugs as a survival strategy, 
drug economies offer a different set of opportunities for wealthier households. Indeed 
as David Mansfield‘s (2001) analysis of the opium economy in Afghanistan shows, a 
―symbiotic relationship‖ often emerges between the resource rich and resource poor. 
For the poor, opium production offers a means of accessing credit to cover basic needs 
during the winter months when food shortages are acute, something that is true in both 
Afghanistan and drug-producing regions in Southeast Asia historically and today. For 
the resource rich, offering credit and trading opium can become a lucrative form of 
capital accumulation. As Mansfield‘s (2001) study of the salaam system in 
Afghanistan shows, many poor households sell their entire future crop prior to harvest 
in return for an advance payment set at half the current market price of opium on the 
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day the agreement is made. Similarly, in Myanmar credit is provided at extortionate 
monthly interest rates alongside an agreement which requires the farmer to sell the 
entirety of his crop to his creditor at harvest time (see Chapter 7). Control over opium 
purchasing and local credit systems thus enables resource rich households and outside 
investors and traders to accumulate land and other assets (such as machinery or 
livestock) both from the interest they generate and dispossession from farmers unable 
to pay back their debts (Mansfield 2001; Cohen 1984). Drug money also creates large 
surpluses of investible capital and the difficulty of moving money abroad often creates 
strong demand to invest at least of this capital domestically.23 Investing in land and 
real estate are often the most attractive options, with the whole-scale investment of 
cocaine profits into land appropriation and agribusinesses in Colombia offering a 
paradigmatic example (Ballvé 2012).  
 
Violence plays a fundamental role in the ―forceful asset accumulation and 
displacement of people‖ which underpins these processes of capitalist development 
(Cramer 2006, 215-6; Cramer and Richards 2011; Peluso and Lund 2011). Securing 
access to land, resources and labour, the collection of debt and the accumulation of 
wealth requires ―institutionalizing new processes of inclusion and exclusion in rural 
political economies‖ (Barney 2008, 106). It involves the destruction of existing land 
uses, property rights structures and social relations and the establishment and 
entrenchment of new property right regimes. The inherent inequality and injustice 
underpinning the primitive accumulation of capital, has meant that  processes to ―open 
up‖ spaces and ―discipline‖ populations are often violently contested (Nevins & Peluso 
2008, 3). Drugs and violence may therefore become intimately linked, although this 
relationship does not necessarily embody ―development in reverse‖, but may be 
embedded within the very processes underpinning capitalist development.24  Those 
with the means of violence – Gallant‘s ―military entrepreneurs‖ – may simultaneously 
be involved in the drug trade and find that their ‗skills‘ provide them with a privileged 
means to accumulate capital through direct dispossession or by hiring out their services 
to elites intent upon securing land for themselves (Gallant 1999, 26). As Ballvé‘s 
(2012, 610) study of the Urabá region of northwest Colombia reveals, paramilitary 
groups since the early 1990s have played a pivotal role in the expansion of capitalist 
development into this frontier region. These militias ―brought together a consistent 
                                                          
23 However, this varies and depends on the context. For example, much of the revenue generated from 
drug trafficking in Afghanistan has been invested in Middle Eastern countries. In Myanmar, much has 
been invested within the country but also in Thailand, China, Malaysia and Singapore.   
24 The influential claim that violent conflict is ―development in reverse‖ in made in a World Bank 
publication written by Paul Collier (2003). For a sustained critique of this claim see Cramer 2006. 
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ensemble cast of characters: drugs traffickers, wealthy landowners, business owners, 
regional politicians, and members of the state security forces.‖ Ostensibly created to 
fight insurgency, many of these paramilitary groups became both the country‘s 
―undisputed cocaine barons‖ and owners of large estates and agribusinesses (banana, 
rubber, teak and palm oil) through a process underpinned by extreme violence and 
wholesale displacement of rural communities. As Ballvé‘s study reveals, strong 
linkages exist between ‗state‘ and ‗non-state‘ actors, between the legal and illegal 
economy and between violence and capitalist development.  
 
The very illegality of drugs plays an important role in facilitating the dynamics of 
capitalist development explained above. The risk premium attached to drugs coupled 
with the risk of prosecution creates willingness amongst traders (who are also often 
creditors) to travel to more remote sites of production, further expanding processes of 
commodification, commercialization and monetization. Furthermore, the difficulties of 
laundering significant sums of drug money may stimulate investment in other 
economic enterprises such as land, agribusinesses, infrastructure, construction and 
tourism. In many cases capital is invested even in enterprises whose profitability may 
be questionable but which offer a means of channeling drug money into the legal 
economy. In such cases the marginal profitability of these ventures is viewed as an 
acceptable cost for laundering ‗dirty‘ money. In a contemporary re-working of 
Trocki‘s (2000) analysis of the relationship between opium farming and the cheap 
production of other commodities in nineteenth century Southeast Asia, it is this 
acceptance of reduced profit margins in return for money laundering opportunities, 
which may inspire investment into otherwise unattractive economic enterprises.              
 
4.3.2 Drugs and contested processes of state consolidation 
 
The „border effect‟ 
Rather than necessarily remaining confined to areas ‗beyond‘ state control, I argue that 
drug economies may in fact stimulate a ―border effect‖, encouraging governments to 
establish authority over drug-producing areas, even those previously deemed 
economically and politically marginal (Gallant 1999). This border effect is the result of 
a number of factors. First, it may be inspired by government attempts to generate 
revenue from the drug economy and/or to make more easily legible, and therefore 
taxable, the emerging networks of trade and migration and the forms of capital 
accumulation stimulated by drugs. Revenue generated in this ways may be channeled 
back to the centre to fund statebuilding activities or it may finance the expansion of 
140 
 
state institutions into rural areas, where the costs of doing so had previously been 
prohibitive.  
 
Second, the ‗border effect‘ may be inspired by the demand placed upon state 
institutions by emerging capitalist classes to create governable spaces, reflecting the 
―ruthless synergies‖ between ―capitalist social relations and the social relations of state 
formation‖ (Ballvé 2012, 604; See also: Woods 2011; Peluso & Lund 2011, 673). The 
production of territory through the expansion of infrastructure, the formalization and 
legalization of property regimes and the extension of security forces becomes integral 
both to capitalist development and to state consolidation. These ―government-led 
reconfigurations of property and landscapes‖ may legitimate and legalise assets 
accumulated through drugs, violence and dispossession and may provide security and 
stability to emerging capitalist classes against the opposition these processes inevitably 
inspire (Ballvé 2012, 617).  
 
Third, the ‗border effect‘ may be motivated by government attempts to prevent the 
income generated by drugs from financing opposition groups challenging state 
authority. This is likely to be especially true where drugs are cultivated in borderland 
regions, which, as Chapter 3 explained, often already embody ―privileged sites of 
rebellion‖, and where the violent, disruptive and intimately linked processes of 
capitalist development and state expansion are likely to arouse further opposition (van 
Schendel 2005, 256). 
 
Fourth, establishing control over drug-producing regions can be an important 
mechanism through which to gain international legitimacy and finance. Government 
agencies may seek simultaneously to establish greater control over the drug trade in 
order to attract funding yet also allow the ‗drug problem‘ to be maintained so as to 
attract continued foreign aid. Where counter-narcotics programmes are implemented 
they may be deployed strategically to target those opposed to the government and/or to 
increase the market share of those allied with the government (Bradford 2015; 
Mansfield forthcoming).  
 
As the government seeks to establish authority over drug-producing regions, the drug 
economy will almost inevitably become embroiled within the dynamics of coercion, 
negotiation and resistance surrounding this process.  The reasons for this, I argue, are 
twofold; first, drugs may finance government attempts to assert direct control. Second, 
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drug economies are likely to become integral to forms of negotiation and brokerage 
surrounding how territory is managed and the creation of governable spaces.    
 
Drugs as a means of financing state institutions 
Establishing, equipping and training police forces, armies and bureaucracies create 
formidable budgetary pressures on states, as does the provision of services demanded 
by populations and needed to legitimate state authority. As a high value commodity, 
the allure of drugs as a means of financing state expansion has often proved 
overwhelming. The British, Dutch, French and Japanese empires in Asia all proved 
willing to prioritize generating revenue from opium over concerns regarding the moral 
and social destruction of drug use (Brook & Wakabayashi 2000). Under the Republic 
of China (1921-1949), despite the association of opium with imperial subjugation and 
the increasingly powerful anti-opium lobby, opium taxation remained an invaluable 
source of revenue for the Chinese government. Whilst opium financed China‘s various 
warlords throughout the 1920s, opium revenues were also essential to the financing of 
Chiang Kai-Shek‘s Northern Expedition which re-unified the country (Yongming 1999, 
61; Slack 2001, 66-70).  
 
After the Second World War, although the emerging international drug control regime 
brought an end to the state‘s ability to generate revenue officially from opium through 
monopolies or tax farming, this did not end the linkages between drugs and the 
financing of (often covert) state coercive power. During the Cold War in Asia, drugs 
financed various covert anti-communist forces, notably French paramilitaries fighting 
against the Vietminh throughout the first Indochina War (1946-54) and anti-
communist Chinese Nationalist troops which fled into eastern Burma following the 
end of the Chinese Civil War and who were supported by the US (Walker 2009, 192-5; 
Gibson & Chen 2011; McCoy 1991).  Just as counter-narcotics strategies were often 
relegated below security concerns in American foreign policy, governments in drug-
producing and trafficking countries have similarly proved willing to prioritize their 
own statebuilding agendas rather than implement prohibition.  
 
In many drug-producing countries, both historically and contemporaneously, drug 
production has been concentrated in borderland regions over which the central 
government has wielded only contested control. Alongside its role in financing 
opposition to central governments, the drug economy has often been viewed as a 
means to finance the expansion of state institutions, and to forge stable coalitions with 
other powerful social groups who may wield the strength to challenge the state. 
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Informal taxation of drug production and trafficking offers valuable opportunities for 
national armies, police and state administrators to finance their activities. Taxation is 
primarily a function of territorial control since it is generated from controlling access 
to rural production sites (which confers the power to tax farmers and traders), control 
of border-crossings and road checkpoints, and is also generated from the ability to 
demand protection money from farmers, refineries and traffickers against the threat of 
state prosecution. Even the collection of formal taxation (such as land taxes), informal 
taxation on licit goods and services (such as road tolls), fees for government-provided 
services (such as schools and hospitals) and the multitude of bribes, backhanders and 
kickbacks requested by state officials, are likely to emanate from the illegal economy 
in drug-producing regions. Thus, symbiotic relationships may emerge between those 
involved in the drug trade and state officials whose job it is to enforce prohibition, 
creating vested interests in continued production rather than drug control. This is likely 
to be especially true in cases where revenue from central state coffers is unreliable and 
inadequate. Revenues generated from drugs to bolster state coffers may also become a 
means of financing state iconography (in the form of offices, palaces, roads, railways 
and airports, and border checkpoints), service provision and bureaucratic structures all 
of which may serve to strengthen the legitimacy of the state.  
 
Drugs, political settlements and brokerage 
Drugs may also become integral to government strategies aimed at establishing durable 
political settlements through reaching agreements with other powerful social actors. In 
drug-producing regions the drug trade is almost certain to be deeply embedded in local 
power structures since the trafficking and taxing of drugs is likely to provide the means 
(perhaps the only means) for local groups to accumulate capital, to establish patronage 
networks and to finance coercion. Furthermore, the reliance of cultivators upon those 
able to provide credit and to link rural production sites with markets for drugs may 
create forms of loyalty tied to the drug trade. The lack of formalized property rights or 
legal protection surrounding illicit drug economies means that influential figures in the 
drug economy are also likely to wield coercive power or form alliances with those that 
can. All of these factors means power and drugs are likely to be strongly correlated.    
 
Attempts by the government to assert greater authority by dismantling the relationship 
between drugs and local elites is likely to be fraught with difficulty. The fact that drug 
production has low barriers to entry (in that it does not require expensive or technical 
equipment or training), is often located in remote areas and the fact that it is 
recognized as an illegal activity all combine to make it difficult for states to 
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monopolise control over production or to prohibit cultivation. In light of these 
difficulties, the government actors may instead look to manage relations with powerful 
social groups by forging ―joint institutions of extraction‖ in which they do not seek to 
curtail or dismantle the drug economy but instead attempt to re-work the relationship 
between drugs and power in an attempt to establish durable political settlements and so 
limit the opposition which the government faces (Snyder 2006). 
 
In fact, the official illegality of drugs provides the government with control over an 
array of incentives and threats with which to establish such joint ‗institutions of 
extraction‘.  Even in drug-producing regions, where efforts to impose greater state 
authority are a recent phenomenon, the government nonetheless controls mechanisms 
that can deeply impact upon the drug trade. These include offers of official protection, 
legal impunity, and the sanctioning of the use of violence to those who prove loyal to 
the state, coupled with the threat of prosecution, crop eradication and extradition 
against those who continue to oppose it. The lack of recourse to formal property rights 
or legal protection makes such offers and threats particularly powerful. Furthermore, 
by straddling the interface between the legal and illegal economies the government 
may be able to offer those involved in the drug trade with a means to ―diversify‖ and 
―graduate‖ out of drugs. This may be by enabling them to launder drug revenues into 
the legal economy, allowing them to form legal businesses and access to government 
licenses and contracts, and allowing them to enter the formal political system 
(Goodhand & Mansfield 2010, 26). Pablo Escobar‘s election to the Colombian House 
of Representatives in 1982 as a member of the Colombian Liberal Party is perhaps the 
most notorious example, but is by no means the only one, with similar instances being 
documented in recent years in both Myanmar and Afghanistan (SHAN 2011; Meehan 
2015; Goodhand and Mansfield 2013).  
 
The global drug control regime and the international pressure on states to implement 
counter-narcotics policies do not necessarily weaken these dynamics; indeed the 
selective implementation of counter-narcotic strategies may become another means 
through which governments are able to forge durable political settlements by targeting 
international efforts against recalcitrant forces whilst insulating political allies 
(Mansfield 2015). In such contexts, the international drug control regime‘s ―making of 
illicitness‖ may actually provide governments with a powerful array of threats and 
incentives with which to forge the kinds of limited access orders and brokerage 
agreements through which to consolidate power (van Schendel & Abraham 2005.) 
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The role that drugs may play in the forging of such coalitions is likely to demonstrate 
significant diversity. The spectrum of brokerage relations developed in Chapter 3 is 
instructive as a means of conceptualising this diversity. Where state consolidation is 
mediated through ‗frontier brokerage‘ and the government‘s priority is to reduce the 
risk of outright challenges to its authority. Forging coalitions with powerful social 
groups who have the power to contest its authority and to destabilise territory is often 
the government‘s primary aim. In its attempts to do so it may offer promises of 
impunity and protection and the re-branding of officials or groups in state media, from 
‗druglords‘ to legitimate political and economic organisations. The government may 
also offer money laundering services and opportunities to enter the legal economy and 
formal political system in return for pledges of allegiance, the end of armed opposition, 
counter-insurgency activities and/or access to territory or borders. State institutions are 
unlikely to exert significant direct control over drug production or trafficking and the 
revenue generated from the drug trade is likely to remain mostly beyond state coffers. 
Whilst the government may seek to re-direct revenues into the legal economy, a 
significant proportion of drug money may still flow out across international borders, 
depending upon opportunities for investment and the efficacy of anti-money 
laundering strategies in neighbouring states. Bargains surrounding the drug trade may 
play a key role in forging coalitions where none previously existed although this 
creates the risk of further empowering elites whose loyalty to the state is questionable. 
At an international level governments face a delicate balancing act between the need to 
uphold plausible deniability of involvement in the drug trade in order to access 
financial and military aid, whilst masking the role that deals surrounding the drug 
economy may have in securing political settlements.   
 
Where the government is seeking to consolidate control through ‗territorialising 
brokerage‘ the distinction between the drug economy and state actors is likely to 
become more blurred. Governments often seek to use territorialising brokerage in areas 
where state institutions have a stronger presence but remain weakly embedded and 
confronted with alternative power structures. Brokerage offers a cheaper and more 
expedient means of territorialising space, often alongside efforts to establish more 
direct forms of state authority. Offers of impunity, protection, money laundering and 
entry into the formal economy and political system may all be used to forge coalitions 
between emerging state institutions and other forms of local authority. Drugs may 
become instrumental to ‗hierarchies of extraction‘ in which certain local groups are 
able to continue their involvement in the drug trade (or become new players) with 
impunity in return for their role in facilitating other government strategies including 
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counter-insurgency activities, securing territory for other forms of extraction such as 
large-scale development projects, and managing the potential for instability which 
these activities are likely to create. Concurrently, the drug trade may also become 
embedded in the more quotidian, everyday practices of statehood. Alliances for profit 
may emerge between government employees and those involved in the drug trade, 
taxation of the drug economy and the creation of informal protection rackets may 
become an important means of financing both military and civilian state institutions, 
and influential figures in the drug economy may become local politicians and 
businessmen.  Defining where the drug economy ends and state power begins becomes 
increasingly difficult and the links between state institutions and drugs may become 
harder to deny. Within such contexts strong tensions may emerge between the 
government‘s need to demonstrate clear commitment to drug control to maintain 
legitimacy and international funding and the risk that counter-narcotics strategies may 
destabilise brokerage agreements and deny state institutions much needed revenue.  
 
Figure 5: Drugs and brokerage  
 
 FRONTIER 
BROKERAGE 
 TERRITORIALISING 
BROKERAGE 
BROKERAGE 
FUNCTION 
Lateral expansion of state 
authority ‘outwards’ into 
spaces where the state’s 
control is weak and 
alternative forms of authority 
remain powerful; Priorities are 
security and stability 
 Vertical penetration of state 
authority, deepening state 
control over society; priorities 
are resource extraction and 
greater state ‘legibility’ 
ROLE OF THE 
DRUG 
ECONOMY 
Provides political and 
economic ‘rents’ with which 
the government forges 
political coalitions with 
powerful social actors able to 
challenge state authority  
 Provides political and 
economic ‘rents’ for forging 
political coalitions with those 
able to provide cheaper and 
more expedient means of 
establishing control over 
populations and resources; 
Drugs also finance emerging 
state institutions 
WHY THE 
GOVERNMENT 
ENGAGES WITH 
THE DRUG 
ECONOMY 
Ability to offer protection, 
legal impunity, access to the 
legal economy and money-
laundering services provides a 
means to secure the 
allegiance of powerful social 
groups; Direct drug revenues 
to allied groups and away 
from insurgents 
 ‘Hierarchies of extraction’ 
provide a means of financing 
local elites able to facilitate 
deeper state penetration, for 
example financing local 
structures of authority under 
state oversight to secure 
territory and facilitate state 
access to resources 
WHY DRUG 
ENTREPRENEURS 
Engagement with the 
government enables drug 
 Territorialising brokers have 
less autonomy than frontier 
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ENGAGE WITH 
THE 
GOVENMENT  
entrepreneurs to formalise 
wealth and power accrued 
from the illegal economy. 
Provides opportunities to 
‘graduate’ out of the illegal 
economy and ‘diversify’ their 
political and economic and 
power base.   
brokers and engaging with the 
government enables them to 
continue drug activities (or 
become new players in the 
trade). 
DRUG REVENUES Most drug revenue remains 
with the brokers themselves 
 ‘Alliances for profit’ more 
likely to emerge in which 
brokers and government 
officials generate revenue 
from drugs 
TENSIONS FOR 
THE 
GOVERNMENT 
Brokerage arrangements may 
secure political settlements 
with powerful elites but drug 
revenues may ensure the 
perpetual autonomy of these 
elites and increase the risk of 
international criticism and 
action. 
 
 Tension exists between the 
government’s need to 
demonstrate commitment to 
counter-narcotics to maintain 
external legitimacy and aid, 
and the risk that such actions 
may destabilise brokerage 
agreements.  
 
Alongside their role in facilitating forms of brokerage, drug economies may also 
become a means of empowering resistance to processes of capitalist development and 
state consolidation. By providing a lucrative source of wealth, which states are unable 
to monopolise or prohibit, drugs can offer a powerful means to finance armed groups 
whilst regional trade networks may provide the means no only to traffic drugs but also 
to access weapons, ammunition and other supplies. Investors in the drug trade may 
prefer to ally with those opposing the government knowing that these groups lack the 
formal judicial power to act against them in the future.      
 
These insights reveal that to construct conceptual binaries between state and non-state 
actors and legal and criminal practices and to blame involvement of state actors in the 
drug trade narrowly in terms of corruption are all deeply misleading.  It ignores the 
complex, myriad ways in which drug economies (and counter-narcotics strategies) are 
likely to become deeply embroiled within how governments seek to consolidate 
authority in drug-producing regions. These insights are not intended to suggest that the 
relationship between state consolidation and illicit drug economies is necessarily 
governed by pre-meditated strategies, or that this relationship has a linear trajectory 
towards greater consolidation.  Indeed, the role of the drug trade in financing attempts 
by state institutions to assert direct territorial control, in helping to forge brokerage 
agreements, and in financing resistance may all occur simultaneously within drug-
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producing regions, creating fluctuating and volatile mosaics of state practices which 
belie simple categorisation.   
 
The paradoxical relationship between drugs and state consolidation 
Many of the dynamics explained above may be ad hoc strategies devised at varying 
levels of government and may contain within them their own contradictions and 
paradoxes. Indeed, whilst engagement with drug economies may become an essential 
aspect of financing state institutions and forging stable political settlements, this may 
in turn come at the cost of undermining the state‘s legitimacy both domestically and 
internationally. In turn, implementation of counter-narcotics strategies to gain 
international legitimacy and attract aid may undermine the role that drugs can play in 
financing state institutions and forging political settlements.  
 
Furthermore, attempts by governments to account for drug production in territory 
under their jurisdiction may create damaging blame-games and strengthen 
exclusionary forms of nationalism in which the need for governments to be seen as 
tough on drugs has often resulted in the blaming of drug production on certain social 
(often ethnic) groups in a way that has perpetuated existing conflict fault-lines. 
Cohen‘s (2013) study of the linkages between anti-opium campaigns and government-
led processes of ‗Laoisation‘ in contemporary Laos reveals these dynamics very 
clearly. Opium, he argues, has become a ―symbol of the primitiveness and 
backwardness of highland minorities‖, juxtaposed with more advanced and civilized 
lowland communities. Eliminating shifting cultivation, resettling ethnic minorities into 
lowland, sedentary  ‗development centres‘, promoting Lao language education, and 
establishing community institutions ―patterned after lowland Lao models‖, have all 
become central to narratives of development and poverty reduction. Opium reduction 
has become a means of financing and legitimating the expansion of state authority 
despite the fact that ―the opium-eradication campaign itself was the immediate cause 
of considerable economic hardship and social dislocation from which many highland 
communities have yet to recover‖ (Cohen 2009, 425). These campaigns strengthened 
state authority and international legitimacy, albeit in ways which effectively ―excluded 
the ethnic minorities from the construction of Lao national identity‖ and perpetuated 
longstanding ethnic schisms (Pholsena 2006, 3, 89; cited in Cohen 2013, 186).    
 
Finally, attempts to harness the drug economy to strengthen state institutions may be 
undermined by the fact that drug economies, which by their very nature are 
transnational, thrive on the risk premium and price differentials created by the very act 
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of border transgression. As van Schendel‘s (2005, 174) analysis of smuggling across 
the Bengal borderland reveals, although states on both sides of the border sought to 
interact with ―illegal entrepreneurs‖ in order to strengthen their own power and 
accumulation, to finance state institutions and to ―dampen[…] demands for higher 
salaries in the state bureaucracies‖, these alliances in turn empowered and made office-
bearers of those who ―routinely undermined the state‘s territoriality‖. In this ―revenge 
of the open border, the economic policy of enclosure and centralization found its 
Waterloo‖ (ibid). 
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
The fundamental aim of this chapter has been to challenge the fetishization of illegal 
drugs as commodities destined to cause conflict and state fragility. This fetishization 
has provided only simplistic, partial and, at times, deeply misleading explanations of 
the political economy of drugs, obscuring analysis of the complex social relations 
surrounding drug economies. In contrast, this chapter has sought to challenge the 
‗exceptionality‘ of drugs and rather than separating out analysis of drug economies, I 
argue that they must be placed within the broader context of the material interests, 
power relations and institutional arrangements surrounding processes of state 
consolidation and capitalist development.   
 
Such an approach offers scope to analyse how and why drug economies have 
flourished during both wartime and peacetime, during periods and in spaces in which 
states have both consolidated power and in which their authority has been contested 
and subverted. Although close correlation between drugs, war economies and weakly 
consolidated states do exist, it is deeply misleading to reduce the causes of conflict and 
weak states to the presence of drugs. In contexts where government authority is weak, 
drug economies may indeed become embedded in dynamics of resistance. The high 
value of drugs, their transnational geographies and the government‘s difficulty in 
monopolising or prohibiting production may all serve to strengthen those forces 
contesting state power. However, as this chapter has sought to show, there is nothing 
inevitable or intrinsic to the relationship between drugs and state weakness. Indeed, 
where governments seek to establish greater authority over drug-producing regions 
interaction with the drug economy is likely to play an important role in this process 
and rather than dismantling the relationship between drugs and power, government 
may attempt to re-work this relationship to fulfil their own statebuilding strategies. 
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As this chapter and the two preceding chapters have outlined, attempts to make space 
governable are likely to be heavily contested and underpinned by violence, conflict, 
poverty and complex political settlements in which power is not monopolised by 
central governments but subject to complex brokerage arrangements and coalitions 
between the government and various social groups. In such contexts, drugs may play a 
central role in financing state consolidation, in forging brokerage agreements, 
stabilising political coalitions, and in facilitating capitalist expansion. Whilst drug-
producing regions may continue to experience high levels of violence, conflict and 
impoverishment, these dynamics cannot simply be explained away through narratives 
of state failure and underdevelopment, but may in fact be a direct consequence of these 
very processes of state consolidation and capitalist expansion. This contention raises 
three insights which underpin the empirical focus of my study on the opium/heroin 
economy in Shan State.  Firstly, it offers a way of interrogating how and why drug 
economies can continue to flourish even in contexts defined by growing stability rather 
than conflict, by emerging peacetime economies rather than war economies, and by an 
increasingly powerful state rather than one whose authority is waning. Secondly, it 
offers a means of understanding the interaction between states and drug economies 
which goes beyond simplistic accounts of isolated corruption or normative 
explanations of the criminalisation of the state. And finally, it emphasizes that to 
understand the dynamics of the opium/heroin trade in Shan State analysis must take as 
its starting point the complex historical political economy of power relations governing 
the region rather than a narrow fixation upon the dynamics of the drug trade. It is to 
this complex history that I now turn to in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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SECTION 2: HISTORY 
 
 
 
 
The Shan Hills, Kalaw, Southern Shan State. Photograph by the author November 2012. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONTESTING THE STATE IN THE SHAN 
BORDERWORLD c.1852-1962 
 
 
Meeting of the Federated Shan States, 1923. Photograph provided to the author by a Shan historian, 
Taunggyi, 2013. 
 
The purpose of this chapter and the chapter that follows is to provide a historical 
overview of contested processes of state consolidation across the Shan region since the 
mid-nineteenth century up until the late 1980s. I argue that in order to analyse the 
relationship between the opium/heroin trade and processes of state consolidation since 
1988, it is important first to understand the history of how this region has been 
governed and why drugs became an important part of the region‘s political economy.  
 
I have chosen the mid-nineteenth century as a starting point because this period 
marked the start of concerted efforts by the Burmese monarchy – the late Konbaung 
dynasty – to reform state institutions as the spectre of British imperial power loomed 
ever larger. Engaging with the legacy of disjuncture and instability created by King 
Mindon‘s efforts to consolidate state power is important in understanding the future 
trajectory of the colonial state, which in turn shaped the foundations bequeathed to the 
post-colonial state. Furthermore, tensions created by the Konbaung dynasty‘s reforms 
reveal the contested relationship between central government and the principalities that 
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governed the Shan region, bringing into stark focus the challenges of asserting state 
authority across this area. The second half of the nineteenth century also witnessed 
Burma‘s increasing integration into the global economy and rising opium production 
in parts of the Shan States. Limitations of space mean that whilst this chapter does 
provide a degree of narrative, the focus is upon developing an analytical history of 
state consolidation rather than a comprehensive overview of Myanmar‘s recent history, 
something which readers can find elsewhere.25  
 
In this chapter, I develop four core arguments. Firstly, I show that government 
attempts to assert control over the Shan borderland since the late 1980s are founded 
upon a long history of weak state authority in the region, which stretches back long 
before the outbreak of the region‘s insurgency in the 1950s. This insight offers 
historical contextualization for why post-colonial governments have faced such 
difficulties in governing the region. In its efforts to provide a brief overview of the 
governance structures and political coalitions that emerged (and broke down) during 
this period, these chapters are guilty of developing a rather elite-centred approach. This 
is because, drawing upon the conceptual framework in Chapter 1, I focus specifically 
on analysing the contestation for control between government and borderland elites 
over the means of coercion, extraction and legitimation and how these dynamics 
shaped state practices.  
 
Secondly, I argue that in order to understand the trajectory of pre-colonial, colonial and 
post-colonial government attempts to manage the Shan region we must situate these 
state-building strategies within a spatial framework that emphasizes the importance of 
both dynamics internal to the borderland itself and broader transnational dynamics. 
This multi-scalar framework of analysis is influenced by Baud and van Schendel‘s 
(1997) distinction between ‗world time‘, ‗state time‘ and ‗borderland time‘. I seek to 
demonstrate how government efforts to establish sovereign, institutionally bounded 
control over the Shan borderland (‗state time‘) have been intimately affected by both 
the inner workings of these borderland regions (‗borderland time‘) and regional/world 
historical transformations (‗world time‘). 
 
Thirdly, I demonstrate how the history of the Shan region is one of both connectedness 
with and separation from the areas of central Burma with which it is now formally 
                                                          
25 For an exhaustive bibliographical guide to secondary literature on Burma, see Charney 2004. For 
comprehensive accounts of Burma‘s recent political history see: Smith 1991; Lintner 1999; Myint-U 
2001 & 2008; Charney 2009; Taylor 2009; Callahan 2003. For more detailed accounts of the history of 
the Shan and Kachin regions see: Tun 2009; Sadan 2013.   
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bound. Close connections existed between the Shan kingdoms and the pre-colonial and 
colonial governments centred on the Irrawaddy plains to the west. However, I show 
that the relationship between central governments and borderland elites was one of 
centrifugal schisms rather than stable political settlements, a legacy that left lasting 
challenges for efforts by postcolonial governments to establish a territorially 
consolidated nation-state. Most importantly, I emphasize how colonial rule entrenched 
the territorial bifurcation of the state by entrenching the sovereign claims of the central 
government over the vast arc of hill areas that formed the colonial state‘s borderlands, 
yet established very different forms of governance in these regions. This bounded but 
separately administered territorial structure entrenched the centre‘s claims to govern 
the Shan States, whilst providing few foundations upon which to do so.  
 
Fourthly, I argue that the drug economy must be placed within the broader socio-
economic and political dynamics of the Shan borderlands. Whilst much analysis has 
viewed the region‘s drug production since the mid-twentieth century through a prism 
of anarchy, lawlessness, resource-driven conflict and state absence, this chapter instead 
emphasizes the historical and transnational dynamics which led drug production to 
thrive in Shan State. 
 
5.1 REFORM AND CRISIS: THE SPECTRE OF BRITISH IMPERIALISM AND THE 
TROUBLED BIRTH OF THE MODERN STATE 
The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed concerted efforts by the late 
Konbaung dynasty aimed at ―refashioning the state‖ in an attempt to strengthen its 
position against the increasingly expansionist British Empire (Myint-U 2001, 115). 
The half century prior to the first Anglo-Burmese War (1824-1826) had marked a 
period of ambitious westward imperial expansion under the Burmese monarch King 
Bodawpaya (1782-1819).26 However, defeat to the British in 1826 and again in 1852 
led to a dramatic loss of territory, including the lower part of the Irrawaddy valley and 
the delta region (including Rangoon).27 The rump Burmese Kingdom was centred on 
the upper echelons of the Irrawaddy Valley and its principal tributary, the Chindwin 
River, a narrow area stretching approximately 200 miles east to west.  
 
                                                          
26 This westward expansion included conquest of Arakan, a small kingdom separated from the 
Irrawaddy Valley by the Arakan Yoma mountain range and bordering the British Indian Empire, the 
annexation of Manipur and the installation of a tributary ruler in the Ahom Kingdom of Assam. These 
conquests marked the zenith of the Konbaung Kingdom‘s territorial expansion. 
27 Under the 1826 Treaty of Yandabo, the Ava Kingdom ceded Manipur, Arakan and Tennasserim and 
was required to pay a war indemnity of 10million rupees. Although no formal peace treaty was signed 
after the Second Anglo-Burmese War the British gained control of the lower part of the Irrawaddy 
valley including Rangoon, Pyay (which the British renamed Prome) and the delta region.  
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To the east of the Kingdom lay the Shan Hills, a vast range of steep hills and narrow 
valleys dissected by the steep-gorged Salween River. It embodied a strongly 
autonomous region criss-crossed by a network of trading routes at the frontiers of the 
Burmese Kingdom to the west, the Qing Empire to the east and the Siamese Kingdom 
to the south. The region comprised multiple (approximately 30-40), loosely bordered, 
principalities (muang), varying in size and power and each governed by a hereditary 
Chaofa (Sawbwa in Burmese) meaning literally ‗Lord of the Sky‘ (Tun 2009, 39; 
Yawnghwe 1987, 65; Younghusband 2005, 23). 28  The relationship between these 
feudal principalities and the surrounding kingdoms fluctuated. Those east of the 
Salween River enjoyed greatest autonomy (with some paying nominal tribute to both 
the Konbaung and the Qing courts), whilst those to the west were more closely linked 
with the Burmese Kingdom. By the mid-nineteenth century stable but weakly enforced 
political settlements existed between the Shan rulers and the Konbaung Kingdom. In 
return for pledging loyalty, paying annual tribute and providing soldiers in times of 
war or rebellion, the Chaofa were recognised by the Burmese King as legitimate rulers 
through the issuing of an official sanad (letter of appointment) and were granted the 
right to administer their kingdoms with minimal interference (Tun 2009, 111). 
Marriage alliances linked the Shan ruling families with the Konbaung aristocracy and 
the sons of Shan rulers often spent their youth at the Ava court (Myint-U 2001, 24). 
Burmese troops were posted at various garrison towns across Shan states ―but these 
soldiers were there to suppress outright rebellion and were not part of a more general 
structure of government‖ (Myint-U 2001, 24).  
 
5.1.1 The failure of reform     
By the middle of the nineteenth century, successive defeats to the British ushered in a 
reformist and modernizing administration under the new king, Mindon, and his brother 
Kanaung. The British Empire‘s military prowess, industrial might and commercial 
expansionism posed both a grave threat and inspired a desire for modernisation. 
Furthermore, the loss of the lower Irrawaddy valley and the Delta region to the British 
after the Second Anglo-Burmese War had serious domestic implications. It prevented 
Mindon using the Delta‘s rice surpluses to regulate food supply (and prices) in Upper 
Burma, which was integral to maintaining order. Instead, the delta region was 
integrated into global commodity markets meaning that in times of shortage, Mindon 
was now forced to purchase rice on the global market at prices inflated by growing 
European demand.29   
                                                          
28 I have chosen to use the term chaofa in this study as it is closer to the original Shan pronunciation. 
29 The Delta had become an important land and migration frontier and by 1881 300,000 people living in 
Lower Burma were recorded as having been born outside the territory. This frontier would have been 
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Mindon‘s response to these growing threats was twofold. At a diplomatic level he 
attempted to stave off further British aggression by seeking support and protection 
from other world powers, primarily France. Domestically, the Konbaung dynasty 
embarked upon a faltering attempt to strengthen the state‘s extractive power through 
two key reforms. First, Mindon introduced a new form of household taxation known as 
the thathameda, initially in central Burma and then from 1868 across the Shan 
principalities also (Scott 1976, 99; Myint U 2001, 122; Mangrai 1965, 58; Taylor 2009, 
23-4). Second, the system of noble patronage was reformed. The granting of landed 
estates (appanages), which had long been the foundation of the aristocracy‘s wealth 
and power, was replaced with a system of cash salaries to aristocratic officials, who 
were then expected to deliver the thathameda tax revenues from the estates they 
controlled to the Royal Treasury rather than retain the revenues from their estates 
themselves. The appanage system had long been used by Burmese monarchs to 
maintain stability by effectively forging a limited access order in which the granting of 
lucrative estates used to forge political loyalty amongst the aristocratic elite. It was 
designed to reduce the inherent tensions caused by the large progeny of many Burmese 
monarchs as appanages were often given to those denied succession (Libermann 1984, 
78-83; Taylor 2009, 26-29). This system dispersed the Kingdom‘s wealth through an 
extensive patronage network in return for maintaining political order. However, the 
external British threat now forced the Konbaung dynasty to dismantle this system in an 
attempt to generate the revenue it needed to strengthen itself.          
 
The emphasis placed upon generating revenue through such potentially destabilising 
reforms reflected the increasingly restrictive financial bind within which the late 
Konbaung dynasty found itself. British commercial pressure limited Mindon‘s ability 
to raise revenue through tariffs and government monopolies.30 The Panthay Rebellion 
disrupted trade with China and forced the Burmese Kingdom to formally renounce 
trade with the rebel state of Pingnan Guo to avoid antagonising the Qing Dynasty. The 
1870s world depression saw a dramatic fall in world commodity prices of cotton, oil, 
sesame and wheat – all commodities produced in Upper Burma – whilst rice prices 
                                                                                                                                                                        
potentially advantageous to the Burmese Kingdom had it remained under its control but its loss and the 
demographic shift this now represented had serious implications in reducing the country‘s tax base and 
productivity. 
30 These pressures culminated in the 1867 Commercial Treaty which forced the monarchy to surrender 
royal monopolies (primarily on oil and timber) and lowered frontier duties for a period of ten years. 
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rose by an estimated 50% between 1878 and 1885 (Myint-U 2001, 180).31 Following 
poor rice harvests between 1882 and 1885 The Konbaung Dynasty was forced to 
import almost 100,000 tonnes of rice in 1885, resulting in a growing trade imbalance 
and an estimated net outflow of 4million rupees annually between 1878 and 1884 
(Myint-U 2001, 180). 
 
High rice prices aroused discontent whilst the dismantling of the appanage system 
weakened local structures of governance. By the early 1880s tax evasion, migration to 
British Burma and growing unrest were widespread. As the superficiality of the state‘s 
coercive power became ever more apparent, large swathes of the country gave up 
paying taxation altogether whilst banditry engulfed much of the countryside. Nowhere 
were the territorial pretensions of the state cast asunder as comprehensively as across 
the Shan Kingdoms. Mindon had been careful to maintain political coalitions with the 
Chaofa, however the heavy-handedness of his successor, King Thibaw (1878-1885), 
coupled with the Chaofa‘s resentment at having to impose the thathemeda tax, 
destabilised the political alliances between the Burmese Kingdom and the Shan 
principalities.32 Rather than continue to act as frontier brokers, the Chaofa capitalised 
upon the weakness of the Burmese Kingdom to pursue greater autonomy and many 
united in rebellion to form the ‗Limbin League‘ (Tun 2009; Younghusband 2005, 11). 
The League mobilised more than 20,000 troops, with the declared aim to install their 
chosen pretender, the Limbin Prince33, in place of Thibaw as King in Ava (Mangrai 
1965, 112-3).34 
 
Thus, on the eve of the third Anglo-Burmese War (1885) government authority had 
collapsed throughout much of Upper Burma. Attempts to reform the appanage system 
                                                          
31 Rising rice prices were driven partly be growing European demand but also demand within Asia itself, 
which was driven by a rising population, especially in the emerging tropical market economies that were 
attracting large labour forces to work on plantations (Lewis 2010, 183). 
32 Mindon had preserved relations with the Choafa, for example by marrying the daughter of the 
powerful Mong Nai Sawbwa, known as the Mong Nai Queen. Thibaw, however, adopted a policy of 
ruling over, rather than through the chaofa. In 1882 for example, the Royal Court chose to reject the 
Keng Tung Choafa‘s nominee for the smaller neighbouring principality of Keng Hung, the 
announcement of which led the Chaofa to execute the Royal Officer and his thirty guards, march to 
Keng Hung to appoint his own favoured candidate and to sever all links with Ava. 
33 The Limbin Prince was Burman and was an illegitimate son of King Mindon‘s brother, the Kanaung 
Prince who had settled in Moulmein where it seems that he was contacted by an agent of the Kengtung 
Chaofa who asked him to spearhead the Shan rebellion (Yawnghwe 1987, 201; Tun 2009, 128; Mangrai 
1965 107).   
34 As expressed in the letter below between the Kengtung and Hsipaw Sawbwas, the aim of the Limbin 
League was not outright succession but a re-negotiation of their relationship with the Ava Kingdom: 
―without a suzerain there will be continual struggle among the Sawbwa…..if there be a suzerain, the 
interests of the country, of the religion, of all of us, will be protected…..if the Limbin prince becomes 
King, the Thathameda tax (an unprecedented thing in history) will be remitted and the Sawbwas will be 
required to do obeisance to the King only once in three years‖ (quoted in Mangrai 1965, 107). 
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had weakened both national-level political coalitions between the King and the nobility 
and the local structures of governance that had historically buttressed the monarchy 
throughout the countryside. In the Shan Kingdoms government revenue collection fell 
to zero and the collapse of royal overlordship revealed the tenuous nature of Ava‘s 
territorial reach.  
 
The collapse of royal authority demonstrated the inherent weaknesses of the state‘s 
coercive and extractive power and revealed that the legitimacy and stability of the 
Konbaung dynasty was predicated upon a set of political settlements that precluded the 
kind of revenue generation and territorial control required to strengthen and consolidate 
state power against a powerful external threat.  
 
5.1.2 Rising opium production in the Shan region  
The Shan Kingdoms were not only affected by the turmoil within the Ava Kingdom 
but also by developments across China and the rest of Southeast Asia.35 This regional 
interconnectedness was reflected most clearly by the significant expansion in opium 
production across the eastern parts of the Shan hills during the nineteenth century. 
Although evidence is scant, it seems the Shan region has a long history of low-level 
opium production, especially in the Trans-Salween Hills (those to the east of the 
Salween River). During the second half of the nineteenth century production rose 
significantly in this region and by the time of the British annexation of Upper Burma 
in 1885 opium cultivation was widespread, especially in the Trans-Salween Kokang, 
Wa and Kengtung regions (Maule 1992, 15; Scott 1900, 276).  
 
The significant expansion in opium production was the culmination of three factors. 
Firstly, it was directly attributable to the transformation of the global opium trade 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Over this period opium played a vital 
role in addressing the challenge that all European empires faced in Asia; namely that 
high demand in Europe for Asian commodities such as silk, tea, spices and porcelain 
threatened to drain European reserves of silver since silver was the only major 
commodity valued by China for exchange (Lovell 2011; McCoy 1991, 79; Trocki 
1999). Growing Chinese demand for opium, coupled with the British conquest of 
Bengal in 1764 (India‘s most fertile poppy-cultivating region) enabled the British 
Empire to address this trade imbalance. A flourishing India-China-Europe trilateral 
trade network developed in which opium produced in India was exported to China in 
                                                          
35 See Sadan 2013 for a much more detailed analysis of the regional interconnection of the regions that 
became modern Burma‘s eastern borderlands. 
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exchange for goods, primarily tea and silk, which were then sent back to Europe. 
Chinese attempts to prohibit the import of opium were thwarted by British victories in 
the Opium Wars of 1840-42 and 1856-60 (Lovell 2011).36 By the 1850s, growing 
opium consumption within China led to a significant rise in domestic poppy cultivation, 
centred on Sichuan and Yunnan. This was fuelled by demand for a cheaper source of 
opium than that imported along the country‘s eastern coast (Maule 1992, 14). It was 
around this time that commercial cultivation most likely spread to the contiguous 
Trans-Salween states. There was no clear international border and Shan, Kokang and 
Wa ethnic groups straddled both sides of what would later become Burma‘s colonial 
boundary.   
 
Secondly, opium cultivation increased as a consequence of the domestic turmoil that 
wracked the Qing Dynasty through the second half of the nineteenth century. In 
response to the growing challenge posed by western imperial power the Qing Dynasty 
launched its so-called Self-Strengthening Movement. This attempted to reform the 
military and improve the institutional capacity of the state. The pressures facing the 
Qing State were exacerbated by the outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion (1850-64) in 
southern China and the Panthay Rebellion (1856-73) in Yunnan. Opium taxation 
became increasingly important to the Qing Dynasty and was used to pay for the 
fortification of Beijing, weapons and ammunition, and soldiers‘ wages (Yongming 
1999, 19; Spence 1975, 170-2). There was little motivation to suppress opium 
production, which continued to flourish throughout Sichuan and Yunnan and across 
into the Trans-Salween Shan Kingdoms. The Qing Dynasty‘s eventual victory over the 
Panthay Rebellion also impacted upon opium production and trade across the Shan 
states as it led to a steady influx of Chinese Muslim refugees who settled in the region 
(Sadan 2013, 143-6). Establishing a number of settlements, notably Panglong (in the 
Wa hills of northern Shan State), these Panthay settlers continued their involvement in 
the centuries-old caravan trade between Yunnan and Siam (Forbes 1986; 1988).  
 
Thirdly, these well-established trade networks then facilitated the further expansion of 
opium production in the eastern Shan States. From as early as the fifteenth century 
(and probably much earlier) mule caravans had traversed the arduous paths linking 
Kunming, Dali and Ssu-Mao in Yunnan with the northern Thai commercial centre of 
Chiang Mai, via Kengtung (Forbes 1986, 6-7). Silks, tea, and copper goods dominated 
                                                          
36The Treaty of Nanking (1842) following the end of the first Opium War opened ports to British trade 
including Shanghai. It also ceded Hong Kong to the British and ensured that British citizens in the five 
treaty ports could only be tried by British law in British courts. At this stage the opium trade was still 
officially illegal. In 1860, following the second Opium War, the opium trade was officially legalised.  
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southward trade, with cotton being sent north (Forbes 1986, 19-22). By the end of the 
nineteenth century poppy cultivation in Yunnan and rising demand for opium 
throughout the rest of southeast Asia meant opium became an increasingly valuable 
commodity. Shan opium was incorporated into these trade networks, integrating the 
remote eastern areas of modern-day Shan State into the regional economy (Forbes 
1986, 22).  
 
5.2 COLONIAL RULE AND THE ENTRENCHMENT OF THE TERRITORIALLY 
BIFURCATED STATE 
By the mid-1880s it was clear to the British government in Lower Burma that the Ava 
Kingdom was unable and unwilling to serve British interests. As Myint-U (2001, 185) 
surmises, ―the best local collaborator for the British Empire would have been at once 
strong internally and appreciative of its external weakness.  The Burmese were 
neither‖. Ava‘s attempts to pursue an independent foreign policy and to establish 
closer links with the expansionist French Empire37, its persistent reluctance to remove 
the fetters on free trade38, and the pervasive disorder and rebellion that racked Upper 
Burma, motivated the British takeover of the Kingdom following the third Anglo-
Burmese War (1885).  
 
The Ava Kingdom had proved unable to develop a political system that could enable it 
to mobilise resources and strengthen territorial control whilst also maintaining 
legitimacy and order. In contrast, the colonial state would prove relatively adept at re-
working the state‘s coercive and extractive capabilities in pursuit of achieving its ―twin 
motives of security and profit‖ (Smith 1991, 40). These structures, however, were 
territorially uneven, relied upon the external coercive power of the Indian Army, 
gained little indigenous legitimacy and ultimately provided few durable foundations 
for the post-colonial state.   
 
One of the profound legacies of colonial rule was the impact it had upon governance 
structures through the hill areas that now comprised the country‘s borderlands. By the 
end of the nineteenth century the British had formally delineated the country‘s eastern 
                                                          
37 The late nineteenth century witnessed growing Anglo-French rivalry in Southeast Asia following 
France‘s victory over the Vietnamese and Chinese in 1882 which established a French protectorate over 
Tongking, Annan, Cambodia and Laos. These tensions were further exacerbated by the 1885 Burmese-
French formal Treaty of Friendship and proposals to establish a joint Royal Bank of Burma following 
the visit by a high-level Burmese delegation to France in May 1883.  
38 The 1867 Commercial Treaty between Britain and Upper Burma had lapsed in 1877 and had not been 
renewed. The final spark for war had been a decision to impose a fine upon the Bombay Burmah 
Trading Corporation for under-reporting its teak exports thus breaking the rules of its commercial 
license. 
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borders with Siam and China apart from a stretch in eastern Shan State that traversed 
the unadministered Wa States. These cartographic exercises enshrined the colonial 
state‘s territorial claims to areas over which the Burmese Kingdom had historically 
exerted only limited suzerainty.39  
 
Within these borders, the colonial government established a bifurcated administrative 
structure which effectively divided the country between ‗Burma Proper‘ (later known 
as ‗Ministerial Burma‘), which covered the eight lowland divisions of Arakan, 
Irrawaddy, Magwe, Mandalay, Meiktila, Pegu, Sagaing and Tennasserim, and the so-
called ‗Frontier‘ or ‗Excluded‘ Areas, which covered the Shan States and Chin, Naga 
and Kachin Hill Tracts. In Burma Proper the British refashioned the state institutions 
under a form of centralised direct rule. In the Frontier regions the British pursued a 
strategy of laissez-faire indirect rule. This bounded but separately administered 
territorial structure served to entrench the centre‘s claims to govern the Shan States 
(and other frontier areas) ever since, whilst providing few foundations upon which to 
do so.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39 The British were intent upon demarcating their eastern frontier with the twin aims of maintaining 
cordial relations with China, whilst preventing it from getting too close to Kengtung and Siam, and 
reducing the presence of the French Empire on their border. On 17th October 1894 King Chulalongkorn 
of Siam and the British minister at Bangkok formally exchanged maps of the border. Joint British-
Chinese Boundary commissions worked to delineate the China-Burma border in the cold seasons of 
1897-99. After two seasons the whole border was delineated by the Joint Sino-British Boundary 
Commission, apart from the stretch of the boundary between Namting and Namka, which traversed the 
unadministered Wa States.  The rest of the border was formalised by the mutual exchange of maps and 
notes in April 1899. Confusion over this part of the border continued for many decades, which 
culminated in the signing of the Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty in Peking on 1st October 1960 
(Mangrai 1965, 236; 293-8). 
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Map 6: Simplified map of colonial Burma40 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40 This is an obscure but useful map that I was presented with during fieldwork and I have not since 
been able to find its original source. 
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The widespread disorder the British faced in Upper Burma following the Third Anglo-
Burmese War encouraged the British to embark upon a further refashioning of the state 
rather than seek to install a figurehead monarch or to governing through existing state 
institutions. The monarchy, Hluttaw (Council of Ministers), Royal Court, provincial 
patron-client administrative apparatus and army were all swept away leaving a chasm 
throughout ‗Burma Proper‘ into which the British set about installing their own forms 
of coercive and extractive power.  
 
Following a lengthy and brutal four year military campaign to pacify Upper Burma the 
British sought to establish a state infrastructure that could maintain order, facilitate 
commercial expansion and cover its own administrative costs.41 The way these goals 
were pursued by the colonial government, and the forms of resistance and negotiation 
they evoked, differed significantly between ‗Burma Proper‘ and the ‗Frontier Areas‘.  
Throughout Burma Proper the British established a rationalised, hierarchical 
administrative structure. Beginning with the 1889 Burma Village Act, colonial rule 
established a systematic territorial governance structure fashioned on the 
administrative model of the Indian village (Callahan 2003, 23). Each of Burma 
Proper‘s eight divisions were divided into townships, governed by a Township Officer 
(myo-ok), which in turn were sub-divided into villages each with their own, state-
appointed and salaried headmen (Furnivall 1956, 75; Taylor 2009, 87).42  
 
The coercive might of the British colonial state was the Indian Army and Military 
Police. Burma was colonised late, by which time the Indian Army was well-established, 
―drilled, disciplined and clothed on western lines‖, and ―accustomed to European 
                                                          
41 The Pacification of rural Burma was violent and left a profound distrust of colonial rule in many areas.  
The Indian Army was deployed throughout the country, the cost for which rose to £1.2million for the 
year 1888 (Taylor 2009, 160). Some of the challenges and brutality surrounding the pacification 
campaign were captured in the memoirs of Sir Reginald Hennel, a colonel in the Indian Army, and have 
powerful resonance with the Tatmadaw‘s post-colonial counter-insurgency offensives: ―In practically all 
engagements with the enemy we had to fight an invisible foe. The dacoits waylaid our troops as they 
came up the river in boats or by road marches, poured forth a heavy fire upon the advancing foes as they 
got within range. Not only was it difficult to locate the enemy in their hidden lairs, but our men laboured 
under the vast disadvantage of having to force their way through the close undergrowth of an unknown 
forest, whilst the enemy knew the ins and outs of their tangled labyrinths and were able to keep 
concealed…our only means of punishment was to burn these villages‖ (Hennell 1985, 134, cited in 
Callahan 2003, 25).   
42 The personal authority of township officers and headmen was rooted in their access to the coercive 
power of the colonial state, rather than local support, as encapsulated by the explanation below of how 
the state responded to tax evasion: “The myooks [township officers] came with the military police, an 
armed Indian sepoy force, and a few Indians in business and a butcher in the neighbouring town. The 
myook then held court and upon failure of residents to pay taxes due, the properties of the delinquents 
were auctioned off…the villages would not buy each other‟s property; but the Indian businessman was 
there to pick it up…the villager‟s animals, his means of earning a living, his bullock carts and other 
moveably property was also disposed in the same manner” (Maung Maung, cited in Taylor 2009, 198). 
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officers, under European officers accustomed to Indian ways‖ (Furnivall, cited in 
Callahan 2003, 234). A domestic civilian police was never successfully instituted 
whilst numbers of indigenous recruits to the Army were extremely low until the 
outbreak of World War One and after which were dominated by recruits from the 
Karen, Kachin and Chin ethnic groups. The ban on Burmans joining the Army was 
only lifted in 1935 and the British Burma Army was only formed in 1937 after the 
country‘s formal separation from India (Callahan 2003, 40-41). For the British it 
became cheaper and quicker to deploy Indian troops than to train a new Army, whilst 
the subsequent preference for Hill area recruits lay in the British fixation of defining 
martial races as well as growing concerns by the 1920s of the rising tide of nationalism 
in Burma Proper (Taylor 2009, 116). 
 
Although British companies had long dreamed of securing a ‗backdoor‘ to China, this 
aspiration never materialised and British Burma remained a predominantly maritime 
trading nation. Although extraction of oil and timber in Upper Burma increased 
significantly, it was rice production in the Delta that dominated the colonial economy.43 
The immigration of Indian rice farmers was actively encouraged and even subsidised 
by the British. In contrast, throughout much of Upper Burma, and especially the 
Frontier Areas, investment was limited to infrastructural projects, notably the 
construction of the Upper Burma railways in the 1890s, and a few small-scale 
industrial projects.  In the Shan States these amounted to little more than a tea 
production factory at Namhsan and lead and silver mines at Bawdwin and Namtu 
(Smith 1991, 47). The colonial government proved able to generate far greater tax 
revenues throughout Burma Proper than its pre-colonial predecessor. The thathameda 
tax system was retained and expanded, becoming a ―fixed tax payable in cash‖, and 
taxes were also levied on both private land and the cultivation of state-owned land 
(Taylor 2009, 192; Myint-U 2001 234).  
 
Across the Shan States British rule was experienced very differently. Having quelled 
the disorder that had spread through the region in the final years of King Thibaw‘s 
reign, the British sought to establish a political settlement capable of delivering 
stability, cheap administration and unfettered commercial access. In many ways it was 
across the Shan States that the British found themselves interacting with a system of 
governance that they were more familiar with from other parts of the Empire. This 
                                                          
43 Between the 1850s and the 1930s rice cultivation expanded tenfold from 800,000 to 8.7million acres 
and by the 1920s (before the World Depression hit the industry) rice exports had risen to 3million tons 
per year up from 162,000 in 1855 (Smith 1991, 42). 
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sentiment was expressed clearly in the correspondence between Lord Dufferin, Viceroy 
of India and Viscount Cross, Secretary of State for India in London in October 1886:  
 
the Shans, Kachins and other mountain tribes live under the rule of hereditary 
Chiefs, whose authority is generally sufficient to preserve order amongst them. 
Here, then, we have to deal not with disintegrated masses as in Burma Proper, but 
with large organised units, each under the moral and administrative control of an 
individual ruler. If we secure the allegiance of these rulers, we obtain as far as can 
be foreseen most of what we require (cited in Smith 1991, 41).   
 
The Shan States Act of 1888 established the parameters of the colonial political 
settlement across the Shan Hills. The Chaofa retained the right to govern their 
Kingdoms in return for guaranteeing peace, stability, unrestricted trade, a tributary 
contribution to administration costs, British control over foreign relations and 
acceptance of supervision of their internal affairs by British political agents, known as 
Assistant Superintendents.44  
 
A number of factors ensured that the British footprint in the region remained relatively 
light, and meant there was no concerted effort to institutionalise the same form of 
direct rule exercised across Burma Proper. First, the structure of indirect rule proved 
largely effective at maintaining internal stability. 45  Second, the region faced no 
significant external threats. The decline of the Qing Dynasty halted the spectre of 
Chinese expansionism, whilst a modus vivendi was established with the French Empire 
in Indochina, by which Siam remained a neutral territory between the two empires. 
Third, governance decisions in the region were shaped by the strategic concerns of 
British India rather than Rangoon. The region was viewed as an imperial frontier to be 
stabilised and monitored rather than a state borderland to be directly administered.46 
Fourth, the British quickly came to the conclusion that the region would never generate 
sufficient revenue to cover the costs of directly administering it (Smith 1991, 47).  
 
                                                          
44 There were 26 States under the Southern Shan States, of which 11 were governed by Chaofa, 11 by 
lesser chiefs known as Myosa and 4 smaller states by Ngwegunhmu (lit: silver revenue chiefs).  In the 
north there were six States, all of whom were led by Chaofa. Large states had their own Assistant 
Superintendent whilst smaller states came under the control of neighbouring assistant superintendents 
(Mangrai 1965, 301).  
45 This is not to say that the Shan region experienced complete stability during the colonial period after 
the initial ‗Pacification‘ campaign. The Saya San Rebellion (see below) affected western and northern 
parts of the Shan hills. There was also much instability in Kengtung in the mid-1930s following the 
death of the Kengtung Chaofa, Sao Kawng Kiao Intaleng, in 1935. However, British rule did mark a 
significant decline in inter-Chaofa conflicts that had often led to outbreaks of violence prior to British 
rule.   
46 Initial forays into the region by the Indian Army had come to the view the turbulent, steep-gorged 
Salween River, rather than the Mekong River further east, as forming a natural imperial defensive 
boundary, a fact that further accounted for the weakness of colonial administration in the Trans-Salween 
region (Mangrai 1965, 217). 
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The period of British rule is often portrayed as something of a ‗golden age‘ for the 
Shan kingdoms and one in which their relations with the colonial state, once fixed, 
remained largely unchanged (Yawnghwe 1987, 77).  Both of these claims, however, 
are misleading (Sadan 2013)47. Although British control brought an end to internecine 
conflict between the Shan principalities, colonial rule marked a period of chronic 
neglect rather than benign paternalism and entrenched a semi-feudal system of 
government dominated by Shan elites that was resented by many, especially amongst 
Kachin, Lahu and Pao communities (Smith 2001, 47). Furthermore, relations between 
the colonial government and local elites did change significantly, becoming 
increasingly antagonistic and revealing the many fault-lines that would continue into 
the post-colonial era. Changing relations were hardly the result of emerging forms of 
institutionalised negotiation between borderland elites and the colonial government. 
Instead, they were a consequence of the changing constitutional dynamics within India 
and the Rangoon government‘s increasing determination to generate revenue needed to 
cover the region‘s administration.  
Burma was governed as a Province of India and constitutional advances in India had 
major repercussions on Burma and the Shan States. As a part of India, Burma came 
under the purview of the 1919 Government of India Act, which gave the Empire‘s 
larger Provinces greater executive power over certain internal affairs. In Burma this 
resulted in a significantly expanded Legislature with a greater proportion of elected 
representatives (Thompson 2001, 82). Both the colonial Burmese government and the 
Chaofa feared that the country‘s emerging nationalist movement would capitalise upon 
these constitutional concessions to question the system of governance within the Shan 
States. In response the British established the Federated Shan States on 1st October 
1922.48 This defined the Shan States as a ‗backward tract‘ and, along with the other 
designated Frontier Areas, placed them under the direct control of the Governor of 
Burma. This ensured that the Governor alone was mandated to legislate for the region, 
insulating the Shan States from coming under the scrutiny of the reformed Burma 
Legislature. The colonial government also used the creation of the Federation to 
renegotiate the initial political settlement it had forged with the Chaofa by increasing 
                                                          
47 Mandy Sadan (2013; 2013b) provides a rich and comprehensive deconstruction of many of the 
erroneous assumptions made regarding the impact of colonial rule on upland societies in the country‘s 
borderworlds. 
48 The Federated Shan states was structured as follows: (1.) Every Chaofa, Myosa and Ngwegunhmu 
was a member; (2) An Advisory Council of 21 representatives was formed to discuss finance and 
common issues; (3) The Council was an advisory body whose resolutions were not binding in order to 
preserve the individual rights of the Chaofa; (4) The Shan States lost their representative in the 
Governor‘s Council in Rangoon; (5) Assistant Superintendents continued to be assigned to the Chaofa. 
166 
 
the contributions they were required to provide to cover administrative costs and by 
expanding British control over the internal affairs of their principalities.49  
Under the Federation, the Chaofa became caught between a form of colonial rule that 
refused to fully accept their self-proclaimed status and which continually eroded their 
power, and the spectre of coming under the auspices of the legislature of Burma Proper 
(Maule 1993, 174). 50  Both the British and the Chaofa became increasingly 
disillusioned with the system of indirect rule. The British came to view the Sawbwa as 
self-interested, poor administrators, whose demands were unrealistic and based on an 
exaggeration of their status and a disingenuous refusal to accept their close ties with 
the pre-colonial Burmese Kingdom. Their inability to defend themselves or to cover 
their own administrative costs meant that the British became increasingly resolute in 
their belief that eventually the region would have to be re-united with the rest of 
Burma.51 For the more powerful Shan chiefs, the refusal of the British to grant them 
equal status to the Indian princes, and the persistent erosion of their privileges and 
autonomy soured relations.52  
 
British colonial rule thus never achieved widespread legitimacy or acceptance, 
although the criticisms and responses it evoked were different in Burma Proper than in 
the Frontier Areas. Throughout Burma Proper, the overthrow of the monarchy, the 
curtailment of state patronage of Buddhism and the refusal to co-opt pre-existing 
governance structures left a lasting perception of colonial rule as something distinctly 
alien. The reliance upon external coercive force, the imposition of the British Indian 
bureaucratic, legal and education systems, and the emergence of a social structure 
                                                          
49 Under the Federation all states were required to provide 40-50% of their revenue to a federal fund and 
the Federation was also required to play an annual tribute to the Government of Burma (reflecting the 
fact that the central government subsidised the costs of administration in the Federated Shan States). It 
was agreed that 75% of revenue generated from forestry would go the Federation, with 25% remaining 
with the Chaofa. 
50 This tension was reflected clearly in the Hsipaw Memorandum (1924) which presented Chaofa 
demands for reforms to the way the Federation was administered. It reflected both resentment at the 
erosion of their status, which the Hsipaw Chaofa now likened to ―docile advisers‖, and their fears that 
unless their position was guaranteed a ―Burman Executive Government responsible to a democratic 
Legislature, might one day eliminate the traditional rule of the Chiefs‖ (Maule 1993, 174). 
51 These sentiments were expressed most clearly in the forty-two page document written by John Clague, 
Commissioner for the Federated Shan States between 1931 and 1935, which concluded that the pre-
colonial history of the region was one of increasing Burman control since the sixteenth century. The 
desire to keep them under the direct control of the Governor lay in the fact that: ―The Shan States… 
present a problem from an international point of view that has no counterpart in India where only the 
Kashmir States, the States around Simla, and the Sikkhim State have boundaries which march with 
foreign countries‖ (cited in Maule 1993, 201).  The belief that the Federated Shan States should 
ultimately be governed as part of Burma Proper was reflected in a dispatch in 1931 from the Chief 
Secretary of the Government of Burma, H.L. Nichols, to the Foreign Secretary in India which stated: 
―the Federation among the Shan states themselves is an essential preliminary to federation between the 
Shan states and Burma which sooner or later must come‖ (cited in Maule 1993, 202).    
52 Interviews with local Shan historian, Taunggyi, January 2013. 
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presided over by British and Eurasian (primarily Anglo-Indian) elites created a 
distinctly detached form of rule. The illegitimacy of British rule throughout rural 
Burma was demonstrated most clearly by the Saya San Rebellion in 1930, which 
marked the culmination of rural grievances, inspired by religious calls for the 
revitalization of Buddhism and economic grievances exacerbated by the devastating 
impact of the world depression on the country‘s rice sector (Aung-Thwin 2010; Brown 
2005, 97-114). Although the rebellion was eventually suppressed it reflected the 
unpopularity of British rule, which had come to be associated with ―international price 
fluctuations, foreign labour competition, alien landlords, large debts and a punitive 
police force‖ (Taylor 2009, 124).53 
 
By the 1930s the colonial government was also faced with a growing urban-based, 
predominantly middle class, nationalist movement centred on Rangoon that crystallised 
following the formation of the Do Bama Asiayone (lit: ‗We Burmans‘) in 1930 (Min 
2009; Kemoto 2000).54 The rising tide of nationalism was a predominantly Burman 
affair, driven by resistance and resentment towards direct British rule. It was a response 
to the deleterious and destabilising impact of integration into the global economy and 
of the mass immigration of foreign labour both of which were felt most pertinently in 
the rice-producing areas of Lower Burma; of the wholesale restructuring of local 
administration, and of the imposition of judicial, education and revenue systems that 
were underpinned by secular, western capitalist ideology and disregarded Buddhist 
religion and culture. The ‗year of strife‘ of 1938, which witnessed student protests and 
widespread worker strikes in Rangoon, was almost entirely confined to Lower Burma. 
The founding of the All Burma Peasants Organisation and the Communist Party in 
1939 and the All Burma Trade Union Trade Union Congress in 1940 reflected an 
emerging political culture centred on the experiences of those living under direct 
colonial rule. The rise of nationalism as largely a ‗Burman‘ phenomenon epitomised 
the territorial bifurcation of the colonial state. The anti-colonial movement was driven 
by the concerns of political opposition centred in Lower Burma, which had little 
                                                          
53 Saya San was a monk who had been elected by the General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA) 
in 1924 to survey the living conditions of the Burmese peasantry. The Saya San rebellion became one of 
the largest anticolonial rebellions in Southeast Asia. The official colonial account of the rebellion 
portrayed it as a monolithic movement driven by superstition and an anti-modern desire to resurrect the 
pre-colonial monarchical state. Such accounts have been rigorously challenged by numerous studies (cf: 
Aung-Thwin 2010; Brown 2005) which have drawn attention to the complex array of political and 
economic grievances against colonial rule which inspired numerous acts of rebellion, rather than a 
single orchestrated rebellion. 
54 This was demonstrated most clearly by the antagonistic rhetoric developed by the Do Bama 
movement between the notion of ‗Dobama‘, meaning ‗Our Burma‘ and ‗Thudo-Bama‘, meaning ‗their 
Burma‘  which was a derogative term against those who were seen as collaborating with British rule. 
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interaction with political elites in other parts of the country, or understanding of their 
very different set of grievances towards colonial rule.  
 
5.3 OPIUM UNDER COLONIAL RULE 
The tensions and ambiguities of colonial rule were reflected in how the government 
approached the issue of rising opium production in the eastern Shan States. The 
differences in how opium was managed in Burma Proper and the Frontier Areas, and 
the conflicts surrounding how the ‗opium question‘ was viewed in London, India, 
Rangoon and the Shan States, provides a microcosm of the broader dynamics of 
colonial rule. In Burma Proper attempts were made to manage the supply of opium and 
limit its consumption to Indian and Chinese users. Legislation passed in 1878 and 1894 
forbade the sale of opium to Burmans and was founded upon racist racial stereotypes 
that viewed Burmans as mentally and physically more susceptible to its deleterious 
impacts (Wright 2014, 57-8). Government supply of opium was obtained at cost-price 
from India and from seizures of illegal opium, which it then sold on to licensed opium 
shops at a mark-up of as much as 500% (Maule 1993, 398, 402). By the mid-1930s the 
government was generating almost four million rupees per year from excise duties and 
license fees, more than any other Indian province (Maule 1992, 19-20). Anti-opium 
sentiment became an important aspect of the country‘s growing nationalist movement. 
This reflected the movement‘s close links with Buddhism, which prohibited opium 
usage, its growing resentment against Indian and Chinese settlers who were perceived 
to profit from the drug (most license holders were Indian or Chinese), and its criticism 
of the immorality of colonial rule (Wright 2014, 121).  
 
The approach to the ‗opium question‘ in the Shan States was starkly different, 
reflecting the colonial government‘s willingness to govern this region as distinctly 
separate from Burma Proper. Colonial rulers argued that since the region already 
cultivated opium prior to 1885 and parts of the Trans-Salween states remained 
unadministered, the government was unable to control supply. Opium usage amongst 
Shan and Kachin populations remained legal as they too were deemed to be less 
susceptible to its adverse effects. In light of growing international pressure for drug 
control after World War One, the government passed the Shan States Opium Order in 
1923, which stated that all opium had to be sold to licensed opium shops through a 
system managed by the Chaofa. However, users did not have to be registered and the 
law did not apply to the Kokang and Trans-Salween Wa States where the vast majority 
of opium was cultivated (Maule 1993, 396). Under this laissez-faire response opium 
cultivation expanded during the colonial period for a number of reasons. Most 
169 
 
importantly, there emerged huge incentives for smuggling opium from the Shan States 
(and neighbouring Yunnan) to other parts of Burma and Southeast Asia. The inflated 
price of legal opium in Burma and under other government monopolies throughout the 
region created high demand for cheaper sources (Lintner 1999, 144). Production in the 
Trans-Salween states must also be placed in the context of the wider opium trade 
networks across the region.  By the 1920s Yunnan and Sichuan had become the 
epicentre of opium production producing a staggering 28,000 tons annually by the 
mid-1930s and Chinese opium was the source of smuggling networks throughout 
Southeast Asia (Maule 1993, 451-4). With few other economic opportunities available 
to populations in the Trans-Salween States, more farmers turned to growing opium to 
capitalise upon the Chinese opium-smuggling networks traversing Southeast Asia and 
by the 1930s the French estimated that 180 tons of opium reached Indochina every 
year from the Shan States, although this was only a tiny proportion of the total amount 
entering the French Empire from Yunnan (Maule 1993, 405).   
 
Tensions over how to address growing opium production in the Shan States provides a 
fascinating insight of the multiple viewpoints which emerged at different levels of the 
colonial administrative structure and reflects the complex and at times contradictory 
framework within which the country was governed. For the British government in 
London and India, the overriding priority was to appease growing calls for prohibition 
emanating from the US and the League of Nations. Pressure was placed upon the 
Government of Burma to address rising opium production and smuggling out of Shan 
State, which threatened a major scandal. 
 
In stark contrast, the attitude of the colonial government in Rangoon was one of 
pragmatism and expediency. The government argued that it was disingenuous to claim 
it could implement prohibition or stem smuggling. It emphasized the huge 
administrative cost that such a policy would require and warned of the sensitivities of 
expanding government presence in the Wa region, where the border with China 
remained contested. Any attempt to curb production and smuggling in the Wa region, 
they argued, threatened to alienate the few supporters which the British had in the 
region (mainly amongst Chinese traders) and would evoke widespread opposition 
amongst cultivators. Opium also provided revenue to the Chaofa and to the Federation. 
The government continued to make the case for Frontier Areas to retain their 
exceptional status and thus remain exempt from all opium treaties.  
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These contrasting perspectives crystallised in late 1920s following the Government of 
India‘s 1926 announcement, in the face of growing international pressure, that it would 
stop exporting opium in 1935. In light of plans to constitutionally separate Burma from 
India, this announcement threatened Rangoon‘s access to cheap supplies of opium.55 In 
response the Rangoon government put forward its own proposal in 1932 (reiterated in 
1939), supported by the Federated Shan States, in which it advocated purchasing 
opium from the Shan States to then sell in Burma Proper with any surplus being 
exported by the government to Siam, and French Indo-China. For the British 
government in Burma this effectively killed two birds with one stone: it alleviated the 
financial burden threatened by the termination of the government‘s supply of cheap 
Indian opium and it would provide a legal market for opium cultivated in the Shan 
States, reducing the impetus for smuggling (Maule 1993, 405). The Proposal, however, 
was rejected by the British governments in India and London which warned that 
Burma ―would not be permitted to deluge the East with opium‖ and argued that 
providing a legal market for trans-Salween opium would simply increase production 
across the Shan States (Maule 1993, 407). Although India eventually agreed to 
continue to provide opium to Burma at cost-price, the rejection of the government‘s 
opium proposal came with a sharp rebuke against the Shan States‘ anomalous position 
within the Empire and Rangoon‘s lack of administrative control over the region. 
Despite these criticisms, the Shan States remained exempt from the 1936 League of 
Nations‘ Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, 
signed by the Government of Burma in 1938 (Maule 2002, 207).56   
 
The continued administrative exceptionality afforded to the Shan States reflected the 
broader institutionalised disjuncture between Burma Proper and the Shan States. This 
bifurcated state structure created a relationship of reciprocal illegitimacy between 
borderland elites and the future postcolonial state. For the Chaofa, the history of 
colonial rule left a legacy of profound distrust of aggrandizing central power, whilst for 
those in Burma‘s growing nationalist movement, the perpetuation of provincial semi-
feudal elites across the Shan Hills was an unacceptable colonial anachronism. The 
Government of Burma was aware of the anomalous and problematic status of the 
Frontier Areas; however with little belief that the sun was finally setting on the British 
                                                          
55 Although India pledged to continue sales to Burma post-separation, this was not to be at cost-price.  
Instead, it would charge the same rate that other Asian countries had to pay – namely 4,000 rupees per 
chest.  This price hike would have cost the Government of Burma 7 lakhs (700,000 rupees) per year 
(Maule 1993, 403-5).   
56 This Convention had already been signed by the Government of India in 1936. Following the 
constitutional separation of Burma from India in 1937, the Burma Office in London demanded that 
Burma sign all opium agreements previously signed by the British Government and Government of 
India. 
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Empire this was an issue to be addressed in the future. The impact of the Second World 
War and the subsequent collapse of the British Empire truncated the time available to 
resolve the tensions and contradictions created in centre-borderland relations and left a 
challenging legacy for the postcolonial state.   
 
5.4 THE TROUBLED EMERGENCE OF THE POST-COLONIAL STATE, 1942-1962  
A repeated mantra within critiques of military rule in Myanmar since 1962 has been to 
juxtapose the parlous state of the country at the end of the twentieth century with the 
country‘s potential at independence. Whilst such critiques rightly point to the failures 
of military rule, it is misleading to characterise the legacy inherited by the post-
colonial state as anything other than one of turmoil, instability and deep territorial 
divisions in which the state‘s coercive power, extractive capability and legitimacy 
remained weak and contested. 
 
The Japanese invasion of Burma in December 1941 led to a dramatic collapse of 
British rule. Within five months the colonial state had evaporated, with its beleaguered 
leadership retreating to India to form a government-in-exile under Governor Reginald 
Dorman-Smith. The support given to the Japanese by a small Burma Independence 
Army (BIA), led by the ‗Thirty Comrades‘ which had been trained secretly by the 
Japanese, left bitter tensions between British administrators and the increasingly 
powerful Burman nationalist movement. Although Burma was granted independence 
by the Japanese on 1st August 1943, this proved illusory and the Japanese installed 
military administration. With limited finances and coercive power, Japanese rule 
sought to maintain stability through accommodating localised forms of de facto 
administration, further empowering the ―centrifugal tendencies‖ unleashed by the 
collapse of British rule (Callahan 2003, 66).  
 
After the Japanese surrender in August 1945 Dorman-Smith returned to govern Burma, 
amidst determined calls for independence led by Aung San‘s Anti-Fascist People‘s 
Freedom League (AFPFL). The initial British response, reflected in Dorman-Smith‘s 
May 1945 White Paper, advocated a ‗two Burma solution‘: Burmese self-government 
with Dominion status within the British Commonwealth for Burma Proper, with the 
Frontier Areas remaining under direct British Administration (Smith 1991, 65).57  
 
                                                          
57 Hopes amongst non-Burman elites for the perpetuation of autonomy from central Burmese control 
were strengthened by plans for a two-wing solution to Burma‘s military, agreed at the Kandy 
Conference in May 1945, in which Burman soldiers and those recruited from the Hill areas, primarily 
Karen, Kachin and Chin soldiers, would form two separate military wings under a single British 
Inspector General (Callahan 2003, 95-6).   
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By January 1947, however, the British stance had changed. The British government 
became increasingly willing to grant Burma complete independence, and to acquiesce 
to the AFPFL‘s demands that the postcolonial state be mapped onto the country‘s 
colonial boundaries.  The reasons for this volte-face were fourfold.  Firstly, the AFPFL 
had developed into a powerful opposition force. The nationwide strike launched in 
August 1946 revealed its ability to mobilise opposition, whilst its dominance of the 
April 1947 election (in which it won 171 out of 182 of the electoral seats) reflected its 
widespread support.58  
 
Secondly, the British were aware of the profound weaknesses of the state edifice. The 
war had badly damaged the country‘s physical and administrative infrastructure, the 
economy was in ruins, there were food shortages and violence and disorder were 
widespread. Furthermore, the Indian National Congress was unequivocal in its 
declaration that the Indian Army was no longer available to be used to suppress anti-
colonial freedom movements (Taylor 2009, 233). Fearing a costly colonial war that 
might deliver Burma to the Communists the British started to look to the AFPFL less 
as a threat and more as an opportunity through which a quick and peaceful transition 
could be concluded, especially in light of the traumatic events unfolding in India.  
 
Thirdly, the replacement of Dorman-Smith with Major-General Rance as Governor 
ushered in a more expedient and pragmatic approach.  Dorman-Smith had been deeply 
hostile to the AFPFL, especially its leader Aung San whom he regarded as a traitor and 
war criminal for his initial support for the Japanese. In contrast Rance was mandated to 
reach agreement with Aung San as quickly as possible. Rance quickly informed 
London that ―the White Paper is now out of date‖ and cabled the Burma Office in 
London on January 2nd 1947 London stating that: 
 
we should start with the premise that there is only one Burma and that the part 
known as ministerial Burma and that known as the Frontier Areas are merely 
parts of the whole. They have been one in the past and they must remain one in 
the future so that our ultimate aim is always a united Burma in the shortest 
possible time (cited in Smith 1991, 77).                   
     
Fourthly, Aung San proved willing to concede certain British demands – notably 
acceptance of debt obligation, the maintenance of a British military advisory mission, 
and the British right to use staging bases in Burma for military activities in Asia 
(Taylor, 2009, 244). 
                                                          
58 Aung San, leader of the AFPFL, accepted the position of Counsellor for Defence on the Governor‘s 
Executive council after which the AFPFL proved able to call off the general strike.  Both of these 
decisions were bitterly criticised by the CPB, which contributed to its decision to split from the AFPFL 
in November 1946 (Smith 1991, 69) 
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The Attlee-Aung San Agreement, signed in London on 27th January 1947, pledged the 
transition of power to an independent Burmese government within one year, subject to 
achievement of ―the early unification of the Frontier Areas and Ministerial Burma with 
the free consent of the inhabitants of those areas‖. Aware of the deep misgivings felt 
by many within the ‗Frontier Areas‘ towards unification with Burma Proper, Aung San 
sought to allay these fears through establishing a Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry 
(FACE) and by convening a conference held in February 1947 at Panglong with Shan, 
Kachin and Chin representatives.  
 
Embittered by their experience of colonial rule and aware of Britain‘s changing stance, 
the Chaofa realised that they could no longer rely upon earlier British pledges to 
protect the autonomy of their principalities. Impressed by Aung San‘s sincerity, 
representatives from the Shan States signed the historic Panglong Agreement on 12 
February 1947, through which they pledged ―their immediate co-operation with the 
Interim Burmese Government‖. As a palliative, the agreement stated that ―full 
autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas is accepted in principle‖, 
and accepted the ongoing financial autonomy of the Shan States (Panglong Agreement, 
quoted in Tinker & Griffin, 1985, 404-405). The 1947 Constitution established the 
Shan State Council, comprising 66 members, including all 33 Chaofa alongside the 
same number of popularly nominated representatives (Tun 2009, 327). In the 
constitution the Shan State Council was given the right to secede from the Union after 
―ten years from the date on which this Constitution comes into operation‖, should it be 
able to pass a resolution with a two-thirds majority and win a subsequent plebiscite. 
The Panglong Agreement paved the way for the Shan States‘ incorporation into the 
Union of Burma, in which the erstwhile Frontier Areas now comprised 40% of the 
country. 
 
Although the AFPFL managed to paper over the territorially bifurcated administrative 
structure bequeathed by the British, the postcolonial state inherited a state edifice that 
was extremely weak. The colonial foundations of coercive power – the Indian Army 
and the well-paid elite civil service – had gone. The legacy of anti-Japanese resistance, 
mobilisation against British rule and the conflictual elite politics which surrounded 
independence left a vast array of active armed groups, or ―pocket armies‖, across the 
country (Callahan 2003, 181). And Aung San‘s assassination in July 1947 deprived the 
country of its most popular and unifying leader.  
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Into this confused situation Burma was plunged into a full-scale civil insurrection as 
both the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and the Karen National Defence 
Organisation (KNDO) – a large Karen militia formed to defend Karen communities – 
went into open rebellion against the government. They decried the country‘s sham 
independence and sought to wrestle control of the state from the AFPFL 
(Thawnghmung 2008; Christie 1996, 77-8). For a time the Burmese government was 
derisively referred to as the Rangoon government in light of how little of the country it 
controlled. Indeed, by February 1949 an estimated 75% of the country‘s towns were 
under the control of groups hostile to the central government and the army had fewer 
than two thousand troops (Callahan 2003, 115). State power was weak, highly 
decentralised, and governed by weakly enforced political coalitions. Throughout much 
of the country power was in the hands of local elites, often army commanders and 
politicians linked with the AFPFL, who established their own patron-client networks 
and paramilitary groups.  
 
The weakness of the state‘s coercive power was mirrored by the difficulties it faced in 
mobilising revenue. Throughout the countryside the CPB rallied support through its 
calls to boycott the state and evade taxation. Against this backdrop the government 
was reluctant to impose taxation.59 Land redistribution and the issuing of government 
contracts, leases and licenses were distributed to elites with the intent to engender 
loyalty to the state through a rudimentary form of ‗limited access order‘. The state‘s 
weak extractive power throughout the 1950s was reflected by the growing importance 
in the state budget of Japanese war reparations (which accounted for almost 40% of the 
budget by 1956/7), customs duties, income tax on state employees, and foreign grants 
and aid (Taylor 2009, 266).    
 
Across Shan State, formal independence hardly changed the internal structure of 
governance. Individual states continued to practice separate systems of criminal law, 
run their own internal police forces, and administer their own systems of taxation. 
Tensions quickly emerged in the Shan State Council between the Chaofa, who sought 
to maintain as much autonomy as possible, and elected representatives many of whom 
were critical of the region‘s semi-feudal structure.60 Parts of the region were heavily 
                                                          
59 Land tax equated to around 30% of tax revenue in the 1930s but had fallen to 4% by 1956-7 (Taylor 
2009, 258) 
60 Opposition to the Chaofa coalesced around the pro-independence and anti-feudal Shan State People‘s 
Freedom League Party, founded in 1946, which advocated the creation of a democratic socialist welfare 
state.  Within the Council its representatives called for the centralisation of revenue, police and political 
authority in the name of development and the democratisation of government against the Chaofas‘ 
traditional feudal rights to select state representatives. 
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affected by the country‘s rising insurgency: Taunggyi was occupied by the KNDO 
from August to November 1949; Telephone lines throughout the state were cut, travel 
on the region‘s few navigable roads was dangerous and smaller bands of armed units, 
including the Chaofas‘ private armies, criminal gangs and local militias were active 
across the region, armed by weapons left over from World War Two.   
 
5.4.1 The KMT incursion  
The political tensions coursing through the Shan States were greatly exacerbated by 
the incursion of Kuomintang (KMT) troops from Yunnan, fleeing the victorious 
Communist People‘s Liberation Army. Starting in mid-1949, KMT troops continued to 
cross the border throughout the early 1950s. By 1951, under the command of General 
Li Mi, the KMT had established its headquarters at Monghsat and had developed close 
links with the Chinese Nationalist government in Formosa (Taiwan). By 1952 their 
numbers had swelled to an estimated 12,000 men as the KMT recruited men from 
across eastern Shan States (Tun 2009, 313; Taylor 1973, 12; Mong 2005, 75-82). The 
Communist victory in China and the outbreak of the Korean War had been major 
setbacks for American foreign policy and as the US searched for anti-communist allies 
in Southeast Asia CIA operatives in Bangkok established links with the KMT.  
 
By 1951 the KMT was being supplied with US-made weapons and ammunition. 
Initially supported through air drops, by 1952 planes from Thailand were landing 
regularly at the KMT airfield at Monghsat (Taylor 1973, 41). It seemed the US hoped 
that the KMT army would become capable of opening a new front against China 
amidst the stalemate of the Korean War, or at least might increase tensions to the 
extent that Burma would disavow its non-aligned foreign policy stance and seek 
American protection (Taylor 1973, 43). Such strategic aspirations, however, proved ill-
founded. KMT forays into Yunnan failed and by 1952 the Eisenhower Administration 
pressured Chiang Kai-Shek to remove KMT troops from Burma (Taylor 1973, 44). 
However, KMT troops had by now secured territory east of the Salween River and 
looked to settle there (Tun 2009 310-12). Following numerous failed military 
offensives against the KMT, the Burmese government took the issue to the UN, citing 
the Chinese Nationalist government (at that time a member of the UN Security Council) 
as an aggressor. The UN‘s weak response was greatly resented by the Burmese 
government and although subsequent US-Thai-Formosa negotiations initiated a 
programme to withdraw KMT troops from Burma in late 1953, this proved half-
hearted. By late 1954 more than 6,000 KMT troops remained, few weapons had been 
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amnestied and many of those evacuated to Taiwan were not even KMT troops (Taylor 
1973, 49-50).  
 
The KMT incursion had a profound impact upon the Shan region for numerous reasons. 
It reinforced the distance and seeming irrelevance of the central government, 
especially in those areas east of Salween. Loyalty was given to whoever proved able to 
provide protection and security, and for many communities this was certainly not the 
state. The KMT incursion also inspired forms of political mobilisation that destabilised 
the weak post-colonial political settlement that had been forged between the 
government and Shan elites. The KMT sought to win the support of the Chaofa by 
capitalising upon their dissatisfaction with the central government and by encouraging 
local autonomy, whilst Communist troops sought to win popular support through anti-
feudal propaganda.61 Furthermore, the KMT established a highly effective cross-border 
economic network that would become the foundation of the insurgent war economy 
ever since. The KMT built approximately 100 km of roads (70km in Burma, 30km in 
northern Thailand) and developed an extensive trade network built upon its links with 
Chinese communities and business and political elites throughout Southeast Asia 
(Callahan 2003, 156).  
 
For a number of reasons opium became central to this flourishing cross-border 
economy. The areas which the KMT controlled – the Kokang and Wa states and the 
hills north of Kengtung – had long been prime poppy-growing sites and pressure to 
generate income meant KMT units sought to expand production and to tax cultivators. 
The situation was summed up prophetically by one of the KMT‘s most famous 
generals, Tuan Shi-wen (Duan Xiwen) when he stated: ―We have to continue to fight 
the evil of communism and to fight you must have an army, and an army must have 
guns, and to buy guns you must have money. In these mountains, the only money is 
opium‖ (cited in Lintner 2000, 7-8). Before long the KMT had re-established trade 
networks across this region that had been disrupted during the war.  
 
                                                          
61 For example, In July 3rd 1952 a statement issued by Li Chaw, one of the KMT‘s regimental 
commanders, stated: ―Try every means to incite the Sawbwas and Headmen to spread Sedition against 
the Burmese Government in abolishing the system of Sawbwa Administration by utilizing the recruits, 
Shan volunteers, in order to accomplish its intention of governing all the nationalities of Burma‖ (Tun 
2009, 314). Although the majority of Chaofa remained loyal to the government many were reluctant to 
answer the Shan State Council‘s request that they raise levies to fight the KMT for fear of retribution. In 
Kengtung, for example, the KMT armed Lahu recruits pledging to support their efforts to create an 
autonomous Lahu region free of Chaofa control in return for their allegiance against Communist forces 
in the area anti-communism. 
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Opium trade networks were strengthened by the close ties forged between the KMT 
and Thai security officials, most importantly with General Phao Sriyanonda, Head of 
Thai Police. With CIA-backing, General Phao controlled a powerful trading network in 
which his police force protected shipments of equipment and material from the CIA-
front company SEA Supplies in Bangkok north to the KMT, using the same network to 
smuggle opium back south. By the mid-1950s Phao‘s police force had almost 50,000 
men, outnumbering the Thai Army, and had its own air force and navy (Chouvy 2010, 
68-9; Lintner 1999, 191; McCoy 1972, 138-41). This network generated vast wealth 
for many Thai government elites, fuelled investment in the Thai economy, especially 
banking and real estate, and stimulated further opium production in the Shan States. 
Although Phao was forced to flee Thailand following the 1957 military coup, the 
opium networks he had forged continued to grow, mostly coming under the control of 
the Thai Army‘s Communist Suppression Operational Command (CSOC) and the Thai 
Border Patrol Police, which retained close links with the KMT and other ethnic armed 
forces (Lintner 1999, 193). With Thailand a leading member of the newly established 
anti-communist Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation, the US turned a blind-eye to the 
unholy alliances forged between the KMT and Thai security services along its northern 
borders.      
 
The rapid expansion of opium cultivation in Shan State during the 1940s and 1950s 
was also spurred by important changes within the global opium market. World War 
Two disrupted the longstanding opium trade from Iran into the region, as did stuttering 
attempts by the Iranian government to ban opium production in the decade after the 
war (McCoy 1972, 89; Lintner 1991, 191-2; Chouvy 2010, 17). More importantly, the 
suppression of poppy cultivation in China in the early 1950s brought an end to the 
source of opium which had long been the epicentre of licit and illicit opium flows 
throughout the region (Chouvy 2010, 17-18). However, in spite of the growing 
international prohibition movement, global demand for opium remained high and by 
the 1960s the opium economy had developed a new regional dynamic. The Shan States 
provided the major source of opium (supplemented by opium cultivated in northern 
Thailand and Laos), which was then trafficked south to Bangkok where predominantly 
Chinese syndicates orchestrated transhipment throughout Asia, primarily to regional 
hub cities of Saigon, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan. This highly lucrative 
transnational commodity chain would form the basis of much of the Shan State‘s 
insurgent war economy for the next four decades.                    
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The government‘s response to the KMT crisis also had a profound enduring impact on 
how the Shan region was governed. Whilst it seems likely that the central government 
would in time have sought to disempower the Chaofa, their harmonious cooperation 
with the AFPFL‘s calls for independence at Panglong revealed their ―continuing 
political utility‖ (Taylor 2009, 230). The high level of local autonomy given to the 
Chaofa and their dominance in the Shan State Council suggested that the government‘s 
approach to addressing their anomalous status would be gradual. Within less than five 
years, however, these concerns had paled in significance compared to the dangers the 
government now faced on its eastern border. KMT presence raised deep concerns of a 
Chinese invasion to rout the KMT and led to fears that Burma might become a Cold 
War battlefield. 62  Just as the time-scale available to address colonial quandaries 
regarding how best to manage the relationship between Ministerial Burma and the 
autonomous Shan principalities was truncated by the precipitous collapse of the British 
Empire, the time-scale available to the post-colonial state to address its delicate 
relationship with the Chaofa was similarly circumscribed by the arrival of KMT forces.  
 
Continued Chaofa autonomy was viewed at best as a hindrance to the mobilisation of 
revenue and troops and at worst as threatening to create territories whose loyalty to the 
government was questionable. In response, the government imposed martial law in 
1950, which by 1952 had extended to twenty-two of the region‘s thirty-three states, 
including areas entirely unaffected by KMT troops. It soon became clear that the 
extension of martial law was intended not only to address the KMT threat but also to 
consolidate state control across the region. Tatmadaw militarisation of the area was 
accompanied by the arrest of numerous political figures, the centralisation of the 
region‘s police force, the imposition of a uniform code of law, and the reorganisation 
of the state‘s administrative structure into thirty-two townships divided into five 
districts in which headmen were elected rather than appointed by the Chaofa (Sai Aung 
Tun 2009, 350; Taylor 2009, 270). In response to the growing threat to their authority 
from both the central government and from those within the region‘s growing 
insurgency who opposed the feudal vestiges that remained following the country‘s 
independence, the Chaofa reached agreement with the government to relinquish their 
hereditary powers and privileges in return for lump sum pensions in a process 
concluded in 1959. Throughout the 1950s the Shan States thus came under an 
increasingly confused governance structure in which an unpopular military 
                                                          
62 This was, for example, reflected by Eisenhower‘s public comment in March 1953 (quoted in the 
Bangkok Post) that Stalin‘s death could lead to Communist ―explosions in Iran or Burma‖ (Bangkok 
Post March 5, 1953, cited in Taylor 1973, 25). 
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administration, weakening Chaofa rule and an often impotent State Council operated in 
parallel.63  
  
The KMT invasion also impacted upon power relations at the ‗centre‘ of the Burmese 
state, most importantly by providing the impetus for military reform which in turn 
enabled the Tatmadaw to wrestle control over state institutions. Throughout the 1950s 
the Tatmadaw was gradually transformed from a collection of ―self-sustaining, isolated 
Tatmadaw units‖ to a more centralised, better-financed military. It became more than 
simply a fighting force and undertook administrative and economic activities which 
other state institutions proved incapable of doing. In 1951, the Defence Services 
Institute (DSI) was established ―to cater for the welfare and needs of troops and for the 
maintenance of morale‖ (cited in Callahan 2003, 168). Initially designed to sell 
wholesale basic goods to soldiers and the public, by 1960 it had become a vast and 
profitable enterprise running banks, shipping lines, retail, import-export ventures and 
the Myawaddy Press, with profits channelled into financing welfare initiatives 
(Callahan 2003, 169; Myoe 2009, 174). By 1962 the Tatmadaw had grown to 57 
infantry battalions, five regional commands and more than 100,000 soldiers (Callahan 
2003, 173). Many within the military‘s upper echelons compared the Tatmadaw‘s self-
sufficiency and ability to deliver results against the instability and increasing 
fragmentation of the parliamentary system, a sentiment that culminated in the 
definitive military coup in 1962 led by General Ne Win. 
 
The timing of the military coup was linked directly to growing political tensions in 
Shan State. It reflected another crisis point in the perpetual difficulties which central 
governments – pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial – faced in consolidating state 
control over this region. By the late 1950s insurgency was growing across the Shan 
                                                          
63 The everyday traumas resulting from this state of affairs were given lyrical testimony by a young 
student, Sai Pan, who won the 1957 Rangoon University Shan Literary Society essay competition, and 
went on to become an influential figure in the Shan insurgency: “Up in the Shan hills today nature still 
boasts her glory, the green forests and the blue mountains still remain as green and ever blue…but 
beneath this beauty of nature‟s wonder something sinister is lurking; stealthily creeping and penetrating 
in, bringing endless pity-begging human tragedies. At one moment in the still words, the engine of a car 
would be throbbing, its tyres crunching against the stony road. The next moment the KMT machine-guns 
would send echoes reverberating through the hills. Deep in the midst of the night blurred figures would 
crouch trembling together while KMT orders thunder through the stillness of the night. In a secluded 
corner of a barn a young dame would sob in hiding leaving the pursuing yebaws [Burma Army troops] 
furious with demands…From the pine-clothed Kalaw hills to the outskirts of every major town army 
barracks have mushroomed, in every nook and corner khaki uniforms have become a routing sight…on 
the one hand the KMT are killing, looting and terrorising while on the other hand a great number of 
army bad heads are raping, menacing and creating racial prejudices…today beneath the boom of guns, 
the marching boots, rifle butts and harsh orders the Shan are reeling…full autonomy and equality are 
the phrases of the Panglong [Agreement] but for ten years they have been confined to paper and 
ink…independence has marked the end of British colonialism but army fascism has come to be the 
substitute” (cited in Lintner 1999, 183-4).       
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hills (analysed in Chapter 6), inspired by widespread resentment towards the conduct 
of the Tatmadaw and increasing frustration that the Constitution, though federal in 
principle, had ushered in a unitary state dominated by the interests of the Burman-
dominated central government against which the State Council exercised very limited 
power. The Shan State‘s constitutional right to secession raised political tensions and 
opposition within the Shan State Council coalesced around the demand for 
constitutional reform towards a more federal state structure.  
 
In an attempt to manage these tensions the government announced that the ‗federal 
principle‘ would be discussed at a national conference in February 1962. This 
conference began on February 24th 1962 in the Main Hall of the Burma Broadcasting 
Service on Pyay Road. It provided a platform not only for the discussion of 
constitutional amendment and federalism but also allowed Shan politicians to air 
grievances against the Tatmadaw‘s actions. However, before the National Conference 
could meet again to discuss the federal principle, General Ne Win had staged his coup, 
bringing an end to the country‘s constitutional democracy.64  
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided a brief historical overview of attempts by successive pre-
colonial, colonial and post-colonial governments to govern the Shan region from the 
mid-nineteenth century up to the 1962 military coup. I have developed a number of 
insights which provide important foundations for understanding processes of state 
consolidation in the post-1962 period, analysed in the next chapter.  
 
Firstly, I have sought to show how the history of the Shan region is one of weak state 
territorialisation in which long-standing social, political and economic structures 
across Shan state do not fit easily within the ―spatial container‖ of the nation-state. 
This reflects the inherent limitations of ‗national histories‘. It demonstrates how 
governance structures, networks and resource flows that play an important role in 
                                                          
64  Brigadier Aung Gyi, who became Minister of Supplies under the new government, explicitly 
emphasized the links between events Shan State and the military coup in press conferences on 7th and 
9th March 1962:          “Because of the crisis caused by the federal issue, power had been seized for the 
second time in order to safeguard the state.  Myanmar is a small country.  It is not proper for such a 
small country to be divided into several states…Due to conditions that had threatened to bring about the 
state‟s disintegration, measures to safeguard it had to be taken.  Had the problem been handled with 
firmness, disorders would not have been so bad…If the states were not given what they wanted, there 
would be secession and conflict.  It is impossible to show magnanimity, as it would lead to the same 
condition that existed in 1948. The Shan affair is but the latest manifestation of the innermost thoughts 
of the feudalist reactionaries, whose federalism is nothing less than an expression of narrow 
nationalism and mania for statehood” (cited in Tun 2009, 492). 
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shaping contemporary processes of state consolidation across Shan State have long 
adhered to a spatial framework that extends beyond the state‘s formal cartographic 
boundaries. Historicizing this reality reveals the fallacy inherent within narratives of 
national homogeneity and territorial unity espoused by successive military 
governments since 1962. It provides a stark reminder that territorialist epistemologies, 
which have attempted to make borderlands appear as natural, uncontested parts of the 
state by reifying the linkages between state, nation, territory and sovereignty, are 
ahistorical constructs. The inherent tensions between post-colonial conceptualisations 
of nation-state space and the history of borderland geographies provides valuable 
starting points for understanding why successive governments have struggled to 
consolidate state authority across the Shan borderlands and how borderland 
populations have sought to resist and negotiate state power.    
 
Secondly, engaging with the region‘s pre-colonial and colonial past offers ways for 
understanding why Shan State has experienced such high levels of violent conflict 
without succumbing to simplistic explanations which blame these issues on the 
absence of state authority. Indeed, this chapter has sought to show how the history of 
violence, conflict and poverty in Shan State is rooted not simply in the absence of state 
authority but also in the very processes through which governments have sought to 
institutionalise power across the region and the forms of coercion, negotiation and 
resistance this has elicited.  
 
Thirdly, this chapter has shown that opium production cannot simply be understood as 
a function of the post-colonial war economy. The history of opium in Shan State is far 
longer than the history of insurgency. This history reveals how the opium economy has 
been embedded within attempts to forge political coalitions between governments and 
local elites and to finance governance structures across the region, as well as to finance 
opposition forces, an insight which will become a recurring theme throughout the rest 
of this study.  
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CHAPTER 6 
IMPOSING AND RESISTING THE STATE  
Drugs, insurgency and contested state consolidation 
1962-88 
 
 
The legend of Khun Sa lives on. Statue of the SUA and MTA leader at Khun Sa‟s former  
headquarters at  Ban Hin Taek, Northern Thailand. Photograph by the author, May 2013. 
 
In many ways the 1962 coup marked the beginning of a more significant disjuncture in 
state-society relations than independence. The Ne Win government sought to refashion 
the state‘s powers of coercion, extraction and legitimation and to expand the state‘s 
territorial reach.  This was characterized by efforts to implement an anti-imperialist, 
anti-capitalist programme under a one-party state. It also marked the termination of 
constitutional negotiations with the country‘s restive borderland populations and 
renewed determination to establish territorial control under a unitary state through a 
bellicose counter-insurgency strategy. These strategies, however, largely failed. Under 
Ne Win the economy stagnated with only the country‘s underlying agricultural 
abundance and the thriving cross-border black market staving off more acute levels of 
impoverishment. The increasingly impecunious state proved unable to realise its 
socialist welfare programme, further delegitimizing it in the eyes of many, whilst the 
widespread insurgency blunted state authority across large parts of the country‘s 
borderlands.  
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One of the central arguments of this study is that consolidating firmer control over the 
country‘s border regions with China and Thailand has become of central importance to 
military government state-building efforts since 1988. In order to explain why this has 
been the case, how post-1988 state-building strategies have been imposed, contested, 
resisted and negotiated, and the role of the drug trade within these processes, it is 
essential to first understand the legacy of the Ne Win period (1962-88). Understanding 
this legacy is important for three reasons. Firstly, it explains the dominance of the 
military within state institutions and, by demonstrating the failures of the government‘s 
centrally-planned economy, it explains why the country‘s border regions became 
viewed by government elites as increasingly important to improving the state‘s 
revenue and extractive power. This analysis is developed in Part 1 of this chapter. 
Secondly, understanding the insurgency that raged during the Ne Win era illuminates 
the fragmented power structures and political and economic networks that had 
developed across Shan State by the late 1980s. This in turn reveals the complex terrain 
upon which successive military governments have sought to strengthen state control 
over the past quarter-century. Part 2 of this chapter provides a careful analysis of the 
history and fragmentation of insurgency across Shan State between 1962 and 1988. 
Thirdly, I argue that a number of important developments during the 1980s, notably 
the changing attitude of Thailand and China, coalesced in such a way as to encourage 
state elites to reconceptualise the country‘s northern and eastern borderlands with 
China and Thailand as sites of potential economic opportunity – in terms of both trade 
and the resources they contained – rather than simply as frontier areas to be pacified. 
These developments are analysed in Part 3 of this chapter. Understanding these three 
legacies of the Ne Win period provides an essential starting point for analysing 
processes of state consolidation in the post-1988 period, which is the subject of the 
final three chapters of this study.   
 
6.1 IMPOSING THE STATE: NATION-STATE BUILDING UNDER THE BURMESE 
WAY TO SOCIALISM 
Having established itself as the country‘s supreme governing body, Ne Win‘s 
Revolutionary Council sought to refashion the state, rather than simply stabilise the 
country for a return to parliamentary democracy. This ambition was outlined in the 
Revolutionary Council‘s primary policy statement, the Burmese Way to Socialism, 
which was released less than two months after the coup on 30th April 1962. In 
conjunction with two further documents, entitled The System of Correlation between 
Man and his Environment (January 1963) and Specific Characteristics of the Burmese 
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Way to Socialism (September 1964), it set out the Revolutionary Council‘s aspirations 
to create a welfare state under a stable, unitary one party socialist system. 
 
In March 1964 all political parties were banned and political opposition was 
effectively declared illegal (Charney 2009, 109; Taylor 2009, 295). The constitution 
was suspended, the Hluttaw (Parliament) was prorogued and the governance structure 
established under the 1947 constitution was replaced with a centralised administrative 
structure under the direct control of the Revolutionary Council. All state parliaments 
were abolished and replaced with State Revolutionary Councils under central control. 
The government asserted strict control over the press by taking over all publishing 
houses in August 1962, and also established control over the education system, cultural 
organisations and student politics. The government pursued an economic policy of 
wholesale nationalisation underpinned both by Socialist ideals and attempts to 
indigenize Burman control over an economy in which Burmese Indian, and to a lesser 
extent Chinese, interests continued to be viewed with suspicion. In foreign policy, Ne 
Win continued the strict neutrality of the 1950s, reflected in Burmese neutrality during 
the 1962 India-China border war, Ne Win‘s determination to avoid become embroiled 
in the Indochina conflict, his shunning of ASEAN, which he viewed as a veil for 
furthering US interests in the region, and the maintaining of official diplomatic 
relations with China, the US and the Soviet Union. However, it was also marked by a 
determined anti-western isolationism and ―cultural protectionism‖ (Egreteau & Lagan 
2013, 116; Maung Maung 1956). Cricket, beauty contests, horse-racing and gambling 
were all banned. All foreign language schools were nationalized or forcibly closed, 
visas were restricted to 24 hours (extended to three days in 1969), and unlike during 
the 1950s very few civil servants, technicians or military officers were sent abroad to 
study (Egreteau & Lagan 2013, 116-117, 128-9). 
 
6.1.1 Refashioning coercive power: The institutionalisation of the military-
state 
The Revolutionary Council established a highly centralized system designed to ensure 
the local implementation of centrally-defined policy. It was determined to monopolise 
power and dismantle the decentralized networks of authority that had existed during 
the 1950s in which local strongmen had retained significant autonomy. The strategies 
deployed to expand the coercive reach of central state institutions varied over the 
course of Ne Win‘s rule. Between 1962 and 1974 attempts to consolidate state control 
were instigated through the creation of Security and Administration Committees 
(SACs), which were installed at every level of government – state/division, district, 
township and village – and were all all chaired by military officers. Responsible for 
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controlling home affairs, administration, agricultural production and intelligence-
gathering, the SACs provided a clear chain of command and sought to wrestle control 
away powerful local elites (Nakanishi 2013, 167). From 1974 these same aims were 
pursued through attempts to create a party state. In 1965 Ne Win announced plans to 
re-establish civilian rule under a constitution and a single party, the Burma Socialist 
Programme Party (BSPP). The BSPP had been formed in 1962 but had remained a 
small cadre party with limited membership and held its first Party Congress only in 
1971. In 1971 membership was opened up and the party was transformed into a mass 
‗people‘s party‘. Following the promulgation of the 1974 Constitution, the SACs were 
replaced with ‗elected‘ People‘s Councils at all administrative levels65 and a centrally 
elected one-party legislature was installed (Nakanishi 2013, 152-3).66  
 
Debate remains over the extent to which the reforms initiated after 1974 were a sincere 
attempt to instil an autonomous party state to govern in place of the Tatmadaw or 
whether these reforms were merely a disingenuous attempt to disguise military rule. 
Either way, the Ne Win period was defined by the enduring dominance of the military 
over state institutions, with long-term consequences. The reasons for this dominance 
were fivefold:  
 
First, efforts to overhaul the country‘s bureaucratic structure drew heavily upon the 
Tatmadaw, both in terms of its hierarchical structure and personnel. During the 1950s 
the Tatmadaw had been the only state institution to develop an effective administrative 
command structure across the country and had come to perform a vast array of non-
military state functions (Callahan 2003, 205). The Tatmadaw represented Ne Win‘s 
power base in 1962, all seventeen founding members of the Revolutionary Council 
were military figures, and Tatmadaw personnel were also called upon to staff SACs 
throughout the country.   
 
Second, the perpetual dominance of the military was a consequence of the country‘s 
swelling insurgency. By the early 1960s insurgency had spread throughout large areas 
of Kachin, Chin, Karen, Shan, Karenni, Mon and Rakhine States, whilst the CPB was 
also active throughout the Delta (as were Karen insurgents) and Pegu Yoma regions of 
central Burma. Much of the country‘s borderlands were entirely beyond government 
                                                          
65 The 1974 Constitution abolished the colonial ‗District‘ administrative level, making Township 
Councils directly answerable to State/Division authorities. 
66 Elections for People‘s Councils were held in 1974, 1978, 1981 and 1985 alongside elections to the 
People‘s Assembly [i.e. Parliament]. Voters could only provide a vote of confidence/no confidence in 
the single BSPP candidate running for office, and no confidence results were often changed. 
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control whilst large swathes of territory were heavily contested. This ensured that 
throughout much of the country military personnel were called upon to serve in 
People‘s Councils after 1974 and that de facto state authority remained in the hands of 
local military commanders. Thus, although the BSPP party structure grew and 
officially undertook greater administrative responsibilities, in reality many of its 
personnel were Tatmadaw officers and in many areas the BSPP party-state 
bureaucratic structure effectively became an adjunct of the Tatmadaw‘s exisiting chain 
of command, rather than developing autonomy from or authority over the Tatmadaw. 
 
Third, the continued dominance of the Tatmadaw over state institutions was a 
consequence of developments in military doctrine throughout the 1960s, which 
proscribed the military with a far greater societal function than merely being a fighting 
force. In the early 1960s Tatmadaw doctrine shifted focus away from prioritising 
conventional warfare primarily against foreign invasion to a ‗People‘s War‘ that 
emphasized the Tatmadaw‘s role in the mass mobilisation of the population in order to 
overcome the country‘s insurgency. It also emphasized the importance of winning 
local support through socio-economic development projects and improved civil 
administration (Myoe 2009, 24, 28).67 Thus, by the late 1960s the Tatmadaw was not 
only the de facto frontline of the state throughout large parts of the country but had 
also developed a clear doctrine which emphasized its responsibility for mobilising and 
organising society. Within this doctrine the role of the BSPP and the establishment of a 
civilian structure of People‘s Councils were in many ways secondary. They were 
envisioned as means of educating the people and establishing civilian administration in 
territory that had been secured by the Tatmadaw, or in the Tatmadaw‘s own counter-
insurgency lexicon, had been converted from ‗black‘ (insurgent-controlled) or ‗grey‘ 
(contested) to ‗white‘ (securely government-controlled) areas. However, the inherent 
contradictions within the People‘s War doctrine ensured that the Tatmadaw struggled 
to convert territory into ‗white‘ areas. The sheer brutality of the Tatmadaw‘s notorious 
‗Four Cuts‘ counterinsurgency strategy and the poor discipline of troops delegitimised 
its authority.68  Tatmadaw control was associated with expropriation of money, food 
                                                          
67 Discussions of how to improve the military‘s counterinsurgency strategies had already surfaced at the 
1962 Tatmadaw Annual Conference and a 1963 report submitted to the General staff Office warned that 
―it is difficult to distinguish insurgents from villagers.  If we cannot distinguish insurgents from villagers, 
we will suffer.  We will always face the insurgents having the upper hand in operations.  It is necessary 
to step up organisational activities in villages.  Whenever a section of the Tatmadaw is sent to a village, 
it should be assigned not only to security and intelligence gathering but also to public relations tasks‖ 
(Myoe 2009, 21). In Chapter 8 I provide a more detailed explanation of the importance of militias to the 
People‘s War doctrine.  
68 The Four Cuts‘ (Phyet lay Phyet) counterinsurgency strategy sought to break the links between 
insurgents and local communities by: (1) Cutting food supplies to insurgents; (2) Cutting money to 
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and services from local populations whilst the government‘s poor financial position 
(see below) meant that money was rarely made available for development projects that 
were supposed to win the support of local populations. Instead, in many contested 
areas, government authority remained heavily contested and reliant upon military 
coercion.   
 
Fourth, the perpetuation of military dominance over state institutions after 1974 was 
also a consequence of the growing threats which Ne Win faced through the mid-1970s 
within the BSPP. Following the First Party Congress, it seems that there were genuine 
attempts to institutionalize greater party control over the military. Party Committees 
were established in the Ministry of Defence, Tatmadaw Regional Commands, and 
military garrisons in order to ―bring military officers and soldiers into more absolute 
acceptance of the party‘s leadership‖ and ―to form organizing committees along the 
chain of command within the tatmadaw to guide and organize its activities‖ (cited in 
Nakanishi 2013, 229). By the end of the 1970s, however, dissenting voices against Ne 
Win emerged within the BSPP calling for greater political and economic liberalization. 
In the 1977 Party Congress support for Ne Win‘s re-election to the Party Chairmanship 
was challenged by some within the party‘s Central Committee.69 The move ultimately 
failed and led to the expulsion of 113 BSPP Central Committee members in November 
1977. However, the potential for the BSPP to provide a means of mobilising support 
against Ne Win seemingly ended the General‘s tentative moves towards establishing a 
civilian party state. The growing tensions and instability within the upper echelons of 
the party ensured by the late 1970s, Ne Win had reverted to concentrating decision-
making power within the hands of a small military clique outside of the party.  
 
Fifth, over time the BSPP became used by Ne Win as a cathartic mechanism through 
which to alleviate tensions within the Tatmadaw. It provided an alternative structure of 
promotion and means of accessing state benefits for those who failed to secure 
promotions within the military. Far from developing into a mechanism of institutional 
oversight over the Tatmadaw, the state bureaucracy became used as repository of 
retired military figures. Although this structure helped to consolidate Ne Win‘s 
                                                                                                                                                                        
insurgents: This meant preventing insurgents from being able to collect taxation from villages; (3) 
Cutting intelligence: i.e. denying all contact between villagers and insurgents; (4) Cutting recruits and 
directly involving the people in fighting against insurgents (Myoe 2009, 29-30). This often included 
forced relocation of entire villages under a policy known as ywar-shaung plan (‗moving villages‘). 
69 Although the details of these events remain unclear Nakanishi (2013, 133-4) asserts that in the 1977 
vote Ne Win came third behind San Yu (the Tatmadaw‘s Chief of General Staff and member of the 
BSPP‘s Central Executive Committee) and Kyaw Soe (the former Chief of Military Appointment and 
leading figure in the government).   
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personal control it had a number of enduring legacies that entrenched the 
institutionalisation of the military‘s control over state institutions (Nakanishi 2013). 
Firstly, it ensured that the bureaucratic hierarchy became dominated by military figures 
rather than those with careers in the civil service.70  Secondly, the fact that being 
transferred out of the military into the bureaucracy was perceived as a mark of failure 
entrenched the bureaucracy‘s subservience to the Tatmadaw. Thirdly, the informal 
institutionalisation of the transfer of Tatmadaw personnel into the civil service created 
little incentive for efficiency. This was because promotions within the civil service 
were set by the individual‘s military rank at the time of entry. The preservation of 
military hierarchy within the civil service was designed to prevent discord within the 
Tatmadaw because it meant that ―an active-duty or retired officer in the BSPP or 
government ministries would never have influence over an officer with a higher rank 
than his own in the tatmadaw‖ (Nakanishi 2013, 289).  
 
All of these factors meant that the military came to dominate all echelons of the state 
structure. As I demonstrate in the next chapter, this helps to explain why the Tatmadaw 
proved able to retain control of the country even as widespread pro-democracy protests 
in 1988 brought an end to the BSPP and Ne Win‘s personal rule. Indeed, the fact that 
the Tatmadaw was able to retain control of state institutions and to establish a powerful 
hold over the country following its refusal to acknowledge the results of the 1990 
election reflected the coercive reach of the state in spite of its overwhelming lack of 
legitimacy.       
 
6.1.2 The Burmese Way to economic crisis: The collapse of the state’s 
extractive power 
In later chapters I argue that since 1988 military governments have given significant 
emphasis to consolidating control over the country‘s border regions with China and 
Thailand in order to generate greater revenue from border trade and natural resources 
located in these regions. The importance of border areas in determining the extractive 
power of the state can only be understood by first analysing the economic failures of 
the Ne Win era. In order to do so this section draws attention to two important 
developments during the 1962-88 period.   
 
                                                          
70 This was epitomised most clearly by the bureaucratic restructuring completed in 1972 in which the 
Secretariat offices in all twenty government ministries were abolished and replaced with the new 
position of deputy minister. Of the seventeen deputy ministers appointed all but one were military 
officers (Nakanishi 2013, 157-9). 
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First, I show that the bankruptcy of the central government by the late 1980s – both 
financially and in terms of its underlying economic ideology – ensured that as the 
Tatmadaw reasserted control after 1988, military leaders were acutely aware that they 
could not continue with ‗business as usual‘ and that the complacency and moribund 
policies of the BSPP era had to be overhauled. In the final section of this chapter I 
demonstrate how the resources and opportunities for cross-border trade across the 
country‘s eastern borderlands with China and Thailand came to be viewed by the post-
1988 military governments as vitally important to addressing the structural economic 
flaws it inherited from Ne Win.    
 
Second, I demonstrate how the failures of the Burmese Way to Socialism created a 
thriving black market, which both undermined government efforts to consolidate 
control over the means of extraction and yet, paradoxically, also became deeply 
embedded in the quotidian practices through which those within state institutions 
sought to maintain stability and were financed. This created a complex relationship 
between the state and illegal practices, which continues to the present day. I argue that 
the fact that this vast black market was fuelled by cross-border trade ensured that by 
the late 1980s consolidating control over the country‘s vast borderlands was no longer 
viewed by the central government simply as a counter-insurgency aspiration but also 
as an economic imperative. 
 
The structural collapse of the Burmese economy 
Burma‘s colonial experiences had a profound impact upon the economic ideology 
espoused in the Burmese Way to Socialism. The country‘s integration into the global 
economy under colonial rule and the instability, exploitation and social tensions this 
evoked inspired a powerful economic nationalism amongst state elites. It was defined 
by the rejection of capitalism, foreign investment and global economic integration as 
acceptable means of stimulating development and placed a premium upon the 
importance of self-reliance, reflected in the valorisation of nationalization, state 
planning, rigid control over the economy and the internal mobilization of capital for 
investment (Tin 2007, 306; Charney 2009, 120; Than 2007; Hlaing 2003, 8-10).71 
 
                                                          
71 The ousting of Aung Gyi, the initial Minister of Industries under the Revolutionary Council, in 
February 1963, marked an important turning point in economic ideology. Aung Gyi had advocated a 
mixed economy, which prioritised industrialization, promoted only moderate nationalization and took a 
pro-business stance by supporting private sector investment in industry and trade as an important 
generator of growth and foreign exchange. His dismissal enabled Tin Pe, Minister for Agriculture, Co-
operatives and Supply, and Ba Nyein to wrestle control over economic ideology and to advocate 
wholesale nationalisation and a complete rejection of private enterprise in favour of state management. 
190 
 
The state established a monopoly over foreign trade and also took control of the 
procurement and distribution of all major commodities. Through the creation of trade 
corporations and cooperative stores it attempted to ensure economic stability by 
standardizing the supply and pricing of goods and mitigating the risk of ‗profiteering‘. 
It undertook a wholesale programme of nationalisation of more than 15,000 enterprises 
coming including small shops and cottage industries (Hlaing 2003, 12-13; Steinberg 
1982, 77).  
 
Great emphasis was placed upon the agricultural sector and the Ne Win government‘s 
enduring ambition was to establish an ―agriculture-based industrial economy‖ in which 
the export of agricultural surpluses, primarily rice and timber, would generate the 
capital necessary to pursue a strategy of import-substitution industrialization (Than 
2007, 225). The Ne Win government sought to generate revenue from rice by 
establishing a compulsory commodity procurement system in which farmers were 
required to deliver a certain percentage of their harvest to the government at a fixed 
price that was low enough to ensure the government could generate foreign revenue 
from exporting it (Taylor 2009, 353).  
 
However, the government‘s failure to invest adequately in the sector – fertilizer for 
example often had to be procured on the black market – and its rigid control over 
procurement and prices dissuaded cultivators from investing in increasing production 
as returns were low and bad harvests could create indebtedness. Production stagnated 
and as the country‘s population rose far greater proportions of the country‘s 
commodities were consumed domestically. Despite efforts at reform during the late 
1970s and early 1980s rice production stagnated again by the mid-1980s. During the 
1950s Burma was, for a time, the world‘s largest exporter and in 1954 more than 50% 
of the country‘s rice was exported. From 1972 onwards this figure never rose above 10% 
(Dawe 2002, 364). As a result the rice sector was never able to produce the export 
surpluses required to generate the capital to finance industrialization.  
 
Failures in the agricultural sector were mirrored by failures in the country‘s industrial 
sector (Than 2007). The rejection of foreign investment and the difficulties in 
generating revenue through agricultural exports limited the capital available to invest 
in industrialization. The state‘s intention was for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to 
spearhead a policy of import-substitution by providing goods that could then be sold at 
cost-price through the state‘s trading corporations to satisfy consumer demand and to 
reduce the pressure to spend foreign exchange on importing goods. However, this 
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system created little incentive for SOEs to increase productivity and reduce costs. The 
country‘s lack of foreign exchange also greatly limited the feasibility of importing 
machinery or purchasing spare parts. Limited power generation and regular outages 
further reduced efficiency creating an industrial sector that produced lower quality 
goods at uncompetitive prices.  
 
At the core of the Burmese Way to Socialism‘s failures was the economy‘s inability to 
generate sufficient foreign exchange. The export sector remained reliant upon 
agricultural commodities, production of which stagnated. This in turn curtailed the 
country‘s ability to import goods, which also hit the government‘s ability to generate 
revenue from taxing international trade. In 1960/1 customs duties had represented 
almost 40% of all government revenue. By 1972/3 it had fallen to only 16% (Than 
2007, 200-8). From 1977 onwards the country ran a persistent trade deficit, which 
caused the government to draw down perilously on its foreign exchange reserves and 
to resort to foreign loans and aid, which grew significantly in the late 1970s. 72 
However, without restructuring the economy, foreign loans failed to stimulate growth 
and by 1983 the country was faced with a rising debt crisis. According to government 
figures, debt jumped from US$35million in 1976 to US$4.3billion in 1987, and by 
1987 debt service alone accounted for 80% of export revenue (in US$) (Than 2007, 
211-3).  
 
In 1987 the country ‗successfully‘ applied for UN Least Development Country status 
in order to access debt relief, albeit at the cost of further delegitimising the government 
in the eyes of many who felt such status was gravely humiliating.73 Within this broader 
structural malaise, a number of factors further exacerbated the country‘s economic 
performance. The Tatmadaw‘s dominance of state institutions and its efforts to quell 
the widespread insurgency throughout the country‘s borderlands meant that more than 
one fifth (and quite possibly more) of annual government revenue was spent on the 
military. Furthermore, as explained above, the way in which the bureaucracy became 
used primarily as a patronage system ensured that many of those in senior positions 
were not career civil servants and lacked the expertise, training or motivation to 
                                                          
72 Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany (a long-time weapons supplier to Burma) were the main 
providers of aid, whilst Burma was also able to secure concessional loans from the World Bank and 
Asian Development Bank and IMF credits to meet foreign exchange shortfalls. 
73 Burma should not have qualified for Least Developed Country status as its adult literacy rate was far 
higher than the 20% threshold required by the UN for countries to qualify for this status. However, in 
1987 the government re-designated the country‘s literacy rate from 78.6% (certainly an exaggeration) to 
18.7% (an under-exaggeration) in order to qualify.  
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implement economic reforms and instead often focused on maximising personal gain 
(Hlaing 2003, 35-6).74  
 
The rise of the black market 
By the 1980s the Burmese economy was in crisis, suffering from profound structural 
failings, institutionalised mismanagement and increasingly propped up by a black 
market that embodied the antithesis of all that the Burmese Way to Socialism had set 
out to achieve. Despite the government‘s efforts to monopolise control over the 
economy, the population were effectively navigating three inter-related economies; the 
official state-managed economy, the black market in goods produced in Burma but 
supplied through illegal traders circumventing the state procurement, distribution and 
rationing system (such as rice, cooking oil, fuel), and the black market in goods 
imported illegally through the country‘s porous borders, a trade which became an 
essential part of the insurgent war economy (analysed in detail below).  
 
The ubiquity of the black market inspired paradoxical state responses. At a national 
level it was blamed for denying the government valuable revenue, reducing demand 
for goods produced by SOEs, concentrating wealth in private hands and creating 
ambivalence amongst the population towards the realisation of the country‘s socialist 
goals. However, state officials were acutely aware of how reliant the population was 
upon the black market and the cathartic role it played calming resentment towards the 
government, whilst at the same time many officials were themselves reliant upon 
wealthy black market traders for propping up local government finances. For many 
officials the status of the black market as officially illegal did not motivate attempts to 
tackle it, but rather inspired efforts to establish patron-client networks with 
businessmen in which they offered official protection and preferential access to scarce 
state goods in return for ‗donations‘ to local state coffers (Hlaing 2003). In the mid-
1980s government elites became increasingly aware of the severity of the economic 
crisis facing the country and the stark juxtaposition between the bankruptcy of the state 
and the amount of wealth circulating within the black market. It was this realisation 
                                                          
74  Hlaing (2003) argues that the benefits that government positions offered served to attract 
―opportunistic cadres‖, many of whom ―joined the party with the sole intent of appropriating as many of 
the state‘s resources as possible‖. Once in government positions, both senior figures and lower-ranking 
cadres ―came to practice the three mas – ma-loke [not doing any work], ma-shote [not getting involved 
in any complication] and ma-pyoke [not getting dismissed] – as guiding principles in performing their 
duties‖. This system not only blunted the central government‘s ability to enact reform but also insulated 
state elites from awareness of how poorly the economy was performing. Departmental reports were 
fabricated, the performance of SOEs was exaggerated and, most farcically, it was not uncommon for 
local managers of government factories and cooperatives to construct fake showrooms and to purchase 
goods on the black market in order to present a positive image to visiting officials (Hlaing 2003, 37; see 
also Than 2007, 221). 
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which inspired the sudden demonetisation of the kyat in 1985, and again in 1987, in an 
attempt to break the economic power of the black market. Such drastic policies did 
little to alleviate the structural factors underpinning the country‘s flourishing black 
market but, in wiping out many people‘s savings and in destabilising the networks of 
provision that so much of the population had to come to rely upon, further eroded the 
legitimacy of the country‘s ruling elites.  
 
6.1.3 The crisis of state legitimacy 
Since 1962 the Ne Win government sought to establish legitimacy through the 
espousal of a secular socialist ideology that eschewed both communism and capitalism 
and sought to build a prosperous welfare state. By the late 1980s the chasm between 
rhetoric and reality made a mockery of the state‘s claims to be the custodian of the 
nation‘s prosperity and welfare. Mismanagement of the economy, heavy military 
expenditure and limited foreign aid ensured that there was little revenue to invest in 
development programmes. Furthermore, by the late 1980s the government proved 
unable even to maintain existing living standards. Imports were reduced in an attempt 
to stem the country‘s trade imbalance, there was rising unemployment in the cities, 
whilst the dual impact of rising prices and sudden demonetisation pushed many deeper 
into poverty.  
 
The government‘s heavy-handed response to civil unrest further delegitimised its rule. 
Initial student protests in 1962 against the military coup were brutally repressed, 
culminating in the Tatmadaw‘s gratuitous demolition of the Rangoon University 
Student‘s Union building, an act that immediately undermined the popular legitimacy 
of the state considering the role that student politics had played in the anti-colonial 
movement. In November 1974 Ne Win refused to grant former UN Secretary General 
U Thant a state funeral, a move which ―provided a catalyst for the release of frustration 
with all the economic problems the Burmese faced‖, and which resulted in more than 
50,000 protestors taking to the streets in Rangoon (Charney 2009, 137; Taylor 2009, 
337). In response the government violently suppressed the protests. It shut down 
universities, temporarily cut off international communications and imposed martial law 
in Rangoon for 18 months (Charney 2009, 138; Topich and Leitich 2013, 93). Through 
1987 and 1988, the country‘s growing economic crisis and its heavy-handed response 
to growing civil unrest marked the nadir of the government‘s legitimacy throughout 
central Burma, inspiring the wave of pro-democracy protests in the summer of 1988 
that brought an end to Ne Win‘s rule and the BSPP party-state he had created.  
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6.2 RESISTING THE STATE: INSURGENCY AND OPIUM IN THE SHAN 
BORDERLANDS 
 
6.2.1 An anatomy of the Shan insurgency 1958-1988: Beginnings 
Outright rejection of the military government‘s legitimacy had emerged much earlier 
throughout the country‘s restive borderlands. Across Shan State the history of weak 
state control and apprehension of Burman dominance were compounded through the 
1950s by the growing belief amongst political elites that the federal ‗spirit‘ of the 
Panglong agreement and the country‘s 1947 Constitution had been perverted by a 
legalistic and rigid approach designed to ensure that, in practice, the country became a 
unitary state.75 The bitter experience of the Tatmadaw‘s brutality and ill-discipline 
during the period of martial law and its offensives against the KMT – for many rural 
communities their first interaction with the central state – further ignited resented 
against the central government. Through the late 1950s and early 1960s opposition 
within Shan State grew along two trajectories – political and military. Within the 
political system, members of the Shan State government agitated for constitutional 
reform, as explained in the previous chapter. Outside of the political system insurgent 
movements had begun to spread and by the early 1960s there were at least six different 
resistance movements operating across Shan State, as well a plethora of smaller 
militias (Lintner 1984; Lintner 1999, 491-2).76  
                                                          
75 This view was reflected most clearly by U Htun Myint, MP for Taunggyi: ―Whenever we put forward 
demands for our rights, we got the constitution shoved down our throat.  The result was that we, of the 
states, were relegated to the situation where we were evermore dependent on the good will of the party 
in power in Burma Proper.  We were reduced to the status where we would be able to breathe freely 
only by such dependence…We are completely tired of having to rush around with the palms extended, 
begging for revenue to which we are entitled, but which has been redesignated as “grants” to be 
distributed as largess by Burma Proper” (cited in Tun 2009, 454). 
76
 The six main rebel groups which emerged in the late 1950s/early 1960s were: 
1. Noom Seik Harn (‗Young Brave Warriors‘): established on the Thai-Burma border in May 1958 
by Saw Yan Da (aka Sao Noi) 
2. The Shan State Independence Army (SSIA) formed in April 1960, also on the Thai border, by a 
group of students which had broken away from Noom Seik Harn having rejected Sai Noi‘s 
leadership. From 1960-64 it was led by Sao Khun Thaw Da, a relation of the Hsipaw Chaofa and 
it was supported by Bo Maung and Chao Kyaw Tun. These men had become known as the 
‗heroes‘ of Tangyan after temporarily seizing the town in November 1959 with a rebel force of 
about one thousand in an attack which left 26 Tatmadaw troops dead (Smith 1991, 191). In 1964 
it formed part of the Shan State Army (SSA). 
3. The Shan National United Front (SNUF) formed in July 1961 with its stronghold in Laikha, 
north of Taunggyi. Led by Bo Mo Heing who had been part of the communist insurgency in 1952, 
and Khun Kya Nu, it had close links with the SSIA and also formed part of the SSA in 1964. 
4. Khun Sa‟s private Army - the Anti-Socialist United Army (ASUA). Khun Sa would later form 
the Shan United Army (SUA). He never joined the SSA. 
5. Shan National Army was Kengtung-based and was commanded by U Gondara (aka Sao Gnor 
Kham) until his assassination in 1964 and included U Ba Thein, a figure who cultivated close 
links with the CIA in Thailand. It never joined the SSA. 
6. Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLA) had already taken up arms against the government as 
early as 1949 under U Hla Pe, although in 1958 it had surrendered as part of a government 
amnesty to establish a political party, the Union Pa-O National Organization, which contested the 
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The timing of the dismantling of the Chaofa system played an important role in 
fomenting both the insurgency and also its fragmentation. For many, especially 
amongst non-Shan communities the removal of the Chaofa was welcomed as it offered 
the prospect of an end to the region‘s feudal structure and its oftentimes excessive 
taxation (Christensen & Kyaw 2006). However, the final destruction of the Chaofa 
system at a time of growing instability and hostility towards the central government 
ensured that, rather than being replaced by a government administrative structure, it 
simply created a powerful political vacuum. The government‘s rejection of the Chaofa 
system denied it the possibility of using the Chaofa to broker control across Shan State 
in the way that the British had done and left many communities unclear of whom to 
pledge their allegiance to. The forced expropriation, violence and conscription that had 
accompanied the arrival of KMT and Tatmadaw troops created willingness amongst 
many communities to accept any force that could ensure a degree of local stability and 
security amidst the increasing violence. Legitimacy, or at least local acquiescence, was 
based primarily upon the deliverance of local tangible benefits rather than broader 
ideologies, whether the socialist revolution espoused under Ne Win, the Marxist-
Leninist ideology advocated by the CPB or the ethno-nationalism promoted by various 
armed groups.  
 
The 1962 military coup had a profound effect upon galvanising insurgency throughout 
Shan State as armed resistance was viewed as the only means to challenge the new 
military government. The state parliament was replaced by the Shan State Affairs 
Council, a powerless administrative organisation, and real power lay with the 
Commander of the Tatmadaw‘s Taunggyi-based Eastern Command, who was a 
permanent member of Ne Win‘s Revolutionary Council. 77 Insurgent groups rallied 
support by citing government brutality, especially following the disappearance, and 
likely death in military custody, of both the Hsipaw Chaofa, Sao Kya Seng, who had 
been an MP in Shan Parliament and in the national parliament‘s upper house (Chamber 
of Nationalities) and Sao Shwe Thaike, the last Chaofa of Yawnghwe who had served 
as the country‘s first President from 1948 to 1952. Symbolic acts, such as the 
conversion of the State Legislative Assembly building in Taunggyi into a student 
                                                                                                                                                                        
1958 and 1960 elections. Hla Pe was arrested following the military coup and the Pa-O armed 
resistance emerged again in 1966. 
77 The first leader of the Shan State Affairs Council was U Htun Aye. He had been a founding member 
of the anti-feudalist Shan State People‘s Freedom League and a vociferous critic of the perpetuation of 
the Sawbwa system during the 1950s. For an intimate biography of U Htun Aye and insights into how 
the Council operated see: Aye 2009.   
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dormitory, incited a powerful sense of disaffection amongst Shan elites against the 
central government, albeit one that lacked unity or a clear figurehead (Aye 2009, 99).  
 
In 1964 the formation of the Shan State Army (SSA), under the leadership of Sao 
Nang Hearn Kham, the wife of Sao Shwe Thaike, marked the first attempt at 
establishing greater unity amongst the mushrooming Shan insurgency (Yawnghwe 
1987). However, the SSA was never able to unite all Shan insurgency groups (let alone 
non-Shan opposition movements), many of whom remained wary of losing their 
autonomy, especially those who had resented the Choafa system and were uneasy of 
the links between the SSA and a number of former Chaofa. The SSA was also very 
quickly confronted with the stark reality facing all armed groups in the region: that the 
forging of a united political-military organisation required significant revenue. Within 
Shan State revenue was dependent upon controlling the region‘s trade routes, most 
importantly border crossings, especially since the poverty of the region limited the 
amount that could be collected through rural taxation. Both the timing and 
geographical foundations of the SSA worked against its ability to generate significant 
revenue. By the mid-1960s the region‘s opium-dominated trade networks were mostly 
under the control of KMT organisations and their allies and these groups also 
controlled most of the predominantly Chinese-speaking border areas with Yunnan and 
the majority of the Shan-Thai border. The SSA‘s operational area, centred in the 
heartlands of Hsipaw, Lashio and Kehsi Mansam, were away from the dominant north-
south trade routes and the country‘s international border with Thailand by territory 
controlled by other armed groups. It was not until the early 1970s that the SSA 
established a southern base close to the Thai border (Yawnghwe 1987, 30-31).78 This 
geographical weakness precluded the SSA from ever convincing the region‘s more 
maverick armed groups, notably Khun Sa‘s Shan United Army (SUA) of the value of a 
forging a united front. Furthermore, it shattered the SSA‘s attempts to forge unity by 
providing a lucrative exit option for those disgruntled by its leadership.  This was 
reflected most clearly in 1969 by the decision of the SSA‘s Chief of Staff Mo Heng 
(aka Gon Jerng) to break away from the SSA to form the Shan United Revolutionary 
Army (SURA), marking the first major split within the SSA (Smith 1991, 334-5).79  
                                                          
78 The SSA established four inter-connected base areas by the mid-1970s all to the west of the Salween 
River: No. 3 Brigade operating across Kyaukme, Namhsam, Namtu; No.1 Brigade or ‗Central‘ brigade 
across Hsipaw, Lashio, Mong Hsu and Kehsi Mansam; No. 7 Brigade around Kunhing and Takaw; and 
No.2 Brigade across Langhko, Mongpai, Mawkmai-Mongnai on the Thai border (Smith 1991, 333). 
79 Mo Heng was a former Communist fighter. After leaving the SSA, he established close links with 
KMT forces under General Li (now based in northern Thailand) and the Thai army. Headquartered at 
Pieng Luang, a thriving Thai border trading town, SURA became deeply involved in opium trafficking 
and fought a brief war against the SSA in 1972. 
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6.2.2 The Fragmentation of insurgency in the Shan borderlands 
The fragmentation of resistance movements has remained an enduring theme in Shan 
State throughout the post-colonial period. Indeed, the history of the region‘s insurgency 
has been one of profound disunity, defined as much by internal conflict within and 
between armed groups as by opposition to the central government. It is this 
fragmentation and disunity, in contrast to the insurgencies in Kachin and Karen State, 
which largely coalesced under single powerful ethno-nationalist organisations (the KIA 
and KNU respectively), that has often led commentators to deride the Shan region as 
one of mere anarchy.  
 
In contrast, I argue that a more nuanced analysis of how and why the region‘s 
insurgency fragmented is important. This analysis renders visible the multitude of 
(transnational) social actors, political structures and diverse interests that came to shape 
the Shan border region. In doing so, it reveals the complex legacy created by decades 
of insurgency and offers valuable insights into the factors that have shaped the efforts 
of central governments since 1988 to consolidate control across Shan State.    
 
I argue that the fragmentation of insurgency across Shan State must be understood as 
the culmination of four elements. Firstly, there are numerous underlying factors that 
have made establishing political unity extremely difficult. Secondly, the arrival en 
masse of Chinese-backed CPB troops in northern Shan State in the late 1960s 
transformed the political landscape in Shan State in ways that created further division 
rather than unity. Thirdly, the government‘s attempts to counter growing insurgency 
by sanctioning the formation of home guard militias, known as Ka Kwe Ye (KKY), 
proved extremely divisive. Fourthly, the political economy of the transnational opium 
trade has proved extremely influential in fomenting division.  
 
i. Fragmented foundations 
Four underlying factors explain the fragmentation of the region‘s insurgency. Firstly, 
the Shan State has a long history of decentralised power and localized sovereignty 
regimes. The outbreak of widespread insurgency in 1962 emerged onto a political 
terrain historically governed by a vast array of principalities, in which wartime 
experience and the instability of the early post-war years had led to the creation of 
many local strongmen and militias whose primary aim was to secure small pockets of 
territory in a region awash with left over World War Two weapons. The spontaneous 
beginnings of the region‘s insurgency precluded the emergence of any kind of 
centralised leadership and for the vast majority of the rural populace legitimacy lay 
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with whoever proved able to provide local security and protection from the excessive 
demands made by some armed groups for recruits, taxation and supplies. Within this 
context, joining local militia, which offered recruits the opportunity to hold weapons 
and to protect their localities have often proved more popular than joining larger, 
mobile guerrilla organisations. All armed groups operating in the region have adhered 
to this logic, forming local militia in areas under their control. However, the 
prioritisation often given by these militias to local security has created an extremely 
fluid and fluctuating mosaic of shifting loyalties.  
 
Secondly, the sheer ethnic and linguistic diversity of the region complicated efforts 
towards any kind of anti-government united front. Many groups, such as the Wa, Pao, 
Palaung and Lahu, as well as small communities of Kachin in northern Shan State and 
Karen and Karenni in the south have historically resented Shan dominance. At an 
organisational level this encouraged ethnic groups to establish their own resistance 
groups rather than be subsumed into other groups such as the CPB or the SSA, and 
fomented conflict between insurgent armed groups as well as against the central 
government (Smith 1991, 334). These divisions have also complicated the legitimising 
discourses espoused by resistance groups. Groups like the SSA (and also the KIA and 
KNU in other parts of the country) strove initially for separatism and latterly for a 
federal constitution based on an ‗eight state‘ solution in which they called for an eighth 
Burman state to be created with equal status to the country‘s seven ethnic states. Such 
demands, however, have been challenged by many minority groups who perceive this 
as threatening the institutionalisation of Shan dominance. In turn the logic of 
establishing a much larger number of ethnic autonomous regions across Shan State has 
been challenged as unworkable and as playing into the central government‘s divide-
and-rule tactics.    
 
Thirdly, the topography of mountain strongholds and isolated valleys ensured that the 
region‘s enduring localism became, to a certain extent, translatable into military 
strategy. Control of strategic hilltops, river crossings, trade routes and border gates 
enabled a plethora of groups to generate sufficient income and/or strength either to hold 
opposing forces at bay or ensure that larger groups have sought accommodation with 
them rather than domination over them. Furthermore, the difficult terrain of steep hills 
and dense forests, the lack of road networks and the challenges to travel posed by the 
annual monsoon rains makes travel extremely slow and centralised governance 
structures hard to maintain. These challenges are clearly reflected in Chao Tzang 
Yawnghwe‘s (1987) vivid account of his own efforts to consolidate SSA control across 
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large parts of central and northern Shan State as the SSA‘s 1st Brigade Commander. 
According to Yawnghwe‘s account, the 1st Brigade was expected to cover a region of 
some 24,000 square miles with a poorly armed force of no more than fifteen-hundred 
men. Parts of this territory were heavily contested by the CPB, KKY units and the 
Tatmadaw against which he ―played hide and seek‖ for at least six months a year. 
These harsh conditions caused high desertion rates. It also meant that SSA units 
exerted a high degree of autonomy, often enabling them to forge local agreements that 
went counter to the strategies devised by the SSA‘s Central Committee (Yawnghwe 
1987, 23-6; Lintner 1999, 250-1). 80  Already territorially and financially stretched, 
armed groups such as the SSA had little means through which to curb such 
disobedience. 
 
Fourthly, the poverty of the region created profound challenges to mobilising resources 
with which to purchase weapons and supplies. Generating income was reliant upon 
extracting revenue from the burgeoning opium economy and from controlling Thai 
border crossings. Contest for control over these revenue flows, interrogated in greater 
detail below, fomented conflict amongst various armed groups and diverted manpower 
and resources away from challenging the Tatmadaw.  
 
These formidable underlying challenges ensured that the insurgency across the Shan 
hills has never been simply a case of resistance movements fighting against the central 
government. Armed groups expended as much time and energy upon trying to establish 
internal unity and organisational strength and securing or wrestling territory away from 
other resistance groups as they did fighting against the Tatmadaw.  
 
ii. The impact of the CPB 
Upon these disjointed foundations the arrival from Yunnan of large numbers of 
Chinese-backed CPB troops in northern and eastern Shan State further transformed and 
fragmented the region‘s insurgency dynamics. 81   In the years following Ne Win‘s 
military coup, CPB exiles in Sichuan and Beijing had established closer links with the 
Chinese government (PRC). The PRC became increasingly committed to exporting 
revolution and following the outbreak of anti-Chinese riots across central Burma in 
                                                          
80 Yawnghwe (1987, 26) for example, recounts the defection of two battalion commanders and 
approximately 200 men in the early 1970s during the SSA‘s conflict against the KIA in Hsenwi, whilst 
Lintner recounts how numerous local SSA units in northern Shan State readily made agreements with 
the CPB in order to gain weapons and ammunition, ignoring their high command (Lintner 1999, 250-1).  
81 For a detailed analysis of the history of the CPB‘s Northeast Command see Linter 1990; Smith 1991, 
247-272; 301-321; 355-373 
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1967 and the rapidly declining strength of CPB strongholds in the Pegu Yoma hills of 
central Burma, Chinese support for the CPB became overt.  
 
Led by Naw Seng, a Kachin rebel who had been living in Guizhou since fleeing Burma 
in 1950, heavily-armed CPB troops crossed the border in January 1968 and stormed the 
Tatmadaw garrison at Mong-Ko. The aim of the CPB was to establish a ‗liberated area‘ 
in northern Burma that would provide a means of funnelling Chinese aid to CPB 
strongholds west of the Salween in the Pegu Yoma from which the Party would then be 
able to challenge the central government. By the early 1970s, the establishment of the 
CPB‘s ‗Northeast Command‘ had transformed the political geography of Shan State. 
KMT forces that had been active in northern Shan State quickly retreated as the CPB 
created a number of inter-connected war zones east of the Salween River (Lintner 
1990). With almost unlimited supplies of Chinese weapons, ammunition, military 
equipment and general supplies, which Martin Smith (1991) estimates at £5.5million 
per year, the CPB controlled almost the entire trans-Salween region north of Kengtung 
by the early 1970s. This included most of the 550 mile Shan-Chinese border apart from 
a narrow government-controlled corridor around Namkham and Muse (Smith 1991, 
248).  
 
The CPB‘s Marxist-Leninist ideology and its emphasis upon a class-based national 
democratic revolution clashed against the ethno-nationalist liberation ideals held by 
many within the more politically-motivated resistance movements. Their grievances 
were targeted against the Burman betrayal of the federal ‗Spirit of Panglong‘, viscerally 
imprinted by the chauvinism and brutality local communities faced at the hands of the 
Tatmadaw. This was in stark contrast to the ideology of the CPB, which warned against 
‗narrow‘ nationalism and emphasized the need for ―the realisation of the worker-
peasant alliance under the leadership of the working class‖82 in which the ‗nationalities 
question‘ was secondary to launching a national revolution to forge a Communist state. 
These divisions are most eloquently summed up by Martin Smith and are worth 
quoting at some length: 
 
Not only was the CPB for the most part in military competition with the different 
ethnic forces, but…the CPB has completely failed to understand the causes of 
grievances of the ethnic nationalist movement…The CPB‘s strict class analysis of the 
situation in Burma allowed no distinct ‗political‘ role for the minorities. In CPB 
terminology, the nationalities question was covered by the ‗class‘ discussion of peasant 
or agricultural problems. But the indigenous peoples…who have been fighting for the 
right of self-determination since the end of the Second World War, have never 
accepted such simple political platitudes…To ethnic minority leaders this was just 
                                                          
82 This quotation is taken from a 1969 CPB broadcast, quoted in Smith 1991, 323.  
201 
 
another example of Burman chauvinism. There was no political reason why they 
should support the CPB any more than the BSPP, AFPFL [or the] National League for 
Democracy (Smith 1991, 322). 
  
Alongside fears that the CPB were merely a vanguard for Chinese expansion,83 many 
ethnic leaders found it hard to accept the difference between the CPB‘s political aims 
and Ne Win‘s Socialist revolution. These concerns were exacerbated by the seeming 
racial divisions within the CPB, whose leaders were invariably Burman, whose 
commanders were Chinese and whose foot-soldiers were predominantly drawn from 
ethnic minority groups (Smith 1991, 325). These misgivings were exacerbated by the 
CPB‘s belligerent ‗fight or join‘ policy and its demand that groups allied to it accept its 
leadership and ideology. 
 
Against these concerns, however, alliance with the CPB had many attractions. The 
succession of victories it scored over the Tatmadaw in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
its ability to expand its territorial reach and to establish an effective administrative 
structure in the multi-ethnic region under its control were deeply impressive, especially 
alongside the concurrent Communist victories in Indochina. To those willing to accept 
its leadership the CPB provided a ready supply of arms for free, and the territory it 
controlled close to the China border offered a safe haven and access to services 
(especially medical facilities) for insurgent groups who were otherwise constantly on 
the move. Somewhat paradoxically, these benefits were especially attractive to many of 
the more politically-motivated ethno-nationalist groups, such as the SSA and SSNLO 
(see below) who were perennially short of materials and whose distance from the Thai 
border made access to cross-border goods (including weapons) and services difficult.  
 
These tensions between ideological aspiration and military pragmatism created major 
splits, most notably within the SSA and the Pao resistance. At its inception in 1964 the 
SSA had taken a strongly anti-Communist pro-western stance and the formation of its 
political wing, the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) in 1971 was inspired by the fears 
of CPB domination. The SSA‘s decision to establish a southern base on the Thai 
border in 1972 was also inspired by a desire to have a fall-back area should it be 
overrun by the CPB in the north (Smith 1991, 339). However, the offer of arms and the 
threat of being squeezed ever tighter between the CPB and the Tatmadaw created a 
                                                          
83 Indeed, an SSA communiqué in June 1968 warned of ―Mao‘s masterplan…to enslave other nations 
and peoples around the periphery of mainland China‖ (cited in Smith 1991, 333). 
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damaging split within the organisation, effectively dividing it into a northern and 
southern faction.84  
 
To the north the SSA command established a military pact with the CPB in 1975. In 
1977 the CPB‘s radio station the Voice of the People of Burma issued a communiqué 
stating that the SSPP had vowed to ―march together with the CPB towards a 
communist world‖, a status many remained deeply uneasy with (Smith 1991, 341). To 
the south, a smaller faction denounced the CPB as ―a racist party guilty of aggression 
and oppression against the people of the Shan State‖ and sought to establish a ‗third 
force‘ against both the CPB and Burmese government. Efforts to restore unity in the 
SSA/SSPP in 1981 failed and the entrenchment of the SSA‘s north-south divisions 
weakened and isolated its southern bases. In 1983 these bases were overrun by Khun 
Sa‘s Shan United Army (SUA) as part of his attempts to establish greater territorial 
control over the Thai border. This precipitated the collapse of the SSA‘s 2nd Brigade 
with some troops travelling north to re-unite with other SSA commands whilst the 
majority joined SURA in 1984.85 Amidst the turmoil the SSA in the north was the only 
Shan force actively engaging the Tatmadaw by the mid-1980s (Smith 1991, 344).  
 
The tensions created by the CPB were even more destructive amongst the Pao 
insurgency in the southwest of the state. The Pao National Organisation (PNO) was 
one of the first insurgent groups in Shan State and had started fighting in 1949 against 
both the government and the perpetuation of Chaofa rule. It had laid down its weapons 
in 1958 as part of the central government‘s ‗arms for democracy‘ amnesty. However, 
following the arrest of its leader, Hla Pe, following the military coup in 1962, a second 
armed resistance movement emerged in 1966 in the Pao strongholds south of Taunggyi. 
Renamed the Shan State Nationalities Liberation Organisation (SSNLO), the Pao 
resistance quickly grew to a force of about two thousand men. In 1968 the SSNLO had 
fought a brief conflict against the CPB close to Inle Lake and it was clear that the CPB 
sought to control this belt of territory in order to establish links with the CPB‘s former 
strongholds in the Pegu Yoma. The issue of whether to ally with the CPB split the Pao 
                                                          
84 In the early 1970s the SSA‘s Chief of Operations, Lt. Col. Sai Zam Maung advocated a military 
alliance with the CPB, a position rejected by Khun Kya Nu and Chao Tzang Yawnghwe who 
commanded the SSA‘s 1st Battalion. In 1973 Sai Zam Maung accepted weapons from the CPB ahead of 
a major split within the Party in 1976, which saw the effective overthrow of Khun Kya Nu and Chao 
Tzang Yawnghwe and the de facto division of the SSA into a northern and southern faction. 
85 As explained above, the Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA) had formed following SSA‘s 
Chief of Staff Mo Heng (aka Gon Jerng) to break away from the SSA in 1969. The merger between 
SURA and the SSA‘s southern brigades led to the creation of the Tailand Revolutionary Council (TRC) 
under the command of Mo Heng. Khun Sa‘s SUA formed an alliance with the TRC in 1985, with the 
organisation‘s army briefly being named the SSA before being renamed the Mong Tai Army (MTA) in 
1987. 
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resistance in 1973 into two armed groups (Christensen & Kyaw 2006). On one side, 
the Shan State Nationalities People's Liberation Organization (SSNPLO), often 
colloquially referred to as the ‗Red Pao‘, established close links with the CPB. On the 
other, the Shanland Nationalities Liberation Front (SNLF), which renamed itself the 
Pao National Organization (PNO) in 1976 and was often referred to locally as the 
White Pao, rejected the CPB.86 For the next fifteen years the two Pao factions fought a 
bitter struggle in which battles against each other outnumbered engagements with the 
Tatmadaw by as many as three or four to one. 87  A tale recounted to me during 
fieldwork epitomised the confusion and fragmentation created by these divisions: 
 
There was a village headman, Phra Pon, highly respected amongst the Pao. The 
White Pa-Oh approached him asking that he store their uniforms, equipment and 
arms in secret. He agreed. He was then also approached by the Red Pa-Oh with the 
same request. Again, he agreed. Later, the Red Pa-Oh returned to collect their 
equipment. A little time later the White Pa-Oh also came to collect their equipment. 
Only later did Phra Pon realise that he had accidentally provided the Red Pao with 
the White Pao‘s supplies and vice versa…He survived this mishap [laughs]…within 
the crying there was laughter.88 
 
iii. The „KKY‟ initiative  
The Burmese government was concerned by the CPB‘s rapid territorial expansion, its 
ability to garner support amongst local populations of various ethnicities, and its 
attempts to win the support of (and arm) other insurgent groups. However, the CPB 
was merely one of a plethora of threats facing the central government. The government 
faced widespread insurgency throughout the country‘s ethnic states, across the Delta 
and in the Pegu Yoma hills in the centre of the country. With limited finances and 
aware of the Tatmadaw‘s vulnerability to guerrilla warfare in remote and difficult 
terrain, Ne Win was forced to prioritise the army‘s counter-insurgency efforts. 
Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s the government‘s focus remained on securing 
control over the Delta region and it was here that the Tatmadaw launched the ‗Four 
Cuts‘ counter-insurgency strategy extensively for the first time. The Tatmadaw also 
launched a number of successful offensives in the late 1960s and early 1970s against 
CPB central strongholds in the Pegu Yoma, finally routing them in the early 1970s. 
 
However, the Tatmadaw‘s approach in northern Shan State was almost entirely 
defensive. Garrisons at Panghsang, Pangyang, Mengseng, Mong Ma and Mong Yang 
were all lost to the CPB as the Tatmadaw pulled back to establish defensive lines along 
                                                          
86 The SSNPLO was led by Tha Kalei and its stronghold was around Hsihseng and the Karenni-Shan 
state border region. The SNLF/PNO was led by Hla Pe, who was released from prison in 1972, U Aung 
Kham Ti and Khun Okkar. Its stronghold was in Hopong Township close to Taunggyi, 
87 This statistic is taken from an interview conducted by Martin Smith with a PNO officer in November 
1989 (Smith 1991, 338).  
88 Interview with a representative of the Pao National Liberation Organisation, Mae Hong Son, 2nd 
January 2013.  
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the west banks of the Salween (Smith 1991, 339). It was determined to prevent the 
CPB‘s Northeast Command from establishing strongholds west of the Salween but did 
not look to engage further east. This was epitomised most clearly by the desperate 40-
day battle it fought against advancing CPB troops in late 1971/early 1972 to retain 
control of the suspension bridge at Kunlong Ferry, one of the few places where the 
Salween could be easily crossed. Beyond these defensive positions, the government 
sought to revamp and expand an earlier counter-insurgency initiative, first launched in 
1963, of authorizing the creation of local militias or home guards, known as Ka Kwe 
Ye (KKY). The initial KKY initiative had been part of the Tatmadaw‘s broader 
attempts to launch a People‘s War against insurgents. By 1967, however, it was 
viewed more as an expedient, cost-effective strategy to fragment the region‘s 
insurgency. Its rationale was to capitalise upon the plurality of local allegiances across 
Shan State by providing support and pledges of local autonomy to any group that 
agreed to fight the CPB. Within the Kokang and Wa regions alone an estimated 
twenty-three KKY units were formed in the late 1960s, ranging in size from a mere 
thirty men to almost fourteen-hundred, with the average being between one hundred 
and two hundred (Sai Kham Mong 2005, 12).  
 
For many local strongmen, forming a KKY offered the opportunity to establish local 
autonomy and privileges (such as tax collection and the right to hold weapons) and 
insulated them from Tatmadaw aggression. For the leaders of larger armed groups the 
government‘s willingness to allow KKY to trade opium with impunity, to use 
government-controlled roads, to purchase and retain weapons and to conscript men, 
offered a valuable opportunity to establish themselves amidst the region‘s complex and 
highly volatile milieu. As one attendee of the 1966 meeting held to launch the KKY 
programme by the Tatmadaw Deputy Chief of Staff San Yu in Shan State, recounted 
to me:   
 
Many of the militias attending the meeting at that time were very small and poorly 
equipped. At the meeting they were told to expand rapidly and would be supported by 
the Army to fight against the CPB. At that time I was part of a militia based at 
Pangyang, with about 100 men, though many other groups at that time had only 20-60 
men…Khun Sa [who had been leader of a local militia in Loimaw, Mong Yai since the 
late 1950s] was very smart. In the evening after the meeting he invited a number of the 
militia leaders to a night of drinking with pretty girls and told them they needed to 
recruit as many men as quickly as possible. He told them to take the proposal seriously 
and to back him…Although at this time his militia was small he soon made links with 
many other militia groups to establish an army of more than one thousand men. In 
comparison to Lo Hsing Han, the area he [Khun Sa] controlled was fairly small but 
these links helped him to become as powerful as both Lo Hsing Han and the Kokang.89 
 
                                                          
89 Interview with former KKY leader, 14th February 2013, Chiang Mai. 
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Many KKY leaders, notably Khun Sa and Lo Hsing Han, used the initiative to establish 
greater control over the region‘s flourishing opium economy. According to Bertil 
Lintner (1999, 262), the government was willing to tolerate the KKY‘s involvement in 
the drug trade for three reasons. Firstly, the Treasury had no money with which to 
support the KKY and therefore needed them to be self-financing. Secondly, KKY 
involvement in the drug trade was viewed as a means to divert drug revenue away from 
other armed groups fighting against the government. Thirdly, the government was 
aware that opium was a vital part of the country‘s cross-border black market which 
provided a steady flow of consumer goods into the country and alleviated, to a certain 
extent, dissension against the government. The priority, therefore, was not to stem the 
flow of drugs but to ensure that the revenue it generated remained in the hands of 
groups allied with the government rather than those fighting against it (Lintner 1984).  
 
However, the government‘s aspiration to convert the KKY into anti-insurgent militias 
under Tatmadaw control never came to fruition.90 In 1973 the government formally 
renounced the strategy and demanded that the KKY disband their troops and relinquish 
their weapons to the Tatmadaw. Many of the larger KKY refused to obey, pushing 
them back across the perpetually vague dividing line between pro-government militia 
and anti-state insurgent. There were numerous reasons why the KKY initiative was 
disbanded. Most importantly, it gave many of the larger militia greater autonomy than 
initially envisaged by the Tatmadaw. The fact that they were able to generate 
significant income from drugs, and operated in territories over which the Tatmadaw 
exerted virtually no control or oversight, enabled them to recruit troops and to purchase 
sophisticated weaponry.  
 
In many ways, to adopt the terminology developed in Chapter 2, the government had 
sought to negotiate control over parts of rural Shan state by attempting to forge the 
KKY into ‗frontier brokers‘. The failure of this strategy epitomised the inherent 
paradox within frontier brokerage – namely that those seemingly best able secure 
territory for the government were also those with the greatest power and autonomy. 
The primary interests of the most powerful KKY – local territorial control (to tax, 
recruit and monopolise local opium harvests) and trade – motivated them to retain as 
much autonomy as possible. The transnational nature of the opium trade and the 
government‘s lack of control over the Shan-Thai border also undermined the 
                                                          
90 In an interview with Bertil Lintner in 1986, Colonel Khin Maung Soe, Commander of the Tatmadaw‘s 
artillery unit at Panglong in 1970, recounted that ―If the KKY turned out to be good fighters, we planned 
to convert them into a full-fledged, regular People‘s militia which could fight together with us against 
the insurgents in the field‖ (Lintner 1999, 261).  
206 
 
government‘s ability to forge any kind of ‗limited access order‘ with which to stabilise 
KKY coalitions. Although the government could offer impunity and protection, the 
larger KKY groups were more intent on securing safe passage through Shan State and 
across the Thai border. These were issues the central government had no power to 
determine access to and ensured that the larger KKY groups retained divided loyalties. 
As Lintner (1984, 423) explains,  
 
in order to conduct their opium convoys through Shan State, the KKY leaders had to 
negotiate tax arrangements with the rebels, who controlled the countryside and 
frequently ambushed the convoys which tried to slip through without paying duties. 
Thus, the KKY, instead of fighting the insurgents had to co-operate with them. The key 
to success in opium transportation was to avoid fighting as much as possible in order to 
be able to advertise to the merchants that the militia commanders could offer safe 
conduct for convoys. 
 
The government‘s inability to keep powerful KKY in check ensured that its efforts to 
mould these groups into frontier brokers proved unsuccessful. This was an important 
lesson for the government and one that has had an important impact upon shaping the 
militia strategy adopted by the Tatmadaw over the past twenty-five years, which is the 
subject of Chapter 8. 
 
The KKY also proved deeply unpopular in many areas and failed to garner local 
support. Although the government initiated the KKY programme as a stop-gap measure, 
there was nonetheless the expectation that it would at least fulfil some of the broader 
aims of the military‘s ‗People‘s War‘ doctrine and increase support for the government 
through extending security and stability. In reality, however, the KKY attracted 
ambitious, entrepreneurial militia leaders and Chinese opium traders who continued to 
impose heavy taxation and forcibly recruit men.  
 
Compounding the flaws in this strategy, the KKY proved to be inept counter-
insurgency fighters. Lacking the training, discipline or inclination to fight, the 
Tatmadaw‘s attempt to deploy them against the CPB in the early 1970s ended in 
ignominious failure (Lintner 1999, 263). Furthermore, their overt involvement with the 
drug trade became increasingly contentious in the early 1970s in the context of the 
US‘s hardening stance against drugs. America‘s changing attitude was reflected by its 
public pronouncement in the early 1970s that Lo Hsing Han had become the ―kingpin 
of the heroin traffic in southeast Asia responsible for a growing proportion of Asia‘s 
and America‘s drug-caused miseries‖ (cited in Lintner 1984, 422). The US‘s 
willingness to cultivate closer ties with the Ne Win government in the early 1970s in 
the face of the CPB‘s growing strength and the country‘s rising narcotic production 
was greeted positively by the Burmese government and created further motivation to 
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disband the KKY in order to distance the government from the drug trade (Lintner 
1999, 315-6).  
 
The KKY programme did, however, prove effective at fragmenting the region‘s 
insurgency. It diverted many powerful local elites and potential recruits away from 
insurgent groups and also encouraged defections from within insurgent groups. Both 
the SSA‘s 2nd and 6th Brigades in Mong Leun and Monghsu defected to become KKY 
and by 1968 Ne Win announced that 1,500 Shan insurgents had already stopped 
fighting against the government (Smith 1991, 221). The initiative also proved attractive 
to many of those unsure of who to ally with, most notably, Khun Sa who had initially 
looked to fight against the Burmese government after the 1962 coup. The fact that 
Khun Sa, Lo Hsing Han and Maha San, who led the large Wa Viangngun KKY unit, all 
established contact with the SSA in the early 1970s after the government‘s disbanding 
of the KKY initiative suggested just how damaging this initiative had been to the SSA 
by preventing it from potentially forging alliances with these powerful figures 
(Yawnghwe 1987, 27, 189, 205; Lintner 1999, 279-80; Mong 2005, 13).91  
 
iv. Opium 
The political economy of the transnational opium/heroin economy also played an 
important role in fragmenting insurgency across Shan State. As outlined in Chapter 2, 
the dynamics of illicit drug economies have often been conceptualised in rather 
simplistic terms, as empowering rebels and increasing state fragility. Certainly, in 
some ways, the flourishing opium economy in Shan State during this period reflects 
these dynamics. The revenue generated from the sale of opium, as well as the taxation 
and protection fees levied on its cultivation and transportation, enabled insurgent 
groups to be self-financing despite the region‘s poverty. High international demand for 
opium meant the value of opium rose sharply after crossing the (insurgent-controlled) 
Thai border, creating high profits and facilitating large transnational trade networks 
which enabled armed groups to attract investors from far beyond Shan State and to 
gain access to good quality weapons.  
 
However, the material interests, power relations and transnational dynamics shaping 
the opium/heroin trade have had a much more complicated impact on the region‘s 
political history than simply empowering rebel groups against the government. This 
                                                          
91 The potential for these ties to develop were curtailed by Khun Sa‘s arrest by the Tatmadaw‘s Military 
Intelligence Service (MIS) in 1970 soon after he had contacted the SSA‘s first Brigade. Similarly, the 
links established between the SSA and Lo Hsing Han in 1973 never came to fruition after Lo was 
arrested by Thai police barely a month later (Lintner 1999, 454). 
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kind of simplistic assumption needs to be challenged as it ignores the complexity of 
the relationship between opium and the war economy. The use of the opium trade to 
finance insurgency (and for self-enrichment) complicated territorial disputes between 
armed groups. Focus was often as much on securing opium trade routes and border 
crossings as it was about fighting the government, creating multiple fronts of armed 
conflict rather than simply a single front against the Tatmadaw. For example, Khun 
Sa‘s successful efforts in the 1980s to establish control over the Thai-Shan border led 
to fighting (and a significant number of assassinations) orchestrated by his SUA forces 
(renamed the Mong Tai Army or MTA in 1987) against Lahu armed groups around 
Doi Lang, SSA forces at Mong Mai and Homong, and Pao forces also located on the 
Thai border (Lintner 1999, 324-5).  
 
Alongside fomenting territorial disputes, the drug trade complicated loyalties across 
Shan State. It often encouraged groups most heavily involved in the drug trade, namely 
the KKY, SURA and the SUA/MTA to prioritise securing local hegemony over 
cultivation and trade, whilst at the same time seeking accommodation with more 
powerful armed groups and/or alliances of convenience with government authorities. 
This was clearly the case with the KKY in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but also 
seemingly with the SUA/MTA‘s activities in the 1980s, with both Martin Smith and 
Bertil Lintner asserting that Khun Sa established a modus vivendi with the Burmese 
authorities at this time as a means of securing recently-acquired territorial gains along 
the Thai border (Lintner 1999, 325-6; Smith 1991). The fluidity with which figures 
like Khun Sa and Lo Hsing Han crossed the boundary between state ally and insurgent 
enemy reflects the flaws in using such binaries to guide analysis of the Shan 
insurgency and the region‘s drug trade (McCoy 1999). 
 
Moreover, the cross-border networks and transnational loyalties that underpinned the 
opium/heroin economy further complicated the region‘s insurgency politics. The 
official illegality of opium placed a premium upon establishing ties with those who 
could protect trafficking networks through Thailand and beyond. This often meant 
forging agreements with Thai security forces, as evidenced by the close links 
established between the KMT and Police Chief Phao in the 1950s, and between Khun 
Sa and Thai security officials up until the 1980s.  However, the need to maintain these 
ties meant that interests far beyond the Shan region came to have an important bearing 
on the trajectory of the region‘s armed conflict. For example, although Thai security 
forces were willing to support armed groups that could provide intelligence, create a 
buffer zone along its northern border and be called upon to fight against the 
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Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), they were wary of any Shan nationalist 
movement that might prove difficult to control and which posed a risk of mobilising 
support for pan-Tai ideology in northern Thailand. Thus, although the Thai border has 
been a valuable resource for armed groups operating in Shan State, the benefits 
accrued from transnational drug flows have invariably been channelled into 
strengthening those groups whose loyalty could be guaranteed to align with Thai 
interests. It is notable that Khun Sa‘s efforts to unite territorial control across the Shan 
borderland under the banner of Shan nationalism came only in the mid-1980s 
following his inability to retain Thai support in the face of growing US counter-
narcotic efforts and the declining threat posed by the CPT.  
 
In northern Shan State the dynamics of the drug trade developed differently than along 
the Thai border. The huge flow of Chinese assistance throughout the 1970s reduced the 
CPB‘s need to generate revenue from the opium trade despite the fact that areas under 
its control had historically been home to the region‘s most fertile poppy growing sites. 
By the early 1980s, however, the decline in Chinese patronage and the subsequent need 
to become self-reliant (see below) led the CPB to become more involved in opium 
production and trafficking. In turn the CPB quickly found that the need to secure opium 
trade routes south across the Thai border required new allegiances, most remarkably 
even with remnants of the KMT and Khun Sa, who had long emphasized his anti-
communist credentials (Lintner 1990, 40). Furthermore, growing reliance upon opium 
revenues affected the economic dynamics within the CPB. Chinese support, much of it 
channelled through the CPB-controlled border gate at Panghsai, had represented a 
relatively centralised patronage structure over which the CPB hierarchy could exert a 
fair degree of control. In contrast, the fact that poppies could be cultivated throughout 
the CPB‘s various war zones meant that opium revenue was much harder to manage 
centrally, which in turn offered far greater financial autonomy to CPB regional 
commanders. Attempts by the CPB hierarchy in the mid-1980s to rein in the illegal 
activities of its regional commanders (quite possibly at the behest of China which 
began to experience increasing inflows of drugs from Shan State at this time) sowed 
dissension within the CPB (Lintner 1990, 41). These heightened tensions and the 
decentralisation of revenue-generating capacity amongst CPB forces played an 
important part in the ultimate collapse of the Party, explained in the next chapter.        
   
6.3 CHANGING BORDERLAND DYNAMICS IN THE 1980s  
By the early 1980s the situation across much of Shan State was one of fragmented 
stalemate. In northern and eastern Shan State the Tatmadaw and the CPB had fought 
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―each other to a standstill in the cold of Burma‘s great mountains and the sticky heat of 
its malaria-ridden forests‖ (Smith 1991, 303). The government retained control over 
the region‘s major towns as well as the roads linking them with central Burma and had 
established a dispersed network of military outposts throughout the region. However, 
beyond these towns and garrisons territory was heavily contested with even the hills 
surrounding Lashio, Hsipaw, Taunggyi and Kengtung remaining ‗grey‘ zones. With 
limited revenue and stretched supply lines vulnerable to attack, the Tatmadaw focused 
upon establishing defensive positions rather than risking frontal attacks. Even in areas 
with a greater concentration of government forces, the financial and logistical costs of 
securing territory proved prohibitive. As Martin Smith explains,  
 
it was only when the Four Cuts operations ran against the borders of Burma‘s 
neighbours…that for the first time any serious military weaknesses in this strategy 
were revealed…In these remote and sensitive border regions it is militarily 
impossible to tie down guerrilla forces who have a back-door escape and supply line 
(Smith 1991, 261).  
 
In turn the CPB struggled to break out of its strongholds along the China border and 
had been unable to establish secure bases west of the Salween River, where it too faced 
the perennial difficulty of overcoming the vulnerability of its supply lines.  
 
To the south the Tatmadaw‘s territorial reach was limited by the spread of Khun Sa‘s 
SUA (later MTA) forces. Throughout much of central Shan State, the topography of 
the region ensured that, although numerically weak, groups such as the PNO, PSLO 
and SSA were able to hold pockets of territory from which to harry Tatmadaw convoys. 
The fact that the majority of cross-border trade was east of the Salween through China-
border posts controlled by the CPB (primarily at Panghsai) and the numerous Thai 
border crossings around Tachilek ensured that the state had no real means through 
which to stem the economic lifeblood of resistance.  
 
Over the course of the 1980s, however, the stalemate began to shift in the 
government‘s favour. This was partly due to the success of military offensives and, 
more importantly, was linked to the changing attitudes of the country‘s neighbours. 
The Tatmadaw had launched its first major offensive east of the Salween – Operation 
King Conqueror – in November 1979, but its major breakthrough came in 1987. 
Having resisted a sustained and bloody CPB offensive against its stronghold on the 
Hsi-Hsinwan Mountain close to the China border in Muse Township in late 1986, the 
Tatmadaw‘s counter-offensive enabled it to seize control of the CPB‘s key border 
town of Panghsai. With a population of more than 7,000 it was the CPB‘s largest 
settlement and its most important trade gate with China (Smith 1991, 358). Lintner 
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estimates that in the late 1970s tax levied by the CPB at Panghsai equated to 27million 
kyat, or fifty per cent of the CPB‘s annual budget, reflecting just how important this 
town had been to the CPB (Lintner 1990, 39).  
 
The gradual waning of the CPB‘s power, reflected by the fall of Panghsai, was a 
function of broader changes in China‘s relations with both the CPB and the Ne Win 
government over the course of the 1980s. Apart from a brief period following the 
outbreak of anti-Chinese violence in Burma in 1967, the PRC maintained state-to-state 
relations with Burma alongside its overt party-to-party support for the CPB. Chinese 
support for the CPB, which began in 1967, was initially agreed for a ten-year period 
and although the PRC continued to provide support to the CPB until the late-1980s, the 
level of support dropped considerably after 1980 (Smith 1991, 248). Amidst the 
turmoil within the Chinese Communist Party following Mao‘s death in September 
1976, the CPB‘s decision to support the hardliners and to denounce Liu Shaoqi and the 
―Rightist chieftain Deng Xiaoping‖ backfired badly following Deng‘s eventual rise to 
de facto leader of the Party in 1978 (Myoe 2011, 87-8). In 1980 a CPB delegation 
visiting Beijing was informed that the Party was expected to become self-reliant by 
1985 (Myoe 2011, 89).92  
 
Alongside its waning support for the CPB, China‘s diplomatic and economic 
relationship with Burma‘s central government improved markedly over the course of 
the 1980s. In 1985 Ne Win visited Beijing at the invitation of Deng Xiaoping not just 
in his capacity as head of state but also as Chairman of the Burma Socialist 
Programme Party, reflecting the reinvigoration of party-to-party relations (Myoe 2011, 
95). For a man once reviled as the ―Burmese Chiang Kai-Shek‖, Deng‘s description of 
Ne Win as a ―far-sighted and outstanding statesman‖ and ―one of the most intimate, 
close and respected old friends of China‖, reflected both a personal triumph for Ne 
Win and a profound sea-change in diplomatic relations (Smith 1991, 360; Myoe 2011, 
95-6). Throughout the late 1980s bilateral trade and aid relations were normalized 
gradually as China looked to cross-border trade as a means of stimulating economic 
development in the land-locked interior provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan. Following 
high profile trade delegations between Kunming and Rangoon, official trade was 
launched in 1988 through the Muse-Ruili border gate, one of the only border crossings 
                                                          
92 Examples of the pressure placed upon the CPB to become self-reliant were reflected by the Chinese 
Communist Party‘s decision to move the CPB‘s radio station into Burma in 1978 and to cut the 
electricity supply to the new radio site at Panghsan in 1985, replacing this with a mobile transmitter. 
Various CPB medical facilities provided for the CPB in Yunnan were also closed down by 1983. In 
1985 the CPB was asked to close down its liaison office in Beijing (Myoe 2011, 88-9, 96).  
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controlled securely by the Burmese government (Lintner 1990, 39). Yunnan‘s trade 
offensive also embraced the flourishing black market cross-border trade in a move 
which saw the emergence of as many as seventy ―unofficially approved ‗gates‘‖ spring 
up along the border (Lintner 1990, 39; Smith 1991, 361).  
 
China‘s changing border strategy had three important outcomes. Firstly, it revealed the 
huge income-generating potential of cross-border trade to Burmese state elites, who 
were about to be faced with the political ramifications of the overwhelming economic 
failure of the isolationist policies pursued under the Burmese Way to Socialism. As the 
dust settled following the 1988 military coup, the resurrection of harmonious relations 
with China provided the central government with significant economic opportunities 
and placed renewed emphasis upon establishing stronger territorial control in a region 
that had long been a major hotbed of insurgency.  
 
Secondly, the liberalisation of border trade further weakened the CPB. Whereas 
previously Chinese goods had been channelled through CPB-controlled trade gates, 
primarily Panghsai, China‘s liberalising trade strategy significantly dented the CPB‘s 
monopoly and saw growing trade passing through territory controlled by other armed 
groups, notably the KIA. The growth in unofficial border gates dismantled the ‗limited 
access order‘ surrounding Chinese patronage and border goods that the CPB central 
command had long used to manage internal Party relations.       
 
Thirdly, China‘s changing border strategy threatened to divert lucrative trade away 
from the Thai border. The Thai government had for many years cultivated ties with 
numerous armed groups operating along its northern border, such as the SUA, SURA 
and various KMT networks. In return for being able to move and trade freely across 
the border these groups provided Thai security forces with intelligence about 
Communist movements from close to the China border, created a buffer zone against 
the CPB and provided military assistance against the Communist Party of Thailand 
(CPT) in the north of the country (Lintner 1999, 320-1). The flourishing black market 
cross-border trade also provided an important foundation to the northern Thai economy. 
Alongside the kickbacks that many within the country‘s security forces and political 
and military elite enjoyed from drug-trafficking networks, large amounts of drug 
money were invested into the Thai economy. Much of this investment was at a local 
level as opium profits were used to purchase an array of foodstuffs and consumer 
goods that were then trafficked back across the border into Burma to be sold on the 
black market.   
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By the mid-1980s, growing Burma-China border trade was one of many concerns that 
combined to encourage a shift in the Thai government‘s approach to managing the 
Thai-Burma border. In the context of the US-led War on Drugs, Bangkok‘s toleration 
of groups known to be heavily involved in drug trafficking threatened to create 
international disapprobrium.93 Furthermore, by the mid-1980s the threat posed by the 
CPT in northern Thailand had waned following successful government offensives 
against its strongholds and mass defections within the party.94 By the mid-1980s the 
changing dynamics of Burma‘s borderland insurgencies were beginning to undermine 
the benefits that the Thai economy had formerly accrued from the cross-border black 
market trade. Sustained Tatmadaw offensives in southeast Burma against the KNU and 
the deployment of the ‗Four Cuts‘ counter-insurgency strategy to parts of the Dawna 
Range on the Karen-Thai border in the mid-1980s severely disrupted cross-border 
trade, impacting adversely on the local economy in Thailand‘s rural north-western 
borderland areas (Smith 1991, 361). The presence of a fragmented insurgent buffer 
zone along the Shan-Thai border began to be viewed more as a fetter upon the 
development of the north of the Kingdom rather than a strategic advantage. By the 
mid-1980s these concerns led the Thai government, like its counterparts in Beijing, to 
pursue improved links with the central Burmese government as a means of securing 
cross-border activities that had long been crucial to economic development in northern 
Thailand (Smith 1991, 361).  
 
6.4 CONCLUSION  
The changing dynamics of the Shan borderlands in the late 1980s created a peculiar 
paradox: at the same time as the country‘s growing economic crisis and repressive 
political authoritarianism created mass uprisings that toppled the Ne Win regime, new 
opportunities were emerging for the government to consolidate control over the 
country‘s border regions with China and Thailand. Alongside the collapse of the 
state‘s legitimacy and extractive power at the centre, China and Thailand‘s changing 
attitudes, the weakening of the CPB and successive Tatmadaw victories in mid-1980s 
meant that the Shan border region began to be viewed differently. Rather than simply 
embodying an insurgent threat which needed to be contained, this territory was viewed 
                                                          
93 This concern was behind the Thai government‘s attack on Khun Sa‘s headquarters at Ban Hin Taek in 
northern Thailand in January 1982. This attack forced Khun Sa to rebuild his SUA headquarters across 
the border in Shan State. 
94 These defections were motivated by government amnesties in 1980 and 1982 and frustration amongst 
many cadres (especially students who had joined the Party after the government crackdown on student 
protests in 1976) with the party‘s staunch Maoist ideology in what they viewed as an emerging 
industrial nation. 
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as offering important economic and political opportunities not only through which to 
extend state control across the Shan hills but also to reinvigorate the very foundations 
of state power. It is these changing dynamics which provide an important starting point 
for understanding why the Shan borderlands have become central to attempts by 
military governments over the past quarter-century to consolidate state power. 
 
A fundamental contention of this study is that the specific trajectory of state 
consolidation strategies since 1988 and the diverse ways in which they have been 
imposed, resisted and negotiated across Shan State can only be understood properly by 
first understanding the complex history of the region. As this chapter had sought to 
show, for so much of the post-colonial period, just as in the colonial period before it, 
the relationship between processes of state formation at the centre and the dynamics of 
the Shan State is one of both inter-connection and separation. The trajectory of 
statebuilding under the Ne Win regime, analysed in the first half of this chapter, 
impacted heavily upon developments across Shan State in a number of ways, and vice 
versa. Ne Win‘s efforts to construct an authoritarian nation-state under military control 
gave tangible shape to the palpable but ill-defined fears of Burman chauvinism and 
military-state authoritarianism that first inspired opposition across Shan State against 
the government in the 1950s. The Tatmadaw‘s effort to assert control through a 
bellicose counter-insurgency strategy founded upon a brutal ‗People‘s War‘ made local 
populations wary about state encroachment, which they have invariably experienced in 
the form of forced labor, expropriation of property, taxation, and intolerance of cultural 
diversity. This environment has strengthened support for local strongmen and armed 
groups who proved able to hold the state at bay. The abject failure of the Burmese Way 
to Socialism generated a flourishing cross-border economy, which not only financed 
opposition groups but also ensured that populations within contested areas invariably 
looked to the border, and to those groups which controlled cross-border trade, rather 
than to the centre to secure access to basic goods. In turn, the cross-border economy 
played an important role in further weakening the formal economy by reducing 
demand for domestically-produced goods and encouraging producers and retailers to 
access the black market rather than the state economy.    
 
Furthermore, the socialist revolution pursued by Ne Win, the country‘s strict foreign 
policy neutralism in the midst of the Cold War and its inability to secure territorial 
control over the country‘s border regions aroused the self-interested concerns of many 
foreign countries, which in turn enabled border-based groups to gain foreign backing. 
Ne Win‘s refusal to be drawn into the growing hostility between Russia and China and 
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to take a stance during the Vietnam War played a part in motivating Chinese support 
for the CPB. Consequently, the rapid expansion of the CPB‘s Northeast Command 
enabled avowed anti-Communist movements operating along the Shan-Thai border to 
secure US and Thai support. All of these factors in turn had significant impact upon 
the trajectory of the Burmese state. Fighting insurgency posed a huge financial drain 
on the state‘s already impecunious coffers and ensured that the Tatmadaw remained at 
the very heart of the state.  
 
However, within these overarching linkages, the configurations of power that emerged 
throughout the Shan borderland were built upon profoundly different foundations to 
the military-state structure that had been consolidated throughout much of the centre of 
the country. By the late 1980s, Shan State embodied a complex ‗field of power‘ in 
which powerful armed groups undermined the central government‘s ability to control 
the means of coercion, opium production and insurgent control over the country‘s 
flourishing black market cross-border trade created lucrative revenue streams beyond 
the control of the government, and ethno-nationalism became a powerful counter-
narrative to the government‘s own efforts to forge popular sovereignty under a 
centralized unitary state.  
 
The opportunities that the Shan borderlands embodied for the central government by 
the late 1980s ensured that territorialising this region became a central priority for the 
post-1988 military government‘s attempts to consolidate state power. However, as the 
government sought to capitalise upon these changing dynamics and to assert greater 
authority across Shan State, the borderland it faced was not the wild, anarchic space or 
―institutional tabula rasa‖ of popular imagery, but a region governed by well-
established local power structures, albeit structures that were complex and volatile due 
to the multitude of armed groups operating there. The government‘s attempts to 
navigate this complex terrain and the role that the region‘s drug economy has had in 
these contested processes are the subject of the final section of this study.  
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SECTION 3: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH  
 
 
 
Myanmar‟s „war on drugs‟ and Tachilek‟s growing real estate market. Photograph by the author, May 
2013. 
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Chapter 7 
THE CONTINUATION OF WAR BY OTHER MEANS  
Ceasefire politics and militarised state consolidation 
in Shan State, 1988-2012 
 
A government billboard along the main road east of Taunggyi, Southern Shan State. Photograph by the author, 
January 2013. 
 
After decades of economic mismanagement and repressive military rule, the near-
collapse of the national economy in the late 1980s incited widespread opposition 
against Ne Win‘s government. Through the 1980s economic growth hardly kept pace 
with population increase and unemployment and inflation grew rapidly.95 Rumbling 
discontent escalated into widespread protests in March 1988 and the government‘s 
brutal response inspired further opposition.96 Despite Ne Win‘s formal resignation on 
23rd July 1988 pro-democracy protests continued, culminating in the general strike 
announced for 8th August (8/8/88), which was brutally suppressed. Despite subsequent 
pledges to hold multi-party elections within three months, protestors demanded the 
                                                          
95 By 1987 the value of the country‘s imports had fallen by more than 50% since 1981, the government 
became unable to service its international debt, and during the last quarter of 1987 foreign exchange 
reserves fell to below $24million according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, insufficient to cover 
even a single month‘s international trade (Taylor 2009, 378). On 5th September 1987, seemingly in an 
attempt to weaken the strength of the black market, the government demonetised the higher value 25, 35 
and 75 kyat currency notes overnight. This antagonised people further by wiping out their savings. 
96 For a vivid description of the beginnings of the protests see Lintner 1990b.  
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immediate dissolution of the government to make way for an interim government to 
oversee elections.  
 
Amidst continued unrest and the seeming inability of the BSPP government to wrestle 
back control, the Tatmadaw launched its own coup on 18th September 1988 and 
established a new military administration called the State Law and Order Council or 
SLORC and renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997. The 
SLORC repealed the 1974 constitution, imposed martial law, suppressed opposition 
movements and renamed the country Myanmar. The new military government did, 
however, pledge to honour the commitment to hold multi-party elections, which were 
eventually held in May 1990. The National League for Democracy (NLD), led by 
Aung San Suu Kyi (Aung San‘s daughter), achieved a landslide victory, winning 60% 
of the vote and 392 out of 485 seats.97 The SLORC, however, refused to acknowledge 
the election result and instead announced its intention to remain in power as a 
transitional government until a new constitution was drafted, beginning an eighteen 
year constitutional impasse that remained until the country‘s third constitution was 
approved in 2008.98 
 
The turmoil of the late 1980s epitomised the failures of Ne Win‘s efforts to consolidate 
state power. Insurgency remained rife throughout the country‘s borderlands, the 
government was confronted by protests of an unprecedented scale throughout central 
Myanmar that coalesced around the NLD, which in Aung San Suu Kyi had a 
charismatic leader capable of winning mass support both domestically and 
internationally. The state was close to bankruptcy and the SLORC‘s legitimacy was 
deeply compromised by the role it had played in the violent suppression of protestors 
and the fact that it could not claim legitimacy via the ballot box. However, amidst this 
malaise the 1988 protests instilled a rejuvenated determination within the upper 
echelons of the Tatmadaw to consolidate the state edifice over which they now 
assumed direct control. For the country‘s military leadership, the crisis of 1988-1990 
epitomised, once again, that the Tatmadaw was the only institution capable of 
preserving stability and forging national unity, and they drew parallels with their role 
in 1948, 1958 and 1962.  
                                                          
97 The National Unity Party (NUP), the successor to the BSPP won only ten seats. The Shan 
Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) was the second largest party with twenty-three seats.  
98 This was reflected clearly in Foreign Minister Win Aung‘s explanation of the government‘s priorities: 
―Our program of democracy is secondary. Our fundamental program is national unity. Given the fact 
that we have so many diverse races living together, if we are not united, there will be no chance of 
survival. A new government can emerge but unless we have solved our problems of national unity it will 
not last long‖ (cited in Steinberg 2001, 68). 
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Over the next twenty years the SLORC/SPDC embarked upon a sustained strategy of 
deeply illiberal statebuilding. This process ―brought with it a new geography‖ in which 
for both political and economic reasons control over the country‘s borderlands with 
China and Thailand became central to the government‘s efforts to consolidate state 
power (Callahan 2007, 17). Contested areas of Shan States were no longer viewed 
merely as a frontier to be pacified but as regions whose effective territorialisation 
would determine the outcome of the government‘s statebuilding aspirations.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to undertake a detailed analysis of the dynamics 
surrounding state consolidation across Shan State since 1988. In order to do so, I argue 
it is imperative to engage both with the strategies deployed the central government to 
impose territorial control over contested regions of Shan State and the ways in which 
these strategies have been contested, resisted, negotiated and manipulated.   
 
In order to develop these arguments, this chapter is divided into three sections. Section 
1 provides an overview of how the SLORC/SPDC governments sought to consolidate 
control over the means of coercion, extraction and legitimation since 1988 and 
explains why securing territorial control across Shan State became central to these 
aspirations. In Section 2 I develop a nuanced and careful periodization of the post-
1988 period in order to demonstrate how the strategies deployed by the government to 
secure territorial control, and the responses they evoked, changed over time and across 
space. Section 3 then offers a retrospective analysis of the impact of illiberal state 
consolidation processes in Shan State since 1988. I argue that although this process has 
been ‗successful‘ in the government‘s eyes in terms of weakening insurgency and 
extracting revenue from border areas, it has been far less effective at institutionalising 
durable forms of territorial control beyond reliance upon the perpetual militarisation of 
border areas. The challenges that the government has faced in monopolising power 
have led to an array of more pragmatic strategies of ‗negotiated statehood‘ and 
‗borderland brokerage‘ to stabilise and secure the region. Whilst this chapter provides 
a broad analysis of events over the past twenty-five years, it provides the foundation 
for the two, more detailed, chapters that follow. In chapter 8 I analyse the rise of 
militias across Shan State, a phenomenon that has become central to processes of 
‗negotiated statehood‘. In Chapter 9 I then analyse the complex relationship that has 
emerged between the illicit drug economy and processes of illiberal state consolidation 
since 1988. 
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7.1 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN POST-1988 STATE CONSOLIDATION 
STRATEGIES 
 
7.1.1 Securing coercive power 
The 1988 military coup ushered in a new generation of Tatmadaw leaders to the helm 
of the state. These figures had no direct links to the anti-colonial struggle and their 
formative experiences lay in the Tatmadaw‘s counterinsurgency campaigns. The 
SLORC‘s immediate ambitions extended little beyond regime survival. By the early 
1990s, however, through the signing of numerous ceasefire agreements with armed 
groups, the suppression of the pro-democracy movement and the country‘s improving 
economic situation (analysed in detail below), the regime had stabilized and embarked 
upon a more concerted strategy to institutionalise authority throughout the country. 
Myanmar has a long history of empire-building and the SLORC portrayed itself as 
following in the footsteps of past kings such as Anawrahta (1044–1078), Bayinnaung 
(1551–1581), and Alaungpaya (1752–1760) whose reigns embodied ―stories of a 
nation naturally inclined to fracture but which through heroic action can be welded 
together‖ (Myint-U 2008, 64-5). The Tatmadaw sought to legitimate its control by 
portraying itself as the custodian of the country‘s three ‗national causes‘: non-
disintegration of the Union; non-disintegration of national solidarity; perpetuation of 
national solidarity. In practical terms this ensured continued emphasis upon securing a 
unitary state structure, intolerance of political opposition and determination to ensure 
that foreign and economic policy adhered to these national causes. Public gatherings of 
more than five people were banned99, strict censorship was invoked, universities were 
shut down regularly throughout the 1990s100, and vast numbers of political opponents 
were imprisoned, including Aung San Suu Kyi who spent much of the 1990s and 
2000s under house arrest.  
 
The government‘s efforts to refashion the state‘s coercive power differed from Ne 
Win‘s regime in a number of important ways. The SLORC distanced itself from the 
BSPP party-state structure, formally severing ties with the BSPP by abolishing the 
Tatmadaw Party Organising Committee in September 1988.101 Rather than attempt to 
resurrect the BSPP‘s notion of a People‘s Administration, the Tatmadaw instead 
                                                          
99 Gatherings of more than five people were allowed subject to prior government approval and if held on 
government premises.  
100 Universities were shut down entirely in the late 1980s and early 1990s and again between 1996 and 
1998. In Yangon, the government‘s determination to prevent student protest movements from posing a 
threat to government control led it to relocate many campuses from close to the city centre to the city‘s 
northern suburbs. 
101 The dismal performance of the BSPP-backed National Unity Party (NUP) in the 1990 election further 
encouraged the SLORC to abandon the party-state structure in favour of the military‘s direct 
institutionalisation of power.   
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embarked upon a strategy of militarising regions where the government‘s writ 
remained weak, and in the country‘s ethnic states the expansion of the state‘s territorial 
reach became synonymous with the expansion of Tatmadaw presence. The rationale 
for establishing this coercion-intensive state structure lay in the failures of the BSPP 
party-state to establish effective administrative control over the country. The BSPP-era 
had created a confused bureaucratic structure in which control officially laid with the 
civilian party administration but within large parts of the country the military wielded 
de facto control. The SLORC simplified this structure by devolving administrative 
power directly to the military and dismantling the BSPP bureaucracy. People‘s 
Councils were abolished and replaced by Law Order and Restoration Councils (later 
Peace and Development Councils), at the township, district and state/divisional level 
and these were dominated by military personnel providing a clear chain of military-
state command. 
 
Particular emphasis was placed upon establishing a stronger military-state structure 
across the country‘s borderlands. The was inspired partly by the frustrated belief held 
by many military elites that the BSPP‘s misguided efforts to establish a party state and 
its mismanagement of the economy had denied the Tatmadaw the opportunities and 
resources to unify the country (Callahan 1999, 54; Selth 2002, 36). The 1988 military 
coup now provided the Tatmadaw with the opportunity to fulfil this mission. 
Militarisation was viewed as a means of securing a number of objectives 
simultaneously, enabling the government to combat insurgency and to manage the 
ceasefire agreements brokered with armed groups (see below), to secure control over 
natural resources located in contested border regions, and to wrestle control of 
increasing cross-border trade away from the black market. In order to achieve these 
ambitions three significant developments distinguished the government‘s post-1988 
military state consolidation strategy. 
 
Firstly, the Tatmadaw underwent an extensive process of modernisation and expansion. 
By 1998 troop numbers had almost doubled to 370,000 and the officer Corps was 
expanded through rejuvenating the Defence Services Academy (Selth 2002, 79; Smith 
1999, 426; Taylor 2009, 399-400; Myoe 2009).102  The Tatmadaw purchased large 
numbers of combat aircraft, naval vessels and heavy weaponry, primarily from China 
but also from Russia, Eastern Europe and Israel (Myoe 2011, 145; 151).  
                                                          
102 The Defence Services Academy is located in Pyin Oo Lwin (formerly known as Maymyo) in 
Mandalay Division. It is the Tatmadaw‘s premier training institution. Alongside mandatory military 
training the DSA offers four-year Bachelor degree courses and is one of the most well-funded higher 
education institutions in the country. 
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Secondly, the government‘s military spending rose sharply to the extent that it was 
allowed to impact adversely upon the country‘s balance of payments and contribute 
towards rising inflation (Steinberg 2001, 78). The SLORC‘s determination to 
modernise the Tatmadaw was reflected in the purchase of $1.2 billion worth of military 
hardware from China as early as December 1989 (Myoe 2011, 145). Between 1988 and 
1995 military spending increased from an estimated 2.1% of GDP to 3.7% GDP 
(Taylor 2009, 400). In 1997/8 the government admitted spending almost one third of its 
entire budget on defence (Steinberg 2001, 78) and the publically available 2010/11 
budget demonstrates that almost one quarter of the budget, was spent on defence, 
compared to only 3% (equivalent to $1.60 per capita) on health (Turnell 2012, 141-
2).103  
 
Despite this vast expansion in expenditure, the day-to-day costs of militarisation have 
been financed only partly by the central government. Tatmadaw units have been 
required to ‗live off the land‘, in line with a policy that became explicit in 1997 when 
the War Office informed the Tatmadaw‘s Regional Commanders that troops ―were to 
meet their basic logistical needs locally, rather than rely on the central supply system‖ 
(Selth 2002, 136; Callahan 2007b, 46). The Tatmadaw has built coercive and exorbitant 
structures of localised expropriation throughout the country encompassing heavy 
taxation on crops, livestock, land, vehicles, travel (in the form of tolls), shops, and 
small-scale businesses, and the forced purchase of goods (primarily rice) at below-
market prices. In the words of one Shan researcher, ―people are quite literally paying 
the price of the government‘s militarisation strategy.‖104 Not surprisingly, as will be 
                                                          
103 Even these official statistics belie the true levels of military spending, which has been heavily 
subsidized by other government ministries such as the Ministry of Energy which provides heavily 
subsidised fuel to the Tatmadaw. Furthermore, military spending has also been channelled through the 
growing number of economic enterprises controlled by the Tatmadaw, most importantly the Union of 
Myanmar Economic Holdings (UMEH) which was founded by the SLORC in 1990. UMEH and its 
subsidiaries developed a vast portfolio of investments including mining (primarily jade and gems), 
banking, construction, tourism, real estate and transport, as well as establishing more than seventy joint 
ventures with foreign firms through which it was able to control much of the official FDI entering the 
country (Callahan 2003, 214; Fujita et al. 2009; Than 2009, 392). Throughout this period 40% of 
UMEH was owned by the Directorate of Defence Procurement and the other 60% by Tatmadaw 
personnel and its extensive profits have been channelled into funding weapons purchases, Tatmadaw 
welfare provision and pensions (Callahan 2003, 214; Myoe 2009, 176-81). The Tatmadaw has also 
enjoyed prolonged access to what has effectively been a huge off-budget ―slush fund‖ created by the 
fact that foreign exchange has been accumulated at the kyat‘s market exchange rate, which by the late 
2000s was in the region of 1,200 kyat to the US dollar, but was recorded in government budgets at the 
official rate of 6 kyat to the dollar. As Sean Turnell (2012, 146) points out, this ―creative book-keeping‖ 
has left a huge source of revenue completely unaccounted for in official statistics, much of which is 
likely to have been spent upon the military. 
104 Interview with Shan researcher. 12 November 2012. Chiang Mai. 
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shown in Chapter 9, across Shan State the Tatmadaw also sought to derive revenue 
from the drug trade. 
 
Thirdly, Tatmadaw commanders enjoyed far greater autonomy than during the BSPP-
era. As Maung Aung Myoe (2009, 68), one of the leading experts on the Tatmadaw, 
explains: 
In the pre-1988 coup period…regional commanders were…subjected to various party 
committees at the central level, such as party discipline and organizing committees.  
These bodies had some form of restraint on military authority…The coup on 18 
September 1988 changed the political status of the regional commanders and displaced 
the ―checks and balances‖ system.  From being one of the members of the party central 
committee, a regional commander became a member of the SLORC, the highest state 
organ made up of nineteen senior commanders.  This guaranteed far-reaching 
consequences for the Tatmadaw leadership.  For the first time since 1974, the regional 
commanders enjoyed enormous power: they became supreme authorities in their 
respective regions.  Economic power further supplemented the political and military 
power of regional commanders…They could also make use of state resources under their 
control as they saw fit…This decentralization of political, military and economic power 
into the hands of the regional commanders gave them immense power.  
 
Although efforts were made in 1997 to curb the power of Regional Commanders by 
retiring them to positions within the Ministry of Defence in Yangon, the local 
autonomy enjoyed by Tatmadaw commanders has remained conspicuous, especially in 
contested border regions where the gradual civilianisation of government bureaucracy 
experienced elsewhere during the 2000s has been less apparent. The Tatmadaw 
continued to take responsibility for managing and financing local administration, 
regulating the local economy, and overseeing the activities of numerous government 
departments, notably the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC) and the 
Central Committee for the Development of Border Areas and National Races (often 
referred to as Na Ta La). 
 
In sum, government efforts to consolidate coercive power have been founded upon a 
concerted strategy of military expansion in which the Tatmadaw was invested with the 
responsibility both for protecting the country‘s ‗national‘ interests and running the day 
to day administration of the country. Although the government‘s overarching aim was 
seemingly ―to re-establish a political and administrative structure which would permit 
the armed forces to exercise real power, without having to run the country‖, it was 
determined that this strategy should be enacted only once the threats posed by 
insurgency, political opposition and economic frailty were addressed (Selth 2002, 37).  
 
7.1.2 Re-asserting the state’s extractive power 
The collapse of the BSPP government in 1988 lay in the state‘s economic bankruptcy 
rather than a crisis within its coercive-bureaucratic structure and this was a point 
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clearly recognised by the SLORC. The danger that economic grievances could provoke 
mass protest impressed upon the new military government the need to break the mould 
of socialist autarky which had prevailed since 1962. In 1988 the SLORC legalised 
cross-border trade through government-controlled trade gates, efforts were made to 
attract foreign investment and from 1989 the SLORC permitted joint ventures between 
SOEs and private investors (Fujita, Mieno & Okamoto 2009, 4-6; Thein 2004, 123-6). 
However, the government struggled to address the enduring economic challenges it 
faced and atempts to stimulate greater agricultural production, especially of rice, had 
only limited success. After an initial rise in production, by the mid-1990s rice yields 
had stagnated and volumes of rice exports remained lower than they had during the 
BSPP years (Okomato 2005, 6-7).105  
 
Economic development was further inhibited by the government‘s attempts to use the 
economy to establish a ‗limited access order‘ through which the allocation of economic 
rents was used to secure loyalty amongst elites. The government retained monopoly 
control over official import/export rights of numerous commodities and important 
sectors of the economy remained under the control of SOEs.106 At a national level, 
allocation of monopolies and import/export licenses was used to secure elite pacts 
amongst the Tatmadaw‘s top brass and between the government and the country‘s 
emerging private sector. Throughout the country the government used its pervasive 
control over the economy to allocate concessions, such as land, business opportunities 
and access to cheap loans, to military personnel or those closely linked to the military. 
Maintaining loyalty within the Tatmadaw was especially important in light of its rapid 
expansion and the competition this placed on promotion structures (Callahan 1999, 56). 
This strategy concentrated wealth and power within an emerging nexus of military 
state-business networks and was designed to ensure that emerging business elites 
remained reliant upon state patronage and retained a vested interest in the perpetuation 
                                                          
105 The government attempted to stimulate greater production in the late 1980s by reducing the volume 
of rice purchased (below market price) by the state from farmers under the paddy procurement scheme. 
This scheme was in fact temporarily abolished altogether in 1987 although was quickly reinstated in 
response to fears that prices were rising too quickly and the continued need to provide cheap rations of 
rice to the military and civil servants. The government also sought to increase production through 
investing in irrigation in order to increase land under paddy cultivation and to instigate two, or in some 
cases even three, annual crop cycles. However, despite these reforms the government continued to 
prioritise securing cheap and stable supplies of rice for the domestic market and to export. As a result the 
procurement structure remained in place, only being abolished altogether in 2003 and the state continued 
to monopolise control over all rice exports through the state-owned Myanmar Agricultural Produce 
Trading Company (Okamoto 2005). 
 
106 The government retained monopoly control over import/exports of gold, jade, gems, metals, sesame, 
peanuts and sugar as well as consumer goods such as mobile phones and cars, which in turn continued 
to stimulate a black market in these goods. 
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of military rule. It did, however, prevent the emergence of a competitive private sector 
and continued to insulate poorly performing SOEs.   
 
Furthermore, trade deficits, which had plagued the final years of the BSPP government, 
grew rapidly as the country legalised border trade. In the early 1990s goods flooded 
into Myanmar in response to decades of starved demand. By 1997 the country‘s annual 
trade deficit had reached an estimated $1.8 billion. Between 1988 and 2003 Chinese 
imports rose sevenfold whilst exports to China rose by less than one and half times 
(Fujita et al. 2009, 107-111). The severity of the situation was reflected by the decision 
of the government‘s Trade Policy Council in 1997 to only allow companies to import 
goods against their export earnings in an attempt to address severe foreign exchange 
shortages (Kudo & Mieno 2007, 7). Like its predecessors, the government also 
struggled to raise revenue through formal taxation and the state‘s weak fiscal base, 
coupled with the imposition of sanctions that denied it access multilateral assistance, 
led the government to resort to printing more money to cover revenue shortfalls. Rapid 
inflation, often reaching 25%-30% per year saw the value of the kyat deteriorate from 
around 35 to the US dollar in 1989 to 1300 in 2007 (Turnell 2009, 256-296).     
 
Amidst this continued economic malaise, a profound shift occurred in the country‘s 
macroeconomic structure in which the economic potential of the country‘s border 
regions to stabilise the national economy took on growing significance. The 
stabilisation of the economy immediately after the 1988 military coup owed much to 
large-scale cross-border logging, fishery and gemstone concessions granted to Thai 
companies, initially negotiated with the SLORC by Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army (1986-1990) (Bryant 1997, 177-8; 
Chongkittavorn 2001, 120; Zaw 2008). Through these deals Thailand gained access to 
new supplies of timber following the country‘s rapid deforestation during the 1970s 
and 1980s which had led to the Kingdom‘s 1988 logging ban, whilst timber exports 
generated in the region of $135-200million for the SLORC in 1989/90 amounting to 
more than 40% of the country‘s total official export earnings (Bryant 1997, 178; Smith 
1994, 13).107 As the rice sector continued to stagnate and the government sought to 
generate foreign exchange to finance Tatmadaw modernization and to satisfy rising 
demand for imported goods, the government modified previously-held aspirations of 
establishing an import-substitution-industrialized economy financed by rice exports. 
                                                          
107 The logging ban in Thailand came into effect in January 1989 as a response to fears over the impact 
of environmental degradation, in particular concerns that the devastating floods in Nakorn Srithammarat 
Province in southern Thailand in November 1988 were linked to deforestation.  
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Instead, exports of offshore natural gas, timber, jade, gems and hydropower were 
viewed as future foundations of the national economy and over the next two decades 
came to generate more foreign exchange than at any time in the country‘s postcolonial 
history. The government‘s changing economic approach was reliant upon securing 
control over the country‘s Thai and Chinese border regions, where many of these 
resources were located in these regions and which provided the gateway to foreign 
markets.  
 
The government continued to emphasize the role of agriculture, albeit in ways that 
differed markedly from the pre-1988 period. Abandoning the Burmese Way to 
Socialism, the government attempted to stimulate a commercialised agricultural sector 
and to expand the country‘s industrial agricultural frontiers. This changing approach 
was reflected in the 1991 ‗Wastelands Law‘108, which gave the government the legal 
framework to allocate large concessions of ‗wasteland‘ (TNI 2012). Land with no 
officially recognised legal title, including all customary and communal land, was 
deemed wasteland, regardless of whether it was being farmed (FSWG 2011). 
Incredibly, the government deemed huge swathes of the country, amounting to 40% of 
Myanmar‘s total cultivable land, to be ‗wasteland‘ and announced plans to develop 
permanent agriculture on 4 million hectares of it by 2030, much of which was located 
in the country‘s ethnic states (TNI 2012, 34).109 These laws have been used to grant 
large-scale land concessions to agribusinesses, usually foreign companies in 
partnership with the Tatmadaw, or private Burmese companies. Over the past twenty-
five years this has transformed the ways in which the government has generated 
agricultural exports away from a narrow focus on the delta-centred rice sector to large-
scale enterprises in corn, biofuels and rubber. Together these developments, analysed 
in greater detail in section 2, meant that by 2010 the country‘s economy, though still 
facing major challenges, was in a much stronger position than it had been in 1988, with 
much of this renewed strength founded upon the military government‘s ability to 
                                                          
108 This Law‘s full title is the ‗Prescribing Duties and Rights of the Central Committee for the 
Management of Culturable Land, Fallow Land and Waste Land‘ Law. ‗culturable‘ is a mistranslation of 
cultivable.    
109 Myanmar‘s post-2010 civilian government has reinforced this system through the passing of the 
Vacant, Fallow, and Virgin Lands Management Law in March 2012, which allows a Central Committee, 
formed by the President under the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, to distribute land deemed to be 
uncultivated (in practice land without legal title) for ―commercial agriculture, livestock breeding, mining, 
and government allowable other purposes‖ (Government of the Union of Myanmar 2012). 
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extract resources from areas of the country where insurgency had previously prevented 
such ventures.110      
 
7.1.3 (De)legitimising state authority 
The quest for political legitimacy has continued to elude military leaders since 1988. 
The government‘s attempts to legitimate control through claiming to be the custodian 
of national unity and stability has diverged sharply from the aspirations of much of the 
population who continue to lament the lack of political freedoms and basic services, 
especially education, health and communication. Despite, or perhaps precisely because 
of, these divergent perspectives, the state has continued to exert a ―command 
relationship‖ over society in which the government‘s claims to legitimacy are based 
upon fulfilling its own self-defined indicators of progress (Callahan 2003, 224). 
Outside of the emerging clientele of military-political-business elites who developed 
powerful vested interests in supporting military rule, obedience has largely remained a 
function of the state‘s coercive infrastructure. The fear and sense of futility enveloping 
opposition since 1990 ensured that although resentment towards the regime remained 
widespread, dominant responses were ―depoliticization, atomization, mysticism, and a 
focus on daily survival‖, as well as surreptitious forms of resistance by those intent 
upon circumventing the government‘s overbearing control over society (Jones 2014, 
782; Fink 2007; Skidmore 2004).  
 
7.2 THE CENTRALITY OF BORDER REGIONS TO POST-1988 STATE 
CONSOLIDATION  
In the remainder of this chapter, and the two which follow, I analyse the dynamics 
surrounding processes of state consolidation across Shan State specifically. In doing so 
I emphasize how state elites sought to maximise the opportunities and minimise the 
threats posed by this region in an attempt to realise its ultimate aim of forging a stable 
unitary state. I also demonstrate how the ways in which this broad strategy has been 
imposed, resisted and negotiated created complex power structures and fragmented 
mosaics of territorial control which differed over time and across space. In an attempt 
to disentangle this complexity I argue that the post-1988 trajectory of state 
consolidation in Shan State can be divided into four periods: (i) 1988-1990: when the 
government‘s primary focus was regime survival and it made ceasefires with numerous 
powerful armed groups; (ii) 1990-1995: during which the government sought to 
stabilise the borderland by initiating further ceasefires and launching offensives against 
                                                          
110 Economic statistics on Myanmar are notoriously unreliable and must be treated with a fair degree of 
scepticism. The IMF claims that between 1988 and 2010 the country‘s GDP rose from $167million to 
$8.7billion although these figures are hard to verify (IMF figures cited in Jones 2014, 781).  
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non-ceasefire groups; (iii) 1995-c.2004 during which the Tatmadaw militarised and 
sought to pacify insurgent-affected areas through violent counter-insurgency 
campaigns; (iv) post-2004: in which the government has sought to use its military 
dominance to convert the region‘s fragmented political geography into more durable 
forms of control beyond perpetual reliance upon the coercive power of the Tatmadaw. 
This periodization is not intended to suggest a conscious linear progression. Indeed, in 
many ways the shifts it tries to capture have been driven by ad hoc reactions amongst 
political elites to the unintended impacts of earlier events. This periodization is, 
however, useful in capturing the changing dynamics and different configurations of 
power over the past twenty-five years.      
 
7.2.1 Regime survival (1988-1990): The collapse of the CPB and the first-
wave of ceasefires  
Within months of the repression of the 1988 pro-democracy protests the CPB 
collapsed.111 The fragmentation of the country‘s most powerful insurgent group sent 
shockwaves through the country‘s eastern borderlands, creating an unstable and 
rapidly changing political environment. The roots of the CPB‘s collapse lay in the 
gradual termination of Chinese patronage over the previous decade. Growing 
resentment against the Party‘s ageing, predominantly Burman leadership, heavy 
military defeats during the 1986/7 dry season, and the human losses caused by the 
CPB‘s human wave attacks aroused further discontent. Growing public dissension 
between the CPB and China in early 1989 may have finally encouraged the munities as 
it became clear that the Party‘s leadership would not be able to call upon Chinese 
support and suggested to mutinying leaders that they would have scope to forge their 
own agreements with Chinese security agencies (Lintner 1990, 45-6).       
 
By late 1988 the CPB had fragmented into four separate armed organisations: the 
United Wa State Army (UWSA) located in the Wa Hills east of the Salween River 
(including the former CPB headquarters at Panghsang); the Myanmar National 
Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), which controlled the Kokang area of northern 
Shan State centred at Laukkai; the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) 
headquartered at Mongla; and the New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K) based in 
eastern Kachin State (Lintner 1990; Smith 1999).  
     
The military government sought to capitalise upon the turmoil engulfing the China 
border region. There was no master plan or precise understanding of these rapidly 
                                                          
111 For a more detailed account of the collapse of the CPB see: Lintner 1990 and Smith 1999. 
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changing dynamics and the government was driven primarily by pragmatic 
determination to minimize the number of insurgent fronts it faced as it struggled to 
reassert control over the rest of the country following the 1988 protests (Oo & Min 
2007, 14). The formation of the All Burma Students‘ Democratic Front (ABSDF) on 
the Thai-Karen border in November 1988 and the formation of the Democratic 
Alliance of Burma (DAB) raised the spectre of a united opposition front between 
insurgent groups and pro-democracy protestors who had garnered much international 
support.112 In this context the CPB‘s collapse was viewed by a faction within the 
government, around Military Intelligence (MI) Chief Khin Nyunt, as offering an 
important opportunity to fragment opposition forces. Accompanied by various 
interlocutors, notably former rebel-cum-KKY leader-cum-convicted druglord Lo 
Hsing Han, MI officials met numerous times with the various CPB splinter groups and 
fashioned verbal ceasefire agreements with all four groups by the end of 1989. In 
September 1989 SSA Brigades under General Hso Ten (who had forged close links 
with the CPB following a military pact in 1975) also agreed a ceasefire with the 
SLORC that enabled them to retain control over territory which became known as 
Northern Shan State Special Region 3. A smaller group of SSA soldiers rejected the 
ceasefire agreement and continued to operate under Commander Sai Lek in the hills 
around Lashio. However, increasingly squeezed on all sides, Sai Lek fled to China 
returning in 1994 to unite his troops with Khun Sa‘s MTA.   
       
MI officials demonstrated greater pragmatism and enjoyed better trust than Tatmadaw 
field commanders and the ceasefire terms they offered were more generous than those 
which had been offered during sporadic peace talks held over the previous forty years 
(Oo & Min 2007). In return for pledging to stop fighting against the government and to 
renounce links with other insurgent groups, ceasefire groups retained their weapons, 
were granted authority to govern designated territories termed ‗Special Regions‘113, 
and gained various trade and resource concessions, as well as gaining unofficial 
authorisation to remain involved in the drug trade (Oo and Min 2007, 28). These 
―battle-oriented ceasefires‖ made no attempt to address underlying political issues but 
                                                          
112 The ABSDF was formed by students who had fled central Myanmar following the military coup and 
the subsequent government crackdown on protestors. The Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) was an 
alliance between the ABSDF and the National Democratic Front (NDF), which had been established in 
1976 in an attempt to increase unity between ethnic armed groups fighting against the country. The 
DAB called for the formation of a federal union. 
113 There is no standard terminology for describing these semi-autonomous zones.  After the ceasefire 
agreements these areas were given a temporary status of ‗Special Region‘.  In the 2008 Constitution the 
term ‗Special Region‘ was omitted and replaced with ‗self-administered division‘, with only certain 
groups retaining the right to govern such territories. For clarity I use the term Special Region throughout 
this chapter.     
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did reduce the number of fronts the Tatmadaw was fighting on. 114  Although the 
ceasefire agreements held, the central role played by MI officials meant they were 
never fully accepted by many within the Tatmadaw who advocated pushing for 
outright military victory, creating a fault-line that would become more apparent 
following Khin Nyunt‘s fall in 2004 and the subsequent dismantling of the MI (see 
below).  
 
The changing attitudes of the Chinese and Thai governments also had an influential 
impact upon the dynamics of the Shan borderland. In Thailand the growing political 
power of business elites saw efforts to improve political and economic relations with 
Myanmar as part of Thailand‘s efforts to convert mainland Southeast Asia ―from 
sanam rop (battlefields) to sanam kankha (marketplaces)‖ – a strategy Thailand 
believed would make it the predominant merchant state in the region (Myint-U 2006, 
287, 308; Renard 1996, 108). China‘s neutrality after the 1988 military coup and its 
refusal to support the CPB‘s leadership in the tumultuous months of early 1989 
heralded the growing priority which the PRC gave to government-to-government 
relations. This stance was strengthened by international condemnation of China‘s own 
suppression of pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square in June 1989.115  In 1988 
Lo Hsing Han‘s Asia World Company was granted a government contract to improve 
the road between Mandalay and the China border at Muse, which reduced travel time 
from two days (as many as seven during the rainy season) to 12-16 hours (Fujita et al. 
2009, 114). As Martin Smith (1999, 441) argues, ―[g]overnment-to-government 
relations were now the new regional priority, and the insurgencies, refugee issues and 
borderland conflicts, although unresolved, became regarded as internal matters and the 
impediments to progress rather than evidence of deep political ills within Burma‖. This 
was important in encouraging the government to believe that attempts to break out of 
the country‘s isolation were compatible with its efforts to consolidate state control.   
 
However, it was soon evident that resource concessions and border trade, crucial to 
generating foreign exchange for the government, also provided new revenue flows for 
                                                          
114 The ceasefires had a number of immediate military effects. In northern Shan State the MNDAA 
capitalised on its alliance with the Tatmadaw by fighting against the KIO in an effort seize territory in 
parts of Kutkhai. To the south, the Tatmadaw launched major offensives in December 1989 against both 
the KNU and New Mon State Party (NMSP), having redeployed troops from northern Shan State (Oo 
and Min 2007, 16-17). 
115 China refused to back the CPB‘s ageing leaders following the 1989 mutinies but did offer pensions to 
members of the 1975 CPB Central Committee if they agreed to settle in China and renounce political 
activities (Myoe 2011, 109). 
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armed groups. 116  This revealed the tensions involved in extracting revenue from 
conflict-affect border regions without first asserting greater authority over them. 
Furthermore, since the initial ceasefires embodied little more than military truces, 
armed groups looked to the stability and financial opportunities they afforded as a 
means to strengthen their armies ahead of future peace talks, rather than as a first step 
towards demobilisation or surrender.  Although bilateral relations between the Chinese 
and Burmese governments continued to improve, realities on the ground revealed a 
much more complex array of Chinese actors and business interests, many of which 
were willing to work with whichever armed groups could best serve their interests with 
scant regard for their relations with Yangon. This was acknowledged in a 1990 
Chinese government document, entitled Regulations on Specific Policies Towards 
Myanmar‟s Ethnic Minority Groups, which stated that China would not give ―political 
recognition, military support or economic assistance‖ to ceasefire groups but could 
regard them as ―Myanmar‘s local authorities temporarily and conduct general business 
based on the actual situation; take the opportunity to do more constructive work with 
their leaders under certain circumstances, but ensuring that this does not go too far‖ 
(Chenyang & Fook 2009, 263). Close ties quickly developed between the ex-CPB 
ceasefire groups and Chinese investors. Initially, this seemingly aroused few concerns 
within the government in light of the military advantages offered by the ceasefires, 
although in time it created a growing network of cross-border political, financial and 
social ties beyond government control which enabled certain ceasefire groups, 
especially the UWSA, to become increasingly powerful. 
 
       7.2.2 Stabilising the Shan borderland (1990-1995): The second wave of 
ceasefire agreements and offensives against non-ceasefire groups  
The collapse of the CPB and the subsequent ceasefire agreements enabled the 
Tatmadaw to target other insurgent groups across Shan State. Those groups which had 
previously allied with the CPB now found their supplies of ammunition cut, faced the 
danger of being attacked by ceasefire groups, and were less able to move through 
former CPB territory. Without this ‗back-door‘ escape route, the Tatmadaw‘s ‗Four 
Cuts‘ counter-insurgency attacks began to bite, initiating a second wave of ceasefire 
agreements with the KIA 4th Brigade (renamed the Kachin Defence Army - KDA) in 
January 1991 and the Palaung State Liberation Organisation/Army (PSLO/A) and Pao 
National Organisation/Army (PNO/A) both in April 1991. The motivations and 
                                                          
116 The KNU and MTA generated revenue by allowing Thai companies to expand their logging ventures 
into territory they controlled (and beyond the concessional territories agreed with the SLORC) and by 
taxing logs transported through their territory. 
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outcomes of these agreements differed significantly both amongst each other and from 
the earlier agreements made with the four CPB splinter groups.  
 
Based in Kutkhai in northern Shan State, the KIA 4th Brigade, led by Mahtu Naw, had 
become isolated from other KIA battalions further north and in 1990 MNDAA troops 
attacked its positions. The government‘s willingness to allow Mahtu Naw to retain 
control over Kachin-populated territory in northern Shan State (Shan State Special 
Region 5), was instrumental in securing a ceasefire agreement, whilst the fact that this 
territory overlapped with that claimed by the KIA fomented dissension (South 2008, 
153-4).  
 
The KDA ceasefire forced the hand of the PSLA, which had been heavily reliant upon 
ammunition and food provided by the KIA 4th Brigade. Palaung areas suffered the 
brunt of the Tatmadaw‘s ‗Four Cuts‘ offensives in 1990/91 and this increased popular 
pressure on the PSLA to agree a ceasefire. Again, the government confirmed that 
PSLA would be able to retain its weapons and control a belt of territory across parts of 
Namhsam, Mantong, Namkham and Namtu Townships (Shan State Special Region 7) 
in return for adhering to a number of demands.117   
 
However, the PSLO ceasefire differed markedly from those agreed with former CPB 
armies and the PNO (see below). By 1991 MI negotiators were more sure of 
themselves (and their support within the government) following the success of the 
earlier agreements and they were aware of the PSLO‘s vulnerability. More 
importantly, PSLO-contested territory was strategically important. It formed a wedge 
between the border and Mandalay and straddled the banks of the Shweli River (long 
viewed as having significant energy-generating potential). The agreement contained 
fewer concessions than the earlier ceasefires and reflected a strategic calculation by 
both the PSLO and the government that a ceasefire offered the best means to pursue 
their different objectives. For the PSLO, the ceasefire offered breathing space. On the 
government side, although the Tatmadaw was coming from a position of increasing 
dominance, the remote hills stretching across Mantong and beyond offered the PSLO a 
                                                          
117 These written demands were: 1. No cooperation with the political groups from inside and abroad; 2. 
Do not relate at all to any groups that continue to fight against the military regime; 3. Resign 
immediately from allied groups that are involved in political and warfare activities; 4.Do not form allied 
forces and cooperative bodies with any other groups; 5. If there are reasons to go into the limited areas, 
authorities must be informed in advance; 6. Any military recruitment is not allowed; 7. Any military 
training is not allowed; 8. Any military movement is not allowed; 9. Levying tax and provision on the 
public and in the areas is prohibited. Interview with the Chairman of the PSLF. Chiang Mai. 26 
December 2012. 
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strong enough defensive position to make any attempt at an outright military victory 
time-consuming and costly. However, the PSLO gained few economic concessions;  
alongside some provision of rice and old trucks for farming, a few of its leaders were 
given cars and permission to forge economic ties with Chinese businessmen moving 
into the area. 
 
To the south, the dynamics surrounding the Pao ceasefire were different again. The 
PNO had lost territory along the Thai border to Khun Sa‘s MTA in the 1980s. Fearful 
of becoming trapped between the MTA and the Tatmadaw, and facing increasing 
demands for peace amongst Pao communities, the PNO leader U Aung Kham Hti 
agreed a ceasefire in 1991. Despite its weakness the PNO secured highly favourable 
terms and alongside retaining nominal authority over a region in southwest Shan State 
comprising Hopong, Hsiseng and Pinlaung townships, the PNO gained logging and 
mining concessions. Although there is no definitive account, a number of factors 
played a role in shaping the PNO ceasefire agreement. Arguably most importantly, in 
1991 the PNO and the Tatmadaw shared a common enemy in Khun Sa‘s MTA. The 
ceasefire was underpinned by a greater degree of ―pragmatic acceptance‖ from the 
PNO leadership, which proved willing to prioritise peace, economic and cultural 
development and business rather than make political demands for autonomy (Callahan 
2007, 45). According to Oo and Min (2007, 18), the favourable terms achieved by the 
PNO also lay in the fact that Khin Nyunt‘s pledge to make the Pao Special Region a 
―model of development‖ aligned with Aung Kham Hti‘s own aspirations to restore the 
region‘s former Buddhist grandeur. Many within the various Shan political movements, 
however, have expressed a less sanguine interpretation, arguing that the extent of 
government support given to the Pao was indicative of its efforts to empower minority 
groups and foment further division across Shan State.118  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
118 Interviews with various Shan political figures and civil society organisations, December 2012 and 
January 2013, Yangon, Taunggyi. 
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Figure 6: Matrix of ceasefire agreements in Shan State 
 
LEVEL OF CEASEFIRE 
GROUP AUTONOMY 
HIGH MEDIUM LOW 
EXAMPLES Ex-CPB groups: 
UWSA, MNDAA, NDAA 
KDA, SSA-North, PNO PSLA 
SSNA 
STRUCTURES OF 
TERRITORIAL CONTROL 
Ceasefire groups retain near total 
territorial autonomy over ‘Special 
Regions’ 
Various and fluctuating forms of 
accommodation between ceasefire 
groups and the military government 
Tatmadaw is the  
dominant authority 
RESOURCE EXTRACTION Ceasefire groups retain control over 
local populations, resources and 
border trade; Ceasefire groups tax 
local populations, extract resources 
and grant resource concessions to 
private companies (predominantly 
Chinese); through ceasefire 
agreements they gain both legal and 
illegal economic opportunities 
Resource extraction by both 
ceasefire groups and the 
government. Officially ceasefire 
agreements stipulate that ceasefire 
groups are not allowed to tax local 
populations but most do; ceasefire 
groups gain the right to establish 
legal businesses and access to 
resources (both legal and illegal); the 
government also allocates resource 
concessions in these territories and 
both state-controlled companies and 
private companies (national and 
transnational) linked to the 
government operate in these areas  
Few economic concessions granted 
as part of ceasefire arrangements. 
Ceasefire groups have little access to 
resources or control over resource 
allocation, which are mostly 
managed by the Tatmadaw and 
companies aligned with the 
government  
BUSINESSES ASSOCIATED 
WITH CEASEFIRE GROUPS 
Hong Pang Group (UWSA) 
Shwe Lin Star Company and Green 
Light Company (NDAA) 
Peace Myanmar Group (MNDAA) 
Ruby Dragon Company (owned by 
Nay Win Tun who is closely linked 
with the PNO) 
Unknown 
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Indicative of the region‘s history of political fragmentation, the ceasefires were not 
universally accepted but fractured the Shan, Palaung and Pao resistance movements. 
Both the Pao and Palaung movements split into pro- and anti-ceasefire factions. On 
12th January 1992 (the 29th anniversary of the start of the Palaung resistance under the 
PNF), a group of Palaung leaders founded the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) 
at Manerplaw (the KNU headquarters on the Thai border) with the avowed intention to 
maintain ―the struggle for national equality and self-determination.‖119 For the next 
twenty-years it remained a small, unarmed opposition group isolated from the Palaung-
majority areas of northern Shan State but in 2011 it formed an armed wing and 
returned to active insurgency in northern Shan State (see below). Amongst the Pao, the 
ceasefire was bitterly rejected by a small number of figures led by Col. Hkun Okker, 
who founded the Pa-O People‘s Liberalization Organisation (PPLO) in 1991 and 
controlled a small band of troops in the Na Awn border area adjacent to Mae Hong 
Son.120   
 
By 1992 northern Shan State, for so long the hotbed of insurgency, experienced 
relative stability and cross-border economic ties with China continued to expand. In 
June 1992 Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping announced that certain interior provinces 
would be granted the same policies of economic openness as enjoyed in coastal China 
during the 1980s in an attempt to address the growing economic disparity between the 
country‘s interior and coastal region. 1992 also marked the launch of the Asian 
Development Bank‘s Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) Programme which sought to 
promote regional economic cooperation between Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, 
Cambodia, Vietnam and Yunnan. Amidst these initiatives Yunnan business and 
political elites sought to re-brand the province as a bridgehead rather than a frontier, 
and at the centre of the China-Southeast Asia region rather than the periphery of 
coastal-dominated China (Summers 2013, 59-69). In 1993 China‘s State Council 
granted Yunnan powers to implement its own border trade policies and to designate 
―border open cities‖ and ―border economic zones‖. This status was granted to Wanding 
and Ruili on the Myanmar border as well as Hekou on the Vietnam border (Summers 
2013, 60-1). Two bridges were constructed over the Shweli River on the Sino-
                                                          
119 Until his assassination in May 1994 the PSLF was led by Mai Tin Moung, a native of Namhsan. He 
was not in fact a former member of the PSLO but had been a doctor in Yangon before fleeing to the 
border following the 1988 protests of which he had been a part. Interview with PSLF Chairman, 22 
April 2014, Chiang Mai.  
120 In 1994 the SSNPLO under Tha Kalei (Tar Kaley) signed a ceasefire with the government. In 2007, 
under pressure to disarm, a small group of SSNPLO troops led by Khun Ti Song and Col. Khun Thurein, 
split from the SNPLO and formed the Pa-Oh National Liberation Organization (PNLO). In 2009 the 
PNLO and PPLO united. This group retained the PNLO name and Hkun Okker became the 
organization‘s Chairman. 
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Myanmar border in the early 1990s to facilitate greater trade, one of which became 
known colloquially as ‗Gun Bridge‘ in light of the volume of Chinese military 
equipment crossing it (Myoe 2011,155).  
 
This relative stability enabled the Tatmadaw to shift focus to securing control across 
southern Shan State. The mutual coexistence that had existed between the Tatmadaw 
and the MTA throughout the latter half of the 1980s was shattered by offensives 
launched against MTA positions between 1993 and 1995. In the early 1990s the MTA 
had more than 12,000 troops, extensive revenue, primarily from its control over heroin 
refineries and cross-border drug routes, and controlled extensive territory along the 
Thai border and as far north as Loilem.121 The government‘s decision to fight against 
the MTA rather than negotiate a ceasefire thus requires some explaining and can be 
understood as the culmination of four reasons. Firstly, it reflected renewed 
determination to secure greater territorial control along the Thai-Shan border in order 
to capitalise upon growing Thai commercial interests and to prevent these revenue 
flows from strengthening armed groups. Secondly, in the early 1990s Khun Sa sought 
to portray himself as the figurehead of Shan nationalism, and the government became 
increasingly concerned that Shan groups opposing the ceasefire agreements would 
unite behind him. SSA troops who rejected Hso Ten‘s ceasefire had already joined the 
MTA, whilst in the north MTA units extended control over parts of eastern Lashio and 
Hsenwi amidst the declining strength of Mahtu Naw‘s KIO 4th Brigade (Lintner 1999, 
402-3). In 1994 and 1995 Khun Sa launched offensives against Tatmadaw positions, 
including a day-time raid on the strategic border town of Tachilek, seemingly in an 
attempt to rally support behind him. Thirdly, the government‘s resolve to move against 
the MTA was strengthened by hardening Thai and US attitudes against Khun Sa. In 
1994 a Joint US-Thai drug enforcement operation, codenamed Tiger Trap, targeted 
MTA drug-trafficking networks through Thailand.122 The Thai authorities‘ decision to 
cooperate with the Myanmar government against Khun Sa by closing border crossings 
in 1995 severely hampered MTA cross-border supply networks and reflected these 
changing geopolitical dynamics.123 Fourthly, and most importantly, the UWSA proved 
willing to lead attacks on MTA positions.124 Using CPB-era heavy artillery, Wa troops 
                                                          
121 Interview with former MTA members, April 2014, Fang District, Thailand. 
122 This reflected how much the international climate had changed since the 1970s and early 1980s when 
Khun Sa‘s SUA had been able to establish its headquarters on Thai soil at Ba Hin Taek. 
123 Interview with former MTA member. 27 April 2014. Fang District (Chiang Mai Province). 
124 Relations between the MTA and Wa groups along the Thai border had soured in the 1980s. In 1989 
one of these groups, the Wa National Council (WNC), had allied with Wa CPB mutineers to form the 
UWSA. Numerous Wa forces had been based along the Thai border since the early 1970s. Various 
factions had emerged in the late 1970s and over the following two decades Wa troops could be found 
fighting in no fewer than five armies: the CPB; KMT groups; the NDF ethnic alliance; the MTA and the 
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attacked MTA positions as part of a tacit agreement with Khin Nyunt that territory 
captured from the MTA would remain under Wa control (Kramer 2007, 22; Smith 
1991). These territories, stretching across Mongton and Monghsat Townships along 
the Thai border, became known as the Wa Southern Command. 
 
Thus, just as northern Shan State experienced relative calm, the Thai border area 
witnessed a bitter war between the MTA and UWSA troops backed by the Tatmadaw. 
In 1995, the situation was complicated further by a mass mutiny within the MTA 
amongst Shan soldiers led by Colonel Gun Yawd and formed a new organisation 
called the Shan State National Army (SSNA).125 Parts of the SSNA (notably its 275th 
Brigade) carved out unofficial local agreements with Tatmadaw commanders to 
become proxy-government militias and the bulk of the SSNA‘s estimated 2,000 troops, 
centred in Laikha, made a ―gentleman‘s agreement‖ with the Tatmadaw (Smith 1999, 
447).  
 
In 1996 the situation in Shan State was transformed by the surprise surrender of Khun 
Sa. In failing health and aware of the changing geopolitical tide, Khun Sa realised the 
difficulties of maintaining drug trafficking operations and armed insurgency in the face 
of hostility from both the Myanmar and Thai governments. Aware of the case of 
Panama‘s Manuel Noriega, Khun Sa was fearful of US indictment and in return for 
government protection he agreed to surrender. 126  Following a formal surrender 
ceremony in the MTA‘s headquarters at Homong, Khun Sa moved to Yangon where 
he invested in numerous legal enterprises which he managed until his death in 2007. 
His surrender left dispersed MTA units to carve out separate localised agreements with 
the Tatmadaw.  
 
By the mid-1990s an increasingly fragmented situation was developing across Shan 
State. The MTA‘s surrender, alongside the 1994 ceasefire with the KIO and successful 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Tatmadaw (Smith 1999). In the early 1990s, alongside the UWSA, there also existed the Wa National 
Organisation (WNO) on the Thai border led by Maha San, which had rejected the ceasefire agreement. 
To complicate matters further, Maha San‘s half-brother, Maha Ja, was a member of the MTA. Interview 
with Joint General Secretary, Wa National Organisation (WNO), 4 January 2013, Mae Hong Son. 
125 These troops had come to resent the racial divisions within the MTA between the organisation‘s 
predominantly Chinese leadership and its Shan frontline foot soldiers and were sceptical of Khun Sa‘s 
nationalist credentials. During the early 1990s the MTA‘s attempts to maintain internal discipline had 
become ―extremely brutal and soldiers were shot for ill-discipline, even for relatively minor offences 
such as stealing‖, and it is possible, though hard to verify, that this too became a factor in instigating the 
SSNA mutiny. Interview with former MTA member, 27th April 2014, Fang District (Chiang Mai 
Province). 
126 Manuel Noriega was the military dictator of Panama from 1983 to 1989. Following a US invasion of 
Panama in 1989—Operation Just Cause—Noreiga was removed from power and sentenced to fifteen 
years imprisonment in the US on drug trafficking and money laundering charges.  
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Tatmadaw offensives against the KNU in January 1995, meant that all the country‘s 
major armed groups had either signed ceasefires or lost significant territory. However, 
Shan State remained home to a dizzying array of armed groups. Stability was a 
function of forms of ‗frontier brokerage‘ negotiated through ad hoc and opaque 
ceasefire arrangements, rather than the clear extension of government authority. In the 
Tatmadaw‘s own counterinsurgency vernacular, whilst fewer ‗black‘ zones remained, 
the vast majority of rural Shan State remained grey, home to armed groups whose 
allegiances remained questionable and populations whose loyalty could not be trusted. 
It was during this period the country‘s opium production rose exponentially as a 
consequence of the fact that: (i) ceasefire groups capitalised upon the region‘s growing 
stability to generate revenue from drugs; (ii) the government offered impunity, 
protection and money laundering to strengthen ceasefire agreements; and (iii) the 
Tatmadaw itself looked to derive revenue from drugs as a means of financing itself. 
These dynamics are analysed in detail in Chapter 9.   
 
7.2.3 Pacifying the Shan borderlands (1996 - 2004) 
The MTA surrender was followed by a number of worrying developments for the 
government, which demonstrated that Khun Sa‘s submission would not automatically 
enable the Tatmadaw to consolidate authority across southern Shan State. As with 
almost every other ceasefire, Khun Sa‘s rapprochement with the government was not 
universally accepted by troops under his command. A significant minority (initially 
approximately 1,000 men) under the leadership of Colonel Yawd Serk vowed to 
continue fighting, initially naming themselves SURA, before renaming themselves the 
SSA in late 1996.127 In the years since, Yawd Serk‘s army has been referred to as the 
SSA-‗South‘, to distinguish itself from the SSA ceasefire group (referred to as the 
SSA-‗North‘). In 1996 Yawd Serk‘s forces launched a number of ambushes on 
Tatmadaw units close to Taunggyi and following this show of force sought to 
negotiate their own ceasefire with the government (Risser, Khur & Htun 2003, 21; 
Smith 1999, 447). The government refused this request, however, arguing that the SSA 
was a renegade force bound by the MTA surrender agreement. Over the next two years 
the SSA recruited throughout rural central and southern Shan State and in 1998 
established its headquarters at the mountain stronghold of Loi Tai Leng, which became 
the largest of a string of SSA bases along the Thai border.  
 
                                                          
127The decision by Yawd Serk to name his group SURA was seemingly an attempt to portray his 
organisation as embedded within the long history of Shan resistance. It emphasized the group‘s pre-
MTA foundations by claiming its roots in the Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA) founded by Mo 
Heng in 1969 (see Chapter 6). 
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The emergence of the SSA epitomised a major challenge facing the government‘s 
ceasefire strategy, namely the issue of demobilisation. The MTA surrender raised the 
issue of how to manage the demobilisation of upwards of 10,000 troops across Shan 
State. In response, the Tatmadaw initiated a messy and un-coordinated strategy of 
forging local agreements with ex-MTA commanders allowing them to become proxy-
government militias.  In return for ensuring territory under their control remained 
insurgent-free, these militias were able to retain their weapons and run their own 
businesses, often within the drug trade.128 As one former MTA fighter explained to me:  
 
For those of us who did surrender there were few jobs. We had been trained to fight. 
Many thought about returning to fight but life in the jungle is so hard.  The militia 
were designed to encourage soldiers to switch sides. The Burma Army struggles to 
control territory so is willing to delegate this responsibility to these militias. The 
militias are a sign of government strength and weakness…where the Burma Army is 
strong enough there are no militias.129 
 
The ‗demobilisation into militia‘ strategy became a pattern, repeated time and again, 
over the following fifteen years and is interrogated further in Chapter 8.  
 
In another worrying development for the government, in 1996 various Shan armed 
groups attempted to forge closer unity. Just seventeen days after Khun Sa‘s surrender 
the SSA-North and the SSNA formed the Shan State Peace Council (SSPC). In late 
1996 troops under Yawd Serk (a childhood friend of SSNA leader Gun Yawd) joined 
this Peace Council (which was then renamed the Shan State National Organisation - 
SSNO), and demanded that the government recognise this alliance (Risser, Kher & 
Htun 2003, 21; SHAN 1997).130 In November 1996, émigré Shan figures formed the 
Shan Democratic Union (SDU) to promote the Shan cause internationally. Supported 
by Chao Tzang Yawnghwe and a number of other leading Shan nationalist figures, the 
SDU sought to shine a spotlight on events in Shan State at a time when the government 
was facing heavy international criticism over human rights abuses and the ‗non-
traditional‘ security threats – especially drugs, refugees and HIV/AIDS – spilling 
across its borders. 
 
In response the government attempted to secure greater authority across central and 
southern Shan State by launching a sustained and brutal counterinsurgency campaign 
throughout consecutive dry seasons between 1996 and 1998. Following sporadic failed 
efforts to reach an agreement with the SSA-S in 1999/2000, the Tatmadaw launched 
                                                          
128 ibid 
129 Interview with former MTA member, 27th April 2014, Fang.  
130 It was at this point that Yawd Serk‘s troops changed the name from SURA to the SSA-South.  
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another major offensive against the SSA-S through the dry season of 2001 in an 
attempt to overrun its border strongholds (Risser, Kher & Htun 2003, 22). 
 
This counter-insurgency campaign was underpinned by two strategies. Firstly, large 
areas of southern and central Shan State were heavily militarised. Existing barracks 
were expanded and new military bases were built. By 2000 the number of Tatmadaw 
battalions and mobile units in Shan State had increased to approximately 100, up from 
40 in 1988.131 Secondly, the Tatmadaw deployed it longstanding ‗Four Cuts‘ strategy 
across twelve townships in a policy that became tantamount to depopulating large 
areas of rural Shan State.132 Across more than 1,400 villages, residents were forced to 
abandon their homes, as the Tatmadaw declared ‗free-fire zones‘ around them, 
stretching across an area of seven thousand square miles (SHRF 1996; SHRF 1998). 
The Tatmadaw attempted to relocate rural populations to towns and military-controlled 
camps, although many fled into the jungle or, if they could afford to, across the border 
into Thailand. This counterinsurgency strategy was accompanied by widespread 
abuses, including extrajudicial killings, rape, dispossession, forced labour and 
portering for the army.133 The testimony below of a lady from Monghsat, captures the 
brutality of this period:   
 
We moved to flee the Burma Army.  In 1996 or 1997 the Army moved through our area. 
Everyone in our village was forced to move. Those that refused were shot.  We travelled 
during the night.  Everybody was forced to move and the whole area was totally cleared of 
people. Some moved to the towns; some left straight for Thailand; some, like us, went into 
the jungle. For people who moved to the towns life was impossible.  People could not 
move freely and could only buy small amounts of rice at a time – only enough for two 
meals at most. In the jungle we would hunt and search for fruits and vegetables to eat and 
also to sell in return for rice. When in the jungle we stayed with a small troop of Shan 
soldiers. We tried to provide them rice and they would learn on their radios where the 
Burma Army was.  We stayed with those soldiers for a number of years. We then stayed in 
a forest camp close to the river, but about a year after the Army presence in the area 
increased again. We decided to come to Thailand. In 2002-3 we made a raft to escape 
across the river [Kok River] from the Army. We came as part of a large group but only six 
of us came the same way as we did through the border.134 
   
                                                          
131 Interview with SHAN, 21st June 2011, Chiang Mai. 
132 These townships were: Kunhing, Nansang, Laikha, Kehsi, Mongkeung, Mongnai, Langkho, 
Mongpan, Mongpang, Monghsu, Loilem, and Hopong (SHRF 1998, 3-4; Risser, Kher & Htun 2003, 51).  
133 There is not the space here to provide justice to the violence and brutality experienced by 
communities during this period. Detailed documentation and personal accounts can be found in the 
following reports by Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF): Dispossessed: Forced Relocation and 
Extrajudicial Killings in Shan 
State (1998), and Uprooting the Shan: SLORC's Forced Relocation Program in Central Shan State 
(1996). See also: Running the Gantlet: The Impact of Internal Displacement in Southern Shan State 
(Risser, Kher and Htun 2003). The harrowing accounts related to me in numerous interviews I 
conducted with Shan families now living illegally across the border in Thailand corroborated the 
accounts given in these reports.  
134 Interview with the former resident of Monghsat, 26 April 2014, Fang District. 
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Despite these offensives, the SSA-S continued to strengthen its mountain-top bases 
along the Thai border and in 1999 extended operations in the north, as far as 
Mongkaung and Mongyai townships. The SSA-S enjoyed better relations than the 
MTA with the Thai authorities and was able to trade across the border. According to 
one former SSA-S soldier, the Thai authorities viewed the UWSA as a Chinese proxy 
and were intent on reducing Wa dominance along the Thai border. As such ―the Thais 
were happy to direct trade through SSA areas of the border and the SSA taxed 
everything to survive. Animals, food, cars, people!‖135  
 
Counter-insurgency offensives continued in parallel with concerted efforts by the 
government to extract greater revenue from Shan State. Through the 1990s and early 
2000s construction began on the Shweli 136  and Tasang 137  hydropower dams and 
numerous coal, iron ore and ruby mining projects were launched.138  These large-scale 
developments were not unique to Shan State but took place throughout the country‘s 
borderlands, exemplified by the Yadana gas pipeline, completed in 1998, which carries 
offshore natural gas across Karen State to Thailand and became the government‘s most 
important source of foreign exchange in the late 1990s (ERI 1999, 3-4). Many smaller 
projects, including logging, small-scale mines and road-building were also initiated by 
the military government or investors linked to it. 
 
Through these processes of pacification and economic ‗development‘, the government 
made significant strides in strengthening its territorial reach and its ability to extract 
revenue from the country‘s border regions. However, the government‘s efforts to 
simultaneously pacify insurgency, promote greater cross-border trade and investment, 
and improve bilateral relations with neighbouring governments often proved 
                                                          
135 Interview with former SSA-S soldier, 24 April 2014, Northern Thailand. 
136 The Shweli Dam project was initially agreed in 2000, although the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) between the government and major investors was not signed until 2006. The first power form 
the dam was generated in 2008. Major investors include Asia World Company and numerous Chinese 
investors including Yunnan Joint Power Development Company, China Southern Power and Sinohydro 
(Burma Rivers Network 2008). 
137 Plans for the Tasang Dam, the first to be built on the Salween River, were developed in the late 
1990s and a Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 2002 with MDX, a consortium of Thai 
companies. Land was cleared and a 13 km road was built to the dam site, although progress on the 
construction of the dam has been slow. Between 1996 and 2006 the number of Tatmadaw battalions 
stationed close to the dam site increased from ten to thirty (Sapawa 2006, 9-11)   
138 These include: (i) the large ruby mines in Monghsu, which were first discovered in 1991 and came 
under government control in 1992. Mining concessions were subsequently given to the UWSA, 
MNDAA, NDAA, SSA, PNO and KDA (SHAN 1994; SHAN 2009); (ii) Tigyit Coal Mine in Pinlaung 
Township (within the Pao Special Region, reflecting the stability created  by the PNO ceasefire), where 
extraction began in 2000; and (iii) Pinpet Iron Ore Mine in Taunggyi where extraction began in the early 
2000s (PYO 2009; PYO 2011). 
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contradictory. For a number of reasons these strategies provoked renewed challenges 
and reflected the unstable and non-linear process of state consolidation. 
 
Firstly, the Myanmar government found it increasingly difficult to manage relations 
with China in a way that ensured Chinese interests adhered to its own statebuilding 
agenda. At a bilateral level Chinese diplomatic support, especially within the UN 
Security Council, and military deals were greatly welcomed. However, the ―provincial 
agency‖ of Yunnan business and political elites and the interests of those living in 
Chinese border towns did not always adhere to the national-level contours of China-
Myanmar relations (Summers 2013, 9; Chenyan & Fook 2009). Attempts by Yunnan 
authorities to use cross-border trade to stimulate economic development meant that by 
the late 1990s Myanmar was operating a vast and ever-growing trade deficit with 
China. This deficit was not only a consequence of the import of industrially-produced 
consumer goods, but also the import of goods which Myanmar itself produced. Myoe 
(2011, 178) explains how during the 1990s Myanmar exported plums and watermelons 
to China; yet by the early 2000s China was exporting these goods back across the 
border in higher quantities and alongside processed products such as jams. At a 
national level this consumed foreign exchange reserves; within Shan State it impacted 
heavily upon rural livelihoods as demand for locally-produced goods such as fruits, 
garlic and tea fell against cheaper Chinese imports.  
 
Yunnan-based companies extracted resources from across Shan State with little 
concern that their enterprises often channelled revenue to ceasefire groups (or even 
insurgent groups). Arguably the clearest examples of the complex, multi-level 
dynamics of China‘s cross-border relations are the casino frontier towns of Mong La, 
Eu Si Lin and Sop Lwe, my visit to which is recounted in this study‘s Prologue. All 
three of these towns are in Shan State Special Region 4 under the control of the NDAA. 
Gambling is officially illegal in China and at various times these casino towns have 
aroused the ire of the central Chinese government. In 2003, for example, Chinese 
authorities raided the casinos and restricted its citizens from crossing the border in an 
attempt to stem the flow of Chinese money being lost there, much of it claimed to be 
laundered by criminal activities and public funds frittered away by officials (Hailong 
2003).139 Chinese authorities have also sought to block internet signals which allow 
                                                          
139 In 2003 Chinese troops amassed at the border as part of Operation Blue Arrow which saw 
Chinese authorities move into Mongla to close down five casinos in order to reclaim a purported 
1.4 million yuan (approximately US$169,000) of public money gambled away by a Chinese 
official‘s daughter. As part of the operation the Chinese authorities encouraged all citizens 
working in Mongla to return to China. 
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gamblers within China to play by proxy. At a local level, however, the influx of 
tourists and gamblers has been a boon for otherwise remote Chinese border towns, 
which have provided electricity, water and internet connection to these casino towns 
(Chenyan and Fook 2009, 272). These cross-border ties enabled Special Region 4 to 
generate huge sums of money, estimated at $830million annually equating to $5billion 
by 2004 (Myoe 2011, 141). The case of Mongla, although illustrative, is by no means 
unique. Kokang and Wa elites have developed widespread business networks across 
Southeast Asia enabling the UWSA in particular to finance its own statebuilding 
initiatives (Kramer 2007). These cross-border linkages have thus prevented the 
government from being able to establish any durable kind of ‗limited access order‘ 
through which to pressure ceasefire groups into accepting greater government 
authority.   
 
Secondly, Tatmadaw efforts to pacify southern Shan State had a number of deleterious 
effects on relations with Thailand, to the point where Thai authorities have, at times, 
proved willing to support opposition groups across the border. The Tatmadaw‘s 
counterinsurgency campaigns increased the flow of refugees into Thailand, and the 
government‘s willingness to allow ceasefire groups and militias to become involved in 
drug trafficking (the dynamics of which are analysed in detail in Chapters 8 and 9) 
increased the flow of drugs entering Thailand. Throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s 
Thailand had been a transit country for heroin and with addiction not a major social 
problem the Thai government had proved willing to prioritise anti-Communist 
strategic interests over counter-narcotics. However, rising production in Myanmar of 
synthetic amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), known colloquially as yaba (lit: 
‗crazy‘), attracted an estimated 4-8million regular users in Thailand by the late 1990s 
and in 1998 the Thai government declared drugs to be the country‘s ―principal security 
threat‖ (Ball 2003, 6; Grundy-Warr & Wong 2001; Chouvy & Meissonnier 2004).140 
Tensions escalated again in 2001 when offensives against the SSA saw Tatamdaw 
units enter Thai territory on a number of occasions. Military exchanges between the 
Tatmadaw and the Royal Thai Army resulted in shells hitting the Thai border towns of 
Mae Sae and Ban Hin Taek. Within this tense environment Thai security agencies 
often preferred to conduct ―clandestine, deniable operations‖ rather than co-ordinated 
anti-drug operations with Myanmar authorities, a policy which, for a time, even saw it 
                                                          
140 In 1998 the US provided military training to Thai counter-narcotics forces under an initiative called 
Baker Torch, which also saw the Thai military establish a new unit, Task Force 399, to tackle cross-
border drug flows (Ball 2003; Tasker & Lintner 2001). 
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provide support to the SSA-South in the hope that it would launch anti-drug raids 
against the UWSA‘s Sothern Command (Ball 2003, 16). 
 
Thirdly, the violent and exploitative nature of the government‘s attempts to pacify 
Shan State further weakened the government‘s legitimacy. The growing strength of the 
Tatmadaw discouraged armed groups from returning to outright conflict; yet it also 
became clear that the government‘s ultimate aim was pacification rather than 
peacebuilding, which offered little hope for future political dialogue. Within this 
setting, it is perhaps not surprising that a response to increased militarisation as one of 
the overriding experiences of the ceasefire was for armed groups to respond in kind 
rather than to trust a vague to non-existent political process. Indeed, although the SSA-
North and SSNA ceasefires remained in place officially, these groups began to 
coordinate with the SSA-South. Troops were rotated between them to provide respite 
for those in active duty and the Tatmadaw found it difficult to separate ceasefire 
soldier from insurgent.141 This perpetuated a cycle in which the Tatmadaw sought to 
consolidate control through further militarisation, which in turn dismantled what little 
trust had existed with ceasefire groups, and created a tense environment prone to 
descending into small-scale violent skirmishes. Amongst many communities there was 
also growing frustration and resentment at ceasefire leaders themselves, who seemed 
to be profiting from business deals at the expense of the people and environments they 
claimed to be protecting.142    
 
       7.2.4 Asserting control: Converting ceasefire politics into durable state control 
(2004-2010)   
Since around 2004 the government‘s efforts to establish greater authority became more 
assertive and confrontational. By the mid-2000s the threat posed by armed groups had 
declined significantly. As explained above, the process of militarized territorialisation 
enacted over the previous decade placed the government in a clear position of 
dominance, from which it now looked to re-negotiate the political terrain created by 
the ceasefires, on its own terms. Furthermore, the fall of Khin Nyunt, architect of the 
government‘s ceasefire strategy, in October 2004 had a major impact upon how the 
government sought to manage the country‘s border regions.  
 
The fall of Khin Nyunt 
In order to explain the impact of Khin Nyunt‘s fall, it is important to first sketch the 
fault-lines within the SLORC/SPDC, often simplistically viewed as a monolithic 
                                                          
141 Interview with Shan civil society organisation, 12 June 2014, Yangon.  
142 For an account of similar tensions within the Kachin ceasefire, see: Brenner 2015 and Sadan 
(forthcoming). 
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organisation.  Khin Nyunt‘s power lay in his control over the intelligence services. He 
had taken over the Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI) in 1983 and 
following the 1988 uprising the DDSI‘s power, responsibilities, autonomy and 
territorial reach grew dramatically. It employed tens of thousands of informers and 
operated detention centres throughout the country (Selth 2013, 10-11; ICG 2000, 11-
12). Its role was not only to monitor civilian behaviour but also to ensure discipline 
and loyalty within the expanding Tatmadaw ranks. In the early 1990s it developed its 
own chain of command with field officers reporting directly to DDSI headquarters 
(ICG 2000, 11-12). In 1994 Khin Nyunt also established the Office of Strategic 
Services, which became the government‘s political ―think-tank‖ and was responsible 
for managing sensitive issues including foreign affairs, narcotics and ethnic politics, as 
well as developing a more positive international image for the government (Houtman 
1999, 57-8; ICG 2000, 11; Selth 1998).  
 
Throughout the 1990s Khin Nyunt developed a powerful institutional base within the 
state, albeit one that antagonised numerous senior figures and many amongst the 
Tatmadaw rank-and-file who resented the MI apparatus he controlled. A ―general 
without an army‖, Khin Nyunt‘s power was dependent upon his ability to remain 
indispensable by securing the ceasefire agreements and establishing a modus vivendi 
between the government, Aung San Suu Kyi and the international community, 
especially the US (Egreteau and Jagan 2013, 199; Taylor 2009, 483).  
 
By the early 2000s, however, Khin Nyunt‘s ability to secure these objectives was 
clearly failing. The hope that the election of George Bush in 2001 would improve 
relations with the US proved unfounded and by 2005 the US derided the country as a 
―rogue state‖ and an ―outpost of tyranny‖ (Egreteau & Jagan 2013, 208-9). The release 
of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in May 2002 marked another attempt to 
improve the government‘s international standing. However, on 30th May 2003 a mob 
attacked her NLD convoy close to the town of Depayin in Sagaing Division as she 
toured the country, leaving a number of her entourage dead.143 Aung San Suu Kyi was 
promptly placed under house arrest again and the SPDC came under renewed 
                                                          
143 The details surrounding the ‗Depayin massacre‘ remain unclear. However, suspicion for the attack 
has predominantly been levelled at members of the Union Solidarity and Development Association 
(USDA), a mass civilian organisation formed by the SLORC in 1993, and members of militias formed 
by the USDA, especially the Swan Arr Shin militia. The government‘s official report claims four people 
died, whilst the NLD claimed the number was closer to seventy. Many questions remain about the 
incident, including whether the incident was orchestrated by figures within the government, and if so 
who. Speculation has often rested with Soe Win, SPDC Secretary Number 2 at the time, who died in 
2007. For a detailed analysis of the USDA, see: NDD 2006. For an eye-witness account see: Allchin 
2010. 
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international criticism. Although Khin Nyunt attempted to restore credibility for the 
government by announcing in August 2003 that it would re-convene the National 
Convention as the first step of a seven stage ―Road Map to Democracy‖, western 
attitudes against the country hardened. In September 2003 the US Congress passed the 
Burma Freedom and Democracy Act, which tightened sanctions against the country 
and in the same month President Bush declared that the Burma had once again ―failed 
demonstrably‖ to make progress in eradicating narcotics, 
 
Khin Nyunt‘s unpopularity within the Tatmadaw and his unsuccessful attempts to 
improve relations with the NLD and western powers left him exposed. On 19th October 
2004 he was arrested on various charges including bribery and corruption and was 
given a suspended 44-year prison sentence (effectively placing him under house arrest). 
The military intelligence infrastructure he had controlled was purged and replaced by a 
new intelligence organisation, the Military Affairs Service, or Sa Ya Pa, which now 
came under the Tatmadaw chain-of-command rather than operating independently of it. 
Khin Nyunt‘s fall concentrated power in those within the SPDC, notably Than Shwe 
and Maung Aye, who had long held reservations about engaging with the NLD. They 
were intent on pursuing domestic political priorities – most importantly counter-
insurgency and the need to manage the rise of a new generation of leaders within the 
SPDC – and were willing to accept a greater degree of international disapprobrium in 
order to achieve these aims (Jagan and Egreteau 2013, 186). This changing outlook 
was reflected by the SPDC‘s prolonged house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi (from 2003 
until 2010), tighter restrictions placed on UN agencies and INGOs operating in the 
country, continued rejection of external pressure to reform and the relocation of the 
country‘s official capital from Yangon to Naypyidaw in November 2005 (South 2008, 
106; Egreteau and Jagan 2013, 185).  
 
Khin Nyunt‘s fall had a significant impact upon political dynamics across Shan State. 
Although many within the Tatmadaw had questioned the ceasefire strategy, the 
durability of the ceasefires and the role they had played in strengthening the 
government‘s position had given Khin Nyunt much credibility. However, his fall, 
coupled with the Tatmadaw‘s growing power in contested border regions, led to 
reconsideration of the ceasefire strategy. In the years following Khin Nyunt‘s fall, the 
Tatmadaw pursued a more hard-line and antagonistic approach in which it determined 
to move beyond the fragmented status quo created by the ceasefires.  
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The first clear sign in Shan State of the government‘s changing approach was the arrest 
in February 2005 of Major-General Hso Ten, leader of the ceasefire SSA-North, Hkun 
Tun Oo, head of the SNLD144 and six other leading Shan political figures. Accused of 
conspiring with the SSA-South against the government, all eight men were charged 
with high treason as well as various other charges and sentenced to lengthy prison 
sentences.145 Further evidence of the government‘s determination to establish firmer 
control came during 2005 with the enforced surrender of both the SSNA and the PSLA, 
two of the region‘s weaker ceasefire groups. The government capitalised upon 
uncertainty within the SSNA caused by the death of its leader, Gun Yawd, in 
September 2004 and alongside encouragement to ‗return to the legal fold‘, SSNA 
commanders were threatened with drug charges should they refuse to surrender. The 
pressure to surrender divided the SSNA. Approximately three hundred troops under 
the command of Lt. Colonel Ganna146 and Lt. Col Koongkurh agreed to demobilise in 
April/May 2005(SHAN 2005b; SHAN 2008).147  However, SSNA troops under the 
command of Sai Yi, who had replaced Gun Yawd as leader and was a longstanding 
friend of Yawd Serk, refused and joined the SSA-South in September 2005 with Sai Yi 
becoming the organisation‘s Vice Chairman Number One.148 
 
On 29 April 2005, having also come under heavy Tatmadaw pressure, the PSLA 
surrendered its remaining 560 weapons under the government‘s much vaunted 
‗exchanging arms for peace‘ plan and was effectively transformed into a number of 
local militias (see Chapter 8).149 The PSLA‘s disarmament was described in national 
media as ―unconditional‖ and as a ―pioneer and example for other nationality groups to 
reach the correct way‖ (NLM 2005). The PSLA effectively ceased to exist and was 
reformed as the Ta-ang National Party (TNP), a purely civilian organisation that went 
on to contest in the 2010 general election. The forced surrender of the SSNA and 
                                                          
144 The SNLD was formed by Hkun Tun Oo in 1988 to contest the 1990 General Election. The Party 
won the second largest number of seats after the NLD. Hkun Tun Oo, now in his early 70s, is the 
nephew of the last ruling Chaofa of Hsipaw, Sao Kya Seng, who disappeared (presumed killed by the 
Tatmadaw) after the 1962 military coup (see Chapter 6). 
145 Hso Ten, who was also found guilty on charges of illegal logging and illegal exporting of timber, was 
sentenced to 106 years in prison and was released in 2011. Hkun Tun Oo was given a 93 year prison 
sentence and was released in January 2012. The other figures arrested were Sai Nyunt Lwin (Khun Tun 
Oo‘s secretary), Sai Hla Aung (Central Executive Committee member of the SNLD), Sai Nyi Nyi Moe, 
Sai Htun Nyo, Sai Myo Win Htun (all of whom were released in January 2012 with Khun Tun Oo), and 
U Myint Than who died in prison in 2006. All received sentences of 79 years or more. 
146 Lt-Col. Ganna died in 2008. Born in Namkham, he had joined the KIA in 1980. He rejected the KIA 
4th Brigade‘s 1989 ceasefire with the SLORC in 1989 and joined the MTA in 1994 after its expansion 
into northern Shan State. He joined the SSNA after Gun Yawd‘s mutiny against the MTA in 1995.   
147 The SSNA‘s Hsenwi-based 11th Brigade was under the command of under Lt.Col. Ganna and the 
Tangyan/Lashio-based 19th Brigade under Lt.-Col. Koongkurh. They surrendered with more than three 
hundred troops and weapons in April and May 2005 respectively. 
148 These were troops from the SSNA‘s 6th, 9th and 16th Brigades. 
149 Interview with PSLF Chairman. 22 April 2014. Chiang Mai. 
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PSLA epitomised the increasing dominance of the Tatmadaw across Shan State and 
sent a stark warning to other ceasefire groups that the government‘s priorities lay in 
securing territory rather than initiating political dialogue.  
 
The Border Guard Force Proposal  
These fears were compounded by the country‘s new 2008 constitution and the ‗border 
guard force‘ proposal announced soon afterwards. In the Constitution Principle 6(f) 
enshrines the Tatmadaw‘s right ―to participate in the National political leadership role 
of the State‖, whilst Article 445 provides immunity for all government figures ―in 
respect to any act done in the execution of their respective duties.‖ 25% of all seats in 
both houses of the national bicameral legislature and the regional/state parliaments150 
are reserved for military personnel and the ratification of any constitutional amendment 
requires a majority vote of more than 75%. By ensuring that the military would 
continue to ‗safeguard‘ the country, the 2008 constitution addressed, in the Tatmadaw‘s 
eyes, the failures of both the 1947 constitution, which was blamed for the instability of 
the 1950s and the constitutional crisis of 1962, and the 1974 constitution, which was 
blamed for establishing a party state that proved unable to maintain stability.  
 
The constitution also stated that ―all the armed forces in the Union shall be under the 
command of the Defence Services‖, which immediately raised a question mark over 
the future status of ceasefire armed groups. The government‘s intentions were made 
clear in April 2009 when it announced that all ceasefire armies were to be absorbed 
into the Tatmadaw as Border Guard Forces (BGF), termed Home Guard Forces (HGF) 
where groups were not close to an international border. The strategy declared that 
BGFs were to become regular military units comprising 326 soldiers, of which 30 
would be Tatmadaw soldiers and of the three commanding officers one would be 
drawn from the Tatmadaw, which would also provide personnel for key positions such 
as General Staff Officer and Quartermaster Officer (Keenan 2013, 2; ICG 2011, 5). 
BGF troops, the government claimed, would be provided with salaries, rations, 
uniforms and pensions, and their families would gain access to Tatmadaw welfare 
services.151 The government also declared that after September 2010 all ceasefires 
would be ―null and void‖ and groups which had not converted into BGFs would be 
deemed insurgents (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2013). Throughout the 1990-2008 period 
the SLORC/SPDC had consistently informed ceasefire groups that, as a transitional 
                                                          
150 Under the 2008 Constitution each of the country‘s seven states and seven regions (formerly termed 
divisions) have their own parliament. For analysis of how these parliaments function, see: Nixon et al 
2013. 
151 Interview with representatives of the UNFC [United Nationalities Federal Council], 29 December 
2012, Chiang Mai; Interview with TSYO, 3 May 2013, Mae Sot. 
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government, it had no mandate to enter into political dialogue until a new constitution 
had been enacted. The BGF proposal, however, marked a clear volte face in which 
ceasefire groups were now demanded to surrender autonomy prior to any form of 
political dialogue.  
 
In the period leading up to the 2010 election large ceasefire groups were pressured to 
transform into BGFs. During August 2009, in what became known as the ‗Kokang 
Incident‘, the government moved against the MNDAA, marking the first attempt to 
renegotiate ‗terms‘ with one of the more powerful former CPB ceasefire groups. 
Tensions had purportedly risen within the MNDAA between its leader, Pheung Kya 
Shin, who rejected the BGF proposal and a group of Central Executive Committee 
members, led by Bai Xuoqian and Liu Guoxi, who had been expelled from the party 
having advocated converting to BGF status.  In what was becoming a recurring theme 
in the government‘s attempts to broker more favourable agreements with ceasefire 
groups, the SPDC capitalised upon this internal dissension and justified its actions by 
citing the organisation‘s illegal activities.152 Following a brief escalation in violence, 
more than 700 MNDAA troops loyal to Pheung Kya Shin crossed the border into 
China where they were disarmed by Chinese authorities (Keenan 2009, 5). A ―silent 
coup‖ then took place within the MNDAA, led by Bai Xuoqian and Liu Guoxi and the 
remaining MNDAA troops were transformed into BGF#1006 and both leaders were 
elected, uncontested, in 2010 as MPs for the government-backed USDP in Laukkai 
Township (Keenan 2009, 5).   
 
In late 2009 the SSA-North, was the next group to come under pressure. Two of its 
three Brigades – the 3rd and 7th – and its ‗Headquarter Security Force‘ accepted the 
BGF proposal in April 2010 and submitted lists of approximately 700 men and 
weapons that would become BGFs (SHAN 2010). However, the SSA-N‘s largest 1st 
Brigade, under the command of Major-General Pangfa, refused. Fearing that 
surrendered troops might leave to re-join the 1st Brigade, the Tatamdaw proved willing 
to convert SSA-N troops into militias rather than formal BGFs, a move that allowed 
them to avoid coming under direct Tatmadaw control.153 Although requested to wear 
BGF uniforms on official occasions they have continued wearing SSA-North uniforms 
at other times and have retained their own command structure.154  
                                                          
152 In August 2009 police issued warrants to search what was claimed to be a drug refinery (later found 
to be a weapons repair workshop) and Pheung Kya Shin‘s house in Laukkai. On 24th August warrants 
were issued for his arrest, along with his two sons and his brother Pheung Kya Fu. 
153 Interview with SHAN, 26 April 2013, Chiang Mai. 
154 Ibid. 
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Throughout 2009/10 the KIA also came under heavy pressure to transform itself into 
seven BGF battalions (Keenan 2010, 3). Although the strength of the KIA and the 
government‘s desire to avoid conflict prior to the 2010 General Election discouraged 
an escalation in violence, it became clear that the KIA ceasefire was failing and both 
sides started preparing for a return to war. The government also denied the KIO/A-
linked Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP), formal registration as a political party, 
preventing it from standing in the 2010 election. 
 
Revenue Extraction 
Over the past decade the government has also sought to extract greater revenue from 
Shan State through initiating large-scale development projects, exerting greater control 
over the rural economy and attempting to control the dynamics of cross-border 
investment. The most iconic example of these changes has been the construction of oil 
and gas pipelines delivering offshore crude oil and natural gas from the Bay of Bengal 
to China‘s Yunnan Province. Construction began on the US$1.5 billion oil pipeline 
and US$1.04 billion gas pipeline in 2009 as a joint venture between the state-owned 
Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) and the China National Petroleum 
Company (CNPC). It was driven by China‘s determination to improve its energy 
security in light of its reliance on imported oil, which rose above 50% in 2008 (from 
34% in 2003), 80% of which has to pass through the strategically vulnerable Malacca 
Straits (Chenyan and Fook 2009, 259). The gas pipeline became fully operational in 
July 2013 and in its first year channelled almost two billion cubic metres from offshore 
gas fields to which China had been awarded exploration rights in 2006. Over the next 
thirty years this pipeline will generate an estimated $30billion for the Myanmar 
government (TSYO 2012; SGM 2011a; SGM 2011b). In January 2015 the oil pipeline 
became operational and will deliver up to twelve million tonnes of crude oil per year 
from the Middle East and Africa via the deep sea port at Kyaukphyu in Arakan State to 
refineries in Yunnan. These pipelines, which tread a path through former insurgent-
controlled territory, are directly reliant upon the Tatmadaw‘s territorialisation of 
northern Shan State where at least twenty-six infantry units have been deployed to 
protect them (TSYO 2012, 26).  
 
The government has also sought to exert greater control over revenue flows entering 
contested areas of Shan State. In 2006, for example, the government, albeit with only 
very limited success, declared overland trade of timber to China illegal in an attempt to 
channel timber exports through Yangon, where they could be taxed by the state-owned 
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Myanmar Timber Enterprise, and would limit the revenue reaching armed groups 
along the China border (Forest Trends 2014, 2).155 The government also re-negotiated 
the ‗terms‘ surrounding gem concessions previously granted to ceasefire groups. 
Initially these agreements had seemingly demanded that at least 10% should be sold 
through government-organised auctions. By the mid-2000s all gem sales by joint 
ventures between the government and private businesses had to go through these 
auctions in an attempt to re-direct the export trade through Yangon rather than through 
border gates that could be taxed by armed groups (MacLean 2008, 143; Jones 2014, 
793-4).  
 
Government attempts to secure control across Shan State has been undermined by a 
process, termed ―ceasefire capitalism‖ by Kevin Woods (2011, 753), through which it 
has ―appropriated the market to do battle‖ in order to territorialise spaces previously 
controlled by insurgent groups. The government‘s granting of large-scale land 
concessions to both domestic and international companies for logging and agribusiness 
ventures such as rubber, corn and fruits crops has directed transnational finance into 
areas where state sovereignty has historically been weak. In these militarized 
borderland areas, where access to land and resources remains highly contested, 
national and transnational corporations have sought to promote functioning state 
institutions, especially those able to wield coercive power, viewing these institutions as 
the most viable way to ―fix, regulate and expand capitalist spaces‖ and to uphold and 
enforce their property ‗rights‘ (Woods 2011, 751). Through these new ―geographies of 
power‖ the state has spearheaded processes of primitive accumulation and increased 
state legibility, thus converting the state‘s de jure sovereignty into de facto control 
(Woods 2011, 767).  This profound reconfiguration of borderland space is underpinned 
by a powerful nexus of inter-dependent military, government and private sector power 
and an emerging clientele of borderland elites whose political and economic interests 
are vested in institutionalising, rather than resisting, state control.  
 
However, reflecting the enduring complexity of the Shan borderlands, these processes 
have not developed uniformly. The sheer number of armed groups operating across the 
region, the perpetual difficulties the military government faced in demobilising these 
groups, and the continued presence of the illicit drug economy have complicated the 
dynamics of ‗ceasefire capitalism‘, creating a more fragmented process than Woods‘ 
analysis shows for Kachin State, as will be analysed in the next two chapters.  
                                                          
155 This ban had very limited success and although cross-border timber exports did fall sharply initially, 
by 2013 they had reached historically high levels. According to Report by Forest Trends (2014) 94% of 
China‘s timber imports from Myanmar were registered in Kunming, demonstrating that the vast 
majority of timber continued to be imported across the border.  
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Figure 7: The oil and gas pipeline in northern Shan State  
(Sources BNI 2014, 9; SGM 2011c)  
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7.3 ASSESSING ILLIBERAL STATE CONSOLIDATION IN SHAN STATE SINCE 
1988 
The government‘s decision to continue with its ‗roadmap to democracy‘ by holding a 
general election – the first for twenty years – in November 2010, to release Aung San 
Suu Kyi six days later and to initiate a spate of political and economic reforms took 
many Myanmar commentators by surprise.156 Alongside these reforms President Thein 
Sein publicly pledged to prioritise bringing an end to the country‘s sixty-year conflict. 
Although overshadowed by the outbreak of fighting against the KIA in 2011, the 
government has sought to mobilise a new peace initiative. It seemingly abandoned the 
BGF strategy, re-affirmed agreements with existing ceasefire groups and signed 
ceasefires for the first time with both the KNU and the SSA-South.157   
 
Coinciding with the ―pivot‖ in US foreign policy away from prioritisation on the 
Middle East towards Asia (Clinton 2011) and disillusionment with the weak impact of 
sanctions against the country, western governments, multilateral institutions and 
INGOs have embraced the government‘s reform process, supporting what the World 
Bank (2014) has termed the country‘s ―triple transition – from an authoritarian military 
system to democratic governance, from a centrally directed economy to a market-
oriented economy, and from 60 years of conflict to peace in its border areas‖. Amidst 
the international rush to support this ‗triple transition‘, accounts proffered for the 
sudden pace of change have been rather superficial. Analysis has coalesced around a 
number of explanations including: the government‘s desire to repel overbearing 
Chinese influence by improving ties with the west; fears of domestic protests inspired 
by the Arab Spring; and/or the government‘s belated realisation that the path it had 
taken since 1988 had merely perpetuated the country‘s economic malaise and its own 
illegitimacy to the point that political reform and access to foreign investment offered 
the only way out of the impasse. These accounts, however, are founded upon two 
problematic assertions. Firstly, they reflect an implicit tendency to shoehorn the 
country‘s recent reforms into a pre-ordained vision of how modern states should 
function and a desire to fashion Myanmar into a progressive liberal market democracy, 
rather than a deeper engagement with the historical shifts upon which these changes 
are based. Secondly, they reveal an enduring misperception of Myanmar as a static, 
stagnating backwater awaiting change, belying the fact that the previous twenty years 
                                                          
156 The election was widely criticised for numerous irregularities. See, for example, ICG 2011b. 
157 The Thein Sein government renewed ceasefires with the UWSA and NDAA in September 2011, with 
the SSA-‗N‘ in January 2012 and signed ceasefires with the SSA-‗S‘ in December 2011 and the KNU in 
January 2012. 
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had been witness to a concerted process of state consolidation, albeit one that has been 
deeply illiberal.  
 
Indeed, in many ways the reforms enacted since 2010 reflected the government‘s 
growing self-confidence that it was now in a strong enough position to manage the 
country‘s political and economic liberalisation in such a way that would not threaten 
its ability to preserve stability and sovereignty, but which could allow the Tatmadaw to 
extricate itself from the day-to-day administration of the country. At a national level, 
the constitution has ―locked in‖ the Tatmadaw‘s ability to retain a degree of control 
over the country‘s transition to civilian rule, organised political opposition within the 
country had effectively been quashed and the threat posed by both the NLD and 
insurgent groups was far weaker by 2010 than in 1990 (Jones 2014, 786). Furthermore, 
although the country remains far behind its Asian neighbours in terms of social and 
economic development, the government is in a stronger financial position than during 
the 1980s and 1990s. The willingness of western powers to accept the country‘s 
pseudo-civilian government provided assurances that further economic liberalisation 
offered opportunities to attract foreign investment, technical expertise and foreign aid 
without the threat of overbearing political and economic conditionality. Furthermore, 
the large-scale privatization of state enterprises in the years prior to 2010 invested huge 
economic power into a class of military-political-business elites with proven loyalty to 
the state (Rieffel 2010, 8; ICG 2010, 7-8). Although these elites have faced growing 
competition from foreign companies since 2010, they have also benefitted from the 
relaxing of sanctions, improved access to the international financial system and 
increasing flows of foreign investment.  
 
The government‘s willingness to embark upon reform has also been founded to a large 
extent upon its growing authority across many contested areas of the country‘s ethnic 
states. The ability to transform gradually the country‘s border regions with China and 
Thailand from sites of conflict to sites of revenue extraction is fundamental to why the 
government believed itself to be in a strong enough position to re-engage with the west, 
despite foreign governments‘ historic support for various border-based ethnic groups.   
 
However, there is a danger that, in pursuing this overarching argument too far, one 
overlooks the distinctly messy and non-linear trajectory of state consolidation across 
the country‘s border regions. Amidst the broad contours of aggrandizing state power, 
the territorialisation of Shan State remains partial, contested and geographically 
uneven. Amidst the fanfare surrounding the post-2010 peace process Shan State 
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continues to experience significant conflict. In November 2010, just days after the 
election, the Tatmadaw launched a major offensive against the SSA-North‘s first 
Brigade, which lasted for more than six months. Despite signing a ceasefire with the 
government in January 2012, the SSA-North reported more than two hundred 
skirmishes throughout 2012 and 2013 (BNI 2014, 173, 180). Meanwhile, the collapse 
of the Kachin ceasefire in June 2011 marked the start of renewed Tatmadaw offensives 
against the KIA which have continued sporadically to this day (October 2015).   
 
Furthermore, in 2009 active insurgency returned to Palaung areas of northern Shan 
State.158 Although the PSLA had been forced to surrender in 2005, the Palaung State 
Liberation Front (PSLF) – which had been based on the Thai border ever since its 
formation in opposition to the Palaung ceasefire agreement in 1991 – formed an armed 
wing (the Ta‘ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) in 2009 and in 2011 attempted to 
regain territorial control over parts of northern Shan State. Although it has no 
permanent military bases, it has grown rapidly to more than fifteen hundred men. 
Supported by the KIA, the TNLA has developed into a significant insurgency force 
centred in Mantong and Minewee, but stretching to parts of Namhsan, Namtu and 
Kutkhai. Many TNLA soldiers are former PSLA troops that had surrendered in 2005. 
In some cases Palaung weapons have gone full circle; weapons that were previously in 
the hands of Palaung insurgents prior to 1991, then came then under the control of the 
PSLA‘s 1991 ceasefire agreement before being transferred to local militia groups 
following the PSLA‘s disarmament in 2005, now arm TNLA insurgent soldiers.159  
 
Reflecting important continuities with the 1988-2010 ceasefire period, the post-2010 
ceasefire discussions have in many ways embodied wars of position and manoeuvre, 
rather than clear progress towards a peaceful resolution able to address longstanding 
political and economic grievances. From the government‘s perspective there is 
seemingly tension between two contrasting standpoints. There are those advocating the 
value of granting concessions in order to reach a settlement with the potential to 
further reduce conflict, to garner international support and to offer a more stable and 
peaceful environment in which to ‗develop‘ border regions. Against this stance, is the 
belief that such a formal resolution may become unnecessary and may cede too much 
to armed groups which have already been greatly weakened over the past twenty years. 
For those advocating the latter perspective, militarization, successful counter-
                                                          
158 For a detailed analysis of the Palaung ceasefire and renewed insurgency in this area see: Meehan 
forthcoming    
159 Interviews with: PSLF Chairman. Chiang Mai, 26 December 2012, and Palaung civil society 
organisations, 17 November 2012, Mae Sot. 
256 
 
insurgency operations and the creation of compliant local elites may mean that armed 
groups will become so weak that that the government may not be required to grant any 
meaningful concessions in the future. Although this latter approach is clearly less 
satisfactory to western governments engaging with the peace process, it is more 
congruous with the history of conflict in Myanmar.  
 
A similar tension exists amongst armed groups. Pushing for a durable peaceful 
resolution, especially in the current international climate may empower armed groups 
giving them a stronger hand with which to bargain with, especially in the context of 
their weakening military position, their dwindling territorial reach, the loss of foreign 
patrons and the risk that they may become portrayed as peace-spoilers and terrorists 
rather than grievance-driven resistance movements. Contrasting voices, however, have 
argued that by temporising and staying firm on their political demands, the political 
climate may in the future change again in ways that serve to strengthen their 
bargaining power, especially in the context of Myanmar‘s complex geopolitical 
position. Some commentators, for example, have suggested Myanmar‘s improved ties 
with the US may see China increase support to ceasefire groups along its border. These 
contrasting attitudes within both the government and armed groups account for the 
ongoing cynicism and distrust towards the peace process despite it embodying the 
most concerted peacebuilding effort for decades. 
 
At the heart of the challenges facing the government‘s attempts to move beyond the 
existing ceasefire terrain lie the difficulties it has faced in finding ways to secure 
territorial authority across ethnic states beyond reliance upon perpetual militarisation. 
Although the Tatmadaw has been effective at wrestling territory away from insurgents, 
it has struggled, beyond the major towns, to convert these coercive foundations of 
control into more durable, stable and centralized forms of institutional control. Even 
the oil and gas pipelines, the epitome of the state‘s growing territorial control, are 
reliant upon the extensive deployment of Tatmadaw troops, police and militias along 
its routes across northern Shan State. It is thus important to acknowledge not only the 
central government‘s increasing authority across Shan State but also the perpetual 
challenges that it has faced. These challenges, I argue, are threefold, and reflect the 
continued lack of government legitimacy, the state‘s perpetual difficulties in 
establishing control over borderland political and economic networks, and the 
challenge of demobilising armed groups.   
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Firstly, the negative experiences of the ceasefire period have ensured that resentment 
and antipathy towards the government remain common throughout Shan State. 
Although communities have welcomed the reduction in conflict and the growing space 
for civil society organisations, the ceasefire period has also been associated with brutal 
pacification, forced resettlement, environmental destruction, the collapse of local 
economies, land dispossession, rising drug usage, extensive emigration and the 
continued lack of basic services. The violence and disruption caused by war has in 
many places been replaced by the advent of authoritarian, predatory and exploitative 
structures of authority.  Ceasefire groups have come under conflicting pressures to 
avoid surrendering, to steer clear of a return to armed conflict and to protect 
communities from unchecked exploitation at the hands of the Tatmadaw. These 
pressures, at times almost contradictory, have created a highly volatile environment in 
which the government has struggled to secure territory beyond the perpetual use of 
strong-arm Tatmadaw tactics. It has created a situation in which the increasingly 
asymmetrical power imbalances between an enlarged Tatmadaw and beleaguered 
armed groups has discouraged a return to outright conflict; yet ceasefire experiences 
have perpetuated resentment towards the government.  
 
The second overarching challenge facing the government is the fact that Shan State 
continues to be cross-cut by political and economic networks that have perpetually 
evaded government control. Over the past twenty-five years the government has tried 
to construct clear boundaries between ally and enemy. By granting a degree of local 
autonomy and economic opportunity to those willing to accept government expansion 
and by launching offensives against recalcitrant groups, it has attempted to re-align 
borderland networks so as to bring them under tighter government control. However, 
the government has found it impossible to monopolise control over, or even to manage 
effectively, the tangled ties of ethnicity, loyalty, friendship, shared history, military 
alliances and business arrangements that extend across Shan State and beyond its 
borders. Alongside ceasefire agreements with government, the SSA-North and SSNA 
maintained close links with the SSA-S even rotating troops between the three groups; 
the former CPB groups have retained close military, political and business ties; the 
KIA provided extensive support to the TNLA even before the Kachin ceasefire 
officially collapsed (Keenan 2011, 8; Wan Mai 2011); and within both Pao and 
Palaung politics close ties persisted between ceasefire and non-ceasefire factions.160 
Although many communities have accepted growing government control, some have 
continued to give tacit support for armed groups. Such ties reflect the highly 
                                                          
160 Interview with representatives of the PNLO and PNLA, 2 January & 5 January 2013, Mae Hong Son. 
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personalised nature of politics throughout Shan State and the close family and 
friendship ties that transgress the boundaries which the government‘s ceasefire and 
BGF strategies sought to construct. Lin Ming Xian, leader of the NDAA, for example, 
is the son-in-law of erstwhile Kokang leader Pheung Kya Shin; many of the ex-MTA 
militia leaders have retained close ties with former comrades still fighting against the 
government; and it is not uncommon for families to have one member serving in a 
local militia and another in a ceasefire and/or insurgent group.  
 
The diversity of cross-border influences on Shan State has further undermined the 
government‘s attempts to monopolise control over political and economic networks. 
At a bilateral level China and Thailand‘s actions have been broadly supportive of the 
central government‘s determination to territorialise border regions. However, it is 
impossible to treat the impact of ‗Chinese‘ and ‗Thai‘ actions as monolithic. Political 
and business ties exist between elites on both sides of the border in ways that 
commonly circumvent government control and have been instrumental in enabling 
armed groups to access weapons and revenue. Although larger state-owned Chinese 
companies have attempted to operate through official channels by establishing legal 
agreements with the central Myanmar government, many sub-contractors, smaller 
cross-border enterprises and border security agencies have often ―hedged their bets‖ by 
establishing links and paying ‗taxation‘ to an array of different groups including local 
Tatmadaw units, Regional Commanders, ceasefire groups and insurgents (Smith 1999, 
442).161 Without the power to definitively curtail these diverse cross-border networks 
the government has been unable to operationalize an effective ‗limited access order‘ 
since the ability of borderland elites and armed groups to access alternative cross-
border sources of patronage has perpetually challenged the government‘s claims to be 
able to offer those willing to ally with it preferential access to political and economic 
rents. 
 
Thirdly, attempts to establish military-state control across Shan State have consistently 
struggled to address the thorny issue of demobilisation, reflected by the failure of the 
BGF strategy. Armed groups are well aware that weapons and troops remain their 
main bargaining chip. The Tatmadaw‘s attempts to stabilise contested regions without 
inciting outright conflict have encouraged a pragmatic strategy of creating proxy-
government militias rather than concerted efforts at demobilisation (see Chapter 8). 
                                                          
161 The TNLA, for example, has gained revenue by taxing Chinese businesses in return for allowing 
access and ensuring the safety of Chinese operations in areas through which the TNLA operates.  
Interview with PSLF Chairman. 29 March 2014. 
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However, the ‗demobilisation into militias‘ strategy has created an extremely messy 
and complex patchwork of armed groups, whose loyalty to the government remains 
questionable, perpetuating the fragmentation of coercive power that has for so long 
been a defining feature across Shan State. The challenges the government has faced are 
not so much the existence of distinct ‗anti-state‘ spaces à la James Scott; rather it is the 
difficulty of consolidating control over territories where individuals and armed groups 
play an array of state-like and subversive functions simultaneously, where allegiance 
remains opaque and mutable, and where complex, multivalent relationships transcend 
the kind of boundary-activation between state/non-state actors and state-
sanctioned/subversive practices, which the government has attempted to implement in 
order to consolidate power.   
 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has sought to chart both the government‘s attempts to consolidate 
territorial control across contested borderland regions and the complex ways in which 
these efforts have been challenged, negotiated and subverted across Shan State since 
1988. Drawing upon the insights developed in Chapter 2, I have demonstrated how 
processes of state consolidation have been underpinned both by purposeful 
government efforts to monopolise power and the ways in which these strategies have 
been ―bent by the complex social processes they provoke and by the compromises they 
require‖ (de Guevara 2012, 5). This messy reality has created a ―kind of post-civil-
war-not-quite-peace environment‖ (Callahan 2007, xiv) in which the government‘s 
actions have been effective at ―managing conflict rather than resolving it‖ (Kramer 
2012, 5). The past twenty-five years have, to use Baud and van Schendel‘s (1997, 227-
8) terminology, witnessed a transition in Shan State away from a ―rebellious 
borderland‖, defined by outright powerful insurrection against the state, towards the 
emergence of an ―unruly borderland‖ where organised opposition is weak but in which 
―local society proves to be unruly, resisting the new social and territorial boundaries 
and the rules that come with them.‖  
 
The military government has sought ways to manage the continued unruliness of the 
Shan borderlands through an array of brokerage strategies designed to manage 
contested regions in ways that can enable the Tatmadaw to extricate itself from day-to-
day security and administrative duties whilst ensuring it retains overarching authority. 
Attempts to enact these brokerage strategies, especially through the formation of local 
militias, have become an extremely important but largely unreported dynamic across 
Shan State and it is these dynamics that the remaining two chapters of this study now 
260 
 
turn to. Analysing these brokerage strategies offers an important entry-point for better 
understanding the dynamics of state consolidation and provides new ways of 
conceptualising the spatial variation of these processes. It also offers a means through 
which to account for continued and diverse forms of violence across the region and the 
multi-faceted ways in which the drug trade has become embedded within the political 
economy of state consolidation.  
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Chapter 8 
MILITIAS, VIOLENCE AND NEGOTIATED 
STATEHOOD  
 
 
“Secretary-1 Lt-Gen Thein Sein receives U Sai Mon of Manpang Militia and U Law Ma of Monhin 
Monha Militia of Shan State (North).” Thein Sein [incumbent President] is fourth from the left. Bo Mon 
is second from the left. This photo is from 2004 and is taken from the New Light of Myanmar, the 
government-owned national newspaper (NLM 2004b, 9).  
 
Ever since independence Myanmar‘s borderlands have experienced varying degrees of 
conflict. This has encouraged a tendency to analyse the country‘s post-colonial 
borderlands through a binary prism of state versus rebel and to perceive the dominant 
forces shaping the region as the conflict between processes of militarised counter-
insurgency versus insurgent resistance. These categorisations reflect a broader 
propensity within the literature on statebuilding and conflict to draw distinct binaries 
between state and non-state actors and between war-time and peace-time. In the case 
of Southeast Asia specifically the continued use of state/non-state categories to frame 
political analysis also reflects the influence of James C Scott‘s (2009) work on Zomia 
and his conceptualisation of the region‘s upland borderland regions as ―nonstate spaces‖ 
with histories shaped by the binary dynamics of state encroachment versus the arts of 
resistance. 162 Although seductive in their apparent ability to rationalise the complexity 
of state-borderland dynamics these kinds of conceptual binaries are deeply problematic. 
The history of conflict in Shan State has never fitted easily into a single state/anti-state 
dynamic but has been underpinned by multiple conflict fault-lines and has been shaped 
                                                          
162 For a powerful critique of the state/anti-state binary developed by James C. Scott, see Sadan 2010 
and Sadan 2013. 
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by groups and individuals whose actions and interests have often straddled these 
supposed boundaries. 
 
Since 1988 the ceasefire agreements have inspired Myanmar commentators to develop 
a tripartite framework for analysing the country‘s borderlands, distinguishing between 
the military government, insurgents and ceasefire groups. Even this tripartite 
framework, however, fails to illuminate the multiple societal actors, motivations, forms 
of violence and multivalent relationships which do not easily fit into these categories 
but which have nonetheless have had huge influence in shaping both the quotidian 
experiences of borderland populations and the longer-term trajectory of processes of 
territorialisation. Indeed, the ―kind of post-civil-war-not-quite-peace environment‖ 
(Callahan 2007, xiv) that has emerged across Shan State over the past twenty-five 
years demonstrates profound ‗categorical‘, ‗institutional‟, ‗motivational‘, ‗temporal‟ 
(Krause 2012) and also ‗spatial‟ hybridity. ‗Categorical‘ distinctions between periods 
of ‗war‘ and ‗non-war‘ are unable to capture the array of non-formal types of violence, 
which borderland populations have continued to face during the ‗ceasefire‘ period and 
that cannot easily be equated to formal measurements such as counterinsurgency-
related battle-deaths. The actors influencing the political economy of the Shan 
borderland belie easy ‗institutional‘ categorisations of state/non-state actors; ‗state‘ 
actors, such as the Tatmadaw and personnel in government departments, have 
commonly pursued private interests and ‗non-state‘ actors, such as ceasefire groups 
and militias, have conducted various ‗state-like‘ functions that have played an 
important role in shaping the government‘s attempts to consolidate control. The 
‗motivations‘ of these actors have fluctuated between the material and the ideational, 
between predation and protection, and between localised interests and attempts to 
engage with larger-scale dynamics of state encroachment and regional economic 
development shaping the borderland. These hybrid forms of violence, institutions and 
motivations have also fluctuated across time. This is both in an immediate sense, with 
borderland actors shifting back and forth between identities in response to changes in 
their immediate environment, and in a more transitional sense in which their activities 
and influence have shifted more firmly in one way or another over the past twenty-five 
years. Epitomising the history of localised structures of authority across Shan State all 
of these dynamics have demonstrated profound ‗spatial‘ hybridity, developing along 
varying trajectories in different parts of Shan State simultaneously.        
 
Although dizzying at times in its complexity, engaging with this hybridity is integral to 
analysing processes of state consolidation and the political economy of the drug trade 
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(the subject of Chapter 9) across post-1988 Shan State. The purpose of this chapter is 
to interrogate one of the most important, yet overlooked, dimensions of Shan State‘s 
hybridized political economy, namely the proliferation of government-sanctioned 
militias across the region. Messy, unofficial and fragmented, the political economy of 
militias in Shan State has, to date, remained almost completely unacknowledged and 
poorly conceptualised, despite their importance in shaping how power has been 
imposed, resisted and reconfigured across the borderland and the role they have played 
in shaping processes of state consolidation.163 These militias, I argue, are the epitome 
of what Christian Lund has termed ―twilight institutions‖; they are ―not the state but 
they exercise public authority‖ (Lund 2006, 673). They perform various state-like 
functions and have played an important role both in shaping how the government has 
attempted to assert control over contested regions negotiate and how borderland actors 
have in turn navigated encroaching state power.  
 
In order to interrogate militia politics in Shan State and to situate this politics within a 
broader understanding of the forms of brokerage and negotiated statehood this chapter 
is divided into three sections. Section 1 explains the origins of militias that have 
operated across Shan State since 1988. I summarize the long history of militias in 
Myanmar, but also emphasize why their contemporary prevalence is explicitly linked 
to the changing political and economic dynamics over the past twenty-five years 
analysed in Chapter 7. Contrary to much of the literature on militias, I argue that their 
ubiquitous presence across Shan State is not an indication of state fragility or 
breakdown but is intimately linked to strategies employed by the government to 
establish greater control. This section provides the first detailed empirical analysis of 
militias operating in Shan State and can be read alongside Appendix 1, which provides 
biographies of the more significant militias and their leaders. Section 2 analyses the 
functions that militias have performed. I emphasize how and why militias have become 
an important aspect of the government‘s strategies to extend and legitimate its coercive 
and extractive power and explain how this strategy has developed in response to the 
specific historical and spatial dynamics of the Shan borderland. However, I also ‗de-
centre‘ the ‗state‘ in my analysis to demonstrate how the militia strategy has been co-
opted and manipulated by various borderland actors. In Section 3 I account for the 
profound diversity in militia politics by explaining how the government has employed 
different militia strategies in different parts of Shan State and why these strategies have 
been effective in enabling the government to fortify state control in some areas but 
have had deleterious consequences in other parts of the borderland. By drawing upon 
                                                          
163 TNI‘s work on Burma provides one of the few valuable exceptions. See TNI 2012 and TNI 2014.  
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the spectrum of brokerage developed in Chapter 2 I demonstrate how militias have 
performed both frontier brokerage and territorialising brokerage functions in ways that 
have both extended and circumscribed the territorial reach of state institutions. I argue 
that engaging with the diverse brokerage roles played by militias provides new ways to 
account for the uneven political topography of the Burmese state, the repertoires of 
violence enacted across Shan State and the different kinds of institutions of extraction 
that have emerged around borderland resources. 
 
8.1 THE ORIGINS OF SHAN STATE’S UBIQUITOUS MILITIAS 
In the period since 1988 a vast number of militias have been active throughout Shan 
State. They vary in size, power, territorial concentration, relations with the Tatmadaw 
and the level of autonomy they exercise. They range from small, poorly equipped 
village defence forces to powerful militias with extensive power in the locales in which 
they operate and with armed recruits numbering in the hundreds. The militias active 
across Shan State today are part of a long history within Myanmar of irregular armed 
forces and reflect the perpetual difficulties governments have faced in realising the 
Weberian ideal of establishing a centralized state monopoly over the legitimate use of 
physical force. Until the late 1950s the Chaofa had each wielded bands of armed 
retainers, of varying sizes. The collapse of colonial rule and the resistance against the 
Japanese saw the decentralisation of the means of coercion throughout much of the 
country. By the end of the Second World War there were estimated to be more than 
100,000 people under arms across the country and the deteriorating security and 
economic situation of the late 1940s discouraged many from relinquishing their 
weapons (Callahan 2003, 92).  
 
Across Shan State various local defence forces emerged in the early 1950s to resist the 
threat posed by the KMT. Amidst the political power struggles, the outbreak of 
insurgency and the weakness of the postcolonial state bureaucracy, attempts were 
made by both the government and various strongmen through the late 1940s and 1950s 
to utilise irregular armed groups across the country rather than attempt to dismantle 
them. In the late 1940s, under the oversight of Major Aung Gyi, the government 
sought to convert local armed groups throughout the centre of the country into militias 
known as Sitwundun (Special Police Reserves) to support the Tatmadaw (Myoe 1999, 
141-2). In 1955 the AFPFL government launched a new militia initiative, the 
‗Pyusawhti‘. Modelled on the Israeli system of militias it was an attempt to form local 
defence forces across the country under the oversight of a National Defence 
Committee (Myoe 1999). However, although relatively effective as counter-insurgency 
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forces, both the Sitwundun and Pyusawhti effectively ―eclipsed the state‖ by 
empowering local politicians who controlled them. They proved difficult for the 
central government to manage and under Ne Win‘s Caretaker military government 
(1958-60) the Pyusawhti programme was abolished in an attempt to consolidate 
greater state control over the means of coercion (Englehart 2005, 627).  
 
However, amidst the up-swell of insurgency following the 1962 military coup militias 
became an essential aspect of the Tatmadaw‘s counter-insurgency strategy. Ever since 
1962, the role of militias has had both ideological and pragmatic foundations. They 
have been part of the Tatmadaw‘s longstanding ‗People‘s War‘ counter-insurgency 
doctrine, devised to mobilise the population against internal and external threats, yet 
they are very much also a function of the prosaic and ad hoc ways in which military-
government personnel on the ground have attempted to govern amidst continuing 
insurgency. The valorisation of militias has been integral to military doctrine since the 
1960s, inspired by the writings of Mao and Lin Biao, which were translated into 
Burmese and studied within the Tatmadaw (Selth 2002, 90).  In Maoist philosophy, 
militias formed a cornerstone of the mass mobilisation of the populace required for 
launching a People‘s War, based upon the notion that ultimately manpower and not 
weaponry was the key for military victory. Fighting successful warfare was based upon 
the ‗three combinations‘, namely the regular army, which was highly mobile, local 
army units tasked with protecting certain localities, and people‘s militia. Militia had 
both a civilian and military role. In peacetime they were expected to lead production, 
to guard factories and development sites, to expose ‗reactionary‘ elements and to 
mobilise the populace during campaigns such as the Great Leap Forward and Great 
Cultural Revolution. During war they were expected to provide intelligence and local 
guides, protect supply lines, porter for the military and to act as ―a reservoir of 
manpower‖ for the regular army in a way that was often cyclical with army veterans 
joining militias (Roberts 1983, ix).  
 
Reflecting Maoist influence, a 1964 Tatmadaw report, entitled Survey of the Situation 
for Training Tatmadaw and People in Accordance with People‟s War Doctrine, 
recommended that ―the Tatmadaw and the people should be trained for the ―people‘s 
war‖ and made ready by 1970.‖  The Report outlined aspirations to develop a fighting 
force of 5% of the population, with 25% becoming reserves in militias that could be 
ready for combat within 72 hours (Myoe 2009, 23). The rationale for militias was 
enshrined in the 1968 Directorate of Military Training‘s ―Directive for People‘s 
Militias‖ and a second document, entitled ―Implementing People‘s Militia 
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Programme‖ issued by the General Staff Office in 1973 (Myoe 2009, 30-31).164 In a 
similar way to the command structure in China, where militias came under the control 
of both the Army and the Party, these Tatmadaw directives emphasized that militias 
were meant to be formed only in areas where government influence was strong and 
where BSPP People‘s Councils were functioning, where a Tatmadaw outpost or police 
force was present, and where the local population demonstrated clear desire to resist 
insurgency (Myoe 2009, 30).  
 
However, in reality counter-insurgency imperatives ensured that the formation of 
militias rarely adhered to these ideals. It was across the borderlands, amidst the 
challenges posed by insurgency, that the clear-cut doctrinal foundations underpinning 
the government‘s militia strategy gave way most clearly to a more pragmatic, messy 
and ad-hoc set-up. In these regions militias were managed directly by the Army and 
under pressure to deliver results, Tatmadaw commanders often formed militias in 
contexts where neither they nor the BSPP could provide oversight. 165  Rather than 
becoming a means of mobilising support in areas under clear military and BSPP 
control, the Tatmadaw adapted the militia strategy in an attempt to stretch control into 
areas under weak government authority. Militias became a way of devolving to 
villages the responsibility for their own defence. Alongside the People‘s Militias, often 
referred to as village defence forces, established in villages under government control, 
the Tatmadaw formed thakasapha, or ‗anti-insurgent militias‘, which were formed and 
armed by the Tatmadaw under the control of individuals it believed it could trust but 
over whom it had little oversight. It also formed KKY militias, as detailed in Chapter 
6, which were almost entirely autonomous and whose essential function was to wrestle 
recruits, territory and resources (primarily control over the drug trade) away from 
insurgents. Although militias were envisioned ideally as playing a ‗territorialising‘ 
function akin to Maoist principles enabling the government to control and mobilise 
populations in areas already under its control, across Shan State they were effectively 
deployed far more as ‗frontier brokers‘ (see Chapter 2).  Although relatively effective 
at fragmenting insurgency, the government found it almost impossible to manage these 
groups effectively, reflected by the failure of the KKY programme and difficulties the 
government faced in demobilising these militias after disbanding the programme in 
1973 (See Chapter 6).  
                                                          
164 These documents emphasized the military dimension of militias, tasking them with intelligence 
gathering, local security, protection of Tatmadaw supply lines, reporting on the presence of strangers, 
and propaganda. 
165 In 1973 the Directorate of People‘s Militias and Public Relations was established under the Ministry 
of Defence, institutionalising the Tatmadaw‘s control over the militia programme (Myoe 2009, 31). 
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The means of violence across Shan State was further dispersed by the fact that 
insurgent groups also formed militias to retain control over villages in territory they 
controlled. Insurgent groups faced the perpetual challenge of recruiting soldiers and 
those who were recruited were often reluctant to move away from their communities. 
In an attempt to alleviate the threat of desertion many insurgent armies also drew upon 
Maoist military doctrine, forming both residential militias, in which soldiers were 
educated and trained and did not have to move away from their communities, and 
mobile units, comprising trained soldiers who could be relied upon not to desert as 
they undertook more gruelling operations away from their communities. 166 
Furthermore, in some areas local strongmen capitalised upon the fragmented nature of 
coercive power to form their own militias, aware that providing a show of localised 
force – not hard in a region still awash with weapons and people who knew how to use 
them – would likely encourage the Tatmadaw and insurgent armies to leave them alone 
or to negotiate with them rather than attempt to fight them. The motivations behind 
these kinds of militias varied. In some cases they were predatory with local strongmen 
attempting to carve out local fiefdoms; in other cases they had a more protective 
function and sought to shield villages from forced recruitment drives and expropriation 
by both the Tatmadaw and armed groups.     
 
The disbanding of the KKY, the severe threat posed by the CPB and the difficulty of 
launching an effective Four Cuts offensive in border regions (See Chapter 6) meant 
that throughout much of the 1970s and into the 1980s the Tatmadaw retained direct 
control over counter-insurgency campaigns across much of Shan State, rather than 
embark upon an extensive programme of militia-building. Through the 1990s and 
2000s, however, the number of militias operating across the country‘s borderlands has 
grown dramatically.167 The Tatmadaw has been tasked with establishing a hierarchical 
militia structure throughout the country with local village defence forces to be formed 
in every village under an overarching township militia battalion (Keenan 2012).  In 
part this reflects the fact that the collapse of the CPB, the stability created by the 
ceasefires, pervasive Tatmadaw militarisation and the declining strength of insurgency 
enabled the government to extend the militia programme to parts of the borderland 
where this strategy had hitherto been viewed as unsuitable. According to Maung Aung 
                                                          
166 Interview with SHAN, 10 January 2013, Chiang Mai. 
167 Although this chapter focuses solely on Shan State, militias have been formed throughout the entire 
country. For evidence of the militia strategy in Kachin State, see KWAT 2014; for Karen State, see 
KHRG 2014; for Mon State, see: Kaowao Newsgroup 2009; for Chin State, see: Chinland Guardian, 
2009 and 2011. 
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Myoe (2009), the renaissance of the militia strategy since 1988 can also be accounted 
for by the continued ideological embrace of the doctrine of People‘s War. Indeed, 
barely a month after seizing power, the new SLORC leadership re-iterated this 
doctrine, stating that: 
 
in every war, the people‘s support is vital.  It is important not to forget the point that the 
victory or defeat in a war depends largely on the support of the people.  It is necessary to 
plan ahead for people‘s war.  While suppressing insurgency, [commanders should] learn 
the experience of mobilisation and training of people‘s militias and prepare form people‘s 
war.  We need to draw up a nation-wide mobilisation, training and command and control 
system for people‘s militias and people‘s war.168  
 
Leading government figures, notably Than Shwe, consistently emphasized the 
importance of militias to the country‘s defence. 169  History has been invoked to 
legitimise this strategy with state media citing people‘s militias as the foundation for 
the country‘s victory against Japan during World War Two. A 2008 op-ed in the state-
controlled New Light of Myanmar also linked the people‘s militia strategy to the 
success of the country‘s first Empire-builder, the revered King Anawrahta: 
 
The first Myanmar empire founded by King Anawrahta who was on the throne in 1044AD 
was the foundation of present day Myanmar.  The King Anawrahta introduced the 
common weights and measures, made sure of the territory and boundaries, designated 
some towns as places where specific numbers of soldiers could be summoned to come to 
the king and established a defense system strategy of people‘s militia.  By doing so he 
made the first Myanmar empire strong‖. 
 
Furthermore, Article 340 of the 2008 constitution explicitly states that ―the Defence 
Services has the authority to administer the participation of the entire people in the 
Security and Defence of the Union. The strategy of the people‘s militia shall be carried 
out under the leadership of the Defence Services.‖ 
 
Of the many hundreds of militias now active across Shan State, the majority are small 
village defence forces, which have been formed by local Tatmadaw commanders to 
provide security and intelligence in territories under the control of the Tatmadaw. 
However, since 1988, a significant number of larger and more influential militias 
became active across Shan State, a phenomenon which cannot easily be explained by 
                                                          
168 This is an excerpt of a speech by General Saw Maung to Commanders in October 1988 (cited in 
Myoe 2009, 34-5).  
169  In numerous speeches Than Shwe has extolled the virtues of the people‘s militia strategy, A 
paradigmatic example can be found in the speech he delivered at the graduation ceremony of the 52nd 
intake of the Defense Service Academy on 11th December 2009, in which he stated: “The Tatmadaw 
alone cannot provide a comprehensive defense of the nation.  Therefore, it is necessary to organize the 
people to seek their cooperation.  Only then, can we implement the people‟s militia strategy which is the 
defense strategy of our nation.  As military leaders, you should also have organisational capabilities to 
mobilize local people.  In building a strong military power, just as unity within the army is important, it 
is equally important to focus on organizational capabilities outside the army in order to implement the 
people‟s militia strategy that can ensure comprehensive defense for the state” (NLM 2009). 
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focusing on the ideological foundations of the government‘s militia strategy. Contra 
Myoe‘s (2009) analysis, I argue that it is misleading to view the proliferation of these 
more powerful militia as motivated primarily by the government‘s official People‘s 
War doctrine, despite the ideological gloss this has provided, or simply as a 
continuation of previous counterinsurgency militia strategies. The origins, functions 
and impact of these militias are qualitatively different than those operating in the 
decades of insurgency prior to the ceasefire agreements. Their ubiquity is best 
understood as embedded within the strategies of spatial management developed by the 
government – at various levels (including central government, Tatmadaw Regional 
Commands, and local Tatmadaw units) – to manage the changing opportunities and 
threats they have faced across the Shan region (detailed in Chapter 7) and the 
subsequent ways in which these strategies have been negotiated by borderland actors. 
Thus, although militias are not a new phenomenon in Shan State, the proliferation of 
large militias and their role in shaping how power is transmitted through the region is 
one of the most significant, and under-reported, developments of the post-1988 
ceasefire period.  
   
Figure 8 provides a summary of the most significant militias that have operated within 
Shan State since 1988. It is to be read alongside Appendix 1, which provides brief 
summaries of many of these militias and biographies of their leaders. The information 
provided here is by no means fully comprehensive and there are other militias of 
similar size and influence for which I have been unable to attain reliable information. 
This research does, however, provide the first systematic effort to document militias 
operating in Shan State. The size of the militia is the estimated number of men which 
the militia is able to call upon. The majority of these are reserves who know how to 
use weapons and who take it in turns to carry out duties, rather than representing 
mobilised standing armies.   
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     Figure 8: Militias operating in Shan State 
Militia name Location 
(Township) 
Leader Size Origins Dates 
active 
Further Remarks 
 
Northern Shan State 
Hseng Keo Militia 
 
Hsipaw Sao Loimao  300 Former ceasefire 
group militia: formed 
from the disbanded 3rd 
Brigade of the SSA-N 
2009 - 
ongoing 
See Appendix 1 
Kutkhai Militia Kutkhai U Ti Khun Myat 600 Longstanding 
Tatmadaw-allied 
militia  
? - ongoing See Appendix 1 
Kawngkha 
Militias* 
 
 
Kutkhai Mahtu Naw 500+ Former ceasefire 
group: formed from 
the disbanded KDA 
1991 – 
ongoing 
(1989-2010 
as KDA; 
2010 – 
ongoing as 
militia) 
See Appendix 1 
 
* Numerous militias were formed when 
the KDA disbanded in 2010; all under 
overall control of Mahtu Naw 
Tamoeng−ngen 
Militia 
Kutkhai U Myint Lwin  
(aka Wang 
Guoda)*  
100 Longstanding 
Tatmadaw-allied 
militia 
Pre-1988 - 
ongoing 
See Appendix 1 
 
* Various spelling are given, including 
Won Kway Tar and Wang Kwe Tar 
Palaung Militia Kutkhai/ 
Namkham 
U Kya Htun 20-
40 
Former ceasefire 
group militia: formed 
from the disbanded 
PSLA 
2005-2009 See Appendix 1 
BGF 1006 Laukkai Bai Xuoqian  Former ceasefire 
group (MNDAA) 
converted into BGF 
2009 - 
ongoing 
See Appendix 1 
Mantong Palaung 
Militia 
Mantong Formerly U Tan 
Nyan; now Khun 
Li. 
50-
60 
Former ceasefire 
group militia: formed 
from the disbanded 
PSLA  
2005 - 
ongoing 
See Appendix 1 
BGF 1010 Matman Unknown  Longstanding 
Tatmadaw-allied 
militia 
2010* - 
ongoing 
* This is the date the militia was converted 
to BGF 
Mongkoe Defence Muse Mong Hsala  Former ceasefire Early 1990s * The Mongkoe Defence Army was 
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Army Militia: split from the 
MNDAA  
– 2000* disbanded by the Tatmadaw and its leader 
Mong Hsala arrested after a mutiny within 
the organisation.  
Mongpaw Militia Muse Keng Mai (aka 
Du Kying Mai in 
Kachin media) 
150-
200 
Militia formed since 
1988 by the Tatmadaw 
2000s - 
ongoing 
See Appendix 1 
Panhsay Militia Namkham / 
Kutkhai 
‘Panhsay’ Kyaw 
Myint 
(aka Li Shau 
Yung; Li 
Yongqiang) 
100+ Longstanding 
Tatmadaw-allied 
militia 
1980s – 
ongoing 
See Appendix 1 
Nampaka Village 
Militia 
Namkham Unknown; under 
the control of U 
Ti Khun Myat 
100 Militia formed since 
1988 by the Tatmadaw 
2011 - 
ongoing 
 
Nonsai* Militia Namhsan Htun Myat Lay 
 
50-
100 
Longstanding 
Tatmadaw-allied 
militia** 
Pre-1988 - 
ongoing 
See Appendix 1 
 
*Nonsai is a Village in Namhsan. 
 
** There is some discrepancy in accounts 
of when this militia was formed, with some 
stating it was a longstanding anti-
insurgency militia; others suggesting it 
was formed in the mid-2000s by the 
Tatmadaw.  
Manpang Militia 
(aka Tangyan 
Militia Fifth 
Company) 
Tangyan Bo Mon (aka U 
Sai Mon) 
500+ Ex-MTA 1996 - 
ongoing 
See Appendix 1 
Tangyan Militia 
First Company 
Tangyan Sai Hla Aung/ 
Sai Kham Leng 
80 Militia formed since 
1988 by the Tatmadaw 
2011- 
ongoing 
 
Tangyan Militia 
Second Company 
Tangyan Sai Than Tin 80 Militia formed since 
1988 by the Tatmadaw 
2011- 
ongoing 
 
Tangyan Militia 
Third Company 
Tangyan Aung Win 
Naing* 
40 Militia formed since 
1988 by the Tatmadaw 
2011- 
ongoing 
* Aung Win Naing is a former Tatmadaw 
soldier 
Tangyan Militia 
Fourth Company 
Tangyan Unknown 200 Militia formed since 
1988 by the Tatmadaw 
2011- 
ongoing 
 
Mongha Militia 
(Tangyan Militia 
Tangyan Ma Guowen (aka 
Lao Ma; Law Ma) 
150 Ex-MTA Between 
1996/2oo1* 
See Appendix 1 
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Sixth Company) 
 
(in state media: 
Monhin-Monha 
Militia) 
- ongoing * According to state media the militia was 
established in 2001, although this seems 
more likely to be the date it was officially 
recognized rather than when it was 
formed, which seems most likely to have 
been soon after Khun Sa’s surrender in 
1996. 
Nalao and Loizay 
Militias 
Tangyan Xiao Terh 400 Militia formed since 
1988 by the Tatmadaw 
2010 - 
ongoing 
 
Southern Shan State 
SSS Militia / 
Homong Militia / 
Homein Region 
Development and 
Welfare Group 
Langkho Maha Ja 150+ Ex-MTA 1996 - 
ongoing 
See Appendix 1 
Kali Militia Kunhing Sao Gai Fah  Former ceasefire 
group militia: formed 
from the disbanded 7th 
Brigade of the SSA-N 
2009 - 
ongoing 
See Appendix 1 
Laihka Wanpang 
Militia 
Laihka Formerly Col. 
Moengzuen*; 
now Kaling Htoi 
(aka Sai Htoi) 
50-
100 
Former 
insurgent/ceasefire 
group militia: Ex-
MTA; then SSA-S 758 
Brigade 
2005 - 
ongoing 
See Appendix 1 
 
* The group is associated with Col. 
Moengzuen who defected from the SSA-S 
in 2005. However, Moengzuen died 
around 2009 and was replaced by Kaling 
Htoi. 
Nayai Militia Nansang Zhou Sang 100+ Ex-MTA 1996-
ongoing 
See Appendix 1 
Matkyan (aka 
Markkieng) Militia 
Nansang Sai Lu (aka Lern 
Hsai) 
100+ Ex-MTA 1996 - 
ongoing 
See Appendix 1 
Eastern Shan State 
Punako* Militia Monghsat Ja Ngoi 100-
200 
Militia formed since 
1988 by the Tatmadaw 
Early 
2000s- 
ongoing 
See Appendix 1 
 
In Lahu Punako means ‘bat cave’ 
Nanyon Militia Mongphyak Ja Seo Bo 
(U Kya Soe Bo in 
state media) 
500+ Militia formed since 
1988 by the Tatmadaw 
Late 1990s/ 
early 
2000s* - 
ongoing 
See Appendix 1 
 
* Ja Seo Bo is a long-time government 
having fled from CPB advances in the area 
273 
 
during the 1970s. However, his militia was 
only formed in the late 1990s/early 2000s 
BGF 1007 
(formerly known 
as Hwe Aw* 
Militia) 
Mongton Ja Pikoi (aka 
Japi Kwe) 
 Lahu militia converted 
into BGF 
2010** - 
ongoing 
* Hwe Aw is the name of an area in west 
Mongton. 
 
**The militia was operating before 2010 
but this is the date it was converted into a 
BGF. 
Maeken* Militia Mongton Tin Win  Militia formed since 
1988 by the Tatmadaw 
Unkown - 
ongoing 
* Maeken is the name of a village tract in 
Mongton 
Mongyawn Militia Mongyawn Ai Ya 150 Ex-MTA Late 1990s- 
Unknown 
 
BGF 1008 Mongyawng   Lahu militia converted 
into BGF 
2010*  - 
ongoing 
*The militia was operating before 2010 but 
this is the date it was converted into a 
BGF. 
 Nam Pung* 
Militia  
Tachilek Yishay  60-
100 
Ex-MTA 1996 - 
ongoing 
See Appendix 1 
 
* Nam Pung means ‘Hot Spring’ 
Mong Hai Militia Tachilek Formerly 
Marku*; now 
unknown 
 Lahu militia formed 
since 1988 by the 
Tatmadaw  
 Marku was a close ally of Khin Nyunt and 
established links with MI. For reasons that 
remain unclear – possibly linked with 
Khin Nyunt’s fall and the purge of the MI 
– Marku lost favour and was imprisoned. 
Hawngleuk militia Tachilek Naw Kham* 100 Ex-MTA 1996-2012 *Naw Kham was arrested in 2012 by 
Chinese security forces. He was executed 
in 2013 for the murder of 13 Chinese 
sailors on the Mekong River in 2011. 
See Appendix 1 
Nahai Long Militia Tachilek Yi Lai* (aka Yin 
Lang) 
50-
100 
Ex-MTA Mid-2000s 
- 2011 
*Yi Lai was arrested and executed by the 
Chinese government alongside Naw Kham.   
See Appendix 1 
BGF 1009 Tachilek Kyaw Soe  Lahu militia converted 
into BGF 
2010*  - 
ongoing 
*The militia was operating before 2010 but 
this is the date it was converted into a 
BGF. 
Mekong Border 
Security Militia 
Tachilek Sai Awn* 300+ Militia formed since 
1988 by the Tatmadaw 
2009 – 
ongoing 
* Sai Awn is the son of Ja Seo Bo, the 
leader of the powerful Nanyon Militia 
based in Mongphyak. 
See Appendix 1 
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The majority of militias detailed in Figure 8 have one of three origins. Some are long-
standing anti-insurgency militias (thakasapha) who were active before 1988 under the 
control of local strongmen whom the Tatmadaw trusts. The most prominent examples 
include Kyaw Myint‘s Panhsay militia, U Myint Lwin‘s Tamoeng−ngen militia and U 
Ti Khun Myat‘s Kutkhai militia. All three men had close links with the military-
government in their locality during the Ne Win period and they have continued to 
control militias they formed during the 1980s. U Ti Khun Myat, for example, was 
leader of the local combat police force in Kutkhai during the 1980s, whilst U Myint 
Lwin was Secretary of the local People‘s Council in Tamoeng−ngen, and a member of 
the local judiciary. Kyaw Myint established an anti-insurgent militia in the early 1980s 
and is one of the longest-serving militia leaders within Shan State.  
 
A second group of militias have similar origins, in that they have been established by 
the Tatmadaw under leaders its trusts, but have been formed since 1988. The most 
prominent examples are Ja Seo Bo‘s Mongphyak militia and Keng Mai‘s Mongpaw 
militia. Ja Seo Bo, now in his 60s, is in fact a long-standing government ally.  He fled 
CPB advances in his native Wa State and provided intelligence to the Tatmadaw 
throughout the 1980s before forming a militia in the late 1990s or early 2000s having 
forged close links with Khin Nyunt and local Tatmadaw commanders.170  
 
The third group of militias operating across Shan State have their origins in the 
region‘s complicated insurgency politics, being composed predominantly of men who 
at one time or another have fought against the government. These ex-insurgent militias 
can be sub-divided into three groups. First, a number of militias emerged in the late 
1990s following Khun Sa‘s surrender of the MTA. Although many MTA troops joined 
Yawd Serk‘s SSA-South to continue fighting against the government, numerous MTA 
commanders forged their own local agreements with the Tatmadaw, converting 
themselves into militias ostensibly aligned with the central government. These include 
Bo Mon‘s Manpang militia and Ma Guowen‘s Mongha militia in northern Shan State, 
Maha Ja‘s SSS militia, the Nayai militia led by Zhou Sang, and Sai Lu‘s Matkyan 
militia all in southern Shan State, and the Nam Pung militia led by Yishay, the 
Mongyawn militia and Naw Kham‘s now defunct Hawngleuk militia in eastern Shan 
State. In some cases, notably Maha Ja, the transformation from MTA to proxy-
government militia merely cemented these leaders‘ pre-existing position as local 
                                                          
170 Interview with former Lahu militia leader. 14 February 2013. Chiang Mai. The information is 
corroborated in SHAN 2003. 
275 
 
strongmen. In other cases, however, MTA members seized upon the opportunity to 
lead militias as a means of empowering themselves and their supporters. Zhou Sang, 
for example, had merely been an administrative officer at the MTA‘s Homong 
headquarters prior to Khun Sa‘s surrender171 and Naw Kham had been an MTA Supply 
Officer in Mae Sai (SHAN 2006b).  
 
Second, numerous militias were formed following the Tatmadaw‘s forced disbandment 
of former ceasefire groups. The most prominent examples are the Palaung and 
Mantong militias formed in 2005 following the disarming of the PSLA, and the 
Hsipaw-based Hsengkeo militia and Kunhing-based Kali militia, both of which were 
formed following the forced surrender of the SSA-North‘s 3rd and 7th Brigades in 2009. 
Third, some militias have formed having chosen to break away from either insurgent 
or ceasefire groups, usually in an attempt to forge their own fiefdoms of autonomy 
and/or following internal power struggles. Both the Mongkoe Defence Army (now 
defunct) and BGF 1006 were formed following dissension against the MNDAA 
leadership of Peng Jiasheng. Similarly, the Wanpang militia in Laikha was formed 
after its then leader, Colonel Moengzuen, defected from the SSA-S in 2005 to support 
a short-lived Interim Shan Government in Chiang Mai which had declared Shan 
independence.172 Following threats from SSA-S headquarters Moengzeun met with the 
government and agreed to convert to a militia. State media announced his return ―to 
the legal fold‖ with 848 men in July 2006 (SHAN 2006c; NLM 2006). The militia was 
highly valued because of its intimate knowledge of the inner working of the SSA-S. It 
has been provided with money, weapons and cars by the Tatmadaw and has been 
involved in counterinsurgency operations against the SSA (SHAN 2007).   
 
8.2 NEGOTIATING POWER IN THE BORDERLAND: ACCOUNTING FOR THE 
RISE OF MILITIAS IN THE POST-1988 SHAN BORDERLANDS 
The plethora of large militias active across Shan State embody ―twilight institutions‖; 
they are not the state, but play an instrumental role in shaping people‘s everyday 
encounters with public authority (Lund 2006). They are government-sanctioned but 
epitomise the heterogeneity rather than state-homogenization of public authority and 
transcend the binaries often constructed between state and society, public and private 
and formal and informal practices of power. Across much of Shan State it is militias, 
either alongside or in place of government institutions that wield the coercive power 
used ―to define and enforce collectively binding decisions‖ (Lund 2006, 685) and to 
                                                          
171 Interview with SHAN, 26 April 2013. Chiang Mai. 
172 Moengzuen had been leader of the SSA-S‘s 758 Brigade in a region known as the ‗six corners‘ 
covering a region across Loilem, Laikha, Mongkaung, Kehsi, Mongnawng and Namzang. 
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set the parameters of  ―acceptable political, economic and social behaviour‖ (Taylor 
2009, 11). Militias play an instrumental role in shaping localised institutions of 
extraction through structuring and collecting local ‗taxes‘, controlling access to local 
resources – both for local populations and investors entering their locale – and by 
managing the dynamics of local economies, especially the drug economy (see Chapter 
9). The fact that they operate within state-sanctioned space means it is important to 
understand the functions the government envisions them playing, rather than starting 
from the premise that they are ‗non-state‘ or ‗anti-state‘ actors operating beyond the 
auspices of government. It is arbitrary to portray these militias as embodiments of state 
fragility or breakdown, simply because they do not align with our ‗idea‘ of how states 
should function. Instead, they are better understood as representing specific strategies 
of spatial management, motivated by the government‘s attempts to find expedient and 
cost-effective ways to extend its coercive and extractive power and to generate new 
forms of loyalty. 
 
To a certain extent the sanctioning of militias throughout Shan State reflects the fact 
that the pervasive militarisation of the region means the Tatmadaw believes it is now 
in a strong enough position to manage militias more effectively and to avoid a repeat 
of KKY experience. However, the deployment of militias also reflects the enduring 
difficulties of establishing unitary control across the region. Indeed, despite the heavy 
presence of military personnel in Shan State, developing a military state apparatus 
capable of defeating the insurgency, controlling local populations, and assuring a 
secure environment for business remains beyond the Tatmadaw‘s reach. Although it 
has meant ceding varying degrees of localised control, allowing militias to operate 
across Shan State rather than attempting to monopolise power has been viewed by the 
government as the most viable way, at least in the short term, of stabilising the region, 
wrestling further territory away from insurgents and insulating the Tatmadaw from the 
rigours and risks involved in the everyday governance of these areas.  
 
In lieu of the government‘s ability to monopolise control, it is a strategy designed to 
ensure that power, although dispersed, remains within structures of authority which the 
government believes in time it will be strong enough to either bring under greater 
control or disempower. In this sense, the government‘s approach to militia shares 
similarities with the ceasefire strategy. There are of course important differences. 
Agreements made with militias have been more informal and have been unaffected by 
the kinds of ethno-nationalist demands for political dialogue made by ceasefire groups, 
whilst militias have generally come under greater Tatmadaw control. However, the 
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government‘s attempted BGF strategy – intended effectively to convert ceasefire 
groups into glorified militias – reflects how, in the government‘s eyes at least, militia 
politics and ceasefire politics are parts of the same spectrum of borderland 
management.  
 
Importantly, the rise of militias in Shan State is not solely attributable to top-down 
government-led strategies, but also reflect how those within contested regions have 
attempted to navigate the opportunities and threats posed by encroaching state power. 
Growing Tatmadaw presence has brought with it both the threat of predatory 
exploitation in the form of taxation, conscription and forced labour, and the 
opportunity to access state-controlled resources and to establish power ‗within‘ state-
sanctioned structures of authority rather than outside of them. Encroaching state power 
has thus carried with it the threat of dismantling pre-existing forms of political 
authority whilst also offering the potential for their empowerment. Agreeing to form 
proxy-government militias has become one way of attempting to manage both the 
‗social‘ impact of encroaching state power – i.e. the impact of state institutions on how 
society functions – and its ‗distributive‘ impact – i.e. how the threats and opportunities 
of encroaching state power are distributed between different social groups.  
 
Militias, I argue, are therefore best understood as embodying forms of borderland 
brokerage occupying the political space created by the encroachment of government 
institutions since 1988 and the enduring difficulties the government has faced in 
monopolising power. The Shan region‘s long history of localised forms of authority 
and the wide dispersal of the means of violence accounts for the sheer number of 
militias which have come to occupy this political space. Their presence epitomises the 
dual foundations, outlined in Chapter 2, of the relationship between brokerage and 
state consolidation. They are embedded within the government‘s attempts to make 
borderland spaces and populations governable; yet they cannot be described simply as 
‗state agents‘ since the government‘s reliance upon these ‗twilight institutions‘ to 
transmit power through the borderland gives militias varying degrees of agency, 
autonomy and power. These foundations demonstrate the ambiguity, inherent 
precariousness and potential for instability within the relationship between militias and 
government. There lies constant tension between the government‘s attempts to 
capitalise upon the services militias can offer versus the risks that such a strategy will 
dilute its own authority. Militias, in turn, face the challenge of deciding how best to 
balance their own interests versus the need to retain government backing and local 
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legitimacy, and whether their interests are best served by attempts to carve out 
autonomy within government-controlled hierarchies of power or outside of them. 
 
In order to analyse the relationship between militias and the government‘s attempts to 
consolidate control I use the remainder of this section to assess how militias have 
shaped the transmission of coercive power through the region, their role in forging 
‗institutions of extraction‘ and how their activities have re-configured contests over the 
legitimacy of power structures. Following this broad overview I then use Section 3 to 
‗burrow down‘ into the dynamics of militia politics to explain why these dynamics 
have varied so significantly across Shan State in order to account for the spatially 
uneven political topography of the Myanmar state.   
 
8.2.1 Militias and the exercise of coercive power in the Shan borderland 
Alongside a sustained strategy of militarisation the Tatmadaw has sought to consolidate 
control across contested areas by forging ‗coalitions of coercive force‘ with local 
militias. The most important motivation behind this strategy lies in the fact that 
establishing militias is viewed as more effective and cost-saving in regions where the 
topography of steep hills and dense forests makes eradicating pockets of insurgency 
extremely costly and time-consuming. Beyond the major towns the Tatmadaw has 
often remained vulnerable. Battalions that should have seven hundred soldiers often 
have fewer than half that number and supply lines remain susceptible to attack.173 In 
this context militias are expected to act as counter-insurgent forces as part of informal 
coalitions with the Tatmadaw in which their access to certain privileges (see below) is 
dependent upon their ability to ensure the territorial enclaves they control remain 
insurgent-free, thereby denying insurgents access to resources and populations even in 
regions where the Tatmadaw has only a weak presence. Militias are thus intended to 
provide a means by which to extend the territorial frontiers of state control. The fact 
that almost all militia leaders and recruits are from ethnic minorities and many 
originate from former insurgent groups has meant that their understanding of the terrain, 
local languages and village leaders is often superior to that of Tatmadaw battalions, 
increasing their utility as counter-insurgency forces.  
 
This rationale is by no means unique to Myanmar. As Ariel Ahram‘s (2011, 14) study 
of ―state-sponsored militias‖ argues, militias are particularly prevalent in countries 
experiencing ―protracted low-intensity warfare‖ because: (i) they are cheaper to 
maintain than regular army units; (ii) colluding with militias gives states ―plausible 
                                                          
173 This assertion is from interviews with numerous Shan researchers in June 2011. 
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deniability for flagrant violence committed against civilians in the course of often 
brutal counterinsurgency campaigns‖; and (iii) because their superior knowledge of 
local ―physical and cultural terrain‖ enables them to develop ―improvise techniques of 
repression and surveillance specifically suited to their environments‖.      
 
In some parts of Shan State the Tatmadaw has sought to manage militias through 
establishing chains of command in which it has given larger, mobile militias the 
responsibility of managing smaller residential militias within the territory under their 
jurisdiction. Across Tangyan Township, for example, the Lashio-based North Eastern 
Regional Command has established close links with the Manpang Militia, whose leader 
Bo Mon was given the responsibility in the mid-2000s to manage other militias 
operating across the Township (SHAN 2005c). A similar strategy was deployed in 
eastern Shan State, also in the mid-2000s, where Ja Seo Bo‘s Mongphyak militia was 
given the responsibility by the Tatmadaw Triangle Regional Command for managing 
the plethora of Lahu militias operating across Tachilek, Mongphyak and Kengtung 
Townships. 174  These hierarchies of authority have created a chain of ‗upwards 
accountability‘ through which the Tatmadaw has been able to establish a permanent 
presence ‗by proxy‘ across large parts of Shan State, bringing even remote rural areas 
under greater surveillance and expanding the territory from which it has been able to 
conscript and extract revenue.  
 
The militia strategy has also been instrumental in reconfiguring conflict dynamics 
across Shan State, creating situations in which insurgent groups have often been 
confronted with local militias comprising men of their own ethnicity and from their 
own communities. For example, since returning to Palaung areas of northern Shan 
State, the TNLA has spent much of its time fighting against militias operating in the 
area, primarily Kyaw Myint‘s Panhsay militia (but also Htun Myat Lay‘s smaller 
Nonsai militia) rather than against the Tatmadaw directly. These militias know that 
retaining Tatmadaw support (and the privileges this entails) is dependent upon their 
ability to remain effective counter-insurgent forces. In turn the TNLA is acutely aware 
of the threat that these militias pose to their ability to interact with local populations so 
as to gain access to resources food, recruits and money. These tensions have proved 
effective in fragmenting conflict, inspiring a greater incidence of militia-insurgent 
conflict, which in turn has acted as a ―buffer‖ between insurgents and the Tatmadaw 
(TNI 2014, 31). 
 
                                                          
174 Interview with former Lahu militia leader. 14 February 2013. Chiang Mai. 
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The militia strategy has also become a means through which to manage the thorny 
issue of insurgent demobilisation. Apart from the SSNA in 2005, all other insurgent 
groups which have surrendered to the government (either by choice or under duress) – 
notably the MTA in 1996, the PSLA in 2005 and the SSA-North 3rd and 7th Brigades in 
2009 – were given the opportunity to form militias rather than demobilise completely. 
The ‗demobilisation into militia‘ strategy reflects a pragmatic belief that enabling these 
groups to retain their weapons, leaders and in some cases also their uniforms and 
insignia ameliorates the risk of them joining other armed groups. This was an 
especially important consideration when the MTA surrendered in light of its sheer size 
– approximately 12,000 men – and the fact that the SSA-South, SSA-North and SSNA 
all offered alternative recruitment opportunities for ex-MTA soldiers.  
 
Militias have also been established as a means of devolving responsibility for day to 
day control of localities, thereby insulating the Tatmadaw from the risks and rigours of 
governing the borderland. Militias have been tasked with recruiting soldiers, managing 
local disputes and guarding Tatamdaw barrack. The two accounts below, provided in 
interviews with individuals from townships in southern Shan State, are paradigmatic of 
the kinds of everyday functions that smaller militias carry out: 
 
The militia were controlled by the Army. They were small and were set up, the Army told 
them, to protect the village. The militia had 13-14 members to cover a cluster of 9 small 
villages.  People were forced to join.  They did not have a choice and the aim was to have 
1 or 2 members from each village.  They did not receive any pay or any food.  They had to 
carry out this role alongside their normal work.  They were really just there to work for the 
Army.  They might be guards for the Army, especially at night. (Monghsat Township). 
 
There were two militias.  There were about 30 members in each.  They were expected to 
guard the Army camp at night; that was their main job.  The two militias would take it in 
turns – one month on, one month off.  Each night about 5 militiamen would be expected to 
guard the camp and these would rotate every couple of days.  The militias had guns, old 
guns, provided by the Burma Army. Militia members are recruited through the village 
headman.  The Army would tell the headman that a certain number – say 10 – recruits 
were needed and the headman would seek to find recruits, usually emphasizing the 
protection that such a position could provide to your family. (Mongton Township). 
 
Militias have also been deployed to generate local compliance surrounding important 
national political events, often with little concern for how this is achieved. Htun Myat 
Lay‘s Nonsai militia, for example, was documented as pressurising Palaung 
populations to vote in favour of the 2008 constitution, whilst the Mongpaw, Manpang 
and Panhsay militias all pressured people during the 2010 election campaign to vote 
for the USDP, threatening punishment and imprisonment for those who didn‘t.175  
 
                                                          
175 Interviews with Palaung and Shan civil society organisations, May-June 2013, Mae Sot and Lashio.  
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Militias have been fashioned by the Tatmadaw but their ubiquity and durability also 
lies in the ways in which this strategy has been co-opted by other groups across Shan 
State. For some former insurgent groups, the militia strategy has been a means of 
retaining a degree of local legitimacy, autonomy and power in an environment in 
which weapons and soldiers remain the key form of collateral for bargaining with the 
government and other armed organisations. For others, becoming militias has been a 
means of empowerment in the context of the enduring terrains of violence that have 
underpinned the ceasefire period. Although ceasefire agreements and declining 
insurgency have greatly reduced levels of overt conflict, access to justice remains 
heavily circumscribed. The ‗law‘ has often been used to further the interests of a 
powerful nexus of inter-dependent military, government and private sector power 
rather than protect populations. Furthermore, lucrative parts of the economy are 
officially illegal with no formal contract or property rights.176 In this environment 
‗security‘ is hardly a public good but has become a highly valued private commodity, 
both as a means of protection and predation  (TNI 2014, 37).  
 
In this environment the means of violence – in terms of whom violence is enacted by, 
upon whom and for what purposes – becomes an important site of contestation. For the 
Tatmadaw, conferring ‗violence rights‘ to militias has become an essential aspect of 
forging localised ‗limited access orders‘ and demonstrates how the foundations of such 
coalitions are not purely economic. Militia membership can be a way of avoiding 
forced recruitment to the Tatmadaw and a means of protecting families from harsh 
treatment by the Tatmadaw and alleviating the risk of excessive taxation or land 
dispossession.177 Some former militia members also noted that being a militia member 
meant other villagers were required to provide food and farm labour to their 
families.178 In other cases, militia status has been coveted as a means to gain 
Tatmadaw backing. By linking themselves with more powerful structures of authority, 
militias can enjoy protection and impunity. In some cases the opportunity to form 
militias has become an exit option for disgruntled members of ceasefire or insurgent 
groups (DVB 2012).  Violence, masquerading as counter-insurgency or counter-
narcotics initiatives, may then be used by militias to serve other interests, notably to 
tax, to settle local disputes, to seize assets and to wrestle control over local economies. 
                                                          
176 The illegal economy not only encompasses drugs, but also the illegal extraction of legal resources 
such as timber and gems and the innumerable forms of local ‗taxation‘ such as on crops, land and travel 
in the form of road tolls that are not formally sanctioned. 
177 Interview with former militia recruit from Namkham Township, 3 May 2013, Mae Sot. 
178 Interview with family members of former militia recruits from southern Shan State townships, April 
2014, Fang District, Thailand.  
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In many cases establishing militias has thus served the mutual interests of both the 
Tatmadaw and militia leaders.  
 
However, inherent tensions remain between the Tatmadaw‘s determination to use 
militias as counter-insurgent forces and the motivation amongst recruits to join militias 
as a means of mitigating their risk of facing violence. Militias remain most valued as 
counterinsurgent forces in territories where insurgents are still active and where the 
real risks of violence may discourage recruitment. In 2010, for example, tensions 
emerged between the Tatmadaw and the Mongphyak militia – despite the close links 
between the government and its leader Ja Seo Bo – after the militia suffered casualties 
acting as guards for the Tatmadaw in attacks against the SSA-S. Similarly, most of the 
Palaung militias formed after the 2005 disbanding of the PSLA have stopped 
functioning after the renewed threat of insurgency in the region now posed by the 
TNLA. Many Kachin militias in northern Shan State also faced high desertion rates 
after the resumption of fighting against the KIA in 2011. 
 
8.2.2 Militias and borderland institutions of extraction 
Militias have also become an integral part of the ―institutions of extraction‖ that have 
surrounded resources throughout Shan State over the past 25 years (Snyder 2006).179 
The stability created by the ceasefires, the prioritisation given to by the government to 
generate revenue from the border regions, the partial liberalisation of the national 
economy and increasing transnational (primarily Chinese) investment flows have 
provided new motivations and opportunities for revenue extraction across Shan State 
(see Chapter 7). Militias have played an integral part in shaping these processes. In 
many parts of Shan State they have become important partners in ‗joint institutions of 
extraction‘ with the Tatmadaw (or military-owned companies) and/or foreign or 
domestic companies with links to the military. Alongside the Tatmadaw, they have 
provided the coercive infrastructure required to ―open up‖ new spaces for extraction 
and to ―discipline‖ local populations (Nevins & Peluso 2008, 3). Across contested 
regions ―accumulation by dispossession‖ has been the easiest and commonest way of 
securing economic opportunities, placing a premium upon the means of violence 
(Harvey 2003). Alongside continued insurgency it is these forms of deeply illiberal, 
                                                          
179 ―Institutions of extraction‖ refer to who controls revenue-generating enterprises, the extent to which 
these enterprises are monopolised by a single actor or whether coalitions form around revenue extraction, 
and the relationship between these institutions and political order. It represents a political economy 
approach to analysing the relationship between resources and (dis)order which eschews totalising 
narratives, such as the ‗resource curse‘ literature or that which tries to equate certain kinds of resources 
with specific socio-political outcomes (for example, drugs with violence and instability), and instead 
emphasises the importance of engaging with the ‗politics of production‘ and the social relations or 
institutions which emerge around resources. 
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violent and inherently unequal processes of ‗development‘ that have perpetuated the 
unruliness of the Shan borderland. These dynamics can be understood as cyclical; 
violence has been used as a means to secure control over resources, whilst the 
resistance this evokes has in turn ensured that access to the means of violence remains 
an important aspect of securing gains and stabilizing territory. In this sense, militias 
have become part of the enduring violence governing capitalist social relations, a 
means of both imposing these relations and managing perpetual resistance against 
them (De Angelis 2004; Harvey 2003; Glassman 2006; Bonefeld 2001; Polanyi 1944). 
These dynamics have developed on different time-scales and with varying intensity 
across Shan State. The stability created by the ceasefires in northern Shan State and the 
area‘s proximity to China meant that violent economic transformation developed here 
earliest and with greatest intensity. In much of central and southern Shan State these 
dynamics emerged only after the counter-insurgency offensives and massive forced 
relocation campaigns of the late 1990s and early 2000s.   
 
The roles played by militias in ‗joint institutions of extraction‘ have demonstrated 
significant diversity. In some cases militias have become ‘violent entrepreneurs’.180 I 
define ‗violent entrepreneurship‘ as the use of government-sanctioned violence 
(‗violence rights‘) as a means of accumulating capital. It represents the ways in which 
militia-owned businesses, financed by foreign investors or by their own revenue (often 
accumulated within the illicit economy), have been at the forefront of processes of 
commoditization, becoming ―ceasefire capitalists‖ in their own right with profits 
remaining in the hands of militia leaders. The ‗joint‘ aspect of these enterprises lies in 
the fact that significant amounts of revenue have flowed from these companies to the 
Tatmadaw in the form of payments for resource concessions, protection fees, road-tolls 
for vehicles passing through Tatmadaw-controlled checkpoints and various under-the-
table kickbacks. These ‗contingency expenses‘ have played an important role in 
covering the costs of continued Tatmadaw militarisation and have also generated 
substantial private income for Tatmadaw commanders. 
 
A clear example of this kind of ‗violent entrepreneurship‘ is the Shan State South 
Company Ltd. formed in the late 1990s by Maha Ja, leader of the SSS militia, with its 
headquarters at Homong. The company has generated significant revenue, primarily 
                                                          
180 This term is the same of Volkov‘s (2002). My definition shares similarities with Volkov‘s, although 
my intention is to deconstruct his use of the term in order to account for the different roles played by 
militias in institutions of extraction. I argue that the diverse roles played by militias are best understood 
by drawing a distinction between their role as ‗violent entrepreneurs‘ and their role as ‗entrepreneurs of 
violence‘, a distinction that is not made by Volkov. 
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from logging but also gems mining and import/export businesses. Violence has been 
an important aspect of these enterprises and one of the main areas of teak forest to 
which Maha Ja has logged was in Kengtawng, an area out of which more than 50 
villages were forcibly relocated in 1996/7. The Tatmadaw has also gained significant 
income from its activities in the form of taxes, tolls for use of government-controlled 
road and even provision of teak from the Company‘s concessions, free-of-charge, for 
use in constructing military barracks. These militia-Tatmadaw joint institutions of 
extraction share significant similarities with those formed between the Tatmadaw and 
some ceasefire groups. The NDAA, for example, has formed numerous private 
companies, including Shwe Lin Star, Green Light and Asia Wealth. These companies 
have been involved in various enterprises including road-building, tourism, 
import/export, logging and coal and magnesium mines. According to a report by a 
Lahu civil society organisation, the Tatmadaw collected an annual tax on these logging 
and mining enterprises (in the region of 30,000 yuan (£3,000 / $4,800) per mine) after 
which profits remained with the NDAA (LNDO 2005, 6).  
 
In other cases, militias have served primarily as ‘entrepreneurs of violence’. I use this 
term to define the coercive ‗services‘  militias have provided to other business 
enterprises operating in Shan State, which militias themselves are not ‗shareholders‘ of 
and do not receive profits from. In this role militias have been deployed to dispossess 
land slated for development and to securitize development sites operated by the 
government and/or private companies. As Kevin Woods (2011) has argued, these 
kinds of development projects cannot be understood merely as extractive enclaves but 
bleed into the surrounding territories. They are often reliant upon labour and supplies 
(food, vehicles) from their localised hinterlands, with militias playing an important 
role in mobilising these resources. The ‗joint‘ aspect of these institutions of extractions 
lies in the way that militias have also generated revenue through their involvement, 
either by being paid for the security services they have provided or by being granted 
the opportunity to operate their own income-generating enterprises, such as manning 
road checkpoints, drug businesses or agricultural projects as a quid pro quo for their 
role in facilitating extraction by the Tatmadaw or companies aligned with it. The role 
played by Kyaw Myint‘s Panhsay militia in the forced relocation of many villages in 
Namkham Township to make way for Shweli Dam 1 in the mid-2000s provides a clear 
example of these dynamics.181 The Panhsay militia has also been one of numerous 
militias given responsibility securing the pathway of the oil and gas pipelines through 
                                                          
181 Interviews with Palaung civil society groups: Mae Sot, 17 November 2012; Lashio, 17 June 2013. 
See also TSYO 2011. 
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northern Shan State, protecting settlements of Chinese labourers working on the site 
and mobilising labour locally to work on parts of the project. It has also provided 
coercive services to many medium-scale enterprises operating in Namkham Township, 
an area still heavily affected by conflict between the Tatmadaw and the KIA, TNLA 
and SSA. It has, for example, provided protection for various silica mining projects 
operated by Myanmar mining companies including Myanmar Mya Oo, Ngwe Kabar 
Kyaw and Ban Thissa (SHRF et al. 2014). In return the militia has generated revenue 
through charging protection fees and has also been granted permission by the 
Tatmadaw to operate numerous business enterprises of its own, including drugs (see 
Chapter 9).  
          
The ways in which militias have become embedded within processes of borderland 
economic development has allowed the government‘s militia strategy to be self-
financed, whilst at the same time instilling militias with vested interests in encroaching 
government control across contested regions. These institutions of extractions have 
also helped to finance Tatmadaw militarisation and have channelled borderland 
revenue away from insurgent groups. For militias, the scope to embed themselves, to 
varying degrees, within the changing ‗post‘-war economic landscape has provided 
valuable economic opportunities by enabling many militia leaders to move across 
certain boundaries. For some militia leaders, returning to the ‗legal fold‘ by 
transitioning from insurgent to government proxy has enabled them to remain local 
strongmen and to retain a degree of local autonomy in ways that were becoming 
increasingly difficult as insurgents.  Forging links with the government has also 
enabled militias involved in the drug trade to ―diversify‖ and ―graduate‖ into the legal 
economy. Militia leaders long implicated in the drug trade, such as Kyaw Myint 
(Panhsay militia), Bo Mon (Manpang militia), Maha Ja and Sai Lu (Matkyan militia) 
have all formed legal economic enterprises through which to invest drug revenues and 
to secure their assets should the government attempt to crackdown on the drug trade in 
the future. The diverse institutions of extraction that have emerged between the 
military government, private companies and militias across Shan State epitomise the 
messiness and violence surrounding processes of territorialisation and the ways in 
which these processes have been shaped by both government-strategies but also actors, 
material interests and processes beyond direct government control.  
 
8.2.3 Militias, state legitimacy and the quest to establish infrastructural 
power in the Shan borderland 
The government‘s militia strategy can also be interpreted as part of a longer-term 
attempt to reconfigure borderland structures of power in an attempt to strengthen the 
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legitimacy, or at least the acceptance of state power. The militia strategy has become 
an important aspect of how the government has sought to forge ‗infrastructural power‘, 
whereby populations come to internalize the power of the state and act within 
government-sanctioned parameters of acceptable social behaviour (Mann 1984) The 
role of militias in this process is twofold.  
 
Firstly, they have been used to weaken ethno-nationalist discourses, which have long 
been used to counter the government‘s own nationalist rhetoric and to legitimate 
insurgency. Insurgent groups know that their ability to gain legitimacy with local 
populations and internationally and to strengthen their position in negotiations with the 
government, is dependent upon their ability to control territory and to portray 
themselves as the sole custodians of ethnic rights in the face of centrally-imposed 
forms of Burman state authority. However, the ability of militias to empower certain 
people within ethnic groups by providing a means of protection, social mobility and 
economic benefit has blurred conflict narratives and has proved highly effective in 
further fragmenting conflict across Shan State (TNI 2014, 31). These localised 
conflicts have disorientated the ‗mental maps‘ through which local populations have 
navigated violence and instability throughout sixty years of conflict. Joel Migdal (2004, 
7) defines mental maps as incorporating ―elements of the meaning people attach to 
spatial configurations, the loyalties they hold, the emotions and passions that 
groupings evoke, and their cognitive ideas about how the world is constructed‖, which, 
although social constructions also ―mark and maintain…separation between groups.‖ 
For local populations, militias variously represent forms of protection, opportunity and 
predation. Akin to Blok‘s account of mafiosi in rural Sicily (see Chapter 3), militias 
have, for some, offered a ―mechanism for social mobility‖ and yet have also played a 
role in the violence, dispossession and disempowerment that communities faces amidst 
the expansion of capitalist dynamics and state territorialisation since 1988. Their 
presence alongside insurgents, ceasefire groups and Tatmadaw units, has complicated 
mosaics of territorial control and increased the risks of punishment for collaboration 
with one side or another. The militia infrastructure established across parts of Shan 
State has kept resentment in check and ensured bitterness has mostly given way to 
acquiescence rather than inspiring resistance. As one former militia member in 
Namkham explained, ―village leaders are very weak, certainly much weaker than the 
local militia leader. Village leaders are afraid of the militia and no-one wants to be 
village leader.”182 
 
                                                          
182 Interview with former militia recruit from Namkham Township, 3 May 2013, Mae Sot. 
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Secondly, militias have become part of a strategy to establish new structures of 
borderland governance which can garner greater legitimacy amongst local populations. 
Enabling powerful local elites to become militia leaders can be understood as an 
attempt to empower those who have proven ability to manage local populations and 
who can claim legitimacy through their ethnicity, their ability to speak local languages, 
their longstanding local ties and their ability to support local communities (such as 
through religious donations and charitable work), yet whose positions are also reliant 
upon maintaining the support of the government. The Tatmadaw evidently believes 
that incorporating such figures can ground state authority by blurring the distinction 
between local systems of government and centrally imposed forms of authority, which 
are often still viewed as arbitrary and exploitative. The clearest example of this relates 
to the number of militia leaders that were elected as MPs in the 2010 election as 
representatives of the government-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party 
(USDP). This list includes: Kyaw Myint (Panhsay militia), U T Khun Myat (Kutkhai 
militia), Keng Mai (Mongpaw militia), U Myint Lwin (Tamoeng-ngen militia) and Bai 
Xuoqian and Liu Guoxi (both BGF 1006) (SHAN 2011, 19-24).  
  
For some armed groups forming militias has become a means for armed groups to seek 
to navigate competing ―registers of legitimacy‖ (Lund 2006, 693). Ceasefire and 
insurgent groups have come under conflicting pressures from local populations, 
described by one retired SSA-‗N‘ Commander as the need to adhere to the ―3 not-tos: 
Not to surrender, not to return to the armed struggle and not to leave them to the 
mercies of the Burma Army‖ (SHAN 2009b). Taking on militia status has thus been a 
way for some groups, such as the former SSA-N Hseng Keo and Kali militias, to try to 
reach accommodation with an increasingly powerful Tatmadaw, whilst also seeking to 
retain the support of local populations. 
 
More commonly, embracing the ‗idea‘ and iconography of the state has seemingly 
been an alluring way for militias to institutionalise their role and conceal the contested, 
violent and exploitative foundations of their power. As Lund (2006, 686) argues, in 
such contexts ―it is difficult to ascribe exercised authority to the ‗state‘ as a coherent 
institution; rather, public authority becomes the amalgamated result of the exercise of 
power by a variety of local institutions and the imposition of external institutions, 
conjugated with the idea of a state‖. In numerous cases militias have been re-branded 
as ―region development groups‖ with former insurgent commanders now portrayed as 
―leaders of national races‖ (NLM 2007, 6-7; 16). These militias have sought to situate 
their own local activities within broader projects of democratization (for example 
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through their attendance at the National Convention which drafted the 2008 
constitution) and government-led development initiatives. Local militia land grabs, for 
example, have been framed within government narratives of converting wastelands 
into productive agricultural land.   
 
Paradoxically, although these claims may be used to legitimate highly localized and 
personalized forms of rule, they may nonetheless have a ―strong governmental 
function‖, grounding authority through recourse to impersonal discourses of 
development and formalised legal and administrative codes (Raeymaekers et al. 2008). 
There has been an especially important economic dimension to these governance 
dynamics, with borderland actors seeking to secure and legitimize extra-legal and often 
violent forms of accumulation through recourse to state laws. Companies linked to 
militias have been at the forefront of these processes in many parts of Shan State. Their 
ties to the Tatmadaw and government-backed business enterprises have enabled them 
to ‗use‘ legal frameworks for their own interests whilst denying access to others. Their 
privileged position has thus enabled militias to activate boundaries between 
formal/legal and non-formal/customary property ownership structures, determining 
who is included and who is excluded from accessing legal empowerment or protection. 
This has created new patronage structures in which the ability to secure and make 
legible borderland spaces has become an extremely important resource. In some cases 
such actions have inspired resistance from local populations, albeit increasingly in the 
form of litigious movements to register their own land rather than in the form or armed 
opposition, demonstrating how even such forms of resistance have become entrapped 
in these emerging governance structures.          
 
8.3 THE DIVERSITY OF MILITIA POLITICS: ACCOUNTING FOR THE UNEVEN 
POLITICAL TOPOGRAPHY OF THE MYANMAR STATE  
The analysis above explains the broad contours of militia politics across Shan State 
since 1988. However, within these contours there has been very little uniformity in the 
trajectory of militia politics in terms of the level of autonomy militias have exercised, 
how their actions account for the spectrum of violence experienced by populations, and, 
most important for my research question, the extent to which their actions have served 
to consolidate or fragment the government‘s efforts to consolidate power. There are 
two reasons for the diversity within militia politics. Firstly, the military government 
has employed different militia strategies according to different contexts across the 
Shan region. Secondly, these diverse strategies have themselves had varying levels of 
success and unintended consequences. Understanding this diversity thus requires 
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engaging with both state ‗strategies‘ that shape how power is exercised but also ‗de-
centring‘ the state to consider the impact of forces beyond the government‘s control 
and intentions.  
 
In order to capture effectively the uneven political topography of militia politics I 
argue that it is instructive to apply the spectrum of borderland brokerage developed in 
Chapter 3. The government has, I argue, sought to use militias to fulfil both ‗frontier 
brokerage‘ and ‗territorialising brokerage‘ functions, with both strategies proving 
effective in some areas and yet failing in others. As I elucidate below, a number of 
factors have determined how the government has sought to deploy militias. The most 
important of these factors has been the strategic importance of the territory in which 
militias are deployed, in terms of both countering insurgency and extracting resources. 
Secondary factors include the strength of the militia, the timing of when the militia 
became active, levels of government trust in the militia‘s leader(s) and the existing 
extent of Tatmadaw militarisation in the area (although this is commonly a function of 
the region‘s strategic importance).   
 
8.3.1 Militias as frontier brokers 
The government has deployed ‗frontier brokerage‘ in contexts where government 
control and Tatmadaw militarization have been limited and in territories of less 
strategic importance. This form of brokerage has been most common in remote parts of 
central and southern Shan State where the government has historically wielded little 
control and where transport and communication links are poor, making Tatmadaw 
troop deployment slow and supply lines stretched. The most common examples of this 
form of frontier brokerage are the ex-MTA groups operating across central and 
southern Shan State, such as the SSS, Nayai and Matkyan militias.  They operate in 
regions in which the government‘s priority has been to deny insurgents access to 
populations but in which the costs of securing and administering territory have 
discouraged the Tatmadaw from taking on direct control, especially during periods 
when it has been heavily stretched fighting insurgency elsewhere, as was the case 
when these ex-MTA militias formed in the late 1990s. Instead, the Tatmadaw has been 
willing to devolve authority to militias, allowing them to carve out territorial enclaves 
in which they have retained a fair degree of autonomy in return for ensuring these 
enclaves remain stable and off-limits to insurgents.  
 
In these cases resource concessions have been used primarily as a means to establish 
trust and to ensure militias develop a vested interest in continuing to act as proxy-
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government forces. There has been scope for militias to become ‗violent 
entrepreneurs‘, controlling their own businesses around which they have paid certain 
fees or kickbacks to the Tatmadaw.  These enterprises have commonly revolved 
around heroin and yaba refining and trafficking, reflecting the long-standing 
involvement of certain militia leaders (especially ex-MTA units) in the drug trade. The 
government has offered these groups impunity, protection and official ‗rebranding‘ as 
‗region development groups‘, whilst knowing that their involvement in drugs may 
provide a means of moving against them in the future (this argument is made in greater 
detail in Chapter 9). These forms of frontier brokerage have often provided scope for 
―situational adjustment‖ as militias have sought to exploit ambiguity to maximise their 
own interests (Raeymaekers et al 2008, 17). In southern Shan State militias have 
formed joint institutions of extraction surrounding logging and drugs with Tatmadaw 
commanders, but have also operated concomitantly beyond government-sanctioned 
networks, granting logging deals to private companies in areas adjacent to their 
concessions without government permission, and/or continuing to forge local 
agreements with the SSA-South. For example, during fighting between the SSA-South 
and the PNO ceasefire group in 2004, SSA troops moved through territory controlled 
by the Matkyan and Nayai groups, even disguising themselves by wearing militia 
uniforms. 183  This reflects the personal affiliations that remain between erstwhile 
insurgent allies and the local alliances for profit that have often transcended the 
government‘s attempts to establish firm boundaries between militias and insurgents. 
These ‗alliances for profit‘ may be motivated by attempts to mask the true amount of 
revenue a militia is generating in order to reduce the amount it is required to pay to 
Tatmadaw commanders and/or by the desire to minimise the risk of attack when 
transporting goods through territories in which insurgent groups are active.      
 
On a day-to-day level local populations have continued to experience violence under 
these forms of frontier brokerage due to the fact that militias have been able to act with 
impunity and there is little scope for accessing justice or redressing grievances. 
Furthermore, recurring fears that an increasingly powerful Tatmadaw may eventually 
dismantle them entirely has created a semi-permanent state of flux encouraging militia 
leaders and those allied with them to maximise extraction from the areas they currently 
control rather than develop more sustainable streams of revenue. Militias such as the 
SSS have been implicated in rampant logging, which has forcibly relocated local 
populations, removed communal forest areas and caused environmental destruction, 
                                                          
183 Interview with the Palaung National Liberation Army‘s Vice Chairman of Staff, 5 January 2013. 
Maehongson Province, Thailand.  
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and in human trafficking enterprises (FBR 2007). These kinds of brokerage deals have 
also created scope for more severe outbreaks of sustained violence between militias 
and government forces. Although the Tatmadaw‘s immediate power in these ‗frontier‘ 
regions may be limited, its overall power across Shan State is vastly superior and has 
at times been called upon to keep militia frontier brokers in check or to re-negotiate the 
unofficial terms of agreement with militias. The Tatmadaw‘s violent attacks on the 
Mongkoe Defence Army (MDA) in 2000 after a mutiny in its ranks destabilised the 
region under its control offers a clear example. Many of those who mutinied were 
killed, the MDA‘s leader, Mong Hsala, was arrested and the region was taken over by 
the Tatmadaw. Similarly, the Kokang Incident in 2009, which caused tens of 
thousands of people to flee across the China border and which led to the MNDAA‘s 
conversion into a Border Guard Force, demonstrates how violence has been used by 
the government to keep militias and ceasefire groups in check, to force them to adhere 
to government demands and to send warnings to other groups.   
 
Bo Mon‟s Manpang Militia: The successful transformation of a frontier broker to a 
territorialising broker  
The case of the Manpang militia offers a clear example of how frontier brokerage 
strategies have become an effective means through which the government has been 
able to consolidate control over former insurgent-affected territory. From its insurgent 
background as part of the MTA, the Manpang militia gradually became highly trusted 
and played an important role in extending the government‘s coercive and extractive 
power across parts of Tangyan. In terms of strengthening the government‘s coercive 
power, the Manpang militia has conducted mass forced recruitment campaigns for the 
Tatmadaw across parts of rural Lashio and Tangyan, taking on an arduous and 
conflictual duty that formerly had to be undertaken directly by the military (SHAN 
2009c). It has helped to control strategic Salween river crossings and was also 
delegated responsibility by the Tatmadaw for managing the array of smaller militia 
units across the township. In recent years it has also been involved in counter-
insurgency offensives alongside the Tatmadaw, notably against the SSA-North in 2011 
and KIA in 2012. The militia has also played an important role in shaping institutions 
of extraction across Tangyan. It has acted as a ‗violent entrepreneur‘, profiting from 
continued involvement in the drug trade and has also established legal business 
enterprises, namely the Shan Yoma Aye Chan Yey rubber company, which has 
cultivated rubber on more than 1,200 acres seized from local communities, and the 
Triple ‗A‘ Company that has been involved in joint coal-mining enterprises at 
Mongma in northern Tangyan (TNI 2014, 16; Global Witness 2015, 37). These licit 
and illicit enterprises have generated income for the Tatmadaw in the form of resource 
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concession agreements and protection fees. Through stabilising control across the 
region the Manpang militia has also enabled other domestic and foreign private 
companies to move into the area to operate agribusinesses and mining concessions. 
Although it has been difficult to ascertain precise evidence, it seems likely that the 
Manpang militia has played a role in securing these concessions, many of which are on 
land confiscated from local farmers (Global Witness 2015). The militia has effectively 
transformed from undertaking frontier brokerage functions to territorialising functions, 
enabling the Tatmadaw to delegate day-to-day governance responsibilities without the 
fear that empowering the militia may pose a challenge to its authority.  
 
Three reasons lie behind the success of the government‘s brokerage strategy in 
Tangyan. Firstly, Tangyan‘s increasing strategic importance has meant that the militia 
has been closely monitored by the Tatmadaw, which has also established a heavy 
presence in the area. The highland areas around Tangyan continue to be heavily 
contested with both the SSA-N and SSA-S having bases in the region.184 The township 
has one of the few easily navigable Salween River crossing points and is thus a vital 
gateway to UWSA and NDAA territory east of the river. Controlling this region is thus 
essential to the government‘s attempts to break the links between the various insurgent 
and ceasefire groups.  With a new road constructed between Tangyan and Wa 
headquarters at Panghsang the region will also become of huge important to any future 
Tatmadaw offensives against the UWSA and NDAA. This level of Tatmadaw 
oversight has gradually constricted the militia‘s scope for ‗situational adjustment‘, 
facilitating the transition of a former insurgent group into a government proxy.  
 
Secondly, close personal links have developed between Bo Mon (aka U Sai Mon), the 
militia‘s leader, and high-ranking officials in both the Northeast Regional Command 
and central government. These have been documented in state media and have played 
an important role in facilitating trust between the Tatmadaw and the militia (see 
photograph at the start of this chapter).  
 
Thirdly, the Manpang militia has enjoyed significant benefits from allying with the 
government. The militia has been re-branded from an insurgent group to a leading 
force in promoting regional development. For example, on 4th January 2006, in the 
annual government awards marking Independence Day, Bo Mon was awarded the First 
Class Performance in Social Field Medal, in his capacity as the ‗Chairman on the 
                                                          
184 Tangyan was an SSA-N stronghold prior to 2005 but since then has gradually been squeezed out of 
much of the region. The SSA-S has an important base at Loizay in the hills to the southeast of Tangyan. 
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Manpan People‘s Militia, Shan State (North)‘ (NLM 2006). The militia has profited 
from continued involvement in the drug trade and has also been able to establish legal 
business enterprises. Although the areas under the militia‘s control are effectively 
under dual administration, administered by both the militia and the government, a 
recent TNI Report (2014, 32) claims that bureaucrats and police must still get prior 
permission to enter certain areas under the militia‘s control. All of these factors have 
allowed the militia to carve out a greater degree of autonomy and power within 
government-sanctioned structures of authority. 
 
Naw Kham and the failures of frontier brokerage strategies 
In other cases, however, frontier brokerage has proved ineffective in consolidating 
government control. The case of Naw Kham‘s Hawngleuk militia is an example par 
excellence. The militia had similar origins to Bo Mon‘s Manpang militia having also 
been formed in the late 1990s as a government-sanctioned militia from former MTA. 
Naw Kham apparently forged close links with Lt. Gen. Ko Ko who served as a 
Commander in Tachilek in the 1990s and is incumbent Minister for Home Affairs and 
Chairman of the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC) (SHAN 2011, 
16; SHAN 2006, 43). The Tatmadaw‘s rationale in accommodating this militia was 
less about governing territory and more as a means of establishing a degree of control 
over highly lucrative drug trafficking routes along the Mekong River in eastern 
Tachilek. By forging tacit agreements with Naw Kham the Tatmadaw‘s intentions 
were seemingly twofold. Firstly, it would re-direct drug revenues into the hands of a 
proxy-government militia rather than insurgent groups or the increasingly powerful 
Wa Southern Command. Secondly, it would enable the Tatmadaw to extract revenue 
from the drug trade by demanding protection payments from Naw Kham.  
 
For Naw Kham, militia status enabled him to operate with relative impunity, to move 
freely and to own properties in Tachilek in return for regular payments to officials. 
This strategy, however, ultimately proved ineffective in extending durable government 
over this remote corner of eastern Shan State. Naw Kham‘s overt involvement in 
cross-border trafficking drew concern from neighbouring governments, primarily 
China, whose pressure was behind the government‘s attempts to crackdown on Naw 
Kham‘s drug operations in 2006. After 2006 Naw Kham went underground but 
continued to control trafficking routes along the Burma-Lao Mekong river border. In 
October 2011 he was blamed for the shooting of thirteen Chinese workers travelling on 
two cargo boats. The motivation for these deaths remains unclear with speculation that 
it was either part of a drug deal that had gone wrong or due to the ships‘ failure to pay 
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the necessary protection fees (TNI 2014, 38; SHAN 2011, 16). The abandoned boats 
were found to contain methamphetamine pills and a number of the bodies recovered 
from the river had their hands tied behind their backs. The incident drew huge public 
outcry within China. Chinese authorities launched a manhunt to capture Naw Kham, 
who was eventually arrested in Laos, extradited to China and executed by lethal 
injection in March 2013.  
 
In this case frontier brokerage clearly proved ineffective. Naw Kham‘s drug enterprise 
enabled him to develop an extensive patronage network across the borderland regions 
of Myanmar, Thailand and Laos by paying off officials and village headmen and 
gaining the support of local populations through his taxing of Chinese commercial 
interests and local patronage (McCartan 2009). These patronage networks enabled him 
to manoeuvre between the plurality of networks – public and private; legal and illegal; 
domestic and foreign – across the Golden Triangle. Such networks reduced his reliance 
on the Myanmar government, blunting its efforts to forge any kind of effective limited 
access order with Naw Kham around the cross-border drug trade. Through enriching 
government officials Naw Kham was also able to blur the boundaries between their 
public responsibilities and private interests, in some cases ‗entrapping‘ officials within 
illicit networks, rather than becoming entrapped himself in government efforts to 
broker borderland trade networks through him. Furthermore, his ability to cross 
international boundaries enabled him to escape belated efforts by the Tatmadaw to 
capture him, blunting the effectiveness of the kind of violent strategies used by the 
Tatmadaw against other frontier brokers to bring him into line. The failures of this 
brokerage strategy were reflected in how the incident drew unwanted international 
attention to the messy nexus of drugs, conflict and militarisation in this remote part of 
the country. Myanmar Government officials expressed resentment against China‘s 
willingness to ignore the country‘s sovereignty in both its pursuit of Naw Kham, 
during which Chinese security forces apparently considered using a cross-border drone 
strike to try to kill him, and his subsequent extradition to China rather than Myanmar 
(Chang 2013; TNI 2014, 38). His ultimate capture and killing has done little to reduce 
drug flows. It has merely fragmented borderland networks further, apparently 
empowering other actors, including the Punako and Nam Pung militias.185  
 
8.3.2 Militias as territorialising brokers 
In areas of Shan State with high strategic importance militias have been formed by the 
Tatmadaw to perform an array of territorialising functions. This strategy has been 
                                                          
185 Interviews with: former Lahu militia leader, 14 February 2013, Chiang Mai; SHAN, 26 April 2013. 
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deployed in areas with enduring insurgent activity, along important border trade routes 
– notably the route linking Mandalay to the Chinese border across northern Shan State 
and the main border crossing with Thailand through western Tachilek – and around 
key development sites, the most significant being the oil and gas pipelines. This helps 
to explain the heavy concentration of militias in parts of northern Shan State, notably 
across Kutkhai, Namhsam, Namkham, Muse and Tangyan, and in the area between 
Kengtung and western Tachilek where many Lahu militias have been formed under 
Tatmadaw control. These are areas already heavily militarised but in which the 
Tatmadaw has sought to use militias to penetrate deeper into rural areas. Their purpose 
is to prevent insurgents from being able to gain support or move through even remote 
parts of these regions, to repress opposition evoked by the land dispossession and 
forced relocation that have accompanied development projects, and to provide various 
local services to the Tatmadaw. These include: security patrols around military 
barracks, development sites and roads; tax collection; expropriation of goods 
demanded by the Tatmadaw (such as vehicles and food); and the recruitment of porters 
and soldiers.  
 
The clearest examples of these kinds of territorialising militias are those which have 
been formed by the Tatmadaw under local strongmen whom it trusts, namely the 
Kutkhai, Kaungkha, Tamoeng-ngen, Nonsai, Panhsay and Mongphyak militias. The 
strategic importance of the areas in which these militias have been formed has meant 
the government has been unwilling to cede significant local autonomy to them and the 
Tatmadaw‘s heavy presence has allowed it to oversee their activities. There is a clearer 
hierarchy of authority in which Tatmadaw commanders have more direct control over 
militias and have attempted to regularize their activity by providing them with 
uniforms (all bearing the same militia insignia), training, and in some cases weapons. 
Although some of these larger militias have their own economic enterprises they have 
commonly been deployed to act as ‗entrepreneurs of violence‘, providing the coercive 
muscle to support larger government-controlled development projects. The level of 
control which the military government wields over these kinds of militias and the 
greater levels of communication between Tatmadaw units and militias have reduced 
the risk of violent conflicts of interest emerging. In Namkham and Kutkhai Townships, 
for example, local residents reported that here is a practical understanding between the 
Tatmadaw, the police and local militias to tax villagers at different times of the year 
and/or in different areas.186 This level of oversight has also negated the Tatmadaw‘s 
need to use overt violence to re-negotiate informal brokerage agreements in the way it 
                                                          
186 Interview with Palaung civil society organisation, 3 May 2013, Mae Sot. 
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has against more autonomous frontier militias. Instead populations have experienced a 
greater degree of what may be termed ‗state-sanctioned violence‘. Militias have been 
able to use violence as a means to generate compliance under the gaze of a condoning 
Tatmadaw. Militias have also provided the violence which has often underpinned 
‗legal‘ forms of land dispossession, removing smallholders whose customary rights are 
not recognised by the government to make way for companies carrying legal land titles 
to areas officially deemed ‗wastelands‘ despite the fact that they have been farmed for 
generations. Violence has become more commonplace but less conspicuous, more 
―selective‖ than ―indiscriminate‖, and more closely linked to processes of agrarian 
change than to the dynamics of counterinsurgency (Kalyvas 2006).  
 
Territorialising brokerage amidst Shan State‟s rubber boom: Militias and the 
governance of “ceasefire capitalism”       
The political economy of the rubber boom in northern Shan State provides important 
insights into the territorialising brokerage functions played by militias and their role in 
managing complex transnational economic dynamics in ways that have facilitated the 
production of ―military-state territory‖ (Woods 2011, 768). Over the past decade large 
parts of Shan and Kachin State have been planted with rubber under large-scale land 
concessions. The majority of these concessions are in territories under the jurisdiction 
of the Wa, Kokang and Mongla ceasefire groups, although significant amounts of 
rubber are also now being cultivated in areas around Lashio, Kutkhai and Tangyan in 
regions under Tatmadaw and militia control.   
 
The transformation of parts of northern Shan State into rubber plantations has been 
driven by changes in the regional and global rubber economy. China is the world‘s 
largest producer of rubber products and, alongside coal, iron and petroleum, rubber is 
one of the country‘s four most important industrial materials (Shi 2008; Horton 2013). 
Over the past decade, however, domestic production has stagnated. Only certain areas 
of China – including the Xishuangbanna region of southern Yunnan bordering Shan 
State – are suitable for natural rubber cultivation and these regions have already been 
over-cultivated. Soaring demand (both for rising domestic consumption (linked to 
rising car ownership) and for export industries) and stagnating domestic production 
has created high prices for rubber, especially since 2005 when a severe typhoon 
destroyed rubber plantations in Hainan, one of China‘s other rubber-producing regions 
(Shi 2008). These dynamics have motivated Chinese companies to seek land in 
northern Laos and Shan State (TNI 2012, 22-24; Woods 2011, 763-66). Both the 
Myanmar government and Myanmar companies have looked to capitalise upon these 
changing dynamics within the rubber economy and the Ministry of Agriculture and 
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Irrigation‘s 2000/1 Master Plan for the Agriculture Sector outlined plans to increase 
land under rubber cultivation to 1.5million acres by 2030 (Woods 2011, 759).  
  
Much of the literature on globalisation has warned that the impact of such transnational 
economic networks can weaken states‘ ability to govern territory, especially in 
environments such as Shan State, where central government control has historically 
been weak and where a vast array of ‗twilight institutions‘ operate (Reno 2000; 
Ferguson 2006). As analysed in Chapter 3 many studies have suggested that in regions 
where external demands for liberalisation, decentralisation and privatisation have been 
mapped onto existing unresolved conflicts, the capacity of central governments is 
likely to be weakened further as conflict actors are able to ―establish relations of their 
own with wielders of international capital‖ (Leander, 2004: 72). ―Deepening 
marketization‖ is cited as transforming the hierarchical patterns of government, which 
have buttressed the nation-state, into more ―polyarchical networks of governance‖ 
(Duffield 1998, 97). Mark Duffield‘s influential analysis, for example, supports the 
metaphor of ―neomedievalism‖ with its notion of parcelling out political authority and 
―the creation of zones of authority with overlapping boundaries and, at the same time, 
no universal centre of competence‖ (Duffield 1998, 70). 
 
In the case of parts Lashio, Kutkhai and Tangyan townships, however, transnational 
capital has been deployed by the government as a means of territorialising borderland 
spaces rather than ‗hollowing out‘ the state, epitomising precisely the dynamics of 
Woods‘ (2011) notion of ―ceasefire capitalism‖. Militias have been an essential 
component in producing ―postwar landscapes‖ for a number of reasons (ibid, 768).  
 
Firstly, Sino-Burmese187 militia leaders, such as such as Kyaw Myint (aka Li 
Yongqiang), Bo Mon and U Myint Lwin (aka Wang Guoda) have acted as important 
intermediaries, linking military government officials (and companies associated with 
them) to Chinese investors. They have provided a means of navigating the language 
barriers, ethnic affiliations, regularity pluralism and jurisdictional complexity created 
by the border, enabling transnational companies to work more easily with the 
government than look to operate through borderland networks outside of it.  
 
                                                          
187 As TNI (2012) rightly point out: ―‗Sino-Burmese‘ is a confusing term: it can include the Kokang 
Chinese, Burmese citizens with Chinese ancestry, and/or China-born citizens who live in Burma, who 
sometimes illegally purchase their Burmese citizenship card.‖ In the case of militia leaders, U Myint 
Lwin is Kokang Chinese descent, Kyaw Myint is Lisu-Chinese and Bo Mon is a Chinese-speaker of Wa 
descent.  
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Secondly, proxy-government militias have provided a means through which to 
scrutinise the activities of foreign businesses. The very high levels of taxation and 
scrutiny imposed by the Burmese government on wholly foreign-owned enterprises 
has meant many foreign-owned rubber plantations are operated as joint-projects with 
Burmese front-companies, often linked with the Tatmadaw, but also with militia-
owned companies (Woods 2011, 760).  
 
Thirdly, militias have become an essential aspect of the infrastructures of violence and 
security which foreign businesses enterprises are reliant upon. Investment in Shan 
State is possible not only because of the decline in insurgency but also because of the 
ready availability of the means of violence required to expropriate and then secure 
concessions. This is especially important in the case of rubber because of its lengthy 
maturation period of 5-10 years. This has prevented smallholder cultivation and has 
ensured that Chinese businessmen and the military government have sought to expand 
rubber production through large-scale agribusiness concessions, mostly on farmland 
confiscated from local populations. Alongside the Tatmadaw, militias have thus 
provided the means to secure these concessions and have encouraged Chinese 
investors to operate through alliances with the military government and its proxies 
rather than through networks beyond government control. In this sense foreign 
businesses have secured their interests by becoming embedded within government-
managed structures of authority. In some cases, Chinese businesses have operated 
through ―double alliance[s]‖, seeking agreements also with ceasefire groups, especially 
those controlling areas along the border (Woods 2011, 761). However, across Lashio, 
Tangyan and Kutkhai militarization and ‗militia-ization‘ has enabled the government 
to retain a greater degree of hierarchical control over transnational rubber investments 
and has limited the kind of anarchical dispersion of wealth and empowerment of 
conflict actors suggested by much of the literature.  
 
Palaung „militia-isation‟ in northern Shan State: The failure of territorialising 
brokerage  
However, attempts by the Tatmadaw to deploy militias as territorialising brokers have 
by no means been universally successful. The clearest example of the failure of this 
strategy has been in the Palaung areas of Namkham, Mantong and Namhsam in 
northern Shan State following the disbanding of the PSLA in 2005. The area is of 
significant strategic importance. There are numerous dam sites on the Shweli River, 
the region has a long history of insurgent activity, not just Palaung groups but also the 
SSA and KIA, and the region straddles parts of the Mandalay-Muse road close to the 
China border. The Tatmadaw attempted to form militias to act as territorialising 
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brokers in this region since the mid-2000s. Small militias of 10-15 men were formed in 
most villages under the oversight of more powerful militias, such as the Panhsay 
militia, or Tatmadaw units. Numerous larger militias were formed under the control of 
former PSLA members, whom the Tatmadaw believed could mobilise support within 
local communities. For example, since around 2010, the Mantong militia has been led 
by Khun Li, the son of former PSLO Chairman, Mai Aik Mone, who is now leader of 
the civilian Ta‘ang National Party (TNP). Many of these militias were armed by the 
Tatmadaw, mostly with weapons confiscated from the PSLA when it surrendered in 
2005. These militias underwent training, much of it at the barracks of Tatmadaw 
Infantry Battalion 130 in Mantong, which was built in 2000 on a 100 acre-site 
confiscated from farmers. As one former militia member who was trained at these 
barrack explained,  
 
IB 130 is important. Militias have to report back to this Battalion and are trained by 
it…Militia training is surprisingly tough. It lasted for 2-3 months with the training taking 
place every day during this period. Recruits had to sleep in camps and even teachers from 
local schools were sent there to learn how to use weapons. The training was physically tough 
with recruits having to get fit and also involved much weapons training.188  
 
These militias had very limited autonomy, were given no significant economic 
concessions and few bonds of trust emerged between them and the Tatmadaw. Their 
primary purpose was to provide various support services to the Tatmadaw, including 
tax collection, guarding of military barracks, intelligence and to act as local guides. 
This strategy has, however, been a failure. It has aroused huge resentment, further 
delegitimising the government and the entire Palaung ceasefire process. It has 
radicalised Palaung youth, especially in opposition to being forced to fight in counter-
insurgency offensives.189  Following its arrival in northern Shan State in 2011, the 
TNLA has capitalised upon this widespread resentment and radicalisation. Its army has 
grown quickly, swelled by ranks of angry young men, including former militia 
members many of whom have brought PSLA weapons back with them.190 As a result 
some militias, such as U Kya Htun‘s Palaung militia, have disbanded completely. 
Other militia leaders, notably Htun Myat Lay (Nonsai militia), are now fearful of 
TNLA retribution.191 Far from enabling the Tatmadaw to control the region and to 
                                                          
188 Interview, 3 May 2013, Mae Sot. 
189 Than Yan, the erstwhile leader of the Mantong militia, wrote a letter to President Thein Sein in 2010 
stating that his militia was formed to provide local security and to promote development within 
Mantong; it was not intended to be used as a frontline fighting force. This action worked initially and 
reduced the pressure on the militia to fight with the Tatmadaw. Interview with Palaung civil society 
organisation, 3 May 2013, Mae Sot. 
190 The TNLA has also forcibly recruited soldiers. In some areas where the TNLA is active families are 
expected to provide one son to the TNLA, although its lack of territorial control has limited this kind of 
recruitment. 
191 Interview with Palaung civil society organisation, 3 May 2013, Mae Sot. 
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extricate itself from the day-to-day tasks of governance, the militia strategy has fuelled 
resentment against the government, contributed to re-igniting insurgency and forced 
the Tatmadaw to become embroiled again in bloody counter-insurgency warfare.  
 
Furthermore, rather than wait for the government to establish stronger military control 
in the region, a number of Chinese enterprises have instead sought to broker financial 
deals with the TNLA to ensure that they can continue to operate safely in the area and 
do not become targets of the insurgency.192 Whereas in many parts of Shan State the 
government‘s strategy of Tatmadaw militarisation and militia deployment has been 
effective in securing control, its failure in this part of northern Shan State reveals the 
inherently messy, spatially uneven and non-linear nature of this process.  
 
8.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter opened by emphasizing the hybridity of the Shan borderland. Many 
narratives have accounted for this complexity through decries of anarchy and state 
fragility, in which Shan State, or parts of it at least, continue to be presented as a 
lawless and ungoverned region contested by a plethora of non-state armed groups. In 
contrast, I have sought to show why the proliferation of militias across Shan State has 
become deeply embedded shaping the territorialisation of borderland spaces. I have 
argued that interrogating this messy, unofficial and fragmented world of borderland 
governance illuminates the complex dynamics surrounding processes of state 
consolidation over the past quarter century. It is thus misleading and disingenuous to 
create distinct categorisations between ‗state‘ and ‗non-state‘ actors and to portray the 
ubiquity of militias as evidence of state fragility or breakdown. Instead, the rise of 
militias is better understood as emerging out of the dynamics surrounding the 
government‘s attempts to secure control over contested regions of Shan State. Militias 
have occupied the changing political space created by encroaching military-
government institutions. They have become embedded within the forms of mediation, 
negotiation and coalition-building surrounding attempts to create governable space, 
rather than operating autonomously, or anarchically, outside of these processes. 
 
A number of important insights stem from these overarching arguments. Firstly, I have 
sought to demonstrate how a nuanced analysis of the political economy of militias 
helps to account for the spatially uneven political topography of the Myanmar state 
across Shan State. I have sought to emphasize both how militias are an important 
aspect of specific government strategies of spatial management, motivated by the 
                                                          
192  Interview with the Chairman of the PSLF, 29 March 2014, Chiang Mai. 
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government‘s attempts to find more expedient and cost-effective ways of consolidating 
control, but also of the importance of ‗de-centring‘ the state in our analysis of the Shan 
borderland in order to show how militia politics has been shaped by motivations, 
interests and actions that are beyond government control. It is these dual foundations 
of militia politics that help to explain the unevenness of the relationship between 
militia politics and processes of state consolidation over time and across space. 
 
Secondly, this chapter has revealed the enduring importance of violence in shaping 
borderland structures of governance. It is becoming increasingly anachronistic to 
portray the violence experienced by populations across Shan State as rooted merely the 
perpetuation of insurgency-related violence. Even where insurgency has been 
extinguished and populations no longer face the terrifying risk of being caught in the 
bloody cross-fire, violence has remained a ubiquitous characteristic of illiberal 
processes of state consolidation and economic transformation. Violence has become an 
integral foundation for establishing order, extending government control and 
spearheading economic ‗development‘. The issuing of ‗violence rights‘ have also 
become an important part of the coalitions forged between the Tatmadaw and militias, 
demonstrating how non-material ‗rents‘ may also play an important function in 
strengthening limited access orders.193 The dynamics of ceasefire politics in Shan State 
give weight to those which have critiqued the precise boundaries commonly drawn 
between war-time and peace-time, emphasizing instead the importance of 
understanding the spectrum or ‗continuum of violence‘ in which violence is embedded 
in social relations surrounding processes of societal transition and economic 
transformation that are not easily compartmentalised into periods of war and peace, 
insurgency and ceasefire (Cramer 2006). 
 
Thirdly, these insights echo Kate Meagher‘s (2012) critique of the sanguinity 
surrounding much of the literature on hybrid forms of governance. This literature has 
often valorised these kinds of twilight institutions as embodying ―organic forms of 
public order and rule of law‖ that are more socially legitimate than top-down forms of 
state-building (either domestically or externally driven) (Menkhaus 2006/7, 77; see 
also Boege et al 2008, 15-16). For Ahram (2011, 138), ―learning to live with militias‖ 
by ―defending the position of militia leaders and solidifying their ties in a local 
community encourages them to form a vested interest in the community‘s 
                                                          
193 These ‗violence rights‘ may of course be subsequently used to secure material interests but the point 
is that limited access orders may be founded upon controlling access to non-material resources, rather 
than explicit apportioning of material gains.  
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sustainability and productivity‖. However, a more nuanced approach is needed that is 
able to distinguish between ―constructive and corrosive forms of non-state order‖ and 
which deconstructs the very notion of legitimacy (Meagher 2012, 1073). In one sense 
Shan State‘s militias are organically embedded in that they have emerged out of the 
region‘s complicated history of insurgency and counterinsurgency and the deeply 
personalized and localised dynamics of Shan State politics. However, in the face of an 
increasingly powerful military government their legitimacy has invariably become 
linked to forms of ‗upwards accountability‘ to the Tatmadaw and to (trans-)national 
businesses rather than to local populations. Reflecting Meagher‘s own insights into 
hybrid security systems in Eastern DR Congo and eastern Nigeria, the complex 
alliances forged between militias, the Tatmadaw and businesses has created ―a locally 
embedded form of order that [has] ended up reproducing rather than challenging 
predatory and unaccountable modes of governance‖ (Meagher 2012, 1097).  
 
Militias have played an important, albeit highly uneven, role in weakening insurgency, 
strengthening the government‘s ability to stabilise and control contested areas and have 
become an integral part of the governance regimes that have facilitated private 
investment and ‗development‘. However, the very nature of these emerging 
governance regimes across Shan State warns against the complacency with which 
(hybrid-)statebuilding and economic ‗development‘ have automatically been cited as 
antidotes to the poverty and perceived ‗anarchy‘ of frontier regions. Over the past 
quarter century the violence, expropriation, inequality and impoverishment faced by 
populations across Shan State are not simply a function of insurgency, the war 
economy and weak government presence; they are embedded within the very fabric of 
processes of illiberal state consolidation and capitalist development that are 
transforming the borderland.    
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CHAPTER 9 
 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE OPIUM/HEROIN 
TRADE 
 
 
A block of „Number 4‟ (heroin). Photograph provided to the author by the PNO ceasefire 
group, which claims to have seized it from a local militia. 
 
Khun Aung Win began cultivating poppy in 2008 and has been growing it ever since.  A 
resident of Pinlaung Township, a highland area in southern Shan State, his family and 
their neighbours have, for generations, grown tea and thanat trees (the leaves from which 
are used to roll cheroots) to generate the income they needed to supplement their 
subsistence livelihoods.  ―It is impossible to make money from tea and cheroot anymore‖, 
Aung Win reflects. ―Many of our neighbours had already started growing poppy. In 2008 
I decided I would to‖. His family grow the crop once a year, harvesting the opium 
around January time.  ―Traders arrive by motorbike to buy the opium from us.  In the 
past some farmers used to add things to the opium to make it heavier to earn more 
money.  Now the opium buyers bring with them opium tasters who smoke the opium 
before buying it so we can‘t do this anymore.‖  In the 2010 election local candidates 
promised farmers in Pinlaung that they would be able to grow opium freely for three 
years after the election, and Aung Win does not anticipate stopping growing the crop 
anytime soon.  I ask him whether opium production is a lucrative enterprise. Aung Win 
gives a wry smile, ―Yes.  But not for us.  In the past we had to pay a ‗revolution fee‘ [to 
insurgent groups]; now we just call it the ‗opium fee‘.‖  The last two decades have seen a 
significant reduction in fighting across Pinlaung and neighbouring townships.  However, 
the relative stability has allowed armed groups and officials to move through the area 
taxing farmers like Khun Aung Win, who tells me, resignedly, that ―There is now a 
saying in the villages of Pinlaung that the farmer must plough his land five times: one for 
the military, one for the rebels, one for the police, one for religion and once for himself 
and his family.‖194 
                                                          
194 This is a pseudonym to protect the farmer‘s identity.  The interview was conducted in Taunggyi on 
30th January 2013. 
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Khun Aung Win‘s story is by no means unique.  Myanmar is the second largest 
producer of opium in the world; only Afghanistan cultivates more.  Shan State is the 
source of over 95% of opium in Southeast Asia (the majority of which is converted 
into heroin within the country‘s borders). Khun Aung Win‘s testimony reveals a 
number of pertinent insights into the drug economy which this chapter interrogates. 
Firstly, his story demonstrates the multiple levels of actors and motivations within the 
drug trade: at the micro-level, numerous reasons explain why farmers cultivate opium 
and why opium is such an important part of the rural economy and livelihood 
strategies; at the macro-level, international drug markets ensure there remains strong 
demand for opium/heroin, epitomised for Khun Aung Win by the fact that the traders 
always come; at the meso-level, an array of actors have capitalised upon the drug trade, 
reflected by the fact that much of Khun Aung Win‘s income is spent paying various 
taxes. An important contribution within this chapter is to interrogate the ‗meso-level‘ 
level of the drug economy in order to demonstrate why vested interests in the drug 
economy extend beyond those directly involved in the production, trafficking and 
consumption of drugs. 
  
Khun Aung Win‘s account also reveals the changing dynamics within the drug 
economy, emphasizing the importance of understanding why farmers like him have 
started growing opium having never done so before, even in areas such as Pinlaung 
where conflict has receded. His story challenges dominant narratives surrounding the 
Shan State drug economy in which opium, anarchy and state failure have been viewed 
as synonymous. These narratives persist despite the shrinking territorial reach of 
insurgent groups, the growing presence of government and proxy-government forces 
and the spread of commercial opium production to regions largely under the control of 
these actors – all revealed in Khun Aung Win‘s account.  
 
In this chapter I challenge such narratives. From the outset, I want to emphasize that 
my intention is not to deny the perpetual involvement of insurgent groups in the drug 
trade, but to demonstrate that focusing solely on the role these groups play offers only 
a partial and increasingly anachronistic account of the political economy of the 
opium/heroin trade in Shan State over the past quarter-century. In contrast, the purpose 
of this chapter is to reveal how the drug economy has also become embedded in messy 
and contested processes of (deeply illiberal) state consolidation and economic 
development. 
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In the first of this chapter‘s four sections, I provide a brief explanation of prevailing 
narratives that have been used to explain the dynamics of the drug trade in Shan State 
since 1988 and which I critique throughout the rest of this chapter. In section two I 
then address the question, what drives opium/heroin production in Shan State? Section 
three then explains how the opium/heroin economy is structured in Shan State. It 
conveys the multiple scales of the drug trade into a commodity chain in order to 
visualise the interactions between various actors involved in the drug economy. In 
Section four I then analyse the relationship between the opium/heroin economy and 
processes of state consolidation I argue that the opium/heroin economy has become 
embedded within broader processes of militarisation, ceasefire politics and the 
proliferation of militias across Shan State. I demonstrate how the opium/heroin 
economy has become an integral part of producing ceasefire and ‗post‘-war 
governance structures, albeit in diverse ways that are spatially uneven. I seek to nuance 
the quantitative trends and analysis presented in UNODC reports and, through this 
critical reinterpretation, I demonstrate how a political economy analysis offers news 
ways of understanding both the dynamics of the drug trade and processes of state 
consolidation across Shan State.             
 
9.1 PREVAILING NARRATIVES OF MYANMAR’S DRUG ECONOMY SINCE 1988 
Since 2002 the UNODC has conducted annual opium surveys across Shan State in 
collaboration with the Myanmar government. Considering the lack of other 
quantitative datasets, these well-presented surveys are quoted in almost all reports on 
the drug trade in Myanmar. However, the UNODC‘s ―monopoly of truth‖ over 
narratives of drug production is problematic because its analysis provides only partial, 
and at times deeply misleading, insights into the metrics and dynamics of the drug 
trade in Shan State (TNI 2014, 21). According to UNODC (and US data), the drug 
economy in Shan State has demonstrated three distinct trends over the past twenty-five 
years. Firstly, in the late 1980s opium production grew exponentially and remained 
high until 1998. Secondly, between 1998 and 2006 levels of opium production 
underwent an equally precipitous decline. Thirdly, since 2006 opium production has 
risen for seven consecutive years. According to the UNODC (2012, 9) between 2006 
and 2012 the amount of land under poppy more than doubled and Myanmar‘s share of 
global opium production rose from 5% to 25%, although the organisation emphasizes 
that production has remained significantly lower than peak years of production during 
the 1990s. My own qualitative fieldwork broadly corroborates this ‗rise-fall-rise‘ 
pattern. However, both my own research and that conducted by numerous other 
international and local research organisations presents significant challenges to both 
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the scale of these trends and, most importantly, the explanations provided for them 
(TNI 2014, 21).  
 
9.1.1 Quantitative limitations of UNODC data 
There are three fundamental weaknesses in the quantitative data trends presented in the 
UNODC‘s analysis of the drug trade in Shan State since 1988. First, the UNODC‘s 
analysis of the drug trade over the past twenty-five years have been constantly 
measured against inflated production figures during the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
which exaggerated levels of opium cultivation throughout Shan State. Both UNODC 
and US government data claim an almost impossibly steep rise in production in the late 
1980s. US data claims production doubled between 1988 and 1989 to 2,430 tons, 
whilst the UNODC claims a similarly dramatic annual rise in production in 1989 albeit 
with lower estimates, from 1,125 metric tonnes (equivalent to 1,240 tons) in 1988 to 
1,544 metric tonnes (1,702 tons) in 1989. The sheer margin of difference between 
UNODC and US data reflects the weaknesses in accurate data collection and reveals 
how these figures were little more than guesstimates. This is entirely understandable 
given the difficulties of generating reliable data. Indeed, the UNODC (2002) itself 
acknowledges that ―[t]he 2002 opium poppy survey was the first comprehensive 
survey implemented throughout the Shan State of Myanmar‖, before which it was 
reliant upon US satellite-based data, without any kind of ‗ground-truthing‘. The 
problem, however, lies in the fact that these figures have then been quoted as fact and 
have been used to compare and contrast quantitative trends in opium production ever 
since. Both my own research and that conducted by other local research organisations 
questions the accuracy of high production levels quoted for the late 1980s/early 1990s 
and suggests that although production rose it never reached such heights (TNI 2009, 
13-17; Yawnghwe 2005; SHAN, interviews with the author). 
 
Despite their questionable accuracy these inflated figures served a number of important 
vested interests, both at the time and ever since. For numerous armed groups in Shan 
State, Khun Sa‘s MTA in particular, the opium issue was the key ‗hook‘ through 
which to attract international attention. As Khun Sa himself explained, ―the road to 
Shan independence is through the opium issue because in the strategic calculations of 
the superpowers our Shan State is only a small country which is better ignored, except 
for its opium‖ (cited in McCoy 1999, 143). Ever the international showman, Khun Sa 
had already tried to garner international support in the 1970s and 1980s through 
offering to sell the entirety of the opium crop under his control to both the US and 
Australian governments. In the 1980s Khun Sa claimed opium production in Shan 
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State was 2,000 tons, a figure that was subsequently taken up by the international 
media and international counter-narcotics agencies (Yawnghwe 2005, 40). Powerful 
vested interests within these agencies also had reason to embrace inflated production 
figures. With the end of the Cold War, counter-narcotics policy became an important 
means through which to legitimise and protect military budgets. As ―the ‗communist 
threat waned, the U.S. justified its global military infrastructure by making the 
Pentagon the lead agency for international drug-interdiction operations‖ (Jelsma 2015, 
5). Following the 1987 International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, 
the UN General Assembly initiated the first special session on the world drug problem. 
It declared the 1990s as the ―Decade Against Drug Abuse‖ and in 1991 established the 
UN International Drug Control Programme (Jelsma 2003; Jelsma 2015). The 
reinvigoration of the global counter-narcotics machinery, the prioritisation given to 
cutting supply rather than addressing western demand, and US concerns over the 
growing calls to legalise drugs,  increased willingness to publish inflated figures, 
despite their questionable veracity.      
 
Second, the UNODC remains reliant upon uncorroborated data provided by the 
Myanmar government‘s Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC), 
especially regarding levels of crop eradication. Although UNODC reports 
acknowledge that they do ―not monitor or validate the results‖ of government 
eradication campaigns, they have nevertheless published this data (UNODC 2014b, 
80). This is despite the fact there is a clear political rationale for the government to 
inflate eradication figures to garner international support and the fact that numerous 
reports have warned that government figures are exaggerated or fabricated (PWO 2006; 
2010; SHAN 2005).  
 
Third, the overall snapshot of opium production captured in UNODC reports, 
especially aggregate figures of declining production in the early 2000s, masks 
significant regional variations across Shan State. Whilst opium bans launched by the 
Wa, Kokang and Mongla ceasefire groups did contribute to a decline in production in 
these regions, this masked another significant development, namely increasing 
commercial opium production in other areas of Shan State. As UNODC‘s Executive 
Director, Antonio Maria Costa, was stating in 2007 that ―the Golden Triangle is 
closing a dramatic period of opium reduction‖ many communities across Shan State 
were reporting rising poppy cultivation, including in areas with little history of 
widespread commercial production. Although this trend has become visible in 
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UNODC figures since 2007, rising production in areas such as Khun Aung Win‘s 
Pinlaung Township began much earlier. 
 
9.1.2 Analytical limitations of UNODC narratives 
More problematic than these quantitative limitations is the narrative given for why 
opium production fell in the late 1990s and why it has risen again since 2006. Falling 
opium production was attributed to the growing stability in the region created by 
ceasefire agreements and the surrender of Khun Sa‘s MTA and, more importantly, 
increasing government eradication efforts. Subsequent rises in opium production have 
been blamed on increasing tensions in the region, especially surrounding the 
government‘s efforts to convert ceasefire groups into Tatmadaw-controlled border 
guard forces. Production has been blamed primarily on the efforts of 
ceasefire/insurgent groups to stimulate production in areas they control in order to 
generate income to prepare for further outbreaks of hostility, with the UNODC arguing 
that opium remains a ―staple of Shan State and insurgent finance‖ (UNODC 2014b, 6). 
Within this narrative, ‗peace‘ and ‗development‘ are cited as the necessary antidotes to 
lift farmers out of poverty and to discourage them from growing poppy.     
 
However, as the rest of this chapter seeks to show, the perpetuation of these narratives 
reflects the continued dominance of state-centric discourses in which the tendency 
towards ‗seeing‘ like a state has encouraged the neat ‗mapping‘ of the illegal economy 
onto the contours of the political landscape. It has perpetuated the construction of 
conceptual binaries in which the state is portrayed as the bastion of ―law, order and 
bureaucratic probity‖ and illegal economies remain the domain of rebels and 
underground criminal networks (van Schendel & Abraham 2005, 9). Furthermore, the 
emphasis given by the UNODC to the profitability of opium when accounting for 
rising production masks the complexity of motivations and local dynamics surrounding 
why farmers choose to grow poppy. Presenting ‗fact sheets‘ which include the price 
farmers receive for selling opium and the value of wholesale opium production, whilst 
remaining silent on the amount of taxation, ‗protection fees‘ and bribes which farmers 
such as Khun Aung Win have to pay to various authorities, entirely misrepresents the 
role of the opium economy in rural power structures.195     
 
These narratives has overlooked, or actively ignored, the ways in which the drug 
economy has also become embedded in the messy and contested processes of 
                                                          
195 Incredibly, the UNODC‘s 2014 Myanmar Opium Survey does not make a single reference to taxation 
structures [or equivalent terms such as ‗bribes‘, ‗protection‘, ‗fees‘] surrounding the drug economy. 
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militarisation and militia brokerage surrounding state consolidation and the deeply 
inequitable and violent processes of development which are already transforming Shan 
State. The UN is inevitably constrained by the fact that its in-country presence is 
reliant upon maintaining the support of the Myanmar government. However, this 
cannot justify the UNODC‘s failure to address the wider political economy of the drug 
trade, especially in light of its near hegemony over quantitative data and policy 
narratives. The rest of this chapter seeks to address this weakness. 
 
9.2 WHAT DRIVES OPIUM PRODUCTION IN SHAN STATE? 
Understanding why drug production remains one of the most important foundations of 
the rural political economy across Shan State requires engaging with three inter-linked 
scalar dynamics. At a local or micro-level it requires understanding why farmers 
cultivate poppy, thus engaging with the motivations and actors surrounding the supply 
of opium. At a regional or macro-level it requires understanding market structures 
surrounding the drug trade and the interplay between supply and demand. Thirdly, it 
requires detailed ‗meso-level‘ analysis of the networks of political and economic actors, 
interests and relationships that coalesce around the drug economy. The political 
economy of the drug trade is more complex than the market interplay between supply 
and demand; it is also shaped by how drugs become embedded in the broader milieu of 
borderland power structures. Meso-level analysis reveals how the drug economy has 
become embedded within processes of militarisation, economic development and, 
most importantly, forms of brokerage surrounding state consolidation.  
 
9.2.1 The micro-level dynamics of supply: why do farmers grow poppy?     
Three broad factors explain why farmers cultivate poppy: agro-ecological advantages 
to growing opium over other crops; its importance as a cash crop; and its role as a 
response mechanism to changes within the rural economy. 
 
Agro-ecological factors 
Opium is a highly-valued crop amongst poor upland farming communities due to a 
number of intrinsic agro-ecological qualities. Firstly, it is well-suited to upland 
conditions. It grows best in areas above 800m. It needs well-drained soil and thus 
grows well on steep inclines. Other crops produce low yields on such land.  
 
Secondly, poppy has a short annual growing cycle and requires no maturation period. 
Opium offers farmers a marketable harvest within four months. In contrast, other crops 
suitable for upland cultivation – fruit trees, tea, coffee and rubber – all take years to 
mature. By growing opium farmers can therefore generate cash quickly on new land if 
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they have been displaced by conflict or land grabs. In some areas, the short growing 
cycle enables farmers to grow opium twice within a single year. It also allows farmers 
to conduct multi-staged cropping (planting the same crop on the same plot of land at 
different times) or staggered cropping (planting opium in different fields at different 
times). These strategies lengthen the harvesting period, reducing the need to employ 
labour. They also mitigate the risks of losing an entire crop to bad weather or 
eradication. 
 
Thirdly, opium can be grown on the same plot of land for up to ten years without 
appreciable declines in yield, which is affected more by the vagaries of the weather 
than by soil degradation (TNI 2014, 14). This is advantageous where conflict, lack of 
access to land and/or the desire to avoid discovery discourages expansive forms of 
shifting cultivation.  
 
Fourthly, poppy cultivation requires few inputs. Seeds from one year can be stored for 
use the following year. The crop is rain-fed and generates reasonable yields without 
extensive use of fertilisers or pesticides. Yields are certainly higher with these inputs 
and there is evidence across Shan State of a growing stratification of cultivation 
practices with larger poppy-farms investing in irrigation and fertiliser.196 However, 
these are not prerequisites for production and do not represent significant barriers to 
entry, thus allowing impoverished farmers to cultivate poppy.        
 
Fifthly, opium is non-perishable and can be stored indefinitely without depreciating in 
value. In fact, if properly stored, opium increases in value over time as freshly 
cultivated opium has high moisture content (US DEA 1992, 10). One recent study of 
the opium economy in the Pao region estimated the price of fresh opium at US$300-
400/viss (1 viss = 1.6kg) and US$700-750/viss for older dry opium (Nyo Oo 2011, 62).  
 
Sixthly opium is a low bulk, value-dense commodity, making it one of the only crops 
that will cover the cost of transporting it to market. In contrast other cash crops, such 
as fruits and vegetables, are bulky and spoil quickly, placing pressure on farmers to 
ensure their produce reaches markets quickly.197  
 
The role of opium in local livelihood strategies 
                                                          
196 Interviews with: national NGO, 21st March 2013, Yangon; Shan youth groups, 25th March 2013, 
Taunggyi. 
197 Interview with Food Security Working Group (FSWG). 15th March 2013. Yangon. 
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There is no single relationship between opium and livelihood strategies. The 
commodity offers different benefits for asset-poor and asset-rich households. For the 
asset-poor, opium is helps to alleviate food insecurity.  The World Food Programme 
(WFP) estimates that almost one million people suffer ―severe and chronic food 
insecurity‖ in Shan State, out of an estimated population of between five and six 
million (WFP 2009, 6). 198  Decades of conflict and underinvestment in rural 
development programmes have increased the vulnerability of rural communities.  Lack 
of irrigation leaves farmers at the mercy of the weather (WFP 2010)199; bad roads 
(many of which become unusable at the height of the rainy season) makes the 
transportation of food expensive meaning food brought into the area (especially rice) is 
more expensive than in urban areas, whilst transportation costs squeeze farmers‘ 
profits.200  
   
Many households have only small plots of lands and there are increasing numbers of 
landless labourers.  Most households do not produce enough food to cover their needs 
and must earn money to cover this shortfall. Across many upland regions of Shan State 
livelihood strategies are founded upon the food cycle and the poppy cycle. Most food 
crops are harvested before October when poppy is then sown for harvesting between 
January-March. Generating income to cover the cost of basic healthcare, education and 
agricultural inputs is even harder, with many households becoming heavily indebted 
(WFP 2008; WFP 2010).  The situation is exacerbated by the fact that there are few 
off-farm employment opportunities.   
 
Within this environment of poverty, profound food insecurity, indebtedness, and rural 
underdevelopment, opium is a valuable cash crop. Although prices do fluctuate, 
farmers know there will always be buyers and emphasised this consistent demand as a 
key reason why they cultivate it.201 The income generated from poppy also provides 
for farmers to rent land, which can then also be used to grow food. The opium 
                                                          
198 There is a staggering variation in population estimates by international agencies.  Whilst the UN 
estimates the country‘s population (in 2011) at 48.3 million, the World Bank estimate (for 2012) is 52.8 
million, the CIA estimate (for 2013) is 55.1 million and the Asian Development Bank estimation (for 
2012) is 61.1 million.  The difference between the low UN estimate and high Asian Development Bank 
is an incredible 12.8 million.   
199 The World Food Programme (2010) also found that on average only 28% of households with access 
to land in northern Shan State had access to irrigation.  In numerous areas, including the notorious drug-
producing townships of Tangyan and Namkham, those households with access to irrigation fell below 
20%. 
200 Interview Myanmar NGO staff, Yangon, 21st January 2013:  One researcher working on food 
security issues estimated that transportation costs meant that the cost of rice in Shan State is up to 50% 
higher in parts of Shan state than in Yangon, with one pyi (cup) of rice in Yangon costing around 800 
kyat whilst in Shan state it ranges from 1000-1200 kyat.  
201 Interviews throughout Shan State, October 2012 – June 2013. 
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economy also sustains wage labour, thus supporting landless households and those 
looking to augment their income. Many households employ casual day labourers 
during harvest-time with the daily wage set against the amount of raw opium the 
labourer collects. In poppy-producing regions of Hopong, Hsihseng and Pinlaung 
Townships wages for casual labourers were 5,000-6,000 kyat/day. By way of 
comparison a construction worker in nearby Taunggyi would earn about 3,000 
kyat/day.202 Some larger poppy farms employ labourers for the entirety of the harvest 
at a monthly rate of around 80-90,000kyat, with Htun (2015, 16) reporting that 
monthly wages in Pao areas rose as high as 150,000kyat for the most skilled 
harvesters. 203  Labour recruitment for these farms tends to be more discrete and 
labourers will migrate to live close to the plantations where they are provided with 
food and accommodation (Nyo Oo 2011).  
 
Opium is also valued by households because it allows them to access credit and on 
more favourable terms than when borrowed against other crops. Heavy indebtedness 
and the difficulties of accessing credit are major drivers of poverty across Shan 
State.204 Many households are reliant upon borrowing money in order to cover the cost 
of family occasions, land rent, unexpected expenses (e.g. healthcare) and in response 
to shocks, such as failed harvests. 205  Official credit mechanisms are woefully 
inadequate. The Myanmar Government Agriculture Development Bank offers only 
small loans, mostly to rice farmers.206 Credit is almost universally accessed informally 
through borrowing money from wealthier local families, traders or black market 
moneylenders. Moneylenders‘ desire to secure loans amidst high uncertainty within 
local economies and the fact that households are desperate for money means credit 
agreements are usually exploitative, as the following two examples illustrate:  
 
In my area [Kyaukme Township, northern Shan State] tea planters have been able 
to borrow money from Chinese businessmen in the area but it is deeply unfair. 
They have to pay back the loan with interest, they have to sell all of the crop to the 
businessman at harvest and when they sell the crop the businessman does not give 
them money but instead gives them a ration card with which they can then buy food 
and other basic requirements from a specific shop, which he either owns or from 
whose owner he takes a fee.207 
 
                                                          
202 Interview with local researcher on drugs in Pao regions of southern Shan State. 28th January 2013. 
Taunggyi. 
203 ibid. 
204 Nyo Oo‘s (2011, 64) study of 6 villages in Hopong Township found an average debt-asset ratio of 
2.69 and indebtedness was emphasized as a major driver of poverty in the majority of my own 
interviews. 
205 Focus Group discussion with farmers from Southeastern Shan State. 27 March 2013. Nyuang Shwe. 
206 ibid 
207 Interview with local pastor (and former resident of Kyuakme Township). 14 June 2013. Lashio.      
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In a focus group discussion with farmers from across southern Shan State, one farmer 
explained to me how credit worked in his village: ―Brokers lend money at an interest 
rate of 7% per month. In return for borrowing money, farmers must not only pay back 
what they owe but also agree to sell all of their crop to the broker. These agreements 
are not written down.‖ Once the broker has sold the crop he deducts the money owed 
from the loan, ―a ‗fee‘ for their services‖ – this can be up to 40% of the market value of 
the crop - and ―transport costs‖, leaving very little for the farmer. ―We can sometimes 
get away with keeping some of their crop to sell ourselves but we fear that if the broker 
discovers this he will not lend us money in the future.‖208  
 
The terms surrounding loans are dependent upon the assets against which they are 
secured.209 Consistent demand for opium means it is one of the few crops against which 
farmers are able to access credit. Creditors are often opium traders and credit 
agreements include demands that the farmer sells his opium to the creditor. Over time 
this has often locked poppy farmers into exploitative relations with moneylenders. 
However, in the short-term struggle for survival the ability to use opium as collateral 
against which to borrow money remains an important advantage in the eyes of those 
who grow it.  
 
Three further factors also help to account for why opium has become important to local 
livelihoods. Firstly, opium is only of the only commodities produced in the region for 
which buyers are willing to travel to remote areas to purchase it directly from farmers. 
Secondly, opium attracts other trade networks into remote and otherwise unprofitable 
regions as opium traders often bring other goods such as food, petrol, oil, cooking pots 
and utensils with which to barter. This enables remote communities to purchase goods 
that they could otherwise only access by travelling to larger towns or the border. 
Thirdly, opium continues to be used locally for an array of purposes. It has various 
medicinal uses as both a painkiller and is often used to alleviate the symptoms of 
muscle-ache, malaria, diarrhoea, dysentery and stress. It is also still used recreationally 
and as part of certain celebrations (TNI 2014, 40).         
 
Despite these numerous benefits, there are important drawbacks to growing poppy 
which explain why farmers do not dedicate greater amounts of land to it. Opium only 
generates good yields in certain upland areas. It is also highly susceptible to adverse 
                                                          
208 Focus group discussion with farmers from Southeastern Shan State. 27 March 2013. Nyuang Shwe. 
209 Nyo Oo‘s (2011, 92) study of Hopong Township records how loans off-set against land or other 
assets were set at around 5% interest per month, whilst those loans not secured against assets could 
command interest rates at between 10-25% per month. 
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weather conditions. Too much rain in October and November can destroy young poppy 
plants (as was the case in many areas of southern Shan State in 2012) 210  whilst 
downpours in February/March washes away the opium sap. Many poppy farmers 
throughout central Shan State have complained of the detrimental impact of irregular 
rainfall in recent years.211   
 
Furthermore, the threat posed by eradication drives is very real. Over the past two 
decades periodic crop destruction drives have been launched by government officials, 
ceasefire groups and insurgents. Such actions have been disastrous for many 
households and the fact that eradication drives are often driven by the desire to gain 
international legitimacy has made it hard for local communities to predict their timing 
and severity. In the early 2000s, for example, the Myanmar government launched more 
concerted, albeit spatially uneven, eradication efforts as parts of a fifteen-year 
eradication programme (1999-2014) intended to eliminate drug production one year 
before ASEAN‘s own deadline to make the region drug-free by 2015. These efforts 
were part of Khin Nyunt‘s efforts to improve ties with the west and ASEAN, and 
thereby strengthen his own position within the government. 212  Eradication drives 
became more common, temporarily, which discouraged farmers from growing poppy. 
It should be noted, however, that whilst central government directives called for crop 
destruction, at a local level this policy was often used by local Tatmadaw units as an 
income-generating exercise. Thus although eradication has periodically been a real 
threat to rural livelihoods, in many cases the threat farmers have faced has been in the 
form of having to pay inflated bribes and ‗protection fees‘ rather than the systematic 
destruction of their poppy fields. These localised protection rackets have been masked 
by the fact that local officials report fabricated eradication figures to their superiors 
who in turn have little to gain from questioning them or exposing their inaccuracy. This 
helps to explain why opium production has risen over the past decade alongside the 
vast increases in official government eradication recorded in UNODC reports.     
 
Finally, farmers must also weigh the advantages of cultivation against the risks 
associated with its illegality. The combination of opium‘s wealth-generating potential 
and its illegality raises the spectre of attracting unwanted attention and having to pay-
off local authorities. Paying such fees are rarely one-off events, nor do they guarantee 
                                                          
210 Interview with Director of the Taunggyi office of a national NGO. 29 January 2013. Taunggyi. 
211 Interview with MP for Konhein Township. 21 March 2013. Yangon. 
212 In 2003 the government also passed anti-money laundering laws which led to the shutting down of 
two private banks – Myanmar Mayflower Bank and Asia Wealth Bank – in early 2005. 
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protection. 213  These risks encourage farmers to limit cultivation to remote, secret 
locations, or areas where they are sure of local protection, or when their need for cash 
is so great as to make the risks worth taking. For the majority of farmers, poppy is 
grown as a means of spreading risk rather than maximising profit and dedicating large 
proportions of their land to poppy can entail just as much risk as not growing any at all.  
 
Thus, whilst prevailing UNODC narratives have emphasized the rise in government 
eradication drives and have claimed that continued production is a result of opium‘s 
enduring profitability, neither of these claims capture adequately the nuances 
surrounding the factors which drive or diminish opium production.       
 
Although the majority of farmers grow opium as a survival strategy, the drug economy 
offers different opportunities for wealthier households.  Some richer families generate 
significant income from opium by investing in, or directly managing, larger poppy 
farms which use irrigation, fertilisers and pesticides and hire labour. Others profit in a 
less direct manner through moneylending. As one pastor from southern Shan State 
explained: 
 
Rich people in the village lend money, often charging interest rates of 10% per 
month. People getting into debt is very common, partly for social reasons such as 
weddings and gambling, and partly due to bad harvests. It is common for 
households to struggle to pay back money, in which case moneylenders take 
livestock, buildings and land.214  
   
These practices provide a relatively reliable means through which to accumulate capital 
in a short period of time, much of which has been invested into legal businesses such as 
husbandry, and shops, guest-houses and restaurants in provincial towns and cities.  
 
Attempts to use the drug trade as a means to accumulate capital for legal investments 
have seemingly created a cyclical dynamic, whereby the influx of drug money has 
inflated prices for land and property in urban areas, especially Lashio, Kengtung, 
Tachilek and Taunggyi, which in turn has motivated efforts to accumulate capital from 
drugs. According to one long-time researcher in Taunggyi,  
 
There are new areas of wealth including in Tachilek and Taunggyi. In Taunggyi house 
prices have risen tenfold over the past ten years. The money invested is from drugs, no 
doubt. The only question is whether the buyers are the ‗blacks‘ or the ‗Chinese‘ [„Blacks‟ 
is not a racial term; it is a reference to the Pao people whose national dress is dark 
blue/black. The Pao signed a ceasefire with the government in 1991 (see Chapter 7). Since 
                                                          
213 Interviews with former poppy farmers from southern Shan State, April 2014, northern Thailand. 
214 Interview with local pastor. 30 January 2013. Taunggyi.  
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the early 2000s opium production has risen significantly in Pao populated territories 
around Taunggyi].215    
 
Symbiotic relationships have emerged between rich and poor households in which 
opium has become a lifeline to impoverished families whilst at the same time offering a 
means for richer households to accumulate wealth. These findings are by no means 
unique to Shan State and David Mansfield‘s (2001, 4) analysis of the opium economy 
in Afghanistan makes similar insights.  
 
Opium as a response to changes in the rural economy 
Profound changes within the rural political economy over the past twenty-five years 
provide further reasons why farmers grow poppy, especially across Hopong, Hsihseng 
and Pinlaung Townships in southern Shan State and Namkham, Namhsan and Mantong 
Townships in northern Shan State, which do not have a history of widespread 
commercial cultivation.  
 
Most importantly, opium production has been driven by the combination of rising 
inflation, which has increased the cost of basic foodstuffs, petrol, medical and school 
fees and taxation, and stagnating or collapsing prices for other cash crops. Increasing 
poppy cultivation in areas of northern Shan State is directly linked to falling prices of 
tea, which has historically been the most important source of income for more than 
500,000 people. In southern Shan State stagnating prices for cheroot leaves (thanat 
phet) used to roll cigarettes, garlic, chilli, indigo and various fruit crops have 
encouraged more farmers to turn to poppy, as reflected in Khun Aung Win‘s account at 
the beginning of this chapter. Four main factors seem to account for these 
developments. Firstly, farmers have faced increasing competition from cheap Chinese 
goods following the liberalisation of cross-border trade. As the General Secretary of the 
Pao National Liberation Organisation explained to me: 
    
In the past, despite the country being closed to international trade the domestic market was 
enough to ensure Pao farmers could get a decent price for their crops. Today that is no 
longer possible. It is attractive for Chinese companies to sell produce in Myanmar. They 
can undercut local produce, yet still get a price that generates a big profit for them.216 
 
Secondly, agricultural production costs within Shan State are high. Rising inflation has 
increased the costs of transport, wage labour and land rents. On-going instability has 
disrupted trade, meant that higher wages are needed to attract labourers and has 
increased the amount of taxation farmers find themselves having to pay to various 
armed groups. As one local pastor explained: 
                                                          
215 Interview with Shan researcher. 29 January 2011. Chiang Mai. 
216 Interview with General Secretary of the PNLO. 2 January 2013. Mae Hong Son. 
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people have more money now but are even poorer than before. People are now earning 
more money but the value of it has become much less. Farmers have to pay so much 
money in various taxes and also have to pay rent on land seized by the army and rented 
back to them. Medical bills are also very expensive, discouraging people from visiting 
hospitals even when they are very ill.217 
   
Thirdly, responses to these challenges have been hamstrung by the fact that there is no 
marketing strategy to support farmers to access international markets, nor is there any 
industry around primary commodities. As one Palaung migrant now living in northern 
Thailand wryly noted, ―In Thailand there are factories producing iced tea, tea leaf oils, 
tea shampoo. In Burma there is only lahpet thoke [tea leaf salad]!‖218 Furthermore, 
local traders and businessmen have protected their own interests by reducing the prices 
they pay to farmers. The clearest example of this is the tea economy is Namkham and 
Namhsan in northern Shan State where a small number of companies have 
monopolised the area‘s tea market, creating an effective monopsony (many sellers only 
one cartel of fixed buyers). The main companies are Flying Dragons (Ngar Pyan), a 
joint enterprise between a Chinese company and government officials; and Palaung 
Htae Htar Company, owned by a local military officer (TWG 2011). As one former tea 
cultivator explained, ―Representatives of these companies meet with smaller traders 
and buyers before Shwe Pyi Oo [the first tea harvest] and tell them the prices they have 
fixed so it is impossible for farmers to find a better price for their tea.‖219 Farmers 
know this is an exploitative system. However, they are powerlessness to challenge it 
because they are fearful of retribution since these companies have close links with local 
authorities, and because many borrow money from tea traders.220 
 
Fourthly, attempts to promote alternative cash crops have, almost universally, failed. 
For example, attempts by The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to 
support farmers in Kokang to grow buckwheat was difficult to sustain as the cost of 
reaching Japanese markets became prohibitively high. As Piang Jiasheng, the erstwhile 
Kokang MNDAA leader explained in a rare interview given in 2008: 
 
It is a project not worth at all of the trouble we took [sic]. At first, they bought all the 
harvest at a very good price. So everybody wanted to grow it. But now that the output has 
increased, they [the Japanese] have begun stalling thereby shaking the ex-poppy farmer's 
confidence in the project. As far as I know, there is no shipment to Japan via China. The 
problem is that you need to go through a lot of bureaucratic hurdles when you want to ship 
something through the Mainland. With Rangoon, the problem is that we have to pay heavy 
                                                          
217 Interview with local pastor. 30 January 2013. Taunggyi. 
218 Interview with Palaung migrant, 29 April 2013, Mae Sot.  Tea leaf salad is a popular dish in 
Myanmar comprising pickled tea leaves, peanuts, beans, garlic, tomato and sometimes dried shrimp 
and/or chilli. 
219 Interview with former tea cultivator. 29 April 2013. Mae Sot. 
220 Interview with a Palaung women‘s organisation. 16 June 2013. Lashio. 
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duty to export it, which doesn't cover the cost. The Japanese were really enthusiastic at 
first, but now they seem to have been discouraged by the said problems. As a result, 
nobody wants to grow it anymore (SHAN 2008). 
   
Attempts to promote potato as an alternative crop in Pinlaung Township in the mid-
2000s proved similarly unsustainable. As one Pinlaung resident explained:       
 
Around 2006 an international NGO established partnership with a village headman in 
Pinlaung to grow potato. The crop was good but there was no market for it. The nearest 
major market was 20 miles away. Transporting the potato was extremely hard.  People had 
to carry 15-25kg loads of potatoes. The cost of labour meant farmers made a loss and 
returned to growing opium the following year.221 
 
In other cases, the failure of alternative development strategies is rooted in how ‗opium 
substitution‘ was used to legitimate blatant self-enrichment by officials. The most 
notorious example of this occurred in northern Shan State in the early 2000s. Under the 
rubric of the Myanmar government‘s New Destiny opium substitution project, farmers 
were coerced into purchasing Sin Shweli222 rice seeds from Chinese agribusinesses that 
had forged an exclusive deal with Major-General Myint Hlaing, then commander of the 
Tatmadaw‘s North-East Command (and now incumbent Minister of Agriculture and 
Irrigation). 223  Whilst highly profitable for the Regional Commander and Chinese 
agribusinesses, the forced cultivation of Sin Shweli rice proved disastrous for farmers. 
According to a local Palaung researcher ―It is a summer rice crop and the idea was that 
since Palaung farmers were unemployed during the summer months they should focus 
on growing rice during this period to generate income so that they were less reliant 
upon opium income.‖ However, the climate in Palaung areas was not conducive to 
growing rice in the summer season. As a result the crop failed leaving farmers heavily 
indebted and encouraging many to return to growing opium.224    
 
The resort to opium is also linked to the challenges smallholder farmers have faced in 
securing access to land amidst the growing commercialisation of agriculture. The 
stability created by the ceasefires, increasing cross-border investment, primarily from 
Yunnan, and the Myanmar government‘s attempts to develop the country‘s agricultural 
sector by prioritising large-scale agribusinesses have combined to create heavy 
competition and increasing prices for low-lying land close to towns and roads. 
Commercial land acquisitions have exploited existing rural power structures that are 
stacked heavily against smallholder farmers. Unholy alliances between businesses and 
                                                          
221 Interview with Palaung researcher. 29 March 2013. Taunggyi. 
222 Sin Shweli is a generic term covering a variety of strains of High Yield Variety (HYV) rice seeds, 
most of which are imported from Yunnan Province, China. 
223 Interviews by the author: Yangon January 2013; Chiang Mai, March 2013; Lashio, June 2013. See 
also: McCoy, 2007; SHAN 2004.   
224 Interview with Palaung research organisation. 29 April 2013. Mae Sot. 
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local authorities, primarily the Tatmadaw but also militias and ceasefire groups, have 
created a nexus of coercive, bureaucratic and private sector power that facilitates and 
legitimises exploitation and dispossession. Farmers‘ vulnerability has been exacerbated 
by the government‘s refusal to acknowledge customary land tenure.225 As recounted in 
the Prologue to this study, many farmers who practice shifting cultivation have 
returned to fallow land to find it fenced off and under new ownership (Woods 2011b).  
 
Even initiatives explicitly intended to reduce poppy production by supporting 
commercial agricultural practices have exacerbated these threats, ironically increasing 
the attractiveness of growing poppy. For example, in 2006 the Chinese government 
launched its Opium Substitution Programme in northern Myanmar to stem the flow of 
heroin entering its borders. The rationale behind the project was to encourage Chinese 
companies to invest in agricultural enterprises across the border by offering tax 
exemptions on agricultural commodities imported back into China.  By 2009 almost 
200 Chinese companies had enlisted in the programme with many using the scheme to 
finance rubber plantations, fuelling further land dispossession (TNI 2012).  
 
Against these myriad challenges, the intrinsic qualities of opium means that poppy 
cultivation has become the alternative for many farmers despite the risks associated 
with growing it. With reduced access to low-lying farmland, communities are more 
reliant upon gleaning their livelihoods from upland areas where the comparative 
advantage of opium is magnified. Diminishing access to land has increased households‘ 
food insecurity, increasing the need to grow reliable cash crops to cover the cost of 
buying food. In contrast to other commodities, the fact that opium production is strictly 
prohibited in China and other neighbouring countries has meant the region has retained 
its comparative advantage in this particular commodity. 
 
The proliferation of poppy cultivation has developed gradually. Across parts of 
Hopong, Pekhon and Hsihseng a number of households initially sought to augment 
their income by working as labourers on poppy plantations in neighbouring Nanzang 
Township in areas controlled by the ex-MTA Nayai and Matkyan militias. Better 
wages and resentment at the greater prosperity of some poppy-growing villages 
encouraged some farmers to start growing poppy on their own land, attracting buyers to 
                                                          
225 Interview with representative of a Myanmar NGO specialising in rural livelihood development, 21 
March 2013, Yangon. This particular comment was made with reference to events NGO staff had 
witnessed in Kutkhai Township, northern Shan State. 
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the area. These developments are captured in the list of reasons one farmer from 
Pekhon provided for why he started to cultivate opium: 
 
Other farmers had already started to grow it [poppy] so successfully in the years 
previously. Other members of my family began growing it five years ago [2008] 
and I started three years ago.  It is easier and more profitable to grow than rice and 
fruits. I can raise 500,000 kyat per viss of raw opium. Traders will come to buy the 
opium so it is an easy market. There is also a local market as there are many addicts 
within the community and within nearby villages. Now so many poppy are grown 
throughout all the area.‖226  
 
Prevailing narratives of Myanmar‘s drug economy have, however, failed to capture the 
importance of these changing dynamics to rising opium production. Although the 
UNODC acknowledges that poverty is a driving force for poppy cultivation the drivers 
of poverty have invariably been depoliticized and presented as an enduring legacy of 
the region‘s conflict and underdevelopment. However, such narratives are only 
partially accurate.  The fact that opium has become a survival strategy for farmers 
trying to manage the deleterious impact of ‗development‘ in areas of growing stability 
warns against the assumption, often made in policy documents, that greater economic 
integration and investment in marginal drug-producing regions will necessarily reduce 
production. In Shan State commercialisation, increasing cross-border investment and 
deeply illiberal and inequitable forms of accumulation have stimulated rather than 
reduced production. This emphasizes the importance of disaggregating more clearly 
who gains and who loses out from these processes.  
 
9.2.2 The macro-level dynamics of demand: Markets for opium/heroin  
The fact that poppy cultivation remains an important livelihood strategy is a function of 
consistent demand for opium, which has ensured that local buyers continue to purchase 
opium, creditors are willing to lend money against opium and prices have risen with 
inflation. The consistency in demand, however, masks major changes in the global 
heroin trade over the past twenty-five years. Throughout the 1980s the majority of 
Shan opium was transported south, converted into heroin in refineries close to the Thai 
border in territory controlled by Khun Sa and then trafficked into Thailand, much of it 
destined for western markets via Hong Kong (Chin & Zhang 2007, 8; Dobinson 1993; 
McCoy 1999; Chalk 2000; Gaylord 1997).  
 
Rising western demand, especially in the US following the return of high numbers of 
Vietnam War veteran addicts, stimulated production and inspired trafficking networks 
to reach these distant markets. In turn, ready supply created a relentless search for new 
                                                          
226 Meeting with former poppy farmer who had now migrated to Thailand. 7 January 2013. Mae Hong 
Son.  
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markets. ―Commodity transformed culture‖ as growing supply facilitated higher purity 
cuts, allowing users to smoke heroin, thus breaking the association between the drug 
and images of emaciated ghetto-alleyway injectors (McCoy 1999, 142). Heroin became 
an important part of the late 80s counter-culture epitomised in the deaths of River 
Phoenix in 1991 and Kurt Cobain in 1994. During the 1990s, however, Myanmar 
opium was pushed out of western markets by Afghan, Colombian and Mexican opium 
(TNI 2012; TNI 2014, 25), especially after the disruption to the southern trade route 
into Thailand caused by Khun Sa‘s surrender, increasing Thai-Myanmar border 
tensions and Thailand‘s efforts to crackdown on drug trafficking. 
 
However, demand for Shan opium has remained high due to rising consumption across 
the region (including within Myanmar itself), especially within China. By the 1980s, 
drug consumption in China was rising quickly. No longer confined to remote 
borderland areas, it became an important dynamic within China‘s rapid urbanisation. 
An indication of the size of China‘s domestic market for heroin is provided by the 
growing numbers of registered users, which has risen from 148,000 in 1991 to more 
than 1.5 million by 2015 (Chin & Zhang 2015b, 3; UNODC 2013, 51).227 Numerous 
reasons have been cited as contributing to rising drug use including: the lack of public 
discourse and knowledge and ―naiveté and curiosity‖ about drugs (Zoccatelli 2014, 
767); the way in which heroin was marketed and made fashionable as part of a 
modernising youth culture that embraces individualism and consumerism (Liu 2011a 
and 2011b); and the greater freedom experienced by young adults through migration, 
mobility and weakening family authority structures (Zoccatelli 2014; Yan 2009). 
Growing demand in China and across Southeast Asia has led the UNODC to claim the 
region is now a net importer of heroin, with as much as one third of supply coming 
from Afghanistan (UNODC 2013, 52-5).  
  
Trafficking networks into China are now the major outlet for Shan opium. Chinese-
speaking Wa and Kokang groups have played an important role in developing these 
networks. China‘s emergence as the workshop of the world has also placed it at the 
centre of global commodity chains providing ready-made global networks for drugs to 
reach other lucrative markets. These trafficking networks capitalised upon border-trade 
liberalisation between the two countries in the late 1980s. In much analysis, as van 
Schendel and Abraham (2005, 9) argue, conceptual boundaries are drawn between 
                                                          
227 This national registry is compiled from the statistics provided by local police agencies that are 
required to identify and register all drug users with whom they come into contact. Although the vast 
increase in users is partly due to increased police registration, it demonstrates the scale of the Chinese 
market, especially as there are likely to be far more users than those officially registered.  
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―illicit bad guy activities (trafficking, smuggling) and state-authorized good-guy 
activities (trade, migration)‖. The cross-border drug trade, however, gives credence to 
the emphasis they place upon viewing these activities as part of a ―single spectrum‖. 
Drug traffickers capitalised upon the growing number of border crossings and the 
rising volume of trade to evade law enforcement agencies. Legal and illegal 
commodities weaved together with investors and traffickers involved in both the legal 
and criminal economy. Increasing flows of migrants and goods shrouded the 
movement of heroin, whilst the opportunity to traffic drugs has financed migration and 
provided capital to invest in local economies. For elites in Yunnan, determined to use 
border trade as a means to stimulate regional economic development, drug trafficking 
was viewed either as an unfortunate side effect against which little could be done, or a 
valuable source of investment capital into the local economy.  
 
High demand has meant that stricter border enforcement by Chinese authorities has 
merely encouraged trafficking networks to pursue new ways of outwitting authorities 
rather than choking the trade. From my own fieldwork interviews, the model of 
trafficking surrounding larger shipments can be understood in the following way. A 
buyer (usually based in China) will make a request for a certain amount of heroin. He 
will have an existing supplier within Myanmar whom he first contacts. This contact 
will then supply as much of the order from his supply. For larger orders he may then 
contact other suppliers meaning that large shipments can have as many as five or six 
different sources. Small samples are transported across the border for the buyer to test. 
The price will then be agreed over the phone before larger shipments are transported. 
When crossing international border, heroin shipments are commonly divided into 
small quantities, usually trafficked on a person‘s body, termed by Zhang and Chin 
(2007, 30) as akin to ―ants moving house‖. This reduces the risk of losing an entire 
shipment, whilst for traffickers it is safer as the severity of punishment, if caught, is 
often linked to the amount they were carrying (Zhang & Chin 2015, 59). As Zhang and 
Chin‘s (2007, 30; 2015, 14) pioneering studies on drug trafficking across the 
Myanmar-China border found, ―although the stakes are high in this business, there 
seems no shortage of risk takers‖ in light of the money on offer. Job are available to 
women who are perceived to be less likely to be searched and can more easily secrete 
drugs upon their person. Once across the border, the buyer will then re-accumulate the 
shipment ready for further transportation throughout China. Wholesale shipments do 
still cross borders albeit through more circuitous routes. As established trafficking 
routes into northern Thailand have been targeted by Thai authorities, new routes have 
emerged, some via more remote border crossings and some through Laos with drugs 
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then entering Thailand through its eastern provinces, as far south as Ubon 
Ratchathani.228 Shan heroin destined for China has sometimes been trafficked through 
northern Laos and even Vietnam (UNODC 2013, 55). 
    
Although it is regional markets that provide the major stimulus for production, 
growing demand within Myanmar itself is also important. Drug use is high in border 
towns, notably Muse and Mongla, and around mining areas, especially the Hpakant 
jade mines in Kachin state. Drug use has also risen significantly in many rural drug-
producing areas (PWO 2006, 2010; TNI 2014). According to the Palaung Women‘s 
Organisation,     
  
Drug addiction rates are spiralling out of control. In many villages the majority of 
young men, are addicted and increasing numbers of women are also becoming 
drug users. In some villages in Mantong we found that 85% of men over the age 
of 15 took drugs. Drug addiction has led to more crime, especially theft, and 
increasing levels of violence. The desperation to get income to buy drugs has led 
to some shocking acts, including families trafficking their daughters to China for 
money.‖229  
 
There is a vicious cycle in which poverty, debt and misery encourages drug use as a 
means to escape hardship, whilst drug often increases a family‘s poverty. Women have 
borne the brunt of rising addiction rates as they are often relied upon to manage 
households, face the stigma of having addicted husbands and have faced increasing 
domestic violence.  
 
9.2.3 Meso-level actors surrounding the drug trade: Opium/heroin and 
borderland power structures 
Amidst the interplay of supply and demand, ‗meso-level‘ actors shape the region‘s drug 
economy. I define meso-level actors as those who manage the interface between sites 
of production and markets. There are two distinct aspects of this stratum. Firstly, there 
are those directly involved in facilitating the flow of drugs: investors, opium traders, 
and those who refine and traffic heroin. Secondly, there are those who derive benefit 
from the drug economy ‗indirectly‘ through their ability to manage and manipulate the 
interface between supply and demand, primarily through levying taxes and protection 
fees. Meso-level activities are particularly important in shaping the political economy 
of the opium/heroin trade for five reasons.  
 
Firstly, the opium/heroin commodity chain is reliant upon sustaining links between 
remote rural production sites and lucrative cross-border markets. The entire trade is 
                                                          
228 Interview with UNODC. 13 June 2013. Yangon. 
229 Interview with Palaung Women‘s Organisation. 29 April 2013. Mae Sot. 
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dependent upon a relatively complex commodity chain involving: opium trading, 
securing precursor chemicals, refining opium into heroin, cross-border trafficking, and 
accessing foreign markets, all of which require managing and mitigating risks posed by 
law enforcement agencies. This creates ‗meso-level‘ specialists surrounding refining, 
transport and cross-border trafficking. 
 
Secondly, the structure of the commodity chain creates a number of sudden high jumps 
in value, notably the refining of opium into heroin, and when drugs are trafficked 
across international borders. Such sudden escalations in value attract actors to these 
parts of the commodity chain and provide those able to manage these dynamics 
successfully with opportunities to accumulate significant revenue.  
 
Thirdly, the vast price differential between the cost of opium production and the retail 
price of heroin makes opium one of the few commodities (jade is perhaps the other) in 
this region that can sustain high levels of taxation without discouraging production. 
The drug trade is thus able to provide two distinct ways of generating revenue; first, 
from direct involvement in the drug businesses and second, from heavy informal 
taxation. As the respected Shan scholar and former SSA Commander, Chao Tzang 
Yawnghwe (1987, 54-5), explained, many of ―those in this business [of drugs] and 
making money are a class of apolitical people whose sole interest in life is trade and 
profit. The majority are Chinese whose relatives, partners, friends, organizations, 
finance, loyalties, interests and obligations straddle national frontiers.‖ These investors 
generate the most income from the actual production and sale of heroin, often 
alongside other legal businesses. These investors do not have armies of their own and 
have thus sought to reach agreements with armed groups across Shan State in ways that 
have been mutually beneficial: investors gain security and stability; armed groups 
derive revenue through offering protection and/or safe transportation. This means that 
even those not directly owning drug shipments or controlling refineries can derive 
revenue from the drug trade and develop strong vested interests in its perpetuation.    
  
Fourthly, the official status of drugs as illegal is extremely important as it allows local 
authorities to demand taxation or protection fees for the ‗right‘ to grow, refine and sell 
opium/heroin without prosecution. Threatening eradication is commonly used more as 
a means of generating revenue than to suppress production, often targeting only those 
unable to pay. At a grassroots level the decision by authorities to tolerate production 
can also be essential to generating legitimacy and support amongst local communities. 
Furthermore, the ability of officials to offer protection and to provide ways for drug 
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businesses to cross boundaries – both literally in terms of crossing international borders 
and figuratively in terms of moving into the ‗official‘ legal economy – can encourage 
these organisations to align with rather than oppose their authority. The drug economy 
is thus particularly conducive to facilitating the kinds of brokerage agreements and 
limited access orders that have been integral to how state power is negotiated across 
contested parts of Shan State. In many cases these meso-level activities – levying 
protection fees, allowing access to the legal economy, and enabling goods to be 
transported across borders and checkpoints without being checked – can take place 
without drugs ever being visible or passing hands. They are, however, integral to how 
the drug trade operates.  
 
Fifthly, the drug economy has become the bedrock for revenue flows and wider 
processes of accumulation, impacting upon those who have never seen a poppy field or 
directly been involved in any aspect of the trade. As a local pastor from Lashio 
reflected, 
 
government departments are profiting from drugs, police, soldiers, physicians, lawyers 
all benefit, so where is the motivation to tackle the drug trade? There are so many 
indirect benefits derived from the money generated in the opium economy. Parents pay 
school fees from the money poppy provides. Even the money at Sunday parish 
collections comes from opium. My pay comes from opium! ...It provides money for 
priests, houses, hotels businesses…There are so many opium-funded businesses.230  
 
Drugs have also paid for new pagodas, and for services where government provision is 
absent.231 As one Myanmar NGO staff-member explained with reference to Tangyan 
Township, where drug production is widespread, 
 
out of 65 primary schools only 8 are government schools and of these many do not 
even have a single teacher provided by the government. The rest of the schools are 
community schools which have been organised and staffed by contributions from the 
community.232  
 
At a national level the symbiotic relationships between the government and those 
involved in the drug economy, notably ceasefire groups, ensured that drug money 
became an important pillar of the domestic economy during the 1990s (Meehan 2011). 
This ―‗stemming of capital flight‘ and the channelling of revenue into the legal 
economy‖ helped to establish the country‘s banking sector and lucrative real estate 
market whilst also providing revenue for investment in roads, hotels and airports 
(Meehan 2011). Although this aspect of the drug economy is not an integral part of my 
                                                          
230 Interview with local pastor. 14 June 2013. Lashio. 
231 Interviews with local NGOs and researchers on the drug economy (both local and foreign 
researchers). January 2013. Taunggyi.  
232 Interview with Myanmar NGO staff. 15 June 2013. Lashio.  
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study, in Appendix 2 I provide a table showing how drug money has financed various 
large legal enterprises.  
 
Engaging with these meso-level dynamics provides insights into the symbiotic relations 
that have developed between authorities and those involved directly in the drug 
economy. They reveal the power structures, political networks and vested interests that 
have coalesced around the drug economy but which have been almost universally 
ignored in UNODC reports. As I demonstrate in section 4, these insights offer ways for 
understanding how the drug economy has mutated from being the backbone of the 
insurgent war economy to also becoming embedded within the emerging political 
settlements across large areas of Shan State.    
  
9.3 HOW IS THE OPIUM/HEROIN ECONOMY STRUCTURED IN SHAN STATE? 
The opium/heroin commodity chain can be visualised thus: 
 
Figure 9: The opium/heroin commodity chain: Flows of money, opium/heroin and 
taxation 
   
 
 
The following table provides an explanation of the actors involved in each stage of the 
opium/heroin commodity chain: 
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Figure 10: The opium/heroin commodity chain: Actors and the roles they play 
STAGE FUNCTION ACTORS EXPLANATION 
OPIUM 
PRODUC-
TION 
INVESTMENT 
IN 
PRODUCTION 
Landowners who 
decide to cultivate 
opium on land 
Landowners in provincial towns such as Lashio, Taunggyi or Mandalay. Do not cultivate the land 
themselves but make decisions about what is grown.  
Moneylenders Asset-rich households in local communities or traders from nearby towns provide credit to farmers. 
Providers of 
agricultural inputs  
Often the same individuals as moneylenders and traders. Provision of land/fertilisers/pesticides for 
cultivation.  
CULTIVATION 
Small-scale poppy 
cultivators 
Poppy cultivated as a cash crop to buy food and other goods; Part of livelihood strategies to mitigate 
risk. Farmers without their own land may rent land. High land rents stimulate production of opium to 
generate cash needed to pay rent. Land rent may be calculated on the value that can be generated by 
poppy cultivation. There is significant diversity in how much land farmers use. As a rough guide, 
households often produce in the region of 2-4kg on approximately ¼ - ½ hectare of land. In my 
research prices for raw opium ranged from 300,000 – 600,000 kyat/kg (c.US$300-600 (dry opium 
earns up to 200,000 kyat/kg more than wet opium). 
Larger-scale poppy 
farms 
Some local wealthier families dedicate a number of hectares to opium since they can afford to pay for 
wage labour. There are also much larger poppy farms, notably in areas under the control of militias. 
Wage Labourers 
Landless labour, local reciprocal labour arrangements, or labourers who earn money as wage labour 
alongside their own farming; Heavy demand for labour at harvest time encourages seasonal 
migration; Wage rates are often 5,000-8000 kyat/day (US$5-6). Larger poppy farms employ labour for 
the season, often providing food and accommodation. This equates to around 40,000-100,000kyat 
(US$40-100) per month. 
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TAX 
COLLECTION 
 
ARMED GROUPS: 
Tatmadaw units; 
Ceasefire groups; 
Insurgent groups; Militias 
GOVERNMENT 
OFFICIALS: 
Local government; 
Police; CCDAC; 
Taxation is informal and highly localised with little uniformity. Tax collection is a function of territorial 
control and the threat that can be demonstrated against non-payment. Farmers report tax on 
amount of land cultivated, amount of opium harvested, tax demanded for the ‘right’ to grow opium 
and tax demanded in the form of ‘protection fees’ against the threat of eradication.  
There is no uniformity in the amount taxed. In my own interviews taxation on opium was 
approximately 10-20% of opium produced. The cost to avoid eradication was between 10,000-
60,000kyat (US$10-60)/acre. Farmers suffered most where they were subject to taxation by multiple 
authorities. 
OPIUM  
TRADE 
SMALL-SCALE 
TRADING 
Petty traders 
Petty traders within the local community buy small amounts of opium to sell on to larger traders. 
Some petty traders come from nearby towns, moving through poppy producing areas at harvest time 
with either cash or goods (such as cooking utensils, salt, cooking oil, clothing) to buy opium with. They 
link remote production sites with medium and larger-scale buyers. They may be working alone or as 
part of bigger buying networks. 
MEDIUM-
SCALE 
TRADING 
Wealthier buyers 
Armed groups 
 
Medium-scale traders may buy opium directly from cultivators and act in the same way as petty 
traders but on a larger-scale, or buy opium from an array of petty traders. Some medium-scale 
traders have links with armed groups or are themselves armed groups. Traders can get in the range of 
15-20% mark-up when selling opium to large buyers. 
WHOLESALE 
TRADING 
Large investors 
Armed groups 
Wholesale buyers are likely to have close links with heroin refineries or themselves own refineries. 
These include businessmen connected with local authorities and/or part of armed groups. Many 
wealthy investors reside in Mandalay, Lashio, Taunggyi or in Yunnan. The mark-up is so much higher 
for heroin than for opium that it makes little sense to accumulate large amounts of opium without 
then also controlling refining.  
TAXATION 
Armed groups and 
government officials 
‘Taxation’ is paid by traders for the right to trade and/or to secure protection. Some taxation is ‘pro-
active’ with traders reaching agreements with local authorities; some is ‘reactive’ with fees paid to 
avoid prosecution if caught. In some areas armed groups sell ‘opium monopolies’ to traders to 
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monopolise control over local production.  
HEROIN  
REFINING 
REFINERIES 
Large investors 
Chemists 
 
Heroin refining is secretive and thus it is hard to obtain precise information. Refineries are often 
linked to armed groups/local authorities, either directly owned by them or by investors linked to 
them. Capital is needed to buy the opium, precursor chemicals and any taxes that have to be paid. 
Many are Chinese or Sino-Burmese investors, either from Yunnan or Wa, Kokang, Mongla areas.  
Opium is refined into heroin within Myanmar, often in remote sites close to the border. They are 
small-scale, rudimentary operations often located in jungle clearings. 
SUPPLY OF 
PRECURSOR 
CHEMICALS 
Illegal Traffickers 
Diversion of legal 
shipments 
Precursor chemicals are not produced in Myanmar and come from China, Thailand and India. Acetic 
anhydride is the most important chemical needed for heroin refining. Other chemicals, such as 
calcium hydroxide, ammonium chloride and hydrochloric acid are also used. It is unclear if chemicals 
cross the border illegally or enter legally and are then re-directed into the drug trade. Acetic 
anhydride, for example, has many uses - it is used in the production of rattan furniture, or which 
there are numerous factories within Myanmar.  
TAXATION Local authorities Refineries may proactively pay local armed groups to gain the right to refine in areas under their 
control and/or to pay off authorities if found.  
HEROIN  
TRADE 
LOCAL TRADE Local sellers 
Growing local demand for heroin especially in urban areas and major mining sites. Sellers may buy 
the heroin to then sell on or have direct links to those in charge of refineries.  
NATIONAL 
TRADE 
National trafficking 
routes to supply 
national markets 
Very hard to find precise information. Growing demand for heroin in urban centres, especially Yangon 
and Mandalay. UNODC estimates as much as 10% of heroin produced in the country’s border areas 
remains in the country and estimates the cost to be US$ 96/g (UNODC 2013, 58). 
INTER-
NATIONAL 
TRADE 
Cross-border 
trafficking networks to 
international markets 
Drug shipments are often broken down into small amounts, which are then trafficked across the 
border before being re-accumulated by a member of the trafficking network on the other side of the 
border. Most Shan heroin goes to China with smaller amounts also reaching regional markets across 
Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific.  Chin and Zhang (2007, 30) estimate traffickers within China can 
earn as much as US350-$600 to transport small amounts of heroin from the border region to cities 
across China. Retail prices are hard to gauge. UNODC estimates the retail cost of heroin in China to be 
US$222/g, rising to over US$1,000/g in Australia (UNODC 2013, 58).     
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9.4 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE OPIUM/HEROIN TRADE, 1988-2012 
By the mid-1980s, opium had emerged as a commodity ‗success story‘ across Shan 
State and had, consequently, become one of the foundations of rural power structures 
generating revenue to sustain an array of armed groups and finance patronage networks 
that extended well beyond the border (Meehan 2015, 267). Faced with the enduring 
challenges of consolidating control across Shan State (see Chapter 7), government 
actors have attempted to manipulate and reconfigure the relationship between opium 
and power to fulfil state-building objectives, rather than launch sustained efforts to 
dismantle to the region‘s drug economy. Consequently, alongside the continued role 
that drugs continue to play in financing insurgent groups, the drug economy has also 
become instrumental to shaping how state power has been imposed and negotiated over 
the past twenty-five years. Two strategies have underpinned the government‘s 
engagement with the drug economy. Firstly, the drug economy has helped to finance 
the militarisation of Shan State. Secondly, the drug economy has been an important 
part of brokerage agreements through which the government has sought to govern the 
region. 
 
9.4.1 Drugs and militarized state consolidation: Financing Tatmadaw 
expansion across Shan State 
The Tatmadaw has faced the perennial challenge of how to finance its efforts to secure 
military control across the country. As explained in Chapter 7, the impecunious state of 
central government finances placed great emphasis upon military units to ‗live off the 
land‘. Throughout the country‘s border regions there was greater pressure on units to 
be self-sufficient due to the fact that counter-insurgency campaigns required them to 
penetrate into remote rural areas where government control had historically been weak 
and where there were no well-established supply lines. There was pressure on battalion 
commanders and regional commanders to deliver results with little concern or 
oversight regarding how this was achieved. This combination of financial pressure and 
weak scrutiny encouraged many commanders throughout Shan State to capitalise upon 
the region‘s drug economy as a means to generate revenue. Commanders were aware 
that as long as their activities did not draw overt attention they would be unlikely to 
face reprimand. The Tatmadaw‘s ability to generate revenue from the drug trade was 
repeated time and again in my interviews. Many were surprised at my level of interest 
in an aspect of the rural economy that was, to them, as unremarkable as it was 
commonplace.  
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The military has generated revenue from the drug economy in a number of ‗direct‘ 
ways, primarily through taxing cultivators and demanding protection fees from those 
growing, trading and refining drugs. As one Pao researcher explained with regards to 
the opium economy in Pinlaung and Pekhon townships:  
Almost all of these taxes are informal and likely to be ad hoc, based on the decisions 
made at a local level by battalion commanders. This tax can take many forms. Farmers 
may be taxed in order to enjoy the ―right‖ to grow opium. This is a protection racket 
for it has the threat that non-payment will lead to prosecution. They [farmers] may be 
taxed at harvest time in order to sell their opium. Farmers may also be taxed during 
eradication drives when headmen have to negotiate with those coming to eradicate the 
crop in order to spare their fields. The military also tax opium buyers in order to access 
rural communities and to traffic the drugs.233 
The localized and informal nature of revenue collection and military commanders‘ 
desire to conceal their interaction with the drug trade means there is little uniformity 
regarding how the Tatmadaw collects taxes. In some areas the Tatmadaw has collected 
tax directly from poppy farmers, threatening to destroy crops if taxes were not paid. 
This was more common in the 1990s when taxation was sometimes even paid in opium 
rather than cash.234 More commonly village headmen were tasked with managing tax. 
As one former resident of Kunhing Township in central Shan State explained to me, 
―The Army came to survey how much land people had in the village.  They would ask 
the village headman and then set the level of tax.  They did this at harvest time so it 
was easier to survey.‖235 One former village headman, who had served for twenty 
years in a village in Mongpan, explained his role: 
I became village headman partly because I was the only person in the village who was 
able to speak Burmese [this being needed to communicate with the Burma Army]. The 
Burma Army had a camp on the hill above the village.  The police had a presence in 
the towns but rural areas were under the control of the Army…After 1996 the Burma 
Army became violent and abusive as they sought to control the region.  They regularly 
took animals and food. I had to spend a lot of time in the Burma Army camp and they 
would endlessly question me about the resistance…A lot of poppy has been grown in 
Mongpan…Poppy is grown by both the Shan and hill groups…when I was village 
headman growers paid tax to the Burma Army.236 
 
Those I interviewed consistently cited how the illegality of opium cultivation made 
farmers vulnerable to heavy taxation by officials. The difficulty of concealing fields of 
poppies in full bloom increase farmers‘ vulnerability to eradication. Paying taxes has 
become a way of mitigating this risk. As one farmer from Mongton township, 
commented, ―You pay 5,000 kyat [US$5] per acre to the local military and nobody is 
going to bother you‖ (SHAN 2003, 32). In many interviews, people were secretive 
                                                          
233 Interview with Pao researcher. 28 January 2013. Taungyyi. 
234 Interview with former poppy farmer from southern Shan State. 27 April 2014. Fang District, 
Thailand.  
235 Interview with migrant from Kunhing Township now living in northern Thailand. 25 April 2014. 
Fang District, Thailand.  
236 Interview with former village headman from Mongpan. 26th April 2014. Fang District, Thailand. 
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about where poppy was grown, not because of concerns that what they were doing was 
wrong or illegal, but because they feared that discovery would subject them to heavy 
taxation. Paradoxically, in some areas the fear of eradication has spurred production. 
According to one Mongton resident, ―Over the last ten years a lot [of poppy] has been 
grown. Lahu communities are growing more so they can pay more to the Burma Army 
to protect themselves and their areas [from eradication].‖237  
 
The Tatmadaw has also generated revenue in more ‗indirect‘ ways, through 
establishing ‗hierarchies of extraction‘ around the drug trade. These have operated in at 
least two ways. Firstly, the Tatmadaw has collected taxes/protection fees from traders 
in return for allowing them to enter territory under their control. This has effectively 
enabled the Tatmadaw to expand the territorial reach of taxation networks without 
having to undertake arduous and dangerous revenue collection exercises throughout 
rural areas. As one former poppy farmer from Mongnai Township explained: 
We paid tax, but indirectly. The buyer would pay tax on the opium he bought from us, on 
our behalf. This tax was then deducted from the price that the buyer would pay to us for 
our crop. The buyers had to pay tax to the Burma Army. This was only once a year when 
the crops were sold.238      
 
Secondly, in some areas where Tatmadaw control has become well-established, 
officials have generated revenue indirectly by issuing de facto taxation rights and 
production monopolies to certain groups or individuals, giving them the right to tax 
farmers and monopoly purchase opium within a given area, in return for a fee. This is 
an easy way for Tatmadaw units to convert territorial control into a means of 
generating income from the region‘s most lucrative commodity without the need to 
engage directly with the drug trade. In many regions there has been a gradual transition 
in the way that the Tatmadaw has taxed the drug economy. Throughout the 1990s, 
overt, direct forms of taxation on poppy farmers were common. Over the past decade, 
however, hierarchies of extraction have become much more common, in which it is 
primarily local militias and some ceasefire groups who tax, buy, refine and traffic 
drugs, providing kickbacks to the Tatmadaw for the privilege.  This process was 
explained clearly by one local researcher:      
Generally, it seems that once a militia has been formed, the local battalion Commander 
will carve an area of territory over which it will give the militia responsibility for. The 
militia will be responsible for managing the area, for challenging any insurgent troops 
in the area and for collecting tax in the area, of which it will then give an amount to the 
Army. Within these areas of responsibility militias are able to promote opium 
cultivation and to tax it…militias can do whatever they want.239 
 
                                                          
237 Interview with migrant worker from southern Shan State. 26 April 2014. Fang. 
238 Interview with former poppy farmer from Mongnai Township. 26 April 2014. Fang. 
239 Interview with SHAN. 12 November 2012. Chiang Mai. 
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These insights from southern Shan State were corroborated by a Palaung researcher 
from northern Shan State,    
 
Of course the army benefits financially from the drug trade, but mostly indirectly. It 
does not sell drugs, nor is it the main force taxing farmers. However, it certainly 
benefits from these taxes indirectly, mostly through the taxing of militias and 
businesses. Soldiers‘ salaries are very small and commanders look for opportunities to 
improve the conditions of soldiers.240 
 
Powerful symbiotic relationships have thus emerged between the Tatmadaw and 
militias around the drug trade in which the interests of these groups are tied up in 
continued drug production rather than concerted efforts at eradication.     
 
Thus, whilst the UNODC (2014b, 80) emphasizes how opium/heroin is ―a staple…of 
insurgent finance‖, it ignores how revenue from the drug trade is also a ‗staple‘ for 
financing Tatmadaw expansion and proxy-government militias. This is despite the 
fact that even its own data seems to intimate this. In the same 2014 survey, for 
example, the UNODC reports that 67% of all poppy growing villages it surveyed 
reported ―government activity‖ over the past twelve months, 54% reported ‗militia 
activity‘, yet only 16% reported ‗insurgent activity‘ (UNODC 2014b, 80). Although 
the nature of this ‗activity‘ is not explained, it seems highly likely to have included 
taxation on opium, which is an issue the UNODC has consistently failed to report on 
despite this being one of the biggest grievances expressed in many of my interviews. 
 
In areas where the Tatmadaw does not seem to have taxed opium directly, 
expropriation of food (especially rice) at below market prices has, nonetheless, 
increased the need for families to generate cash as a means of covering their own 
subsequent food shortfalls. As one farmer from Mongpan Township explained,  
 
If we had not produced enough food to pay tax and had to borrow money to buy food 
we would borrow from local better-off people or go into the jungle to hunt and find 
foods we could sell.  We would try to borrow from friends or relatives because they 
would not charge much interest.241  
 
Even in areas where the threat of insurgency has abated and Tatmadaw units have 
returned to barracks in the towns, levels of expropriation have not necessarily receded. 
The entry of civilian bureaucracy has often created new forms of tax collectors, in the 
form of local government officials and members of the Forestry Department, the Land 
Records Department and the police. These taxes may not necessarily be on opium but 
as this is the only cash crop in many areas, it is opium that pays for these demands. As 
                                                          
240 Interview with Palaung research organisation 3 May 2013. Mae Sot. 
241 Interview with farmer from Mongpan Township. 26 April 2014. Fang. 
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one former government official commented, local government figures ―see nothing and 
hear nothing. They tax it [opium] and benefit from it‖.242  
 
In some cases, drug eradication units have been at the forefront of attempts to extend 
government apparatus and institutions into contested regions. For example, at a 
meeting in Tachilek in 2012 the UNODC attempted to orchestrate a trilateral 
agreement between itself, the government and the SSA-‗South‘ for joint cooperation to 
tackle opium production and to conduct joint needs assessments across contested areas 
of Mongnai and Mongpan townships. The agreement seemingly broke down amidst 
government demands that survey areas concentrate on areas under stronger SSA 
influence and that SSA troops disarm before entering these areas. In turn the SSA had 
attempted, unsuccessfully, to use the agreement to engage with communities in 
territories under government control. It seems that neither side‘s priority was drug 
eradication but was an effort to use counter-narcotics policies as a means of pursuing 
other goals.  
 
The entry of government officials into contested parts of rural Shan State under the 
rubric of counter-narcotics programmes raises interesting parallels with James 
Ferguson‘s (1990) work on the ―instrumental effects‖ of poverty-alleviation 
interventions in Lesotho. Ferguson‘s analysis demonstrates how development 
initiatives had negligible impact on reducing poverty but proved highly effective in 
bureaucratizing peasant life by normalizing state power and increasing the ‗legibility‘ 
of rural populations. Similarly, counter-narcotics efforts across Shan State have often 
had little impact on stemming drug production but have helped to finance the extension 
of government presence into unruly areas. Whilst such policies are analysed 
predominantly in terms of their success or failure in curtailing drug production, it is just 
as important, as Ferguson argues, to understand how these activities have affected 
‗target populations‘ beyond their ‗official‘ policy aims. In rural areas, eradication 
drives by the police and the Tatmadaw have had both a performative and revenue-
generating function. The visible threat to farmers‘ livelihoods is a way of projecting 
state power (both locally and to international audiences) whilst also increasing the 
amount of ‗protection fees‘ that state officials can then demand. 
 
9.4.2 Drugs and negotiated statehood: Opium/heroin, ceasefire politics and 
militias 
                                                          
242 Interview with former government official. 20 March 2013. Yangon. 
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The drug economy has also become embedded within the political settlements that 
have emerged over the past twenty-five years. The government‘s ability to offer 
taxation rights, impunity, protection and access to the legal economy has created a 
system of rents with which to build coalitions with various ceasefire groups and 
militias. Informal deals surrounding the drug trade have become an important 
dimension of the informal governance structures that extend across Shan State, 
complicating narratives that equate drug production with state absence or breakdown. 
Developing a distinction between territorialising and frontier forms of brokerage is 
again useful for interrogating the spatial variation of this phenomenon. 
 
Drugs and frontier brokerage 
As outlined in the previous chapter, in areas where government control has historically 
been weak and/or which are of limited strategic importance, the government has 
sought to establish a greater degree of control through frontier brokerage. The drug 
economy has become an important ‗hook‘ upon which the Tatmadaw sought to 
establish durable coalitions with groups over which it commanded little authority. The 
clearest examples are the ceasefire agreements forged with the ex-CPB groups along 
the China border in the late 1980s and the deals made with ex-MTA militias after 
Khun Sa‘s surrender in 1996. These unofficial agreements were underwritten by a 
clear quid pro quo: in return for making regions under their control stable and 
insurgent-free, these groups were allowed to generate revenue however they liked. As 
one local historian surmised, ―as long as the gun barrel is not pointed at them [the 
Army] they are happy to let anything go‖.243  
 
The drug economy has been an especially important means through which to stabilise 
these forms of potentially volatile frontier brokerage. The drug economy magnified the 
benefits for ‗frontier‘ groups to broker deals with the government despite the fact that 
continued opposition remained a viable option. It enabled these groups to tax opium 
and to profit from refining and trafficking heroin with impunity. Opium/heroin‘s 
illegal status also created powerful incentives for those involved in the trade to seek 
ways to convert the revenue and power derived from it into more secure forms of 
formal authority and investment. By acting as ‗gatekeepers‘ to the state-controlled 
legal economy the government has been able to determine who is given opportunities 
to ―diversify‖ and potentially ―graduate‖ out of the drug economy (Goodhand and 
Mansfield 2010, 26).244 Allying with the government has thus enabled many of these 
                                                          
243 Interview with Shan historian. 28 March 2013. Taunggyi. 
244 This study of the political economy of the drug trade in Afghanistan clearly reveals that the processes 
taking place in Shan State are not unique but are also present in other drug-producing regions. 
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groups to establish formal businesses and to launder drug money. Furthermore, the 
official rebranding of these groups from ‗insurgents‘ to ‗leaders of national races‘ that 
have ‗returned to the legal fold‘ has helped to create a veneer of legitimacy around 
their activities.  
 
For government officials, frontier brokerage agreements enabled them to forge 
coalitions with armed groups over which they previously exercised little control, and 
from an illegal trade over which it had no power to curtail or monopolise production. 
Drug revenues also meant these groups could be self-financing. This reduced pressure 
on the government to secure these agreements through any form of direct payment or 
social investment in ceasefire regions. Furthermore, providing protection and 
economic opportunities to frontier brokers encouraged investors to work with these 
groups rather than with insurgents. These agreements have also channelled money 
back into the legal economy (see Appendix 2). Arguably the most iconic example of 
this was the use of Yunnan Chinese, Wa and Kokang capital, much of it originating 
from the drug and jade trade, to rebuild central Mandalay in the early 1990s following 
the spate of fires that had gutted parts of the city centre through the 1980s after the 
government had been unable or unwilling to foot this bill. 
 
Finally, the fact that drugs remain illegal has meant that even in areas where 
government control is weak, it has been able to retain a degree of influence over 
frontier brokers by wielding the perpetual threat of prosecution against those who fail 
to adhere to the demands placed upon them. This was exemplified in August 2009 
when the government justified Tatmadaw offensives against the Kokang MNDAA 
ceasefire group (following its failure to convert to a Border Guard Force) by citing the 
group‘s involvement in the drug trade, despite the fact that this had never been an issue 
during the prior twenty-year ceasefire agreement.245 
 
In most of these ‗frontier‘ areas there has been few direct links between military 
government officials and the drug economy and little drug money reaches government 
coffers. Instead, the primary function of these deals has been to strengthen political 
alliances.  
 
                                                          
245 The New Light of Myanmar, the state‘s official mouthpiece, justified the attacks by stating that: 
―Kokang national race leaders stuck to dictatorship and warlord system and showed total disregard for 
the law by manufacturing illegal arms and ammunition and trafficking narcotic drugs on a large scale. 
So, the government had no choice but to take action against the offenders in accordance with the law‖ 
(NLM 2009, 8).   
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Drugs, ceasefire politics and frontier brokerage: The case of Lin Ming Xian 
Lin Ming Xian, also known as U Sai Lin, was born of Chinese parents at Panghsai. He 
was a leading member of the CPB and commanded Division 815 in eastern Shan State 
(Lintner 1990). Throughout the 1980s drug production increased significantly in the 
area under his control. Following the CPB‘s collapse Lin Ming Xian forged a ceasefire 
with the government as head of the newly-formed NDAA, and retained control over a 
100 kilometre stretch along the China border headquartered at Mongla. This territory, 
known as Special Region 4, is remote but strategically important due to its position 
along the China and Laos borders and the fact that both the Mekong River and parts of 
the ADB-funded Asia Highway road network bisect the region. Over the next decade 
the NDAA generated significant revenue from taxing opium production and refineries, 
and most likely also from trafficking heroin across the border, although this is hard to 
verify.  
 
The NDAA invested much of this money into developing gambling border towns at 
Mong La, Eu Si Lim and Sop Lwe to cater for Chinese tourists. During the 1990s Lin 
Ming Xian also established numerous legal companies, including: Shwe Lin Star, a 
tourism business with agencies as far afield as Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong; 
and Green Light Company and Asia Wealth Company both of which are involved in 
coal and magnesium mining, road-building and logging. Asia Wealth Company played 
a role in the construction of the 56 mile road between Kengtung and Mongla that 
forms part of the Asia Highway network. Drug money provided necessary start-up 
capital for these companies whilst road-building in particular proved an easy way of 
laundering money with ‗dirty‘ investment in constructing roads being converted into 
‗clean‘ toll revenues. Lin established close links with Khin Nyunt and was invited to 
attend the government‘s National Convention to draw up the country‘s new 
constitution. Although the military government derived little direct financial benefit, 
informal deals surrounding the drug economy brought greater stability and funded 
infrastructure.  
 
In the late 1990s, Lin Ming Xian‘s declared the region opium-free after a high-profile 
eradication drive seemingly in response to Chinese pressure. Although officially a part 
of Myanmar, these Special Regions are more dependent on China for basic foodstuffs 
and materials, business and investment, and weapons. The fear that China could shut 
down the border to stem the flow of drugs discouraged these groups from taking ―full 
advantage of the China route‖ and has forced them to navigate competing political, 
economic and strategic considerations (Zhang & Chin 2007, 10-11). Field researchers, 
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however, continued to claim that poppy was being cultivated in remote areas and it is 
difficult to confirm or reject these claims (LNDO 2005). Either way, informal deals 
surrounding the drug economy played an important part in stabilising relations with the 
NDAA throughout the 1990s.   
 
The ex-MTA militias of southern Shan State: Counter-insurgency druglords 
Amidst the scramble to capitalise upon the turmoil created by Khun Sa‘s surrender in 
1996, informal agreements surrounding the drug economy played an instrumental role 
in the Tatmadaw‘s efforts to establish proxy militias and to reduce the threat posed by 
the SSA-S. Almost all former MTA militias across southern and eastern Shan State, 
notably the Matkyan, Nayai, Wan Pung and SSS militias became (and remain) 
involved in the drug trade. In this case the dynamics surrounding informal deals were 
slightly different than those brokered with ex-CPB groups. Although these militias 
were weaker, brokering deals was viewed by the Tatmadaw as a more expedient and 
cost-effective way of securing territorial control and preventing defections to the SSA-
S. The Tatmadaw offered these groups local autonomy in return for agreeing to 
become anti-insurgent militias. Within militia territories farmers have been able to 
grow poppy and numerous heroin refineries operate.  
 
It seems that different militias have different specialisms within the drug trade (See 
Appendix 1). Both the Nayai and Matykan militias – the latter described in state media 
as the Matkyan Region Development Group (NLM 2007, 6) – are notorious for 
controlling large poppy-growing areas and for buying opium from surrounding areas, 
which is then refined into high quality ―shoes/slippers‖ [Kep-tin in Shan], a slang term 
for blocks of heroin, which come in pairs (hence the term) weighing approximately 
700g.246 In contrast, Colonel Yishay‘s Wan Pung militia is much smaller (60-100 men) 
controls less territory and most of his revenue has been generated from operating 
cross-border trafficking routes into Thailand via the Mekong River and through Laos, 
for which other militias lack the know-how and established networks.247 Although 
Yishay is wanted for drug trafficking by the Thai authorities, he has continued to live 
safely within Shan State. He has established close links with numerous officials, most 
importantly Wilson Moe who is a USDP MP in the Upper House and is married to 
Yishay‘s niece (SHAN 2011).  
 
These agreements strengthened Tatmadaw commanders‘ efforts to wrestle control 
away from insurgent groups without costly and bloody military offensives. The 
                                                          
246 Interview with SHAN. 10 January 2013. Chiang Mai.  
247 Interview with former Lahu militia leader. 14 February 2013. Chiang Mai. 
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clearest example of this is in Nansang Township where both the Matkyan and Nayai 
militias are based. The Township has long been a stronghold of resistance and the 
SSA-S had also established a military camp there (Wansai 2012).  Nansang town 
stands at the apex of National Highway 4 [NH4] linking Taunggyi and Kunhing, Road 
44 linking Nansang with Hsipaw to the North, and Road 45 which meanders south to 
the Thai border. The collapse of the MTA and the presence of proxy-government 
militias stabilised this region as demonstrated by the decision in 2011 to make 
Nansang the headquarters of the newly formed Tatmadaw Middle Eastern Regional 
Command.  
 
This relationship between drugs, militia brokerage and processes of state consolidation 
has, however, been entirely misconstrued in UNODC narratives. In 2009, for example, 
the UNODC stated that ―the negotiation of a series of truce agreements with most 
break-away factions‖ of the MTA ―paved the way for control by the government of 
opium poppy-growing regions and allowed the implementation of measures to reduce 
opium poppy cultivation‖ (UNODC 2009, 63). This statement entirely misrepresents 
how the military government‘s willingness to allow ex-MTA groups to remain 
involved in the drug trade became integral to frontier brokerage arrangements.  
 
Although deals surrounding the drug economy stabilised frontier brokerage 
arrangements, they also pose significant challenges to the government‘s efforts to 
consolidate control. Most significantly, drugs have enabled many of these groups, 
especially the UWSA and NDAA, to finance their own armies and statebuilding 
initiatives, allowing them to retain a high degree of autonomy. These agreements have 
done nothing to address long-standing questions regarding the political status of these 
regions or tackle the thorny issue of demobilisation and disarmament. According to 
one former government official I interviewed, the biggest challenge facing the 
government is ―how to move from ceasefires in which groups can do anything, to there 
being greater government control in rural areas‖. 248 Any such process, however, is 
likely to threaten the delicate power structures that have proved effective in managing 
border regions over the past two decades. The government is aware that factors driving 
supply and demand for drugs have not changed and more concerted action against the 
drug trade may not only destabilise existing political settlements but push investors 
and traders into the hands of other armed groups such as the SSA and KIA. 
 
 
                                                          
248 Interview with former government official.  20 March 2013. Yangon. 
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Drugs and territorialising brokerage 
In areas of Shan State where the Tatmadaw has sought to establish greater territorial 
control through processes of ‗territorialising brokerage‘, political alliances forged 
around the drug trade have demonstrated different dynamics. Offers of impunity, 
protection and entry into the legal economy have also played an important role in 
forging loyalty and ensuring militia groups are self-financing. However, the fact that 
‗territorialising‘ militias operate in areas where there is a stronger Tatmadaw presence 
has created closer ties between military government officials and the illegal economy. 
In these regions ‗hierarchies of extraction‘ have emerged in which militias are major 
players in the drug trade under the oversight of the Tatmadaw. Militias enjoy the right 
to tax, refine and sell drugs in return for securing areas under their control and 
providing revenue to Tatmadaw superiors. Amidst international scrutiny of the 
government‘s counter-narcotics efforts, these hierarchies of extraction have served a 
very useful function. They have allowed the Tatmadaw to distance itself from the drug 
trade without pushing investors and poppy growers back into territories or trade 
networks controlled by insurgents or less trusted ceasefire groups. Instead, the drug 
economy – and the power and revenue it creates – has remained under the control of 
proxy-government forces from whom the both the Tatmadaw and other state 
institutions (such as the police) have been able to extract revenue.  
 
„Panhsay‟ Kyaw Myint: Militia leader, MP, successful businessman and druglord  
The case of ‗Panhsay‘ Kyaw Myint offers a fascinating insight into how the drug trade 
has become embroiled in the dynamics of territorialising brokerage.  Kyaw Myint (aka 
Li Yongqiang; U Win Maung) is in his mid-50s and is a long-time government 
supporter in Namkham Township, which borders China in northern Shan State. 
Throughout the 1980s he was the leader of a counter-insurgency militia operating in 
the area and in 1991 this group became known as the Panhsay People‘s militia, which 
today is the largest proxy-government militia in the region. The region is strategically 
important due to its proximity to the main road linking China with Mandalay and due 
to a number of major development projects in the area, including the Shweli dams and 
the oil and gas pipelines. It is also a region in which various opposition groups, notably 
the TNLA, KIA and SSA operate. The area has been heavily militarised with many 
Tatmadaw battalions based across Namkham, Mantong, Namhsan, Lashio and Hsipaw 
Townships.  
 
With over thirty years of proven loyalty Kyaw Myint embodies a safe pair of hands in 
which to delegate local authority. His militia has been involved repeatedly in 
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Tatmadaw counter-insurgency operations, notably in 2006 during the operation to 
capture SSA Commander Lt-Col Khun Kyaw, and in the recent clashes with the 
TNLA.249 It has also been deployed to secure development projects.  Kyaw Myint, 
who is Lisu-Chinese, is also an influential figure in Yunnan and has served as a 
facilitator connecting the military with Chinese companies seeking to work in northern 
Shan State.250 In return, Kyaw Myint has been able to become one of the largest drug 
producers in Shan State under the gaze of the Tatmadaw.  
 
Kyaw Myint controls a large poppy-growing area around Panhsay, the highest hill area 
in Namkham. It employs large numbers of labourers and uses fertilisers and pesticides. 
The protection Kyaw Myint enjoys has attracted some farmers to migrate to the region 
to mitigate the risk of crop eradication. 251  These developments mark a shift in 
traditional modes of poppy cultivation across the region. As one Palaung researcher 
explained,  
In the past poppy would be grown on small plots in the jungle. Now that it is legal and 
encouraged larger farms have emerged, owned by the wealthy, often Chinese. These 
farms can be large and are away from the main roads. Kyaw Myint is the largest poppy 
farm owner in northern Shan State. Farmers in the area controlled by his militia also 
have to pay tax to Kyaw Myint in order to be able to grow opium…Large farms 
employ many labourers. Some of these also offer a place to sleep and food. There are 
many unemployed people in Palaung areas and they are paid more working on these 
farms than from working in tea plantations or in other jobs. Often labourers are paid in 
opium, yaba or even heroin, especially young male labourers. They are encouraged to 
try drugs.252 
Kyaw Myint has also been granted permits and licenses to operate a number of other 
legal businesses in the area.253 In 2010 he was elected to the Shan State Parliament as a 
representative of the government-backed USDP in an election campaign that promised 
that poppy cultivation would continue to be protected for a further five years (SHAN 
2011, 22, 31-2). 
 
Although Kyaw Myint is the most heavily involved of all militia leaders in the 
opium/heroin trade in northern Shan State, my research uncovered similar evidence of 
militia involvement in taxing, refining and trafficking drugs, notably the Manpang, 
Mongpaw and Kutkhai militias, and the Kachin Defence Army (see Appendix 1). 
Allowing militias to become involved in the drug trade has served a number of useful 
functions for the government. It has facilitated the creation of a large number of self-
                                                          
249 Interview with PSLF Chairman. 26 December 2012. Chiang Mai. 
250 Interviews. Lashio. June 2013. 
251 Interviews. Lashio. June 2013. 
252 Interview with Palaung research organisation. 29 April 2013. Mae Sot. 
253 According to SHAN (2011, 22, 31-2) these include a cigarette company under a Chinese franchise at 
Naloi, west of Namkham; a licensed pork and beef business supplying Muse and Namkham townships, 
a gas station in Muse‘s Zawnzaw Quarter and Yongyang Casino on the Mao-Shweli River near Muse. 
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financing militias who have played important counter-insurgency functions and whose 
interests are linked to retaining the support of the government. It has provided a means 
of channelling revenue from the drug trade into military coffers through the deals made 
between militias and Tatmadaw commanders. Increasing militia control over the drug 
economy has also denied revenue to insurgent groups by encouraging investors and 
traders to ally with groups that enjoy semi-official protection.  
 
However, significant drawbacks to this strategy remain. The close ties between the 
government and militia leaders such as Kyaw Myint and the close relationships on the 
ground between Tatmadaw units and militias has made it increasingly difficult for the 
government to deny knowledge of what is happening. Scope for plausible deniability is 
shrinking in light of growing determination amongst civil society organisations to draw 
international attention to the ravages caused by drug addiction on rural communities. 
Claims that the military government has willingly ignored the social scourge caused by 
drug abuse in order to create a generation of docile, ill-educated ethnic youth incapable 
of continuing armed resistance may be far-fetched; yet the incessant repetition of this 
claim during fieldwork reflects the corrosive impact that political bargaining 
surrounding the drug economy has had on the government‘s legitimacy. It is noticeable 
in recent years how various armed groups, notably the TNLA and SSA, have sought to 
proclaim their anti-drug credentials to gain greater local as well as international 
legitimacy.  
 
For much of the past twenty-five years the country‘s western isolation, the inability of 
foreigners to access remote rural areas and continued conflict has shrouded the clear 
contradiction that exists between internationally-accepted norms of the ‗proper‘ role of 
the state and localized strategies of state consolidation. However, as conflict recedes 
and as re-engagement with the west gathers pace, this contradiction will become starker. 
These tensions have already led to changes in the structure of the drug economy with 
farmers in many areas being told to cultivate opium only in remote places that cannot 
be observed from roads.  
 
The government‘s attempts to forge brokerage agreements through manipulating the 
drug economy whilst at the same time trying to avoid international scrutiny and 
condemnation may create new forms of instability in the coming years by creating an 
environment in which official complicity, impunity, and support for the certain groups 
involved in the drug trade goes hand in hand with more concerted drug raids and 
eradication programmes. Such contradictory impulses will likely intensify as the 
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country‘s re-engagement with the West increases the government‘s determination to 
establish stable control over Shan State‘s resources and, at the same time, raises 
international expectations that the central government demonstrate commitment to 
reducing the flow of drugs emanating from its borderlands (Meehan 2015). This raises 
serious questions about the durability of deals that have been brokered around the drug 
trade and the potential volatility and insecurity that is likely to accompany any 
concerted effort to renegotiate these brokerage arrangements.  
 
9.5 CONCLUSION 
Shan State, opium and anarchy have long been viewed as synonymous. The 
combination of a complex array of armed groups, drug production and widespread 
poverty has created a vision of a region defined by lawlessness and state failure in 
which the thriving drug economy has been viewed as both a cause and a sign of state 
fragility and economic marginalisation. This vision is reflected in the prevailing policy 
narratives surrounding the drug trade in Shan State, outlined in the first section of this 
chapter, which continue to associate drug production with the insurgent war economy 
and emphasize how peace, stability and borderland economic development are the 
necessary antidotes to the region‘s opium/heroin production. This narrative reflects 
broader assumptions, in both theory and policy, that counter-insurgency, peacebuilding, 
statebuilding, economic integration and counter-narcotics interventions are mutually 
reinforcing. 
 
This chapter has sought to challenge these narratives by explaining how the dynamics 
of Shan State‘s opium/heroin economy have changed over the past quarter-century. 
Although drugs do continue to finance opposition to the government, it is deeply 
misleading to the view the drug trade in the period since the ceasefire agreements in 
the late 1980s simply as the residue of the insurgent war economy. As this chapter has 
demonstrated, the opium/heroin economy has also become embedded within strategies 
to stabilise the region and to make ‗unruly‘ borderland spaces governable in ways that 
have served the interests of both the government and capitalist forces.  
 
The relationship that has emerged between the drug trade and processes of state 
consolidation is rooted in the government‘s attempts to wrestle greater control over the 
Shan borderlands since the late 1980s and the enduring difficulties the region 
continues to pose for aggrandizing state power. The Myanmar government has faced 
the challenge of managing pre-existing structures of authority in which drugs have 
historically played an integral role in accumulating power, financing patronage 
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networks and creating loyalties beyond state control. In a context where the factors 
driving supply and demand of opium remained strong and in which the government 
had little scope to monopolise or prohibit drug production, the government has sought 
to reshape the relationship between opium and power to fulfil its own statebuilding 
objectives, rather than seek to use its growing authority to dismantle the trade. Drugs 
have played a role in financing the extension of state institutions and, more importantly, 
have become central to the forms of negotiation and coalition-building through which 
the government has sought to extend its power and authority. These processes have 
been complex, messy and spatially uneven and reveal the important, although 
commonly overlooked, brokerage role played by powerful local actors in shaping how 
state power has been transmitted through contested regions.  
 
This chapter has also revealed the multi-faceted ways in which the drug trade has 
become embedded in the expansion of capitalist relations across ceasefire landscapes 
and the growing economic integration of rural economies. For some farmers like Khun 
Aung Win, whose testimony opened this chapter, growing poppy has become a 
response mechanism to attempt to mitigate the deleterious impacts of processes of 
agrarian change over the past two decades. For others, the drug trade has offered a 
means of capital accumulation in an attempt to capitalise upon economic opportunities 
created by renewed efforts from governments and businesses across the region to 
exploit Shan State‘s natural resources. Drugs have also financed Tatmadaw 
militarisation and the proliferation of militias across Shan State, both of which have 
played an instrumental role in providing the coercive power required to ‗open up‘ 
borderland spaces and discipline local populations amidst the deeply unequal processes 
of accumulation and dispossession that have underpinned the region‘s ‗development‘ 
and economic integration.  
 
Understanding the broader socio-economic and political milieu surrounding the 
opium/heroin trade offers new insights into why farmers like Khun Aung Win have 
started to grow poppy, despite never having done so before and despite the fact that 
many live in areas of Shan State that have experienced growing stability and economic 
integration over the past two decades. These findings warn against the assumption that 
renewed ceasefires, growing stability and economic development necessarily offer a 
panacea for reducing drug production.   
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CONCLUSION 
CONTESTING NARRATIVES OF DRUGS, STATE 
CONSOLIDATION AND BORDERLAND VIOLENCE 
 
―[M]uch of what we identify as order is simply violence in disguise‖ 
 – Kalyvas, Shapiro & Masoud (2008, 1).   
 
―We are tired of western philosophers, self-defined Burmese experts, and foreign-
based ethnic leaders who demand political resolution before development. 
Development and peace come together. Development in ceasefire areas is the 
quickest way to secure peace and stability.‖   
 – Interview with Myanmar Peace Center, Yangon, 12th June 
2013. 
 
Balancing regional development is crucial to provide ethnic minority groups with 
better economic opportunities and greater access to public services. Many of these 
groups live in border areas where ethnic insurgencies are harming their 
socioeconomic development…Developing these local communities is important 
for maximizing Myanmar‘s geostrategic relations with neighboring countries. 
Better economic opportunities will also help stop opium growing and drug 
smuggling, as well as the illegal trade of minerals and forestry products in border 
areas 
 – Asian Development Bank, “Myanmar: Unlocking the Potential” (2014) 
 
 
Borderlands are frequently depicted as ―black spots‖ or zones of ―concentrated 
intractabilities‖ where criminality, state fragility and poverty become embedded within 
the social fabric of spaces at the margins of the state (Goodhand 2015). Against the 
supposed orderliness of ―state territorial spaces‖ (Agnew 1994, 76-77), borderlands 
have often been portrayed as marginal spaces ―either fraught with avoidance, savagery 
and rebellion – or lingering in dark oblivion‖ (Korf and Raeymaekers 2013, 4).The 
Asian Development Bank quotation given above offers a paradigmatic example of how 
―[d]eveloping‖ borderland communities has been viewed as a means of stemming the 
threat of contagion of violence, criminality and terrorism emanating from marginal 
spaces. These narratives epitomise the ―civilising mission‖ (Scott 2009), or what 
Christopher Cramer and Paul Richards define as the ―civilizing frontier rhetoric‖ 
(Cramer & Richards 2011, 289), which typifies how the penetration of state 
bureaucracy and the extension of capitalist structures – commoditization, property 
right structures and market relations – are viewed as the antidote to violence, conflict, 
illegality, drug production and socioeconomic underdevelopment in border regions.   
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These narratives have become particularly powerful across South and Southeast Asia 
over the past quarter-century as the imagery of borderland regions and the 
―territorializing projects‖ deployed within them by central governments have changed 
profoundly (Korf & Raeymaekers 2013, 11). Once viewed primarily as frontier buffer 
zones, borderlands have increasingly been portrayed by central governments and 
multilateral institutions as embodying valuable economic opportunities with the 
extraction of borderland resources and cross-border ‗economic corridors‘ offering 
scope for more balanced regional development and a means of financing central state 
institutions.  
 
However, this rhetoric is deeply problematic for understanding dynamics of 
development and change in Myanmar‘s eastern borderlands over the past twenty-five 
years. Indeed, the central ‗problem‘ that this study addresses is the apparent 
incongruity between narratives that associate the extension of state sovereignty with 
order and a reduction in illegal practices, and the empirical realities of perpetual drug 
production and violence across Shan State. It is this concern that underpins this study‘s 
overarching research question: What role has the opium/heroin economy played in 
fortifying and/or fragmenting processes of state consolidation in Shan State, 
Myanmar, in the period since 1988?      
  
Through attempting to answer this question, my study has sought to unmask the 
pretences of idealised models of statehoods and deconstruct the ‗civilising frontier 
rhetoric‘ that so often shrouds the reality of how central governments engage with 
borderland regions. I have demonstrated how viewing state practices at the ‗margins‘, 
both literally in terms of how power is transmitted across contested border regions, and 
figuratively in terms of analysing the intersection between legal and illegal practices, 
offers a privileged vantage point from which to interrogate the messy and contested 
power relations and the multiple social actors and motivations that shape processes of 
state consolidation.  
 
The expansion of state authority and capitalist market relations into contested border 
regions is not simply about bringing order and development to previously anarchic, 
ungoverned frontier zones but involves the destruction of existing land uses, property 
rights structures and social relations and the establishment and entrenchment of new 
power structures. This study warns against the sanguinity surrounding narratives of 
frontier development and demonstrates how violence has become embedded in 
processes designed to make borderland spaces in Myanmar governable. It lends 
347 
 
credence to the warning, cited at the start of this chapter, that ―much of what we 
identify as order is simply violence in disguise‖ (Kalyvas, Shapiro & Masoud 2008, 1). 
It also gives particular resonance to Korf and Raeymaekers‘ (2013, 7) argument that 
the ‗unruliness‘ of borderlands is often ―a categorical consequence of the type of state 
penetration one witnesses in…border zones, rather than an objective empirical truth.‖  
 
In this concluding chapter I develop Kalyvas et al.‘s notion of ‗disguise‘ in order to 
develop the metaphor of concealment and to demonstrate how the political economy of 
the drug trade in Shan State remains a triumph of concealment. In doing so I challenge 
the reified linkages between drugs, conflict and state fragility and the portrayal of 
drug-producing regions as necessarily non-state, economically marginalised spaces. 
Through a careful synopsis of the arguments presented in the study, I emphasize how 
my empirical findings unsettle such narratives and explain the important theoretical 
and empirical contributions which this study makes.  
 
UNMASKING THE STATE 
One of the recurring motifs of this study is the juxtaposition between idealised notions 
of how states should function and the messy realities surrounding state practices. Since 
the end of the Cold War, building liberal market democracies has become viewed as 
essential to development, a means through which to alleviate poverty, reduce violent 
conflict and stem the flow of global ills – wars, refugees, drugs, terrorism – emanating 
from fragile or failed states. The power of the liberal statebuilding agenda has been 
twofold. It has underpinned external interventions across the world in countries such as 
Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, Haiti, Indonesia, Iraq, Somalia and Timor-Leste.  
Secondly, it has increased the need for governments to fulfil (or at least be seen as 
attempting to fulfil) these expectations in order to retain legitimacy and access to 
international aid and investment.  
 
For two decades during the 1990s and 2000s Myanmar bucked this trend.254 Following 
its brutal suppression of pro-democracy protestors in 1988 and its refusal to 
acknowledge the 1990 General Election result, the country‘s military government 
proved willing to accept international pariah status, economic sanctions, suspension of 
multilateral development finance and vastly reduced amounts of western aid and 
investment in order to prioritise its own deeply illiberal process of state consolidation. 
Political opposition was dismantled, authoritarianism prevailed and the military 
                                                          
254 Myanmar was not unique in this regard. China is the clearest example, whilst Ethiopia and Angola 
have also often been cited as examples of illiberal state-building (Jones, Soares de Oliveira & 
Verhoeven 2013). 
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retained pervasive control over state institutions and continued to pursue brutal 
counter-insurgency offensives in the country‘s contested border regions.  
 
Since 2010, however, all has apparently changed. Following the election of a 
nominally civilian government and a spate of political and economic reforms, 
Myanmar has been portrayed as a ‗success story‘. No end of international leaders have 
visited the country over the past five years and between 2011 and 2013 overseas 
development aid (ODA) to the country rose tenfold from US$319million to 
US$3.9billion, with the country becoming the third highest recipient of ODA in Asia 
(OECD 2015). Rising aid, trade and investment flows to a country which, until 
recently, was vilified for its military dictatorship and abysmal human rights record 
have all been justified in terms of supporting Myanmar‘s transition to a peaceful, 
democratic, market-oriented state.  
 
However, as an analytical framework for understanding the trajectory of political 
change in Myanmar, this perspective is deeply problematic. It is driven by an idealised, 
technocratic approach to how state institutions should function (or can be made to 
function), which is blind to the power structures that underpin state practices. It serves 
to naturalise and disguise the violence and political contestation that surrounds how 
state authority is imposed, resisted and negotiated. 
 
In Section 1 of this study I developed an alternative political economy framework for 
conceptualising processes of state consolidation. Drawing upon the political economy 
literature on political settlements (Di John 2008; Di John & Putzel 2009; Khan 2000), 
‗limited access orders‘ (North et al. 2007; 2009) and power (Abrams 1988; Migdal 
2001; 2004), Chapter 2 introduced one of this study‘s core themes, namely the 
centrality of power relations to processes of state consolidation. It emphasized how the 
rhetoric of ―virtuous statebuilding‖ and its portrayal of the state as a neutral arbiter of 
social conflict and the dispassionate executor of the ‗rule of law‘, disguises how the 
construction, imposition and normalisation of state power is inherently political. It 
ignores how the imposition of state power not only has a ‗social impact‘ – in terms of 
securing order, stability, and development – but also a ‗distributive impact‘ – in terms 
of distributing the benefits and deleterious impacts of these processes. This chapter 
also accentuated the importance of understanding how state consolidation is about how 
power is managed rather than monopolised by state authorities, emphasizing the 
importance of coalition-building and brokerage. Processes of state consolidation are  
shaped by multiple actors and multiple scales and are defined by both intentional state-
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building strategies but also by their ‗malleability‘ in terms of the way that these 
government strategies are managed, subverted and re-worked by other social actors.    
 
Chapter 3 then developed a conceptual framework for interrogating the specific 
spatial dynamics of processes of state consolidation in borderland regions. This chapter 
presents the most important theoretical innovations in this study. I argue that both 
liberal statebuilding paradigms and the existing political economy literature on state 
consolidation processes are insensitive to the inherent spatiality surrounding how states 
function. Statebuilding has commonly been viewed as ―a centrally guided, top-down 
process‖ (Korf & Raeymaekers 2013, 5), whilst political economy frameworks have 
prioritised national elite-level negotiations and political settlements. This chapter 
sought to dismantle the inherent ‗state centrism‘ and ‗methodological nationalism‘ 
inherent in these approaches by emphasizing how borderlands embody specific 
―ecologies of constraint and opportunity‖ that definitively shape state practices 
(Brenner 1999; Barkey 2008, 36). Power does not simply diffuse outwards from state 
centres but is imposed, contested and resisted in ways that create specific territorial 
practices and ―geographies of sovereignty‖ (Korf & Raeymaekers 2013, 5) One of the 
most important and pioneering contributions of this study is my theoretical 
development of the concept of ‗brokerage‘ for understanding how power is transmitted 
and mediated in borderland societies. There is a growing body of work within the 
literature on statebuilding that focuses on informal structures of authority, power and 
governance although this literature lacks conceptual clarity (Boege et al. 2008; 
Hagmann & Péclard 2010; Menkhaus 2006/7; Menkhaus 2008; Raeymaekers, 
Menkhaus & Vlassenroot 2008). The spectrum of ‗territorializing‘ and ‗frontier‘ 
brokerage‘ I present in this chapter represents an important and unique contribution to 
this literature. It provides scope for developing a more nuanced spatiality of processes 
of state consolidation and how these processes may create varying forms of violence 
and diverse ―institutions of extraction‖ surrounding resources (Synder 2006).    
 
Chapter 4 drew upon the insights of the previous two chapters in order to theorise 
how and why illegal drug economies may become embedded in processes of state 
consolidation as well as state breakdown, in peace economies as well as war 
economies and may play an important role in shaping processes of capitalist expansion 
rather than simply being indicative of a region‘s economic marginalisation. It provides 
a rigorous critique of the claim that drugs are inherently a cause of greed-driven 
conflict and state fragility and challenges the literature that views the relationship 
between the state and illegal practices through the lens of corruption and the 
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criminalization of state institutions (Cornell 2005; Brown 1999; Collier 2000; Collier 
et al. 2003; Bayart et al. 1999). In doing so it developed an innovative theoretical 
framework for engaging with my overarching research question. This framework 
builds upon Richard Snyder‘s work on ―institutions of extraction‖ by demonstrating 
how drugs may become embedded in political coalitions and forms of ‗negotiated 
statehood‘. Importantly, my analysis goes beyond existing insights provided by the 
political economy of resources literature by showing how institutions of extraction 
surrounding drugs may vary according to the different ways in which power is 
brokered in drug-producing regions. 
 
OVERCOMING “HISTORICAL AMNESIA” 
Narratives surrounding statebuilding, drug economies and borderland development 
have commonly invoked a form of ―historical amnesia‖ (Cramer 2006, 9). The reified 
linkages between drugs, conflict and state fragility ignores the diverse social, political 
and economic role drugs have played through history, whilst the ‗civilising frontier 
rhetoric‘ conceals the violence that has historically accompanied state territorialisation 
of borderland regions. An important aspiration of this study has been to challenge this 
historical amnesia. Chapters 5 and 6 provided a sweeping historical overview of 
contested processes of state consolidation across the Shan region and the dynamics of 
the region‘s opium/heroin economy from the mid-nineteenth century up until the late 
1980s. Although these chapters draw upon secondary literature rather than original 
archival work, they are an important part of this study and develop four key insights 
that provide the foundations for the original empirical work that follows in final three 
chapters of the study.  
 
Firstly, these chapters emphasize how the political economy of the Shan borderland 
region and power relations at the ‗centre‘ of the Myanmar state have been mutually 
constitutive, locked in a reflexive and dialectical relationship. This insight is important 
because it addresses a problematic spatial divide in the scholarship on Myanmar (and 
beyond) in which studies have tended either to prioritise analysis of developments at 
the ‗centre‘ in a way that has underplayed the significance of borderland dynamics, or 
to emphasize the agency and dynamism of borderland regions in such a way that has 
suggested misleadingly their separation and insulation from power relations emanating 
from the centre. 
 
Secondly, these chapters directly address my first research sub-question – why have the 
Shan borderlands with China and Thailand become central to the government‟s 
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statebuilding aspirations? They demonstrate how determination amongst state officials 
and businesses in China and Thailand to expand cross-border trade and access 
Myanmar‘s natural resources by the 1980s magnified the economic potential of the 
Shan region at a time when the centrally-planned autarkic economic policies pursued 
under Ne Win brought the state close to collapse. These dynamics explain why these 
borderland regions, long viewed as peripheral (and unlikely to cover the costs of its 
administration) to pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial governments, became 
central to the post-1988 military government‘s statebuilding aspirations.  
 
Thirdly, these two chapters draw attention to the existing power structures and 
―twilight institutions‖ across Shan State that formed the ‗terrain‘ upon which the 
government‘s post-1988 statebuilding strategies have been imposed (Lund 2006). The 
history and foundations of these power structures are invariably overlooked or actively 
concealed in the ―civilising frontier rhetoric‖ that surrounds narratives of borderland 
development. In Myanmar, for example, processes of state consolidation since 1988 
have often been proclaimed by the government as penetrating ―unowned‖ territory 
(Korf & Raeymaekers 2013, 31), epitomised by the 1991 ‗Wastelands Law‘ which 
granted the government the right to control land rights over all ―wasteland‖.  Land with 
no officially recognised legal title, including all customary and communal tenured land, 
was deemed wasteland amounting to 40% of Myanmar‘s total cultivable land, much of 
it located in the country‘s borderlands.  
 
Importantly, these chapters provide a corrective to the simplistic state/anti-state binary, 
inspired by James C Scott‘s (2009) work on ‗Zomia‘, which is often deployed to 
analyse power relations in Myanmar‘s borderlands and have sought to develop a more 
nuanced analysis of the dynamics within Myanmar‘s borderland regions called for by 
Mandy Sadan‘s (2013) ground-breaking study on the Kachin. In doing so these 
chapters emphasize how the history of Shan State is one of negotiation between 
borderland elites and central governments as well as resistance, of multiple conflict 
fault-lines, competing ideologies and internal fragmentation all affected by events 
beyond the country‘s national borders and in which groups and individuals like Khun 
Sa and Lo Hsing Han often straddled supposed state/anti-state boundaries. This 
analysis provided integral foundational understanding for answering in later chapters 
my third research sub-question, namely how have government strategies deployed in 
the Shan borderlands been imposed, resisted and brokered?     
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Fourthly, these chapters demonstrated how the political economy of opium in Shan 
State has a far longer and more complex history than that of financing the region‘s 
insurgency. Under British colonial rule opium revenues financed both the indirect 
system of rule employed through the Federated Shan States administration, and direct 
forms of rule in ‗Burma Proper‘ through the revenue the government generated from 
selling opium (obtained at cost-price from India). Indeed, by the 1930s the 
Government of Burma was generating more revenue from opium than any other Indian 
province. Furthermore, the KKY militia initiative launched by Ne Win‘s government 
in the 1960s revealed how drugs have also been used to forge and finance political 
coalitions between the central government and counter-insurgency proxy forces. The 
drug trade has not only been used to fuel conflict by financing opposition to the post-
colonial state, as suggested by the greed/grievance literature, but has long played a role 
in attempts to finance the governance of this region and to forge political coalitions 
between central governments and borderland elites.  
 
RE-INTERPRETING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STATE CONSOLIDATION 
IN SHAN STATE SINCE 1988   
From these historical foundations Section 3 (Chapters 7, 8 and 9) represents the 
empirical ‗weight‘ of this study and provides a body of pioneering research that draws 
heavily upon the fieldwork I have conducted over the past four years. Chapters 7 and 8 
addressed specifically my second and third research sub-questions – what strategies 
has the government deployed in order to extend its power and authority in borderland 
regions?  And, how have these strategies been imposed, resisted and brokered within 
the Shan borderlands?  
 
Chapter 7 provided an overarching analysis of both the military government‘s 
attempts to consolidate territorial sovereignty across contested border regions since 
1988 and how these strategies have been contested. This chapter provides empirical 
weight to the theoretical insights developed in Chapter 2 by demonstrating how 
processes of state consolidation in Shan State have been underpinned by the complex 
power relations surrounding purposeful government efforts to monopolise power, and 
the ways in which these strategies have been ―bent by the complex social processes 
they provoke and by the compromises they require‖ (de Guevara 2012, 5). This chapter 
demonstrated how the complex and spatially uneven emergence of a ―post-civil-war-
not-quite-peace environment‖ (Callahan 2007, xiv) has marked the transition of the 
Shan borderlands from a ―rebellious borderland‖ to an ―unruly borderland‖ (Baud & 
van Schendel 1997, 227-8). Organised opposition against the government has vastly 
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weakened and the government has proved able to extend authority and to extract 
significant revenue from previously insurgent-controlled territory, epitomised by the 
oil and gas pipelines which now traverse a region of northern Shan State that was once 
the hotbed of the country‘s insurgency. However, behind triumphalist government 
narratives of insurgent groups ―returning to the legal fold‖ and the successful 
―development of border areas and national races‖, the legitimacy of government 
authority remains weak and reliant in many regions upon the raw coercive power of 
the Tatmadaw and proxy forces. 
 
Chapter 8 provided a more fine-grained analysis of processes of state consolidation in 
Shan State since 1988, focusing specifically on the role of local militias. One of the 
most important and unique empirical contributions of this study is the analysis 
presented in this chapter and in Appendix 1 on the militias of Shan State. Although 
these militias are beginning to gain increasing media coverage there has been no 
systematic analysis of their genesis or how they fit into the broader political economy 
of Shan State. Problematically, militias have commonly been portrayed as a further 
indication of state failure and breakdown in Shan State, epitomised most clearly by a 
map I was shown in the UNODC Myanmar office (although not allowed to 
photograph!) which clearly presented territories where militias operate as ‗non-state‘ 
spaces. In contrast, this chapter demonstrates how militias have become embedded in 
processes of state consolidation. By drawing upon the matrix of borderland brokerage 
developed in Chapter 2 this chapter demonstrates how militias have played both 
‗frontier brokerage‘ and ‗territorializing brokerage‘ roles. This is an important insight 
as it explains the hybridity and complex spatiality of the relationships between militias, 
drugs and government authorities. In doing so, my analysis of militia politics provides 
new ways of accounting for the uneven political topography of processes of state 
consolidation across Shan State.  
 
Together, the analysis presented in Chapters 7 and 8 provides important insights for 
analysing statebuilding and peacebuilding processes both in Myanmar and beyond. 
Firstly, it demonstrates the centrality of violence to these processes and warns that the 
conceptualisation of borderland violence in Myanmar as rooted in war and insurgency 
is becoming increasingly anachronistic. Although the brokerage roles played by 
militias have brought ‗order‘ and ‗stability‘ in the sense that they have diminished the 
territories accessed by insurgent groups and have ‗opened up‘ spaces for resource 
extraction and ‗development‘, closer scrutiny of their actions gives further weight to 
Kalyvas et al.‘s assertion, that ―much of what we identify as order is simply violence 
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in disguise.‖ The dynamics of ceasefire politics in Shan State warn against drawing 
precise boundaries between war-time and peace-time, emphasizing instead the 
importance of understanding how violence becomes embedded in social relations 
surrounding processes of societal transition and economic transformation that are not 
easily compartmentalised into periods of war and peace, insurgency and ceasefire 
(Cramer 2006). 
 
Secondly, this study cautions those embracing the ‗local turn‘ in peacebuilding. 
Moving ‗beyond‘ and ‗below‘ national-level policies of statebuilding, democratisation 
and marketization has been viewed as an essential antidote to the failures of liberal 
peacebuilding in delivering sustainable peace and the ―disillusionment with the 
modernising and/or democratising potential of states‖ (Hughes et al. 2015, 817). This 
has been especially true for renewed interventions in Myanmar, where long-standing 
condemnation of the government and enduring question marks over the legitimacy of 
empowering state institutions has encouraged many donors and NGOs to emphasize 
their engagement with ‗local‘ actors ‗beyond‘ the state. However, the assumption that 
local spaces are necessarily governed by more egalitarian, politically progressive and 
socially legitimate political structures is often underpinned by romanticized notions of 
supposedly ‗non-state‘ orders. As this study has shown, localised structures of 
authority are likely to be just as contested, violent and inequitable and although formal 
state power may be less apparent, the ability of local elites to enact violence, to tax and 
to control access to local resources is often founded upon the alliances forged with 
government actors and state institutions, rather than forms of organically-embedded 
order, and thus underpinned by ‗upwards accountability‘ to state actors rather than 
‗downwards accountability‘ to local populations. By critiquing the literature that has 
valorised ―hybrid governance‖ as a more legitimate and locally embedded form of 
order    (Boege et al. 2008; Menkhaus 2008; Ahram 2011), this provides an important 
theoretical and empirical response to Kate Meagher‘s (2012, 1074) call ―for a more 
nuanced, comparative approach to informal governance that is capable of 
distinguishing between constructive and corrosive forms of non-state order, and that 
clarifies rather than blurs the relationship between local order and local legitimacy.‖  
 
Thirdly, this study warns that the complex, messy and illiberal structures of authority 
that have emerged across Shan State cannot simply be shoe-horned into a teleological 
narrative that presents them as part of a temporary stage on the path towards a more 
liberal state structure. We must instead understand that efforts to negotiate and manage 
power in such contexts may create ―emerging political complexes [that] are not simply 
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unfortunate bumps in the road to peace but instead constitute intricate and evolving 
social systems that may continue to be adapted and sustained‖ (Callahan 2006, 4). 
 
DRUGS AND (DIS)ORDER: RE-INTERPRETING THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN STATES AND ILLEGAL PRACTICES  
Illegal drug economies have consistently been interpreted as drivers of conflict and 
state fragility, especially in borderland regions. The border ‗gradient‘ between 
different regulatory zones and the high returns that can be accrued from moving 
resources across this gradient gives borderlands a ―comparative advantage in illegality‖ 
(Goodhand 2014), perceived to benefit border-based opposition groups fighting against 
central governments. The opium/heroin trade in Shan State has long been viewed as a 
paradigmatic example of this phenomenon, epitomising how drug money led the 
Golden Triangle to become a region of anarchy, insurgency and state absence. This 
narrative, however, is too static. Although the relationship between drugs and 
insurgency may help to explain what drove rising opium production throughout the 
initial decades of Myanmar‘s independence, it offers less scope for accounting for the 
changing politics of drug production in Shan State over the past twenty-five years and 
the social and political economy relations surrounding processes of state consolidation 
and drugs.  
 
Chapter 9 addressed this weakness in our empirical understanding of the 
contemporary dynamics of the drug trade in Shan State by answering my final research 
sub-question – what is the relationship between contested processes of state 
consolidation and the drug economy? Intentionally addressing this question last 
reflects the overarching political economy framework I have sought to develop in this 
study for analysing illegal drug economies. It provided a way of interrogating how the 
opium/heroin economy in Shan State since 1988 has become embedded within broader 
processes surrounding how ‗unruly‘ borderland spaces have been made governable in 
ways that have served the interests of both the government and capitalist forces. In 
doing so this study reveals how the drug economy has played an instrumental role in 
shaping state practices in ways that have served both to fortify and fragment state 
authority. Revenue from the opium/heroin trade (in terms of both the taxation and sale 
of drugs) has financed the expansion of coercive state power – through financing 
militarisation, civilian administration and proxy-government militias – in a region 
where the costs associated with such expansion have historically proved prohibitive. 
The government‘s ability to offer protection, impunity and access to the legal economy 
has been integral to negotiating ceasefires and forging coalitions with local elites, and 
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has encouraged investors in the drug trade to work with government-sanctioned groups 
rather than rebels. The fact that opium is a ‗diffuse‘ rather than a ‗point‘ resource – 
with poppies blooming across Shan State – has enabled the government to use these 
strategies across a wide territorial expanse and to adhere to its preferred policy of 
proliferating power across many groups rather than concentrating power in only a 
small number of brokers (Le Billon 2001)255. The official illegality of drugs has also 
enabled the government to justify attacks on groups that it has viewed as becoming too 
powerful or autonomous, such as the MNDAA in 2009.  
 
At the same time, however, the drug trade has played an important role in blunting 
state authority. It has continued to finance insurgency and to fund the localised 
statebuilding agendas of ceasefire groups determined to contest the nation-state 
ideology of the central government. Government efforts to manage the relationship 
between drugs and power have created complex and overlapping networks of 
authority, creating ―mosaics of territorial control‖ in which state officials have 
become increasingly focused on ―managing conflict rather than resolving it‖ 
(MacLean 2008, 141; TNI 2012, 5). Furthermore, a clear contradiction exists between 
localised strategies of state consolidation pursued by government authorities over the 
past twenty-five years and internationally accepted norms regarding the role states are 
expected to play in drug control. This raises important questions regarding whether 
the deals brokered around the drug trade can remain stable in the future amidst 
growing western engagement and scrutiny. This tension may create new forms of 
instability and insecurity, fostering an environment in which official complicity, 
impunity, and toleration for the trade go hand in hand with periodic antidrug raids and 
eradication programs. It is these kinds of nuances that future studies must engage with, 
rather than simplified narratives of drugs as inherent drivers of conflict and disorder. 
 
In developing these arguments this study provides a major contribution to the literature 
on states and illegal practices (Baker & Milne 2015; Gallant 1999; Heyman & Smart 
1999; Meehan 2015; Thoumi 1995; Snyder 2006; van Schendel & Abraham 2005). As 
Korf and Raeymaekers (2013, 20) argue, the relationship between states and 
(il)legality is invariably approached through ―a formal language of law‖ in which the 
state‘s claim to sovereign power is underpinned by claims of the unruliness and 
illegality that exist beyond the state. This has created clear conceptual binaries between 
                                                          
255 Le Billon differentiates between point resources, which are those ―concentrated in an area and mostly 
includes resources exploited by extractive industries (i.e., mining)‖, and diffuse resources, which are 
those  ―more widely spread and mostly includes resources exploited by productive industries over large 
areas (i.e., agriculture, forestry, and fisheries).‖ 
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state-sanctioned, legal ‗good-guy‘ activities, and criminal/illegal activities portrayed as 
operating in the realm beyond states by ‗non-state‘ actors (van Schendel & Abraham 
2005, 9). Where government involvement in illegal practices is irrefutable this has 
often been explained away through narratives of corruption or the ‗criminalisation of 
the state‘, both of which perpetuate the idea that the relationship between governments 
and illegality remain exceptional and outside of formal state practices.  
 
However, as this study demonstrates, the motivations and means through which state 
officials transgress the boundaries of (il)legality are rarely simply a result of individual 
corruption or decaying state institutions. In contexts such as Shan State where illegal 
practices have long provided the foundations for power structures, the government has 
sought to renegotiate the relationship between drugs and power to fulfil its own 
statebuilding agenda. Through this ‗negotiation of illegality‘ the government has 
created political and economic rents through which to forge coalitions and stabilise 
political settlements rather than attempt to outlaw illegal practices. The drug economy 
has simultaneously been used to emphasize the dangers of weak state authority and to 
finance the expansion of state institutions, especially the military. This provides a clear 
example of how statist narratives surrounding (il)legal practices conceal how 
governments flout their own laws and how state-sanctioned violence and illegality are 
often disguised under the rubric of establishing order, governance and stability. These 
dynamics are by no means unique to ‗illiberal states‘ such as Myanmar, but form a 
cornerstone for how the raw ―despotic power‖ (Mann 1984) of all states is shrouded by 
a cloak of legitimacy.  
 
These insights have important policy relevance. They warn that counter-narcotics 
strategies may be used instrumentally in ways that extend beyond their ‗official‘ 
purpose for reducing drug production. In Shan State, for example, government 
counter-narcotics strategies have often been used selectively to target government 
opponents, to justify and finance militarisation, to emphasize to local elites the 
protective power of allying with the government, and to attempt to gain international 
legitimacy for the government. For example, in the late 1990s and early 2000s Khin 
Nyunt‘s (unsuccessful) efforts to garner US support through drug eradication measures 
co-existed the Tatmadaw‘s willingness to use the drug trade as a means of brokering 
deals with MTA commanders to convert former insurgent troops into proxy 
government militias following Khun Sa‘s surrender. This insight warns that future 
external interventions which seek to reduce drug production through rural development 
strategies but that are unwilling (or unable) to engage in the complex politics 
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surrounding insurgency, counter-insurgency and state consolidation are likely to have 
significant unintended and potentially deleterious consequences. 
 
This study also warns that counter-narcotics, statebuilding and peacebuilding policies 
may not actually work in tandem to create stability, security and poverty alleviation in 
the way that is often assumed in policy narratives. Instead there must be deeper 
engagement with the empirical realities surrounding how drugs have become 
embedded in the very processes of state consolidation, pacification and stability, 
which are commonly assumed to be the mechanisms through which illicit economies 
are to be dismantled. This study demonstrates how a sustained political economy 
approach to the relationship between states and illegal practices offers greater scope 
for exploring and addressing these challenges.  
 
DRUGS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Alongside Paul Collier‘s memorable phrase that war is ―development in reverse‖, one 
could easily add the perceived wisdom that drugs, too, epitomise ‗development in 
reverse‘. Drugs are interpreted as axiomatic to poverty, economic marginalisation and 
conflict. The association between poverty, conflict and drug production is by no means 
inaccurate. However, the belief that economic development is an automatic antidote to 
violence and drug production in Shan State – epitomised in the quotations from the 
Asian Development Bank and Myanmar Peace Center at the start of this chapter – is 
deeply misleading, as Chapter 9 clearly shows. It ignores how the previous two decades 
have witnessed processes of peacebuilding (although perhaps pacification would be a 
more accurate term), economic development and regional integration, alongside which 
drug production has continued. The perception of Myanmar‘s post-2010 reforms as 
marking a new dawn for building peace and promoting development may be appealing 
to donors, NGOs and policymakers now operating in the country, but it ignores the fact 
that populations across parts of Shan State have already experienced two decades of 
‗peacebuilding‘ and ‗economic development‘ since the ceasefires of the late 
1980s/early 1990s.  
 
A more nuanced approach is needed to understand how capitalist expansion into drug-
producing regions works. In Shan State, like many drug-producing areas, opium has 
historically been part of the insurgent war economy in a conflict that limited the 
penetration of capitalist development and regional economic integration. However, the 
supposed counterpoint – that capitalist development will lead to a reduction in drug 
production – is much too simplistic. As this study has clearly shown, the drug trade is 
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likely to become embedded in this transition in multiple ways, rather than simply be 
pushed aside. Opium production has become a dynamic of resistance, part of the 
‗infrapolitics‘ of impoverished farming communities facing further hardship amidst the 
profound changes in Shan State‘s agrarian economy (Scott 1990). It has also provided a 
valuable means for richer households and local elites to accumulate capital quickly in 
order to capitalise on the business opportunities created by the region‘s growing 
economic integration and cross-border trade. The drug trade has also provided a means 
through which to finance the coercive infrastructure of Tatmadaw militarisation, proxy 
government militias and also ceasefire and insurgent armies which have all, to varying 
degrees, played a role in opening up sites of extraction and disciplining populations 
affected by unequal processes of accumulation and dispossession. Drug revenues have 
paid for road construction, real estate and urban regeneration; they have helped to 
finance the country‘s banking sector and large conglomerates; they have provided the 
capital for local businesses, basic services and even the upkeep of pagodas, churches 
and temples across Shan State. Whilst ‗international criminals‘ like Naw Kham and 
indicted leaders of the UWSA have stolen the headlines, those involved in the drug 
trade include not only insurgent groups but also businessmen with extensive legal 
enterprises, leaders of people‘s militias, government officials and even MPs.      
 
In revealing these dynamics this study adds theoretical and empirical rigour to a 
growing body of literature that has charted similar dynamics surrounding capitalist 
expansion into other drug-producing environments, notably Colombia (Ballvé 2012; 
Thomson 2011) and Afghanistan (Goodhand 2008, 2009; see also Goodhand, Meehan 
& Pérez-Niño 2014).  
 
SMOKE AND MIRRORS IN THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE’S ‘WAR ON DRUGS’ 
On 26th June 2013 the Myanmar government burned $77million worth of illegal drugs 
in ceremonies across Yangon, Mandalay and Taunggyi to mark the annual 
‗International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking‘. Similar drug-burning 
ceremonies were held at the headquarters of various ceasefire groups. Earlier in 2013 
Chinese authorities had executed the notorious drug trafficker Naw Kham by lethal 
injection with the final moments prior to his execution broadcast live on Chinese TV 
as part of a two-hour show recounting his capture and trial. Throughout May and June 
2013 a joint counter-narcotics operation along the Mekong River involving police 
from China, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand – codenamed ‗Safe River‘ – led to more 
than 2,500 arrests and the seizure of ten tonnes of drugs and 260 tonnes of precursor 
chemicals. 
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The ‗War on Drugs‘ is certainly in full flow across the Golden Triangle. In late 2012 
the Myanmar government‘s Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC) 
announced its intention to extend the country‘s fifteen-year drug elimination plan 
(1999-2014) for a further five years ―to maintain the momentum of the war on drugs‖ 
(SHAN 2012). Over the past fifteen years the Wa, Kokang and Mongla ceasefire 
groups along the China border have all imposed opium bans, whilst in recent years the 
SSA-South, the Palaung National Organisation and even the TNLA, which has yet to 
sign a ceasefire and is still actively fighting against the Tatmadaw, have all launched 
their own drug eradication campaigns. And pledges to co-operate to eliminate drugs 
are present in practically every ceasefire agreement made between President Thein 
Sein‘s government and armed groups across Shan State. 
 
And yet, despite these seemingly universal efforts to stem drug production, the 
opium/heroin economy continues to grow. According to the UNODC‘s (2013, 49) own 
estimates, the market for heroin across the East Asia and Pacific region is valued at 
US$16 billion, two-thirds of which is sourced from Shan State. In 2013 the UNODC‘s 
Southeast Opium survey recorded that levels of opium production had risen for the 
seventh consecutive year across Shan State, with the region now accounting for 25% 
of global production, up from 5% in 2006. An estimated 300,000 households, it 
believes, are involved in poppy cultivation and a survey conducted by a local Shan 
research organisation found poppy being cultivated across forty-nine of the State‘s 
fifty-five townships during the 2011/12 growing season (SHAN 2012, 6). Although 
such figures remain ‗guesstimates‘, they reflect the overarching insights from my own 
extensive fieldwork of the enduring importance of the drug trade to Shan State‘s 
political economy.  
 
Blaming continued drug production solely on the insurgent war economy is 
increasingly anachronistic. As this study has shown, the opium/heroin economy in 
Shan State since 1988 has been driven in diverse ways by the dynamics surrounding 
capitalist development and expanding state authority. The fact that these dynamics are 
not better understood epitomises how prevailing narratives surrounding drugs, 
statebuilding and violence in borderland regions serve to conceal the political economy 
of Shan State‘s drug trade. Idealised models of statehood fail to explain the complex 
power relations, political coalitions and forms of negotiation surrounding processes of 
state consolidation and how illegal drugs may become embedded in these processes. 
Yet as this study shows, the drug economy has been instrumental in shaping how 
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power is transmitted across Shan State and how state institutions are imposed, 
contested and negotiated. The reified linkages between drugs, conflict and disorder 
have perpetuated the notion that opium/heroin production is driven by the insurgent 
war economy, but ignores the role it has also had in forging political settlements and in 
creating varying forms of stability. The notion that drug production is driven by 
poverty and underdevelopment is not inaccurate but is often underwritten by an 
essentialised and depoliticised conceptualisation of marginalised rural communities 
that ignores how the region‘s growing economic integration and ‗development‘ are 
creating new drivers of poverty, violence and drug production. Narratives of 
borderland violence have often blamed the enduring instability and insecurity of these 
regions on the absence of state authority and their economic marginalisation. Yet, in 
the case of Shan State, these narratives ignore how violence has also become 
embedded in the very processes through which borderland spaces are made governable 
and the institutions that have strengthened state authority and capitalist penetration of 
these regions.  
 
All of these insights raise troubling questions about the kinds of ‗peace‘ and 
‗development‘ that may emerge throughout Myanmar‘s border regions in the coming 
years. Understanding the local, national and transnational actors and interests 
surrounding attempts to manage borderland populations and resources provides 
important and timely reminders of the complex and violent power relations within Shan 
State. Without this kind of fine-grained political economy analysis, our understanding 
of Myanmar‘s eastern border regions remains obscured and well-intentioned policies 
designed to promote development, drug control, regional integration, and 
peacebuilding are likely to have unintended and potentially deleterious impacts.  
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APPENDIX 1 
SIGNIFICANT MILITIAS IN SHAN STATE AND THEIR 
LEADERS  
 
NORTHERN SHAN STATE 
 
Militia Name: Hseng Keo Militia 
Location: Hsipaw 
Leader: Sao Loimao 
Size: 300 
Origins: Former ceasefire group militia: formed from the disbanded 3rd Brigade 
of the SSA-N 
Dates active: 2009 – ongoing 
 
The Hseng Keo Militia comprises former SSA-North troops. The SSA-North reached a 
ceasefire agreement with the government in 1989. It retained its arms and bases and 
had three brigades (1st, 3rd and 7th) and a HQ Security Force. The 1st Brigade, the SSA-
N‘s largest brigade, was based in Wanhai, Kehsi Township, southern Shan State, and 
was commanded by Maj-Gen Pangfa. The 3rd Brigade was based in Mongkhurh, 
Mongyai Township in northern Shan State, commanded by Maj-Gen Loimao. The 7th 
Brigade was based in Kali, Kunhing Township in southern Shan State and was 
commanded by Maj-Gen Gaifa. The SSA-N also has military bases throughout Shan 
State, including at Kawng Sao Merng and Hseng Keo (both in Hsipaw State), at Nam 
Lao in Tanggyan, and in Monghsu Township.  Its operational area has stretched across 
Nam Kham, Langkho, Hsipaw, Kyauk Mae, Mong Hsu, Tanggyan, Mongyai, Kehsi, 
and Lashio Townships. In 2009/2010 the Tatmadaw pressured the forced 
transformation of the SSA-North‘s 3rd and 7th Brigades into militias as part of the 
government‘s Border Guard Force. Brigade No. 1 was able to withhold government 
pressure, although its opposition led to the collapse of the SSA-North‘s longstanding 
ceasefire, its rebranding by the government as an insurgent group and renewed 
Tatmadaw offensives against its bases throughout 2010. In January 2012 the SSA-
North signed a new ceasefire agreement with the government.  
 
The Hseng Keo militia is comprised mainly of troops from the 3rd Brigade.  It has been 
given the status of a militia, rather than a BGF, which has enabled the Hseng Keo 
militia to avoid coming under the direct control of the Tatmadaw.  The militia is now 
expected to wear government-issued militia uniforms although conformity to this is 
often limited to when Tatmadaw Commanders visit the militia.256  There is very little 
trust between the Tatmadaw and the militia, which has been increasingly restricted to 
its Hseng Keo base area. The enforced nature of the 3rd and 7th Brigade‘s 
transformation to militias and the close links that remain with the SSA (both ‗North‘ 
and ‗South‘) seemingly limited its use by the Tatmadaw in its 2010/11 offensives 
against the SSA-North‘s 1st Brigade with initial attempts to use Hseng Keo PMF 
troops in the frontline resulting in large numbers of desertions.257 The Tatmadaw‘s 
strategy towards this militia is likely to see attempts to convert it into a proper PMF, 
but only if/when it has managed to sever fully the links between the militia and the 
                                                          
256 Interview with SHAN, 26 April 2013, Chiang Mai. 
257 ibid 
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SSA. Hseng Keo, which used to be an important SSA-N base, has now been renamed 
as a Home Guard Base. Both the 3rd and 7th Brigades were reportedly involved in in 
the drug trade.  It is unclear the extent to which their enforced conversion to a PMF has 
affected their former illicit activities. 
 
Militia Name: Kutkhai Militia 
Location: Kutkhai 
Leader: U T Khun Myat 
Size: 600 
Origins:  Longstanding Tatmadaw-controlled militia 
Dates active: 1990s - ongoing 
 
U Ti Khun Myat is in his early 60s. He was formerly a ―Law Officer‖ in Lashio 
District Law Office, Office of the Attorney-General in Kutkai Township.258 He also 
served as Commander of the Kutkhai local combat police force. He was formerly a 
member of the Executive of the Shan State (North) Union Solidarity and Development 
Association and he attended the National Convention to inform on the country‘s 2008 
constitution. In 2007 he was selected as a Member of the ―Commission for Drafting 
State Constitution‖, one of a select 54-man committee. In 2008 he played a role in 
overseeing the Referendum for approving the Constitution as a ―member of 
Commission for Holding the Referendum‖. 259 He is currently a representative of the 
government-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in the Lower 
House (House of Representatives or Pyithu Hluttaw) and chaired the Bill Committee 
for the Disaster Management Bill.260 He has long-standing links with the government. 
In 2003 state media reported that he had donated 5million kyat (C.us$5,000) to a 
government education fund initiative in northern Shan state261 and on January 2004 he 
was the ―Medal for Excellence Performance in Administrative Field (Second Class)‖ 
as part of the country‘s Independence Day annual honours list. 262 In September 2012 
he headed a delegation that travelled to the US to ―observe the functions of US 
legislation‖. 263 In 2012 he was selected as vice-chairmen of the Joint Public Accounts 
Committee. 264  Kyun Myat was a shareholder of Myanmar Mayflower Bank which 
was shut down in 2003. He has been heavily implicated in involvement with the drug 
trade and the Kutkai militia has been linked with cross-border drug trafficking into 
China and is reported to operate a heroin refinery.265 The Kutkhai militia was active in 
counter-insurgency movements co-ordinated by the Regional Commander in Lashio, 
Brig-Gen Aung Kyaw Zaw against the SSA-N in 2011 around Taungyan alongside 
other militias, namely the Mongpaw militia (led by U Keng Mai) and the Tamoeng-
                                                          
258 New Light of Myanmar, ―Six objectives of National Convention guiding light for emergence of 
democracy 
Mass rally held in Shan State (North) to support Prime Minister‘s clarification on seven-point political 
roadmap‖, 20th October 2003. p.16. 
259 New Light of Myanmar, ―Diplomats observe referendum in Lashio‖, 14th May 2008. 
260 New Light of Myanmar, ―Speaker urges MPs to coordinate, cooperate with authorities to help address 
challenges of people‖, 10th January 2013. 
261 New Light of Myanmar, ―Lt-Gen Aung Htwe attends education fund-raising ceremony and prize 
presentation outstanding students‖, 9th November 2003. 
262 New Light of Myanmar, 5th January 2004 
263 New Light of Myanmar, ―Pyithu Hluttaw Deputy Speaker sees off Parliamentary delegation‖, 10th 
September 2012. 
264 New Light of Myanmar, ―Seventh day session of Pyidaungsu Hluttaw continues‖, 9th February 2012. 
265 Shan Drug Watch 2011 
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ngen militia (also in Kutkhai) led by U Myint Lwin, to control Kutkhai and Namkham 
Townships.266    
 
 
Militia Name: Kawngkha Militias 
Location: Kutkhai  
Leader: Mahtu Naw 
Size: 500+ 
Origins: Former ceasefire group: formed from the disbanded KDA 
Dates active: 1991 – ongoing (1989-2010 as KDA; 2010 – ongoing as militia) 
 
Mahtu Naw was a former Commander of the KIA‘s Fourth Brigade.  He became leader 
of splinter Group the Kachin Defence Army in 1990, and formed a formal ceasefire 
agreement with the SPDC in January 1991, in which it was given control over a region 
that became known as Shan State Special Region #5. It seems that after the KDA split 
from the KIA it was allowed to maintain barracks, troops and weapons by the 
government, with some reports even stating that the Tatmadaw provided the KDA with 
food rations periodically since 1990. 267  In January 2010 the KDA changed its status, 
dividing into five closely-linked militias, under the names Kawnghha (Kaung Khar 
Region) militia 1-5.  There is some discrepancy amongst reports of how this 
transformation occurred.  The most reliable explanation is that the KDA formed a 
series of smaller militias under the fairly centralised control of Mahtu Naw who 
answers to the Lashio-based North-East Regional Command. As part of its 
transformation the number of soldiers controlled by the KDA was reduced and it was 
also forced to surrender its heavy weapons. 268 The KDA replaced its former uniforms 
with standard militia uniforms and regalia. Mahtu Naw has been portrayed in state 
media as a leader of national races, a proponent of regional development and 
committed to supporting opium substitution. 269   He has formed close links with 
government at both local and national level.  He accompanied central government 
figures, including Lt.Gen Thein Sein (incumbent President) at the opening of the 
Kawngkha hydroelectric power plant in 2005270, and has taken on a number of local 
positions, including Chairman of Shan State (North) Maternal and Child Welfare 
Supervisory Committee. He represented the KDA at the National Convention. He has 
also been involved in the local activities of the USDA in Lashio, including rallying 
support for the referendum on the new constitution in 2008. 271  In 2007, U Mahtu Naw 
acted as a government representative to UN Secretary-General Special Envoy, Mr. 
Gambari on his visit to Lashio to learn about the region‘s opium substitution initiatives. 
272   
                                                          
266 SHAN, ―Militia men from battlefields deserting‖, 19th May 2011; SHAN, ―Militia units assigned to 
keep their eyes on rebel movements‖, 18th May 2011. 
267 KachinNews, ―Three Kachin peace groups give into junta‖, 29th June 2009. 
268 Kachin News Group, ―KDA transformed to militia groups by Burma junta‖, 21 January 2010. 
269 New Light of Myanmar, ―Leader of Spokes Authoritative Team of the State Peace and Development 
Council Minister for Information Brig-Gen Kyaw Hsan receives scholars of Friedrich Ebert Foundation 
FES scholars tour Shan State (North), Yeywa hydel project in Mandalay Division‖, 7th October 2007 
270 New Light of Myanmar, ―Hydel power station commissioned into service in Kaungkha, Shan State 
(North)‖, 26th July 2005. p.10 
271 New Light of Myanmar, ―Ceremony to support National Convention and Constitution held in Lashio‖, 
3rd October 2007. 
272 New Light of Myanmar, 6th October 2007:―UN Secretary-General‘s Special Envoy Mr Gambari pays 
courtesy calls on Head of State Senior General Than Shwe and Acting Prime Minister Secretary-1 Lt-
Gen Thein Sein‖  
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Mahtu Naw is a key player in administering Shan State Special Region 5, and the 
organization is far more than just a militia.  In an interview in 2010 Mahtu Naw 
claimed the organization had 3000 personnel, over which 900 were militia-men with 
the rest being administrative persons involved in regional development. 273 The group 
opted out of forming a political party to contest the 2010 election.  The US State 
Department‘s Bureau for International Narcotics Matters and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
1996 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report on Burma explicitly cites Mahtu 
Naw as a major drug trafficker. It is unclear how much of a role he still plays in the 
trade, although poppy is cultivated across parts of Shan State Special Region 5 (the 
area controlled by Mahtu Naw.) 274  It seems highly likely that businessmen and 
financiers involved in the drug trade in the Kutkhai-Hsenwi region would require some 
form of modus operandi with Mahtu Naw‘s militia, although the exact nature of such 
agreements remains unclear. 275   There are also claims that the militia controls a 
number of refineries in the area.276 Mahtu Naw also owns an import/export business 
based in Yangon. 277  Numerous reports have cited the role of the Kawngkha militia in 
attacks alongside the Tatmadaw against the KIA.   One report by the Kachin News 
Group claims that the Tatmadaw explicitly utilised former KDA troops in its assault on 
the KIA‘s HQ in Laiza as a means to demonstrate that the attack was not ‗racist‘ (i.e. 
solely Burman versus Kachin) and as a potential means through which to negotiate 
with the KIA.278   
 
Militia Name: Tamoeng−ngen Militia 
Location: Kutkhai 
Leader: U Myint Lwin (aka U Wan Kwe Tar; Wang Guoda) 
Size: 100 
Origins: Longstanding Tatmadaw-controlled militia 
Dates active: pre-1988 - ongoing 
 
U Myint Lwin is of Kokang Chinese descent and in his late 50s or early 60s. He has 
been a long-time supporter of the government in northern Shan State.  Before 1988 he 
held a number of local government administrative positions, including Secretary of Ta 
Moe Nye Security and Administrative Committee. He was also a member of the local 
judiciary and a leader of a local anti-insurgent militia. Since the 1980s he has been the 
Chairman of the Tamoeng-Ngen People‘s Militia Supervisory Committee. 279  
Throughout the 1980s he was also leader of the Tatmadaw‘s Field Mule Transport 
Corps around Kengtung, reporting to Light Infantry Division # 88.280 Throughout the 
SLORC/SPDC period he remained a powerful local government supporter.  He 
attended the National Convention to draft the country‘s 2008 constitution as a ‗national 
races‘ delegate.  In the 2010 election he was elected to the Shan State Parliament as 
USDP representative for Kutkai Township Constituency 2.281 U Myint Lwin has been 
implicated in drug production in the region, apparently forming close links with U Ti 
                                                          
273 Myo Myo and Soe Than Lynn, ―KDA opts out of 2010 election‖, Myanmar Times, 21st June 2010.  
274 Shan Drug Watch 2012. 
275 Shan Drug Watch 2011. 
276 SHAN, “Push coming to shove for Kachins‖, 18th July 2007.  
277 Interview with civil society organisation, Lashio, 17th June 2013. 
278KachinNews, ―Chinese-Burmese military officers meet in Mangshi on KIA‖, 26th June 2011.  
279 Interview with Shan researcher, 26th April 2013, Chiang Mai. 
280 Shan Drug Watch 2011. 
281 ALTSEAN-Burma, Burma Issues & Concerns Vol. 6 The 2010 Generals‟ Election (January 2011), 
p.11.  
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Khun Myat, U Keng Mai and Ma Guowen‘s militia groups. 282  He also has numerous 
legal businesses. These include the Shan State (North) Joint Venture Co. Ltd, which 
was formed in the early 1990s, although it is unclear if it is still active.283 In 1994 he 
was a member of a government delegation to Kunming, China led by Minister for 
National Planning and Economic Development Brig-Gen. Abel which met with the 
Governor of Yunnan. He is also the Chairman of the Tarmoenye Chantha Co Ltd.284  
In 2013 Tarmoenye Chantha Co Ltd. Was one of 150 Myanmar companies approved 
by the Ministry of Energy to collaborate with foreign firms in Myanmar‘s oil and gas 
sector. 285  The Company has also gained publicity for its generous funding to local 
education and health development286 and has been a sponsor of high-profile golf events 
in the country.287       
Militia Name: Palaung militia 
Location: Kutkhai/Namkham 
Leader: U Kya Htun 
Size: 20-40 
Origins: Former ceasefire group militia: formed from the disbanded PSLA 
Dates active: 2005-2009 
 
This militia was formed after the Tatmadaw disbanded the Palaung State Liberation 
Army (PSLA) in 2005. The militia had little authority or autonomy and effectively 
became akin to a Village Defence Force. By the late 2000s it had become very small 
with only 20-40 members. It was disbanded in 2009 and some of its members have 
now joined the insurgent Ta‘ang National Liberation Army. It seems that with the 
resurgence of Palaung/Ta‘ang insurgency in the region the Tatmadaw has taken more 
direct control for securing the region and has disbanded militias whom it cannot trust.  
 
Militia Name: BGF 1006  
Location: Laukkai 
Leader: Bai Xuoqian 
Size: Large (exact size unknown) 
Origins: Former ceasefire group (MNDAA) converted into BGF 
Dates active: 2009 – ongoing 
 
BGF 1006 was formed in 2009 after the ‗Kokang Incident‘. Tensions had emerged 
within the MNDAA regarding whether to accept the government‘s demand that it 
convert into BGF. MNDAA leader Pheung Kya Shin rejected the BGF proposal, whilst 
a group of Central Executive Committee members led by Bai Xuoqian and Liu Guoxi 
had advocated the proposal and were expelled from the party. Following a Tatmadaw 
                                                          
282 BurmaNet News, ―Shan Herald Agency for News: Druglords to contest on junta party tickets – Hseng 
Khio Fah‖, 27th September 2010.  
283 New Light of Myanmar, 2nd February 1994. 
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25th September 2010. 
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offensive against the MNDAA in September 2009 Pheung Kya Shin and more than 
700 troops loyal to him moved across the border into China where they were disarmed 
by Chinese security forces. The remaining MNDAA troops, led by Bai Xuoqian and 
Liu Guoxi, were transformed into BGF#1006 and both leaders were elected, 
uncontested, in 2010 as MPs for the government-backed USDP in Laukkai Township.   
 
Militia Name: Mantong Palaung militia 
Location: Mantong 
Leader: Formerly U Tan Nyan; now Khun Li. 
Size: 50-60 
Origins:  
Dates active: 2005 - ongoing  
The Mantaong Palaung Militia was formed in 2005 after the Tatmadaw disbanded the 
PSLO. The PSLO had agreed a ceasefire with the government in 1991 but in 2005 was 
forced to surrender and was converted into a civilian political party called the Ta‘ang 
National Party (TNP). U Aik Mone, the former Chairman of the PSLO, was offered 
100 weapons by the Tatmadaw (which were former PSLO weapons) and was put under 
pressure to build the militia out of the remnants of the PSLO‘s armed wing, the 
PSLA.288 Its initial leader was U Tan Nyan, a former member of the PSLO. It is now 
led by Khun Li who is in his late 20s and therefore one of the youngest militia leaders 
in Shan State. Khun Li is the son of Mai Aik Mone, who is now Chairman of the TNP. 
The militia comprises soldiers who used to be part of the PSLA. It has been strongly 
supported by the Tatmadaw who view the militia as essential to securing control in 
Mantong after the PSLA was disbanded and in recent years it has been strengthened 
further to try to counteract the threat posed by renewed insurgent threat in the region 
posed by the PSLF/TNLA. It has provided intelligence to the Tatmadaw and warned 
villagers against supporting the TNLA. With close links to the former PSLO, the TNP 
and its leader Mai Aik Mone and made up of members who can speak Palaung, it is 
seen as a means of establishing a local governance structure with greater political 
legitimacy, albeit one under Tatmadaw control. The militia has been encouraged to 
recruit extensively to the extent that it ―has more men than weapons‖. 289   The 
Tatmadaw has continued to provide the militia with weapons and at times salaries.290  
It has also been able to generate income of its own through involvement in drugs, 
primarily through the collection of taxes on Lisu Chinese traders moving through the 
area.291 However, the trust between the Tatmadaw and the militia remains weak. Many 
members have deserted to join the PSLA and the Tatmadaw is concerned that weapons 
provided to the militia will pass to the TNLA.292 In September 2013 the Tatmadaw 
searched the militia headquarters following growing concerns that close links were 
developing between the militia and the PSLF/TNLA. The trigger for the Tatmadaw‘s 
actions was allegedly the militia‘s decision to allow PSLF anti-drug signposts to be 
erected in villages in Mantong and the surfacing of a photograph of Khun Li burning 
yaba as part of an eradication scheme linked to the PSLF.293    
 
Militia Name: Mongpaw militia 
Location: Muse 
                                                          
288 Interview with Chairman of the PSLF, 26 December 2012, Chiang Mai. 
289 ibid. 
290 Interview with Palaung civil society organisation, 29 April 2013, Mae Sot. 
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Leader: Keng Mai (aka U Kein Mai) 
Size: 200 
Origins: Militia formed since 1988 by the Tatmadaw 
Dates active: 2000s – ongoing 
 
Keng Mai is Kachin, and in his late 40s. The Mongpaw militia was formed at some 
point in the early 2000s under the Tatmadaw‘s oversight. Keng Mai was chosen by the 
government as a representative at the National Convention as part of the ‗National 
Races‘ Category and is an elected MP for the USDP in the Shan State Assembly, 
Constituency #2, Muse Township. During the SPDC period U Keng Mai has been 
quoted numerous times in state media supporting the government and condemning US, 
British and UN action against the country. 294    The Mongpaw militia played an 
important coercive role in the run up to the 2010 election, pressuring people to vote for 
the USDP, and threatening punishment and imprisonment for those who didn‘t.  ―If we 
win, we win. And if we don‘t win, we must still win,‖ a villager in Mongkoe quoted 
Keng Mai as saying. 295 The militia was also involved in counter-insurgency operations 
against the SSA-N in 2011 around Tangyan. 296  Keng Mai has been involved in the 
drug trade with his older brother, who had been an associate of Mong Hsala, leader of 
the now defunct Mongkoe Defense Army (MDA). 297    He is more closely involved 
with the production and refining of opium rather than trafficking. He operates trade 
networks across parts of Kutkhai and Muse Townships and also taxes the transport of 
drugs through this area to the China border. 298 In 2014, state media publicised his role 
in plans to eliminate poppy cultivation in northern Shan State.299  Keng Mai also has 
legal business enterprises and is registered as the Managing Director of Nyein Aye 
Myay Travels & Tours Co., Ltd, headquartered in Muse.    
 
Militia Name: Panhsay Militia 
Location: Namkham 
Leader: ‘Panmhsay’ Kyaw Myint 
Size: 200+ 
Origins: Longstanding Tatmadaw-allied militia 
Dates active: 1980s-ongoing 
 
‗Panhsay‘ Kyaw Myint (aka Li Yongqiang; U Win Maung) is in his mid-50s and is a 
long-time loyal government supporter in Namkham Township, which borders China in 
northern Shan State.  He leads the largest militia group in the Palaung region.  
Throughout the 1980s he was the leader of a counter-insurgency militia operating in 
the area and in 1991 this group became known as the Panhsay People‘s Militia. He has 
since become one of the most powerful strongmen in northern Shan State, enjoying 
close links with the Tatmadaw. He has a close relationship with former North-East 
Regional Commander Myint Hlaing, and controls an important area of the China-
Myanmar border including crossings on the Mao-Ruili River.300 The militia he controls 
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has also been used repeatedly in counter-insurgency operations by the Tatmadaw, 
notably in 2006 during the operation to capture SSA Commander Lt-Col Khun Kyaw, 
and in the recent clashes with the TNLA.301 It has also been deployed to relocate 
villages from areas ear-marked for development and to secure development projects, 
including dam sites along the Shweli River and parts of the oil and gas pipelines.  
Kyaw Myint, who is Lisu-Chinese, is also an influential figure in Yunnan and has 
proved a valuable source of information on cross-border political and economic 
developments, as well as serving as a facilitator connecting the military with Chinese 
companies seeking to work in northern Shan State. In return for these services, Kyaw 
Myint has enjoyed impunity and protection, which has enabled him to become one of 
the largest drug producers in Shan State. This protection has enabled him to control a 
large poppy-growing area centred at Panhsay, the highest hill area in Namkham. This 
poppy cultivation enterprise employs large numbers of labourers and utilises more 
intensive cultivation through the use of fertilisers and pesticides. The protection Kyaw 
Myint embodies against the risk of eradication has even attracted some poppy farmers 
to migrate to the area.  Kyaw Myint has also been granted permits and licenses to 
operate a number of other licit businesses in the area. These include a cigarette 
company under a Chinese franchise at Naloi, west of Namkham; a licensed pork and 
beef business supplying Muse and Namkham Townships, a gas station in Muse‘s 
Zawnzaw Quarter and Yongyang Casino on the Mao-Shweli River near Muse.302 In 
2010 he was elected as an MP to the Shan State Parliament as a representative of the 
government Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in Namkham (2) 
Constituency, in an election campaign that promised that poppy cultivation in the area 
would continue to be protected for a further five years.303 
 
Militia Name: Nonsai Militia 
Location: Namhsan 
Leader: Htun Myat Lay   
Size: unknown  
Origins: Longstanding Tatmadaw-allied militia 
Dates active: pre-1988 - ongoing 
 
The militia is based at Nonsai (aka Ngansai) village in Namhsan.  The area has been 
heavily contested and was formerly controlled by the PSLO/A before its surrender and 
disarmament in 2005. Htun Myat Lay was never a part of the PSLO.  He has been 
leader of a counter-insurgency local militia for a long time in his hometown of 
Namhsan.304 He can speak Chinese and the members of this militia are a mixture of 
Palaung, Kachin and Palaung-Chinese men.305 Htun Myat Lay became increasingly 
powerful after the collapse of the PSLA in 2005. Since then his Nonsai militia has 
been supported and strengthened by the Tatmadaw from which it has, at times, drawn a 
salary. 306 The area is still contested and in March 2011 there was fighting between the 
Tatmadaw and SSA-N close-by.  Neighbouring Mantong was a former stronghold of 
the PSLA but is now controlled by the Tatmadaw (LIB No.130) and is a base for 
militia training. Since the TNLA became (since 2011) active in the region there have 
been many skirmishes between the Tatmadaw and the TNLA in which the Nonsai 
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Militia has been called upon to provide intelligence and support to the Tatmadaw. 307 
Htun Myat Lay was a member of the Namhsan Township referendum commission and 
in 2008 was reported as playing an active role amongst Palaung communities in 
encouraging people to vote in favour of the constitution. His militia does not appear to 
be involved in the cultivation of opium but has been reported as selling both heroin 
and yaba. According to Palaung sources, Htun Myat Lay has positioned himself as a 
strong backer of the Tatmadaw and USDP in the local area since 2005, and has 
become very fearful that the resurgent PSLF/TNLA will try to target him.308 He has 
close connection with Aung Than Tun who owns the Palaung Htae Htar and the Flying 
Dragons tea factories.309   
 
Militia Name: Manpang Militia 
Location: Tangyan  
Leader: Bo Mon (aka U Sai Mon) 
Size: 500+ 
Origins: Ex-MTA 
Dates active: 1996-ongoing  
 
Bo Mon (aka U Sai Mon) is a former MTA Commander. At the time of khun Sa‘s 
surrender he was effectively a Brigade Commander and controlled in the region of 
1,000 troops. It is unclear whether he had officially been promoted to the rank of 
Brigade Commander, but the number of troops he controlled reflected the strength of a 
full-strength brigade.310 Bo Mon surrendered soon after Khun Sa‘s surrender in 1996.  
Following his surrender Bo Mon and his supporters resettled in Manpang, Nonghlaing 
and Nammuse villages in Tangyan, an area which had previously been under the 
control of the MTA.  The area controlled by Bo Mon‘s Manpang militia force is in the 
north of Tangyan Township.  The area is at high altitude, over 1,200 metres above sea 
level. It is about 20 km north of Tangyan and just west of the Salween River. Bo Mon 
has established a large local army with between 400 and 800 men.  Many of its 
weapons are old MTA weapons, with some also supplied by the Tatmadaw from the 
stockpile of weapons the Tatmadaw seized during its 2009 offensive against the 
MNDAA in Kokang. Tangyan is in an extremely important strategic location and the 
Tatmadaw has developed a significant number of militia groups in the Township.  
Before the 2010 election these militia groups were reportedly re-organised and formed 
into six companies.  Of these, the Manpang Militia (Fifth Company) is the largest and 
Bo Mon appears to have been given greater authority to co-ordinate the militias in 
Tangyan Township.  Bo Mon appears has acted as a leading figure in the control of 
militia units across northern Shan State since the mid-2000s, reporting directly to the 
Militia Department under the Lashio-based Northeastern Regional Command. 311   The 
Manpang militia has been employed by the Tatmadaw in numerous counter-insurgency 
activities, including assistance in controlling Salween river crossings in 2010, 
offensives against the SSA-N in 2011, and attacks on the KIA in April 2012, where it 
was employed to secure rear territories from KIA counter-attacks.312 It has also been 
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deployed to recruit young men from across Lashio and Tangyan Townships for the 
Tatmadaw.313 Back in 2005 state media also cited U Sai Mon as having played an 
instrumental role in securing the Tatmadaw‘s forced surrender of the SSNA (or SSA-
Central) through his role in facilitating the ―unconditional exchange of arms for peace‖ 
of the SSNA‘s 19th Brigade, apparently due to his close personal relationship with the 
SSNA Commander U Gon Khay.314 
 
Bo Mon has established very close links with senior government officials.  He 
regularly provided written statements and speeches in state media, supporting the 
SPDC‘s ‗Roadmap to Democracy‘ and denouncing UN, US and British criticisms of 
the government. 315 On 4th January 2006, in the annual government awards marking 
Independence Day, Bo Mon was awarded the First Class Performance in Social Field 
Medal, in his capacity as the ‗Chairman on the Manpan People‘s Militia, Shan State 
(North)‘. 316  Bo Mon has been reported in state media as having met with high-ranking 
officials including former Prime minister Khin Nyunt, current Priesident Thein Sein 
(in Lashio in 2006, when he was Secretary-1 of the SPDC) and with Deputy Minister 
Brig Gen Thura Myint Naung in 2003 when he received 30 bags and salt and 600 bags 
of rice on behalf of promoting regional development and a drug-free zone. Reports 
leading up to the 2012 by-election documented the Manpang Militia‘s strong-arm 
tactics to ensure people voted for the USDP in the areas under its control.  This was in 
relation to the contest over a seat in the National Assembly in Constituency #3 of Shan 
State, covering Lashio, Mongyai, Tangyan, Hsenwi and Kunlong Townships, which 
was vacated as a result of the incumbent, Dr. Sai Mawk Kham being appointed as Vice 
President #2. 317  Tangyan is a traditional poppy-growing region and Bo Mon‘s 
Manpang militia has been repeatedly implicated in drug activities, both yaba and 
opium (production and trafficking). 318   In a meeting between the Bangladesh and 
Myanmar counter-narcotic officials in Dhaka in September 2012 the Director-General 
of the Bangladesh Department of Narcotics Control, Mohamed Iqbal, specifically cited 
the Manpang militia as operating one of 37 known methamphetamine factories 
according to Bangladesh intelligence (from which ATS are reaching Bangladesh). 319  
Bo Mon also has a number of legal business enterprises. The Manpang militia has been 
cited in state media as constructing roads in Tangyan.320 Bo Mon is also the owner of 
Shan Yoma Aye Chan Yey Company321, which is involved in rubber plantations and 
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gold mining, and the militia also has links to the Triple ‗A‘ Company which has gained 
coal mining concessions at Mongma in northern Tangyan. Bo Mon is apparently a 
close business associate of Sai Htun Aye, a wealthy businessman in Muse who is 
linked with Tatmadaw Major-General Myint Hlaing. Sai Htun Aye‘s businesses 
include the Yueliendao (Moonshine Island) casino on the Mao River.  This was 
temporarily shut down in 2005 after a drugs-raid by Sino-Burmese authorities but soon 
re-opened.  Sai Htun Aye also has a hotel in Mandalay, namely the ―So So Pyay-Pyay‖ 
(Fresh and Lively) Hotel in Mandalay.322  
 
Militia Name: Mongha Militia (in state media: Monhin-Monha militia)   
Location: Tangyan 
Leader: Ma Guowen (aka Lao Ma; U Law Ma) 
Size: 150 
Origins: Ex-MTA 
Dates active: Between 1996/2oo1 – ongoing 
 
Ma Guowen‘s history is similar to Bo Mon‘s (above).  He was also a former member 
of the MTA who resettled in Tanggyan following the MTA‘s surrender in 1996, in an 
area that had once been under Khun Sa‘s control.   According to state media the militia 
was established in November 2001 although it is unclear what the status of this group 
was between 1996 and 2001.  Ma Guowen has established close links with the 
government. He was depicted in state media meeting Secretary General-1 Lt. Gen 
Thein Sein (now President) and receiving gifts from him in 2004 in recognition of his 
work developing the region and to support further development programmes alongside 
Bo Mon (U Sai Lin).   He was apparently briefly arrested in 2005, although the reasons 
for this were not clear.  He has been a voice-piece for the government, reflected by his 
written criticism (published in state media) on a UN statement by Mr Gambari on the 
detention of Aung San Suu Kyi in November 2007. SHAN reported in 2005 that Ma 
Guowen operates a gambling den in the Kawngmu quarter of Muse. 323   The Mong Ha 
Militia was involved in a number of counter-insurgency operations against the SSA in 
the Tatmadaw offensives of 2011.324 325     
 
 
SOUTHERN SHAN STATE 
 
Militia Name: SSS Militia / Homong Militia / Homein Region Development and 
Welfare Group 
Location: Homong 
Leader: Maha Ja 
Size: 200+ 
Origins: ex-MTA 
Dates active: 1996 - ongoing 
 
Homong is the former headquarters of the MTA and was a stronghold for Khun Sa 
who controlled the area from 1985 until his surrender in 1996. Homong is just across 
the border from Mae Hong Son and is only 30km from Loi Taileng, the SSA-S 
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headquarters. Maha Ja is Wa and a former MTA Brigade Commander.  Most members 
of his militia are former Wa members of the MTA.  Homong is a relatively prosperous 
town, largely due to its position along trade routes on the Thai-Myanmar border.   The 
group is sometimes referred to as the Homein Region Development and Welfare 
Group. Maha Ja is the younger half-brother of Maha San, who was the founder (in 
1976) and leader of the Wa National Army, and then the Wa National Organisation 
(WNO) from the mid-1980s (based nearby) until his death in 2007. 326   Despite 
negotiations with the SPDC government in 1997, Maha San refused to agree a 
ceasefire. According to a 2005 report Maha San distanced himself and the WNA from 
his brother Maha Ja and the Homong SSS. 327 Since the MTA‘s surrender Maha Ja has 
become focused primarily on business and has seemingly managed to avoid significant 
confrontation with either the Tatmadaw or the SSA.  In the mid-late 1990s the SPDC 
consented to Maha Ja forming the first company ever established (legally) in Homong, 
known as the Shan State South Co Ltd. (or simply SSS).  The enterprise has been 
involved in logging, gems mining and import/export businesses. Maha Ja gained 
further significant logging concessions in the early to mid-2000s (estimated at 10,000 
tons in the early 2000s and 3,500 tons in 2006) 328, including in Kunhing and Mongnai 
Townships and the SSS has trading offices in Langkho, Mongnai, Namsang, Loilem, 
Mongpawn and Taunggyi.  One of the main areas of teak forest to which Maha Ja has 
gained access is in Kengtawng, an area out of which more than 50 villages were 
forcibly relocated in 1996/7. 329 When formed in 1999 the SSS‘s six-member board 
comprised Khun Sa's son Chao Jam Hueng, although it is unclear if he is still part of 
the company.330 The SSS attended the National Convention when it was resumed in 
2006.331 There have been sporadic reports that the SSA and the SSS militia have 
cooperated closely for certain business deals crossing the border at the Huei-pheung 
border pass that links Maehongson and Homong. 332  Maha Ja‘s son, Khun Nu, has also 
become a wealthy businessmen through his ability to tax trade through this border gate, 
with imported cars being a particularly lucrative commodity. 333  The SSS is involved 
heavily in the drug trade and the Thai authorities have an arrest warrant out for him on 
drug charges. 334335  He is widely believed to have taken over much of the trafficking 
networks on both sides of this border area from Khun Sa after his surrender in 1996.336 
Field reports have explicitly cited heroin and methamphetamine refineries in Homong.  
In 2005, Banyong Lawka "Jit", believed to be an associate of Maha Ja was arrested by 
Thai authorities on drug charges. 337  A 2008 UNODC Report reported that opium 
cultivation was widespread in areas under the SSS‘s control.338 
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Militia Name: Kali Militia  
Location: Kunhing 
Leader: Sao Gai Fah 
Size:  
Origins: Former ceasefire group militia: formed from the disbanded 7th Brigade of 
the SSA-N 
Dates active: 2009 – ongoing  
 
The Kali Militia has similar foundations to the Hseng Keo Militia (see above). It 
comprises troops from the SSA-N‘s 7th Brigade which, along with the SSA-N‘s 3rd 
Brigade, was forced to convert to a proxy-government militia in 2009. Like the Hseng 
Keo Militia, it did not become a Border Guard Force and this has prevented it from 
coming under the direct control of the Tatmadaw.339 However, its autonomy is limited. 
The Tatmadaw‘s strategy towards this militia is likely to see attempts to convert it into 
a proper Home Guard Force under its control, but only if/when it has managed to sever 
fully the links between the militia and the SSA. The militia is apparently still led by 
Sao Gai Fah, who was the Commander of the SSA-N 7th Brigade, a position he has 
held since the early 1980s. Gai Fah was born in the early 1950s and is now in his early 
60s. His father was apparently a former minister to the Mongyai Chaofa.340 He joined 
the SSA as a teenager in the 1960s and has had a long career with the organisation. He 
initially served under Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, the SSA 1st Brigade Commander up 
until 1976 (see Chapter 6). Following the SSA split in 1976 he joined the northern 
Brigades of the SSA under the command of Sai Myint Aung (aka Khun Obon), Sai 
Zam Muang and Hso Ten. The SSA‘s northern brigades forged an alliance with the 
CPB and Sao Gai Fah became a Battalion Commander and was also a liaison officer 
between the SSA and CPB. In 1989 he was part of the SSA-‗North‘ negotiators, led by 
General Hso Ten, which forged the ceasefire agreement with the SLORC. He attended 
the National Convention to draft the new constitution although he boycotted the 
Convention in 2005 following the arrest of Hso Ten and Hkun Tun Oo (See Chapter 7). 
In the mid-2000s he became the Vice Chairman of the SSA-N. He remains an 
influential figure in Shan politics and is apparently a popular figure amongst SSA 
troops.341         
 
  
Militia Name: Laihka Wanpang Militia  
Location: Laikha 
Leader: Col. Moengzuen; now Kaling Htoi (aka Sai Htoi) 
Size: 50-100 
Origins: Former insurgent/ceasefire group militia: Ex-MTA; then SSA-S 758 
Brigade 
Dates active: 2005 – ongoing  
 
The 758 Brigade under Col. Moengzeun was formerly part of the MTA. After Khun 
Sa‘s surrender it joined the SSA-South and was active in the area known as ‗The Six 
Corners‘: Loilem, Laikha, Mongkeung, Kehsi, Mongnawng and Namzang.  In 2005 it 
defected from the SSA-S, firstly to support a newly formed Interim Shan Government 
in exile (ISG). Within a year Moengzeun, in his mid-40s at the time, decided to 
                                                          
339 Interview with SHAN, Chiang Mai, 26th April 2013. 
340 Interview with Shan historian, 28th March 2013, Taunggyi. 
341 SHAN, ―Gaifah – Veteran survivor‖, 20th September 2005; SHAN, ―Popular ceasefire leader rejoins 
convention‖, 29th November 2005.  
375 
 
surrender, following pressure from the SSA-S leadership at Loi Taileng which had sent 
a 300-soldier column to bring Col. Moengzuen back to HQ.342  State media announced 
Col. Moengzeun‘s return ―to the legal fold‖ with 848 men in July 2006.343  The 758 
Brigade was then re-formed into the Laikha Wanpang militia and was provided with 
money, weapons and cars.344 It has been involved in Tatmadaw against the SSA since 
2005 and was valued because of its intimate knowledge of the SSA-S and hopes that it 
could guide the Tatmadaw to SSA-S camps and routes.345 Moengzuen died in 2009 
and the group is now led by Col. Kali Htoi.346 Both before and after 2006 the group 
was involved in the drug trade. SHAN reports that following skirmishes with the SSA 
in 2011 raw opium and heroin refining precursors were seized from the group, 
although this is hard to verify and in light of the SSA-S‘s bad relations with the group 
it is possible that such claims may have been made to discredit the group.347 
 
 
Militia Name: Nayai Militia 
Location: Nansang 
Leader: Zhou Sang 
Size: 100+ 
Origins: Ex-MTA 
Dates active: 1996 – ongoing  
 
The Nayai Militia is another militia comprising former MTA soldiers. Unlike other 
former MTA militias, its leader, Zhou Sang, was not a high-ranking member of the 
MTA prior to Khun Sa‘s surrender in 1996. He was an administrative officer at MTA 
headquarters at Ho Mong. 348  After Khun Sa‘s surrender he returned to his home 
Township of Nansang and formed a militia that came to control territory between 
Mongsit Town to the west and Nayai Town to the east.349 Nansang is located about 
halfway between Taunggyi and Kunhing.  It is an important infrastructure junction, on 
both the National Highway 4 [NH4] linking Taunggyi and Kunhing, Road 44 linking 
Nansang with Hsipaw to the North and, importantly, Road 45 which meanders south to 
the Thai border at Kew Pha Wok, through Mongnai, Langkho and Mongton. In 2012, 
Nansang witnessed renewed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the SSA-South, 
around the SSA-S‘s military camp on the Loi Ye hill top. 350   The Tatmadaw 
established new large military bases in 2011 in Kunhing and Nansang Townships.351 
There are also a number of Pao militia bases in the Township.  
 
Zhou Sang forged an agreement with the Tatmadaw‘s Eastern Regional Commander 
(based in Taunggyi) and since the late 1990s the militia has been referred to as the 
―MTA Narai Region Development Group (and New Life)‖ in state media.352 State 
media records the official date that the Nayai militia ―returned to the legal fold‖ as 12th 
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October 1998.353 The militia gained logging concessions in the early 2000s in a region 
along the western banks of the Salween. However, the militia‘s major enterprise is 
heroin. Alongside the Matkyan militia (see below) it plays a dominant role in the drug 
trade in Pao areas of southeastern Shan State. Opium is grown in territory under the 
militia‘s control whilst the group also purchases much of the opium purchased in 
nearby Townships, including across Laihka, Loilem, Hsihseng and Mongnai 
Townships. The Nayai has well-established networks across these areas and buys 
much of the opium cultivated there. According to one resident from Pinlaung 
Township, ―Matkyan and Narai tend to offer better prices to farmers, knowing that 
otherwise the Pao farmers will prefer to sell to the their PNO brethren.‖ 354  The 
organisation has a reputation for producing high quality ―shoes/slippers‖ [Kep-tin or 
Kheptin in Shan], a slang term for blocks of heroin, which come in pairs (hence the 
term) weighing approximately 700g.355  The militia‘s relationship with other armed 
groups operating in southern Shan State is not entirely clear and accounts during 
interviews differed slightly. It seems that tensions have generally remained higher with 
Pao armed groups, in terms of both contestation for territorial control and control over 
opium, trafficking networks and other resources (such as timber). According to the 
Vice Chairman of Staff of the small Pao National Liberation Army (PNLA), the Nayai 
was involved in Tatmadaw counter-insurgency attacks in 2004 against the larger Pao 
group the SSNPLO (see Chapters 6 and 7).356 Relations with the SSA-South have been 
better, although not without tensions. In 2004/5 SSA-S troops evaded Tatmadaw 
attacks by moving through Nayai controlled territory and disguising themselves in 
Nayai militia uniforms, although it is unclear if this has been a regular practice.357 
Since the mid-2000s the Nayai militia has seemingly come under greater Tatmadaw 
oversight, which has sought to curb its autonomy, although it is also unclear the extent 
of this control and how this has affected their involvement in the drug trade.358     
 
 
Militia Name: Matkyan (aka Marrkieng) Militia 
Location: Nansang 
Leader: Sai Lu (aka Lern Hsai) 
Size: 100+ 
Origins: Ex-MTA 
Dates active: 1996 - ongoing 
 
The Matkyan militia has a very similar background to the Nayai militia (directly 
above). It is another group that comprises former MTA troops and forged an 
agreement with the Tatmadaw to become a proxy militia after Khun Sa‘s 1996 
surrender. The militia is referred to as the MTA Matkyan Region Development Group 
in state media and the official date given for its formal recognition by the government 
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is 23rd May 2002. 359 It has apparently established a teacher training school in the 
territory it controls, although information on this is scant.360 The Matkyan militia is 
based in Nansang Township (like the Nayai) and controls territory northeast of 
Mongsit, closer to Naungcot.361 The militia is led by Sai Lu (aka Lern Hsai) who was a 
Battalion Commander in the MTA. At the time of Khun Sa‘s surrender in 1996 Sai 
Lu‘s battalion was based in eastern Shan State across the Salween River. At some 
point in the late 1990s he moved to Nansang Township (see entry for Nayai militia for 
explanation of Nansang‘s strategic importance). It is unclear whether the decision to 
move to Nansang was because Sai Lu and the troops he commanded were originally 
from this Township, or whether it was due to links established with the Nayai militia 
already operating there.  Numerous letters credited to the Matkyan militia have been 
published in state media throughout the 2000s pledging its support of the government, 
criticizing Aung San Suu Kyi and UN Representative Mr. Gambari,362 and criticizing 
the UN draft resolution presented to the UN Security Council by the US and Britain in 
2007. The militia was also reported as taking part in a rally in 2005 to oppose the 
statement on the secession of Shan State by Sao Hkan Hpa.363 Despite these claims, 
relations between the Matkyan militia and the SSA-‗South‘ appear to have remained 
cordial and there has been no reported fighting between the two groups. Like the Nayai, 
the Matkyan militia is also heavily involved in the drug trade and also has a reputation 
of producing high quality heroin from refineries located in territory under its control. It 
operates opium trade networks throughout southeast Shan State, purchasing opium 
from farmers across a wider area of territory than that which it directly controls.   
 
 
EASTERN SHAN STATE 
 
Militia Name: Punako Militia 
Location: Monghsat 
Leader: Ja Ngoi 
Size: 100-200 
Origins: Militia formed since 1988 by the Tatmadaw 
Dates active: Early 2000s - ongoing 
 
The Punako militia is based in Monghsat Township. It is controlled by Ja Ngoi and his 
brother-in-law Ai Long. The exact foundations of this militia are unclear although it 
was formed sometime in the early 2000s as a proxy-government militia under the 
oversight of the Tatmadaw. Neither Ja Ngoi are Ai Long have a known background in 
the region‘s insurgency and they appear to be relatively new players in the drug trade. 
SHAN claims that Ja Ngoi has close links with the Military Operations Command in 
Monghsat.364 The Punako militia controls a large territory that is renowned for being a 
fertile region for poppy cultivation and the militia has effectively monopolised control 
over opium purchasing in the area. A number of heroin refineries are located in 
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territory under the militia‘s control. Although the militia is heavily involved in opium 
purchasing and heroin refining, it plays a lesser role in cross-border trafficking of 
drugs. It seems there is an unofficial ‗division of labour‘ between various militias 
operating in eastern Shan State, with drugs refined by Punako‘s militia then being 
trafficked by other militias with better-established cross-border networks and a longer 
history of drug trafficking. There are close business links between the Punako militia 
and Yishay‘s Wan Pung militia (see below). Much of the heroin produced by refineries 
in Punako territory is trafficked into Thailand through networks operated by Yishay, 
who has a much longer history of operating in the drug trade. 365  One informant 
described Ja Ngoi as ―the novice to Yishay‘s abbot‖.366  Heroin from refineries in 
Monghsat also move through Wa-controlled cross-border networks.367 This suggests 
that it is easier for new players in the drug trade to become involved in buying opium 
and operating refineries than it is to operate cross-border trafficking networks.         
 
 
Militia Name: Nanyon People’s Militia 
Location: Mongphyak 
Leader: Ja Seo Bo (aka U Kya Soe Bo) 
Size: 500+ 
Origins: Militia formed since 1988 by the Tatmadaw 
Dates active: Late 1990s/early 2000s* - ongoing 
 
Ja Seo Bo (U Kya Soe Bo in state media) is in his mid-60s and is leader of one the 
largest and most powerful militias in eastern Shan State. Originally from Pangyang 
District in Wa State, he left this area in the 1970s after the arrival of CPB troops. By 
the late 1970s he had established links with the government and became an important 
informer for the Tatmadaw of developments across eastern Shan State. Although he 
was not part of any anti-insurgent militia during the 1970s and 1980s he provided 
intelligence to the Tatmadaw, especially regarding the Shan United Army and the 
MTA.  In the late 1980s he reportedly became well acquained with Khin Nyunt and 
Brig-Gen Htoon Shwe, then commander of the Military Operations Command #18, 
and also incumbent President Thein Sein during his time as Triangle Commander in 
Kengtung. At some point, most likely in the late 1990s he was encouraged to form a 
militia in Mongphyak Township by the Tatmadaw, Nanyon being the name of a village 
in Mongphyak Township. The area of territory which the militia controls stretches 
across western and southern parts of Mongphyak Township as well as parts of 
Tachilek.  
 
Mongphyak is strategically important for a number of reasons. Mongphyak town 
straddles the main highway linking Tachilek and Kengtung, just northwest of Tarlay.  
It is also situated between NDAA-controlled territory to the northeast and territory 
contested by the Wa Southern Command and the SSA-S to the Southwest. Unlike 
many other militias, the Nanyon People‘s militia, has no direct roots in the region‘s 
insurgency. It has been formed by the Tatmadaw as it sought to extend it authority 
across eastern Shan State and most of its weapons were provided by the Tatmadaw. 
Most of its recruits are drawn from Lahu communities. It seems that the Tatmadaw‘s 
decision to form this militia and to subsequently sanction its rapid growth was part of 
efforts to wrestle greater authority over the proliferation of militias across eastern Shan 
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State Around 2004/5 Ja Seo Bo was made responsible for managing local people‘s 
militias across eastern Shan State and a number of informants placed the size of militia 
as around 500 men, although this is seemingly a reflection of the array of smaller 
militias under its official control. This attempt to centralise control over local militias 
has not been particularly successful with many smaller Shan militias rejecting efforts 
to centralise control over them.368 In recent years tensions have surfaced between the 
militia and the Tatmadaw regarding the latter‘s decision to deploy the militia on the 
front-line in counter- insurgency operations against the SSA-S during 2010.369   
 
Ja Seo Bo has benefitted extensively from his close links with the Tatmadaw and the 
government. Numerous reports and local informants emphasize the militia‘s 
involvement in both the refining and trafficking of heroin and yaba.370 He also has a 
number of legal enterprises. He is the owner Nant Youne Mining Company Ltd 
headquartered at Mongphyak. Although the operations of this company remain unclear 
it seems likely it is involved in the lignite mines between Mongphyak and Tachilek 
(and quite possibly also a conduit for drug money). He also co-owns the Lahu & 
Arkhar Company Limited, headquartered in Kengtung Township. Both were 
incorporated in 2013. In the 2006 Independence Day honours list he was awarded the 
Medal for Excellence Performance in Social field (Third Class).371 Close links with the 
government have also enabled Ja Seo Bo to gain access to valuable state assets. In 
2012, for example, he was provided with 187 ‗Citizenship Scrutiny Cards‘ [these are 
national citizenship cards] to distribute to ―those of remote areas‖ across Mongphyat 
Township as part of efforts to improve documentation of citizens.372     
 
 
Militia Name: Nam Pung Militia 
Location: Tachilek 
Leader: Lt-Col. Yishay 
Size: 60-100 
Origins: Ex-MTA 
Dates active: 1996 - ongoing 
 
Lt-Col. Yishay is a former member of the MTA. He was born in Kengtung and is from 
the Lahu ethnic group. He was a former schoolteacher in the city and alongside 
teaching he traded opium.373 He has long been an influential figure in eastern Shan 
State and has been active in the drug trade since the 1980s. Sources differ on his exact 
links with the MTA. In the late 1980s he traded opium through Khun Sa‘s territory 
along the Thai border. According to one source [a former Lahu militia leader] he was 
arrested at some point in the late 1980s and spent 3-4 years in prison and upon his 
release returned to territory controlled by Khun Sa at which time he became an 
important figure in the MTA.374 Another source [a former MTA soldier] concurred that 
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Yishay was arrested on drug charges but claimed that he fled to the MTA and was 
never actually imprisoned.375 Yishay rose quickly through the MTA‘s ranks, in part 
due to his ability to recruit large numbers of soldiers for the organisation from amongst 
Lahu communities.   
 
His rank as –Lieutenant-Colonel‘ was the position he held in the MTA at the time of 
Khun Sa‘s surrender in 1996, at which time he controlled an area just outside of 
Monghsat town. After Khun Sa‘s surrender he met with the Tatmadaw and requested 
to form a militia. He took a small group of around 50 soldiers and established a militia 
in Tachilek.  The name ‗Nam Pung‘ means ‗Hot Spring‘. His militia remained small 
and has never controlled much territory with the militia‘s wealth and power being 
derived from its role in cross-border trafficking operations into Thailand, often via 
Laos. The militia has been one of the main drug trafficking organisations for many 
years and is responsible for trafficking heroin refined by other militia groups such as 
the Punako militia. The wealth Yishay has generated from heroin trafficking has 
enabled him to establish an extensive patronage network throughout Myanmar and 
Thailand amongst both government officials and ceasefire and insurgent groups. He 
holds a Thai ID card under the name of Chaiwat Pornsakulpaisarn and as well as 
owning properties in Tachilek and Taunggyi, he also owns a number of properties in 
northern Thailand, including in Chiangmai. Despite his extensive patronage of officials, 
his overt involvement in the drug trade made this level of impunity hard to conceal. In 
2003 Thai counter-narcotics officials raided his Chiangmai home in 2003 and have 
since placed a bounty on his head, which was raised to 100,000 Thai baht (just over 
$30,000) in 2012. In 2012 his name was also included on a list of ten suspects 
submitted by the Thai government Office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) to the 
Myanmar government for extradition.376  In response Yishay has taken on a much 
lower profile. The day-to-day running of the militia is now undertaken by a man called 
U Wilson Moe, who is married to Yishay‘s niece. In the 2010 election U Wilson Moe 
was elected to the National Assembly as a representative of the government-backed 
USDP in Shan State constituency No.7. Yishay and U Wilson Moe are business 
partners with Wilson Moe named as a Director  for the Thit Lwin Moe Trading 
Company Ltd (headquartered in Tachilek), which Yishay claimed to own in 2012.377 
The Company purportedly runs a manganese mine in mong Koe north of Tachilek, 
although it is highly possible that it acts as a conduit for drug money.   
 
  
Militia Name: Hawngleuk Militia 
Location: Tachilek 
Leader: Naw Kham 
Size: 100 
Origins: Ex-MTA 
Dates active: 1996 - 2012 
 
Naw Kham‘s Hawngleuk Militia shares many similarities with Yishay‘s Nam Pung 
Militia (directly above). Like Yishay, Naw Kham was a member of the MTA and 
established a Tatmadaw-sanctioned militia after Khun Sa‘s surrender in 1996. At this 
time Naw Kham was an MTA Supply Officer in Mae Sai (in Thailand, opposite 
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Tachilek).378 He apparently forged close links in the late 1990s with Lt. Gen. Ko Ko 
who served as a Commander in Tachilek in the 1990s and is incumbent Minister for 
Home Affairs and Chairman of the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control 
(CCDAC).379 Since the late 1990s up until his arrest in 2012, Naw Kham operated 
drug trafficking operations throughout eastern Shan State including along the Mekong 
River to the east of Tachilek. Like Yishay, the Hawngleuk‘s power did not lie in the 
number of men it commanded or the weapons it held but from the vast wealth Naw 
Kham accumulated from drug trafficking, much of which was in turn spent on 
establishing and maintaining an extensive patronage network throughout the Golden 
Triangle. Naw Kham owned many properties in Tachilek. However, again, like Yishay, 
Naw Kham‘s overt involvement in cross-border trafficking placed increasing pressure 
on authorities to move against him, especially once he became known to Chinese 
counter-narcotics agencies. In 2006 Myanmar authorities raided a number of his 
properties in Tachilek and reportedly seized drugs and weapons from these properties. 
Since then Naw Kham‘s trafficking networks became less conspicuous, although 
continued to rely on his extensive patronage of officials and communities throughout 
the Thai-Shan-Laos region. In October 2011 he was blamed for the shooting of thirteen 
Chinese workers travelling on two cargo boats. The motivation for these deaths 
remains unclear with speculation that it was either part of a drug deal that had gone 
wrong or due to the ships‘ failure to pay the necessary protection fees. 380  The 
abandoned boats were found to contain methamphetamine pills and a number of the 
bodies recovered from the river had their hands tied behind their backs. The incident 
drew huge public outcry within China. Chinese authorities launched a manhunt to 
capture Naw Kham, who was eventually arrested in Laos, extradited to China and 
executed by lethal injection in March 2013. The final moments just prior to his 
execution were broadcast live on Chinese TV as part of a two-hour show – the first 
time this had been done in many years – reflecting how high profile Naw Kham‘s case 
had become in China. His ultimate capture and killing has done little to reduce drug 
flows. It has merely fragmented borderland networks further, apparently empowering 
other actors, including the Punako and Nam Pung militias.381 
 
Militia Name: Nahai Long  Militia 
Location: Tachilek 
Leader: Yi Lai (aka Yin Lang) 
Size: 50-100 
Origins: Ex-MTA 
Dates active: Mid-2000s-2011 
 
Yilai (sometimes pronounced Yin Lang) was a former member of the MTA. After 
Khun Sa‘s surrender Yilai initially joined the SSA-South. According to SHAN, Yilai 
separated from the SSA-S to establish his own militia around Tachilek in the 
early/mid-2000s, which became known as the Nahai Long militia.382 He generated 
significant income from taxing (and likely also trafficking) drugs crossing the border 
into Thailand and Laos and at some point in the mid-2000s started working alongside 
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Naw Kham. He owned properties in Tachilek and Mae Sai. He was arrested by 
Chinese authorities alongside Naw Kham and was also executed by lethal injection in 
March 2013.  
 
 
Militia Name: Mekong Border Security Militia 
Location: Tachilek 
Leader: Sai Awn 
Size: 300+ 
Origins: Militia formed since 1988 by the Tatmadaw 
Dates active: 2009 - ongoing 
 
This militia has been formed relatively recently under the control of the Tatmadaw. Its 
leader, Sai Awn, is the son of Ja Seo Bo, leader of the powerful Nanyon People‘s 
Militia based in the neighbouring Township of Mongphyak (see above). The militia 
comprises mostly Lahu men who were previously part of a number of smaller militias 
across Tachilek. The militia has been provided with weapons, uniforms and supplies as 
well as basic militia training by the Tatmadaw.383     
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Appendix 2: Drugs and business: Myanmar companies and their relationship with the drug trade384 
 
Company Chairman Main enterprises Involvement in the drug trade 
Asia World 
Company 
U Tun Myint 
Naing   
(Steven Law) 
Real estate, transport, 
construction (including 
contracts to build the new 
capital Naypyidaw, and 
Yangon‘s airport and 
largest seaport) 
infrastructure, industrial 
development 
Law is the son of notorious druglord, Lo Hsing Han, dubbed the ―godfather of heroin‖ by the 
US Treasury in 2010. In the late 1980s Lo played a significant role in the government‘s 
negotiations with the CPB splinter groups.  Asia World was founded in 1992 with drug 
revenues being the most likely source of much of the company‘s start-up capital.  Law is 
wanted by the US on drug trafficking charges and Asia World has also been investigated on 
suspicions of money laundering.   
Hong Pang 
Group 
Wei Hseuh-
Kang 
Construction, jade mines, 
logging, infrastructure 
electronics, commercial 
agriculture, textiles, 
gems, transport 
Wei is a leading figure in the United Wa State Army, formerly in charge of the UWSA‘s 
Southern Command and his 171 Military Region has been used alongside the Tatmadaw to 
fight the SSA-S. 
Wei is a notorious druglord and a close associate of the late Khun Sa.  He was indicted by a 
Brooklyn Grand Jury in January 2005 and is wanted by both the US and Thailand on drug 
trafficking charges.  In 2008 the US Treasury Department named 26 individuals and 17 
companies linked to Wei and the UWSA as ―Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers 
pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act).‖  The Treasury‘s 
Office of Foreign Assets Control described the UWSA as ―largest and most powerful drug 
trafficking organization in Southeast Asia‖. 
Yetagun 
Construction 
Company 
General Ye 
Myint 
Construction 
General Ye Myint was a member of the SPDC government, serving as the head of the 
government‘s Special Operations Bureau (1) and has been one of the government‘s leading 
negotiators with the UWSA and the Kokang over the past two decades.  In 2008 he was forced 
to resign from the government as a result of his son‘s arrest on drug trafficking charges, though 
reports stated that in 2009 he continued to serve as a government interlocutor with the Kokang 
MNDAA.  
Maung Weik 
and Family 
Maung Weik 
Myanmar‘s largest 
importer of steel and 
Maung Weik had close links with a number of senior government officials and is believed to 
have been closely involved in trafficking drugs from Myanmar to Malaysia. In November 
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Company gilding glue, largely for 
the building and 
renovation of pagodas 
2008 he was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment on drug trafficking charges following an 
investigation into the drug trafficking activities of the son of Lt. General Ye Myint (see above). 
Myanmar 
Mayflower 
Group  
U Kyaw Win 
Banking, Logging, 
fisheries, import/export 
U Kyaw Win, scion of a poor Chinese family from northern Shan State, has close connections 
with the government, especially with General Maung Aye, Deputy Chairman of the SPDC. 
Myanmar Mayflower Bank was shut down in 2005 after intense pressure on the Myanmar 
government from the US, which stated that the Bank was ―of primary money laundering 
concern.‖   
Olympic 
Construction 
Company 
Group 
(renamed Shwe 
Taung group in 
2004)  
U Eike Htun 
(aka Aik Tun) 
Real estate, construction, 
banking  
Established in 1990, Olympic is one of Myanmar‘s largest construction companies, focusing 
on real estate in Yangon. It built Yangon‘s first shopping centre.  Asia Wealth Bank was 
Myanmar‘s largest private bank prior to the Banking crisis in 2003. U Eike Htun forged close 
links with Former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt and the Olympic Construction Company has 
been involved in numerous joint ventures with the government‘s Housing Development 
Agency. By the end of 1996, Olympic had invested $700 million in property development 
projects.   
 
Little is known about the exact source of U Eike Htun‘s capital though it is believed that he 
has close links with the drug trade in his native Kokang region.  In 2003 The US Treasury 
imposed sanctions on Asia Wealth Bank and Myanmar Mayflower Bank, stating, that they 
posed ―an unacceptable risk of money laundering and other financial crimes, and are linked to 
narcotics traffickers. The specific information concerning these two banks justifies their 
exclusion entirely from the U.S. financial system.‖  The US Treasury explicitly cites Eike Htun 
as "having connections with the narcotics trade".   
Asia Wealth 
Bank  
Peace 
Myanmar 
Group 
(PMG Co. Ltd) 
Yang Mao-
Liang 
Spirits and liquors  
(Myanmar Rum and 
Myanmar Dry Gin) and 
bottle drinking water 
Paint factory 
Franchise for Mitsubishi 
Electric 
 
Yang Mao Liang is a leading figure in the MNDAA, one of the splinter groups of the CPB 
which signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in March 1989.  Founded in 1994, 
Peace Myanmar Group has previously entered into joint ventures with the Ministry of 
Commerce.  Throughout the 1990s the Yang family dominated drug production and trafficking 
in the Kokang region of Shan State, controlling many of the estimated 23 heroin refineries that 
emerged in the area following the 1989 ceasefire.  In 1994 Yang Mao-Xian (Yang Mao-
Liang‘s younger brother) was arrested and executed by Chinese authorities for drug 
trafficking. 
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Shwe Lin Star 
Company 
Lin Ming Xian 
(aka U Sai Lin) 
Road-building, tourism, 
construction, logging, 
mining 
Ling Ming Xian, a former CPB Commander, is the leader of the NDAA, a position he has held 
since 1988.  The NDAA formed following the collapse of the CPB and signed a ceasefire with 
the government in 1989.  Through the 1990s Lin forged close links with the government.  He 
is described as a ‗leader of national races‘ in the state press and hosted Congressman and 
House of Representatives‘ Speaker Dennis Hastert in 1993 and Congressman Charles Rangel 
in 1996, during their visits to Myanmar.  Throughout the early 1990s the NDAA, under Lin, 
monopolised drug production and refining in the area of eastern Shan State under his control.  
In 1997 Lin claimed to have made this area opium-free and he was taken off the US Specially 
Designated Narcotics Traffickers List (SDNTK) List in 2000.  Many still believe the NDAA 
derive significant income from heroin trafficking, although this is hard to verify. Lin‘s Green 
Light Company was commissioned to construct parts of the Asian Development Bank Greater 
Mekong Sub-region (GMS) Route highway ‗3B‘ (itself a useful drug money laundering 
channel for Lin). 
Green Light 
Company 
Yangon 
Airways  
Aik Hawk (aka 
Hsiao Haw) 
Airline; Hotels, Gems 
and Construction 
Aik is the son-in-law of UWSA President, Bao Youxiang.  He has close links with Wei Hsueh 
Kang (above) and is closely involved in the drug trade. Aik Hawk had personal links with 
former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt and is close to other senior generals.  The Company has 
won numerous large-scale construction contracts from the Yangon City Development Council.  
Aik has also provided capital for businesses owned by high-ranking generals, including 
General Myint Hlaing, the former commander of the Northeast Regional Command.  Aik was 
also a principal investor in Myanmar Mayflower Bank (see above).  In 2009 a number of his 
associates were arrested after heroin seizures in Yangon, and Aik himself came under 
increasing government pressure, apparently fleeing to UWSA-controlled territory.  In 2008, 
under the Kingpin act, the US placed sanctions on both Yangon Airways and Tetkham, 
designating both as entities of a ―significant narcotics trafficker‖ and added them to Specially 
Designated Narcotics Traffickers List (SDNTK) List.  
Tetkham 
Company 
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